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ABSTRACT 
 
This is a multidisciplinary research project that aims to explore the geopolitical dynamics, 
in parallel with recent developments in the Middle East, in the period 2003-2013 and 
beyond, to some extent. The most effective developments can be found in the shifting 
power relations, alongside regional and international rivalries, that led to instability, 
security threats and patterns of violence. With these dynamics in mind and power shifts 
post-2003, interactions between soft power (ideological proxies) vs military power played 
a crucial role in shaping the political and security landscape of the region. The thesis 
explores three sides of the security triangle. The first corresponds to Iran's foreign policy, 
as case study, which is one of the focal actors that used ideology as basis for action. The 
second is the presence of the US and its allies, particularly its regional allies. The third is 
the Middle East region as a reference point for examining power structures in light of 
rivalry relationships, which in turn interconnects some regional key players in the security 
paradigm.  
 
The objective of this thesis is to broaden the concept of security studies in the field of 
international relations. The thesis endeavours to incorporate non-state actor violence, 
sponsored by some nation-states, in this case Iran, as part of a regional strategic agenda. 
From this vantage point, defensive and offensive approaches will be discussed, in line with 
Iran's foreign policy, in order to demonstrate how Iran resists regional threats to ensure its 
survival, and reinforces its influence to maximise its power. 
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Map 1.1.  The Middle East Region 
 
1.  Syria 2.  Lebanon 3.  Jordan 4. Iraq 5.  Kuwait 6. Saudi Arabia 7.  Bahrain 
8. Qatar 9. UAE 10. Oman 11. Yemen 12. Egypt 13. Israel 14. Turkey 15. Iran 
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Diagram 1 
 
Triangulation: Mutual Perception among Iran, U.S. and the Arab World 
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Diagram 2
 
The Core of the Argument for the Thesis 
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-      ‗Y‘  (Dependent Variable) - Iran‘s foreign policy outcome. 
-      ‗Z‘  (Intervening Variables) - and of domestic factors, including regime identity, nationalism and  
decision makers.
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Chapter One 
 
Introduction and Overview 
 
1.1.    General Introduction  
 
The security dilemma in the Middle East was redefined by the remarkable deterioration in 
the region‘s security structure starting in 2003 (Salem, 2008). The political and security 
developments that followed created a political and security vacuum alongside a change in 
the balance of power in the region. As a consequence, international powers and regional 
players confront serious challenges and unprecedented threats at all levels (domestic, 
regional and international). In an anarchic environment of nation-states and violent non-
state actors, two opposing groupings have emerged: Iran with its regional allies, such as 
the Iraqi government, the Syrian regime and the Lebanese Hezbollah, and the U.S. with its 
regional and international allies. Confrontation between the two groupings is intense as 
both seek to achieve their geopolitical objectives, on the one hand, and to maintain their 
security, to reinforce their self-interests and to maximise their power, on the other (Juneau, 
2009).  
 
One of the most important developments in political dynamics in the post-2003 Middle 
East is the rise of Iran, to become a regional great power (Rubin, 2010; 
www.english.farsnews.com/Newstext.aspx?nn=13940213000238, 2015), not solely 
because its foreign policy involves religious ideology, or even because it allegedly has 
developed a nuclear programme, but also due to its geopolitical interests. The rise of Iran 
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has heightened regional insecurity and provoked further action from the others, particularly, 
Sunni-led states supported by U.S. administrations. See Diagram 1 on page vii. 
 
The U.S. and its regional and international allies view with suspicion the nature and scope 
of Iran‘s behaviour towards others, to attain its geopolitical interests and national/cultural 
survival (Negroponte, 2006). Hence, there emerges a phenomenon of action and reaction, 
which leads to the escalation of regional instability, by creating and perpetuating a case of 
direct and/or indirect confrontation between the parties. All parties are seeking to 
successfully reinforce their strategic interests through their foreign policies, which are 
based on diplomatic practices and often severe confrontations (Wright, 2010).  
 
This thesis provides an analysis of the Middle East security system by focusing on the 
impact of the transformative power of Iran's foreign policy on the security landscape 
between 2003- 2013. This thesis assesses the interactions between the major players: Iran, 
the U.S. Saudi Arabia and non-state actors. These interactions will be examined in light of 
dynamic relationships, to gain a better understanding of the variables, factors and drivers 
which affect states‘ behaviour in the pursuit of their regional ambitions and national 
security. It focuses on the geopolitical dynamics that have influenced the scope of the 
security dilemma, by examining Iran's behaviour, defensive and offensive. 
 
The transformative power of Iran's foreign policy, which has attempted to fill the political 
and security vacuum in order to counter the U.S influence after 2003, besides the 
distribution of soft power across the region within an anarchic environment, has 
contributed to regional threats and raised tensions in international relations (Juneau, 2009; 
www.tehrantimes.com/images/pdfs/12158.pdf, 2014; www.mubasher.aljazeera.net, 2015). 
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The Islamic Republic of Iran is seen by Israel and some officials and analysts (in the West 
and in the Arab world) as always attempting to maximise its power and expand its 
ideological influence, through its strategic alliance with proxies of non-state actors, such as 
Lebanese Hezbullah, for example, and Shiite factions abroad (Levitt, 2012; 
www.yemeress.com, 2014; www.kayhan.ir, 2015).  
 
1.2.   Background to the Study   
 
In recent years, the Middle East has witnessed a number of major developments, the most 
prominent of which was the war in Iraq in 2003 and the crises surrounding the so-called 
Arab Spring in late 2010, which led to the deterioration of security in the Arab world. 
These developments changed Iranian security calculations besides the balance of power in 
Iran's favour (www.tehrantimes.com/politics/117178-iran-wholeheartedly-supports-syria- 
iraq-lebanon-palestine-leaders-advisor, 2014). On the one hand, the removal of the 
traditional threats to Iran's national security (the ideological threat of the Taliban in 
Afghanistan and the military and Baathist threats of Saddam‘s regime in Iraq), along with 
the disintegration of the army in Iraq, together with an increase in national income due to 
higher oil prices, provided opportunities for the Iranian regime to benefit from all these 
developments (Hollis in Reissner et al, 2004; Alfoneh, 2011; www.sabq.org/Ydzgde, 
2015). However, the old threats to the Iranian national security have been replaced by 
Western forces, particularly the presence of American troops who created a geopolitical 
pincer against Iran, with Afghanistan on the eastern flank and in Iraq on the western flank. 
Saudi Arabia and its Sunni allies posed a further challenge (Russell et al, 2002; Juneau, 
2009). 
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This challenge can be viewed in the light of escalating competition for influence and 
dominance of the Middle East. This competition has shifted from diplomatic confrontation 
to material support to their allies of non-state actors in the region, by both parties. Their 
geopolitical interests differ; Iran supports Shiite factions and groups in Lebanon, Iraq, 
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Yemen; in contrast, Saudi Arabia and its allies of Arab 
countries felt the importance of countering the growth of Iran's influence by supporting 
Sunni clans in Iraq and Syria, for example. Consequently, their confrontation became 
sectarian (Sunni vs Shiite), which was perhaps inevitable. 
 
The new era of destabilisation has affected the security landscape and political reality in 
the Middle East, especially after new non-state actors entered the security equation, using 
their entire instruments of power, such as asymmetric warfare and unconventional 
capabilities. For instance, the so-called Islamic State (IS) has imposed itself upon the 
regional and international landscape in an unprecedented way. Furthermore, non-state 
actors such as Lebanese Hezbollah, Al-Mahdi Army in Iraq, Houthi Rebels in Yemen and 
Hamas in Gaza strip and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in West Bank have been working as 
proxies for Iran's foreign policy (www.english.farsnews.com/newstext. as p x? nn =13 930 
603000905, 2014; www.aawsat.com/home/article/332481, 2015; www.watanserb.com/ rep  
orts/6989, 2015). 
 
1.3.   Outline of Research Problem 
 
Iran‘s foreign policy is not easy to understand, especially the inner interactions and 
dynamic processes of decision-making in Tehran. There is a gap between its rhetoric and 
its actions; between its sense of grievance and its revolutionary behaviour; and between its 
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ideological and national interests (Takeyh, 2003, 2007). The picture is further complicated 
by inconsistencies in Iran‘s foreign policy strategy, which is based on a combination of 
power structures; firstly, executive authority (the state of Iran), which is represented by the 
president and minister of foreign affairs; secondly, religious authority (revolutionary Iran), 
represented by the supreme leader of the Islamic Revolution and backed strongly by the 
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (Al-Nefisy, 2014). The difficulty lies in a lack of 
clarity regarding the highest power of decision-making in Iran, responsible for directing 
foreign policy, that is, whether it is the president or the supreme leader. This issue will be 
discussed in detail in chapters two and three. 
 
1.4.   Research Questions 
 
The primary research is: 
 
To what extent have the geopolitical dynamics of the Middle East in the 
aftermath of the 2003 invasion of Iraq impacted Iran's foreign policy and, in 
turn, how did soft power affect the security dilemma? 
 
Addressing this question requires the exploration of a number of secondary research 
questions: 
 
1.   To what extent does ideology shape Iran‘s foreign policy? 
 
2.   Which events, perceived as security concerns, influence Iranian ideology,          
                 identity and foreign policy? 
    
6 
 
3.   What instruments of power does Iran‘s foreign policy use to increase its power,    
           to ensure its security requirements and meet its strategic interests? 
 
4.     To what extent does the perception of the Iranian security threat to and by   
                Middle Eastern states influence the security dilemma? 
 
This thesis is designed to capture the geopolitical dynamics of the Middle East, in order to 
understand the regional security dilemma, by exploring the relationship between the three 
essential variables. These are:  
 
- ‗X‘  (independent variable) - the distribution of soft power, including Iran‘s          
 use of ideological proxies.  
- ‗Y‘     (dependent variable) - Iran‘s foreign policy outcome. 
- ‗Z‘    (intervening variables) - and of domestic factors, including regime    
              identity, nationalism and decision makers. 
     
1.5.    Scope and Objectives of Research Project 
 
The impact of the transformative power of Iran's foreign policy in post-2003 Iraq and the 
subsequent occupation of that country by the U.S. in leading the Western coalition has 
shaped the dynamic situation of the regional security system. However, multi-disciplinary 
studies of the nature and scope of the interactions between regional and international major 
players interconnecting internal and external variables, and specifically the role of 
religious ideology (soft power) in states' behaviour (Iran-U.S.), are limited. This thesis 
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examines the causal links between geopolitical shifts and linkages with regional unstable 
dynamics in light of Iranian behaviour, especially during Ahmadinejad‘s presidency. 
 
At the core of this thesis is an examination of four case studies. These are: Iranian policy in 
Iraq in post-2003; Iranian support to Hezbollah; Iran's anti-Israel policy; and Iran's policy 
towards the Strategic Communities of Gulf States. The justification for selecting these case 
studies is that these four interconnected spheres are the key contextual issues that best 
illustrate the issues that have had a bearing on Iran's behaviour and its foreign policy.  
 
The objective of this thesis is to explore and analyse the geopolitical dynamics, perceptions 
and policies that have impacted the security dilemma in the Middle East, as seen from 
regional and international actors, between 2003 and 2013. In order to achieve this objective, 
the thesis addresses the regional security system by examining the variables, factors and 
drivers which affect both security dynamics, in general, and perceptions, in particular. This 
comprises internal, regional and international variables, which will be studied to explore 
how they contributed to the foreign policy and behaviour patterns of the concerned state, 
particularly, Iran. As this study highlights, the regional security is highly complex, 
involving a multiplicity of variables that have interacted at various levels to produce a 
situation of instability and insecurity. Those geopolitical dynamics, perceptions and 
diverse policies are amplified by the key players (Iran, U.S., Saudi Arabia, Hezbollah and 
the so-called Islamic State e.g.) with contradictions of regional interests, making the 
Middle East security dilemma difficult to overcome. 
 
This thesis develops a comprehensive conceptual research framework by assessing the 
contemporary geopolitical dynamics of the Middle East, based on relevant theories and 
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literature. It investigates the impact of the transformative power of Iran's foreign policy on 
the regional security system, by interpreting the dynamic process of the security dilemma.  
 
1.6.   Significance of the Thesis and its Contribution 
 
This thesis combines a new theoretical approach and empirical research. This combination 
has boosted knowledge in the field of security studies in a number of ways. Firstly, the 
originality of the thesis lies in that it broadens the focus of security studies beyond 
conventional debates of purely military focus, in order to better understand the Middle East 
security dilemma. This includes roles and activities of non-state actors and unconventional 
forces (asymmetric warfare), including ideological proxies and speech acts as instruments 
of power in foreign policy. On this basis, rules of engagement and scope of confrontation 
among diverse actors in light of power relationships, competition for leadership and 
distribution of power, have been changed. These changes are based on a wide range of 
tactical approaches of conflict, which includes militias and transnational radical 
movements. This thesis provides further insight into the nature, form and scope of the 
confrontation between Iran and its allies, on the one hand, and most regional countries with 
their Western allies, on the other. 
 
Secondly, this study establishes new avenues for research by connecting religious ideology 
drivers (e.g. Pan-Islamism and Revolutionary Shiism) and geopolitical forces, by assessing 
state behaviour and the perceptions towards the impact of the distribution of soft power on 
the regional security system. By interpreting and explaining these drivers, options become 
more noticeable, allowing the understanding of patterns and actions. This thesis also 
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provides scholars, analysts, observers and researchers with valuable insight into the origins 
and scope of regional security issues, at domestic, regional and international levels. 
 
In addition, this research project is timely and utilises a mix of approaches from both 
international relations and Middle East studies. Thus, the integration of the theoretical 
framework and empirical approaches assists in filling the gap in the literature, by 
understanding the geopolitical dynamics of the security dilemma in the Middle East and by 
providing reliable outcomes. The hypothesis underpinning the thesis at hand is, in essence, 
that although most of the available literature is very detailed in terms of the security 
dilemma, the role of Iran's foreign policy in the Middle East is not clear. To determine 
whether the role of Iran's foreign policy in the region is constructed on defensive approach 
or offensive action is very important in understanding drivers and motives in Iran's 
behaviour. In this context, most of the available literature either takes the form of a 
narrative that explains an incessant conflict with a chronological approach, or it uses an 
analytical method that adopts a normative approach to discuss what should happen. There 
is no clear theoretical underpinning of an empirical approach to ask what has happened, or 
why events occurred as they did (Bausell, 1986). Furthermore, the central pillar for this 
thesis is ideas and beliefs (the distribution of soft power), rather than material power 
(conventional military capabilities). See Diagram 2 on page viii. 
 
 1.7.   Literature Review 
 
Iran‘s foreign policy has been a source of argument among scholars since the 
establishment of the revolutionary regime in 1979. Iran‘s behaviour just like its revolution 
is still an enigma to many researchers. The current debate on how to respond to Iran's 
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behaviour is based on two perceptions. From one perspective, Iran's ascent is one of the 
examples of the tendency of rising powers to alter the regional balance of power in 
potentially dangerous ways, especially as its ambition is in growth and is guided by 
religious ideology backed by proxies. From another perspective, Iran's foreign policy 
behaviour has been shaped by several factors, such as economic sanctions and political 
isolation and the increasing threats to its national security. All these affect the ways Iran 
sees itself and is seen by others. 
 
Looking at variables, factors and drivers related to regional anarchy and threats, 
competition for leadership, changing power relations and power structure, and the 
distribution of power, we can determine the nature of the geopolitical dynamics and scope 
of possible outcomes of Iran‘s behaviour. Iran, like other nation states, holds the essential 
tools not only to proceed with its foreign policy to achieve its interests, but also to confront 
threats in the region, especially from the United States‘ presence (Byman, 2008). It has 
been argued that Iranian behaviour, with its foreign policy, plays a remarkable role in 
regional security and also in global issues (Takeyh, 2003; Cordesman, 2007; Al-Rashed, 
2015) 
 
As such, the main focus of this thesis is security, which will be explored in light of the 
geopolitical dynamics alongside Iran's behaviour, in order to understand the nature of 
international and regional interactions and its implications on the security dilemma. 
Security studies and foreign policies have been discussed by several scholars who have 
written about the behaviour of states in the regional and international politics. They can be 
grouped into two major schools of thought: First, classical realism, neorealism (defensive 
and offensive, particularly the security dilemma) and neoclassical realism; second, the 
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constructivist paradigm. In addition, the concept of speech acts will be discussed in this 
thesis. 
 
For realists, the international system is anarchic by nature, with no central authority to 
adjust states behaviours (Waltz, 1993). The international system, however, is perceived to 
be a venue that embraces potential conflicts and enmities among competing actors. 
Therefore, the state is a unitary actor in international politics, whose voice is that of its 
capital city and/or its head of state, irrespective of domestic policies, debates, and 
challenges to the legitimacy of the regime in power (Hollis & Smith, 1990). On this basis, 
realism theorists believe that all states behave similarly, because they should respond to the 
international system. The major arguments that support this view can be found in the 
works of Morgenthau, revised by Kenneth & Clinton (1948, 1993), Waltz (1979) and 
Collins (2007). This standpoint concentrates on maintaining security, for instance, (Waltz, 
defensive neorealist) and maximising power (Mearsheimer, offensive neorealist), which is 
a main foreign policy objective, focusing principally on external structural imperatives as 
the major determinant of such foreign policies (Waltz, 1993; Mearsheimer, 2001; Collins, 
2007). In terms of maximising defense, Kenneth Waltz argues that the anarchical structure 
of the international system drives states to maintain a moderate policy in order to achieve 
security (Jervis, 1978). In contrast, offensive realism, John Mearsheimer (1990, 2001) 
argues that the international system encourages an offensive strategy, because the anarchic 
environment leads to insecurity, and only by maximising power can the state be secured. In 
order to illustrate the main theme of structural realism, it is necessary to understand the 
geopolitical dynamics in light of the complexities of the security dilemma. The main 
signpost that helps structural realism to find its way on the ground through transition is the 
concept of interest defined in terms of power. Arguably, the concept is centred on 
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hegemony and presumes the presence of ongoing balance of power patterns that are 
inherent in the nature of the regional system. Iran and Saudi Arabia, for example, cannot 
enjoy friendly relations because they are competing decisively for geopolitical influence in 
a region that lacks any effective security measures. Consequently, both parties compete in 
line with a prisoner‘s dilemma paradigm that cannot be averted (Axelrod, 1984, 1997, 
2000; Grieco, 1988).  
 
Despite differences in approaches, however, the views of Waltz and Mearsheimer 
dominate the field of international relations. However, in the contemporary world arena, it 
is more problematic than ever that the state remains the main player. It seems that realists 
(realism and neorealism) were not particularly successful in explaining Iranian-Saudi 
competition and, more broadly, Shiite-Sunni rivalry, increasingly relevant in several 
regional crises with the participation of external countries, such as sectarian conflict in Iraq 
and the Syrian conflict. Moreover, realists have difficulty interpreting threats by 
transnational radical movements, including the distribution of soft power via ideological 
proxies. 
 
Constructivist scholars challenge realism when it comes to states‘ foreign policies. 
Constructivism emphasises ideology and identity as constructed by political elites as the 
main determinant of foreign policy (Hopf, 1998). Hence, domestic factors instead of 
international system are influencing and playing a major role in state behaviour. It is by 
domestic factors such as regime identity, nationalism, decision makers, religious ideology 
and constitution, for example, that foreign policies are constituted. Therefore, states most 
likely respond to their internal factors and behave accordingly. Arguably, the Iranian 
Revolution of 1979 came as a result of changes during the process of sociocultural 
    
13 
 
interaction. In this sense, changes in states‘ behaviour are common, despite similarities in 
their political systems. Constructivist approaches are adopted by Snyder (1991), Wendt 
(1992, 1998), Hagan, Neack, Laura, Hey, Jeanne, Haney, Patrick (1995), Hopf (1998), 
Yaqubi (2009), Juneau (2009), and Nia (2010, 2011), among other scholars. In terms of 
domestic influences, a lot has been written about Islamic political thought and the Shiite 
school as a revolutionary paradigm to gain power. After Ayatollah Khomeini came to 
power in 1979, he stressed the importance of exporting the Islamic Revolution throughout 
the world. Ayatollah Khomeini indicated that the power of the Islamic movement in Iran 
liberated the people of Iran from oppression and tyranny. Thus, political movements in line 
with religious ideologies have barely begun (Khomeini, 1970; Algar, 1981). Article 152-
154 of the Iranian constitution of 1979 and revised version on 1989 clarifies Ayatollah 
Khomeini's approach and his successors (www.parstimes.com, 1979; www.en.parliran.ir, 
1989). However, there still remains a gap regarding the link between the intensity of the 
ideological dispute among Shiites and Sunnis historically, the type and origin of issues in 
conflict, the nature of relations between the parties, their political dissimilarities, and the 
relative power of the disputants reflected in the geopolitical dynamics of the region. 
 
Neoclassical realism provides a new paradigm of state actions through three variables: 
systemic variables (the distribution of power), cognitive variables (threats and perception 
and misperception of systemic pressures) and domestic variables (identities, state 
institutions and decision makers). Neoclassical realism is a prominent approach in 
international relations. It focuses on the interaction between external and internal dynamics 
constructing state behaviour. Rose (1998), Taliaferro (2006), Lobell, Ripsman and 
Taliaferro (2007, 2009) and Juneau (2009) are some neoclassical realist scholars. Thomas 
Juneau (2009), in his paper ‗Power, Perceptions, Identity and Factional Politics: A 
    
14 
 
neoclassical realist analysis of Iranian foreign policy 2001-2007‘, discusses Iran‘s foreign 
policy assertiveness within a neoclassical realist framework. Juneau has integrated 
variables and factors successfully in a theoretically-informed manner, to analyse and 
explain the growing relative power of Iranian foreign policy in the timeframe. According 
to Juneau (2009: 1), ―much has been written on Iranian foreign policy between 2003 and 
2007, taking into consideration some of these variables, and even more has been written 
concerning prior eras‖.  
 
Although much has been written on Middle East security, little has been written to 
comprehensively explain the geopolitical dynamic in the Middle East in the aftermath of 
the 2003 invasion of Iraq, by integrating the impact of the transformative power of Iranian 
foreign policy and regional security implications. Indeed, this thesis focuses on Iran's 
foreign policy, geopolitical dynamics in the Middle East, power politics, competition for 
leadership, security issues, religious ideology and regional anarchy. It uses primary and 
secondary sources. 
 
To understand Iran's foreign policy, the thesis needs to include the concept of speech acts. 
Austin's speech act theory (1962) is the best-known in this field. Allwood (1977) and Oishi 
(2006) also explore this theory. In accordance with the concept of speech acts, the Iranian 
supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, for example, warned the international 
community on 04 June 2006 that Iran would disrupt energy supplies from the Gulf region, 
if Iran were attacked by the United States for its nuclear programme 
(www.theodoresworld.net/archives, 2006). It is clear that Iran perceives threats from many 
sides. Repeated U.S. interventions in the Middle East, notably the overthrow of the 
regimes in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003), have provided Iran with good reason to 
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feel insecure. Furthermore, there is mutual historical hostility between both sides (Iran and 
the U.S.) which shape their international relationships and also their behaviour towards 
each other, in line with the geopolitical dynamics of the region (www.english.farsnews.co 
m/newstext.aspx?nn=13940627000603, 2015). 
 
The core argument of this thesis relies on the concept of soft power as a key instrument of 
the transformative power of the Iran's foreign policy in the Middle East. Soft power can be 
viewed in the sense of the distribution of ideological proxies, not only to counter external 
threats, but also to maximise Iran's geopolitical influence in the region. This thesis 
addresses security issues that are associated mainly with the pattern of interactions in 
political relationships in line with the geopolitical dynamics after the 2003 invasion of Iraq. 
A combination of schools of thought, classical realism, constructivism, neoclassical 
realism, including the concept of speech acts, will provide a basic understanding of how to 
see the larger picture of the regional landscape by interpreting security events that 
influence foreign policies. 
 
Soft power and hard power in the literature has been divided into two aspects, 
effectiveness and usefulness in line with capabilities. Some scholars argue that soft power 
is effective and it sometimes reinforces and sometimes interferes with hard power, but in 
any case, soft power does not depend on hard power (Nye, 2004). Joseph Nye formulated 
the term 'soft power' in 1990, which he described as the ability to shape the preferences of 
others and getting others to want the outcomes you want. In other words, Nye broadened 
his concept as a behaviour influence outcome, especially in the post September 11 period 
(he did so in Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, 2004). Others feel that 
soft power would be more effective if more money was spent. Jan Melissen is one of them. 
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One of his famous works is The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International 
Relations (2005). Yet it could be argued that soft power revolves in the orbit of the conflict 
in terms of extending ideological influence. Consequently, interaction among states in line 
with the geopolitical dynamics is most likely to result in a security dilemma. 
 
Why does this happen? How does soft power change events on the ground? The answer to 
the first question is that soft power makes no noise, unlike hard power, when it is put into 
action. This is because soft power infiltrates smoothly to the targeted area. In reference to 
Iran's case, ideological linkage (Wilayat Al-Faqih theory, see section 2.6.3.) between 
Tehran and its proxies of non-state actors and Shiite factions which are spread around the 
region (e.g. in Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Kuwait) provides a 
supportive approach for Iran's foreign policy. 
 
Lily Hamourtziadou (2016) answers the second question by stressing the importance of 
wars of ideas, discourse wars and most importantly, wars of ideology to promote the 
geopolitical interests of states abroad without launching a military campaign (the air, land 
and maritime components). Hamourtziadou argues that the effects of soft power are often 
felt for much longer than those of hard wars, being passed on from one generation to the 
next, and can be revived at any time.  
 
The literature shows that some scholars find that Iran's foreign policy has adopted different 
approaches in dealing with its neighbours and foreign powers, especially the U.S., as a 
result of some domestic factors, such as regime identity and religious elites who control the 
power (e.g. Kinzer, 2006; Jawada, 2007; Takeyh, 2007; Al-Nefisy & Abdullah, 2008; 
Rakel, 2008). These studies assume that during Ayatollah Khomeini‘s rule (1979-1989) 
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and president Ahmadinejad‘s (2005-2013), Iranian foreign policy was controlled by hard 
liners, close to the radical groups (e.g. Al-Ghareib, 2005; Bergman, 2008; Takeyh, 2009, 
2010). Despite the pragmatism of president Rafsanjani (1989-1997), and a moderate leader, 
president Khatami (1997-2005), the Iranian regime was unable to end its international and 
regional isolation. On the other hand, several studies claim that the international system 
has driven some Iranian foreign decisions since the Islamic revolution of 1979, which 
means that the changes in Iran‘s policies have come in response to international factors 
(e.g., Robert Jervis, 1988, 2005; Ehteshami, 1998, 2003; Graham Fuller, 2003, 2006; 
Bulent Gokay, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2012; Jan Melissen, 2005; Anthony Cordesman and 
Martin Kleiber, 2007; Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Mahjoob Zweiri, 2008, 2010; Sir 
Lawrence Freedman, 2008). 
 
Other scholars have discussed international security studies and the phenomenon of 
conflict in the Middle East by focusing on various dimensions, including Gulf security and 
political violence (e.g. Thomas Schelling, 1958, 1980; Roger Myerson, 1997; Buzan & 
Wæver, 2003; Kayhan Barzegar, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010; Ken Booth & Nicholas Wheeler, 
2008; Mohammad Mousavi & Yasser Norouzi, 2010; Jelle Puelings, 2010; Bruno, 2011; 
Adel El-Gogary, 2013). However, it is still a challenge to capture all variables to connect 
Iran's behaviour with drivers of soft power (ideologies, pan-Islamism and revolutionary 
Shiism) that impact upon the geopolitical dynamics, which in turn lead to the security 
dilemma in the Middle East. This thesis interprets Middle East security issues, particularly 
Iran's behaviour, in the context of the complex regional security system.  
 
Scholars like Kayhan Barzegar (2009, 2010) believe that Iran's foreign policy is driven by 
pragmatism in line with the complexities of national security stances. Others like Abdullah 
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Al-Nefisy (2008, 2013) argue that policy is driven by religious imperatives, or by both 
ideology and pragmatism, as, for instance, Mahjoob Zweiri (2007).  
 
In order to understand the transformative power of Iran's foreign policy alongside its 
strategic interests and the reflections on security affairs in the Middle East, including the 
threat of transnational radical movements, one must become familiar with works by Pinar 
Bilgin (2005), Regional Security in the Middle East: A critical perspective; Mahjoob 
Zweiri (2007), Iranian Foreign Policy: Between Ideology and Pragmatism; Michael 
Connell, Alireza Nader and Jacob Boyars (2007), Iran‘s Strategic Interests in the Middle 
East: A Project Iran Workshop; Paul Williams (2008), Security Studies: An Introduction; 
and Anthony Cordesman, Arleigh Burke and Adam Seitz (2009), Iran and the Challenges 
to Middle East Security. All contributed significantly to the conception and analysis of 
chapters four and six. 
 
Barry Buzan (1991: 19) in People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security 
Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, developed the concept of security and described it as 
"the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their 
functional integrity". Buzan (1991) argues that, since the state is basically an idea, the 
essential security task of the state is to reinforce this idea. In line with the theoretical 
approaches of constructivism and neo-classical realism, a number of studies have 
expanded the discussion and debate on the concept of security studies, to move beyond the 
traditional focus on military power. This has, in turn, altered the meaning and content of 
national security perceptions.  
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Rosemary Hollis discusses the nature of interactions between the U.S. and Iran, besides the 
phenomenon of terrorism, the Middle East peace process and the Iraq crisis. Hollis 
explores the Iraq crisis on domestic, regional and international levels by focusing on 
interactions between leaderships, security issues, arms control, cultural aspects and the 
concept of neo-imperialism. Her work includes What Price Renewed Conflict in the 
Middle East (1992); Gulf Security: No Consensus (1993); Getting out of the Iraq trap 
(2003); The U.S. Role: Helpful or Harmful (2004); Iran and the United States: Terrorism, 
peace in the Middle East and Iraq (2004). Hollis writes about Gulf security as being 
connected with a variety of factors, which prevent all efforts to establish a collective 
security arrangement. Instead, Western intervention plays a prominent role in maintaining 
the balance of power in the Gulf region. 
 
Bulent Gokay has also published a wide range of books and articles on U.S. foreign policy 
and hegemony, particularly in the Middle East and Central Asia. Among his contributions 
are: 11 September 2001: War, Terror and Judgement, in collaboration with Walker (2002); 
Ghost Dance: The U.S. and Illusions of Power in the 21st Century, in collaboration with 
Whitman (2004); and the Fall of the US Empire: Global Fault-Lines and the Shifting 
Imperial Order, in collaboration with Fouskas (2012). Gokay (2012) has a new angle on 
the conflict, which is based on American hegemony over the global system and its 
perspective on the Iranian risk to regional and world security as a pretext to justify taking 
military action against Iran, on the one hand, and to assist interest groups in American 
politics due to a relative economic downturn, on the other. 
 
Kinzer‘s work (2006) has contributed to the understanding of the integration of religion 
and state in the Islamic Republic of Iran. This was essential in helping me to assess the 
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approaches of those conservatives who seemed to have a hostile attitude towards the West, 
but also to ideas of progress and modernity. This has led me to focus on speech acts 
between Iran and its allies of non-state actors, on the one hand, and Western countries, 
especially the U.S., on the other, in order to understand part of the struggle for power, 
hostilities, and mutual threats between two different cultures and nations, in a volatile area. 
However, in Kinzer literature, there was no discussion of the implications and impact of 
Iran's behaviour on the geopolitical dynamics of the Middle East. 
 
Paul Rogers has written many books and articles on Iranian affairs and Middle East 
politics and security. Some of his distinguished works are: Iran: Consequences of a War 
(2006); A War Too Far: Iran, Iraq, and the New American Century (2006); Why We‘re 
Losing the War on Terror (2007); Global Security after the War on Terror (2009); and 
Losing Control: Global Security in the 21st Century (2010). Rogers has addressed the 
major global challenges with a focus on security issues and the real cause of global 
insecurity. The war on terror and the threat of transnational radical movements are central 
to this thesis. 
 
Ray Takeyh in his book Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic (2007, 
2010) provides a comprehensive analysis of Iranian behaviour. Takeyh writes of the power 
structures of the political system, Islamist movements and Middle Eastern politics. Takeyh 
(2007) provides great insight and analysis of internal political interactions and explains 
why Iran has so often confounded American expectations and inspired a long series of 
misguided U.S. policies that continue to this day. Takeyh illustrates how the game of 
political chess is played in Iran. He gives the Iranian view of the world, which transcends 
political affiliation, and the prominent role the country seeks to play in the Gulf region, in 
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the wider Muslim world, and in relation to its neighbours in Central Asia and the Indian 
subcontinent (Takeyh, 2007). He asserts that Americans have grossly misunderstood the 
complex realities of Iranian political life. 
 
Madeleine Albright (2007), in her book The Mighty and the Almighty, in association with 
Bill Clinton, discussed the role of religion in shaping George W. Bush's thinking and the 
impact on American foreign policy. The book provides insight into the American approach 
to Islamist extremists. As a result, Iran considers its national security under threat from the 
U.S. and Israel. As the U.S. is deemed a source of instability in the Middle East, Iran 
attempts to play the role of protector of the regional security and value system against the 
foreign players (Mansharof & Savyon, 2010). In this sense, the mechanism of the security 
dilemma in the Middle East continues in this framework of uncertainty between Iran and 
its allies, on the one hand, and the U.S. and its allies, on the other, as long as each party 
assumes the role of protector and defender of higher values of righteousness and freedom, 
while rgarding the other party as wicked and roguish (Kemp, 2005; Bahgat, 2007). 
 
This thesis has built on works by Arabic scholars such as Abdullah Al-Nafisi and Abdullah 
Adel (2008), by developing their core argument concerning the development of Shiite 
doctrine throughout history. In their book Drives of Persian Policy in the Arabian Gulf 
Region, Al-Nafisi et al argue that throughout modern history, at the external level, Iran's 
foreign policy has adopted a regional proactive approach. The Iranian regime has 
attempted to pursue its foreign agenda based mainly on the Shiite paradigm of struggle for 
social justice, in line with principles of Islamic revolution (for more details see chapter 2). 
In addition, Al-Nafisi et al argue that Iran's foreign policy reinforces its regional influence 
and survivability through its faith to reach the Arab street and Shiite minorities. Abdullah 
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Al-Ghareib (2005), however, argues that Shiism began as a political movement rather than 
a truly religious ideology.  
 
This thesis uses sources on Iran's nuclear activities, as they are an essential part of regional 
dynamics and deterrence (discussed in chapters five and six). The major and most concise 
analysis and model for current trends are The Nuclear Option in the Middle East (2001) by 
Muhammad Mansour; Iran's Ballistic Missile Capabilities: A Net Assessment (2010) by 
John Chipman. Moreover, Sir Lawrence Freedman has written on the cold war era and 
nuclear strategy, such as The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (2004) and Deterrence (2004). 
Despite the many books and articles on deterrence, in this important and groundbreaking 
book Freedman has developed a distinctive approach to the evaluation of deterrence, as 
both a state of mind and a strategic option. The contemporary concept of deterrence has 
been developed by Freedman, who discusses whether and how it still has relevance in 
today's world, in the context of constructivist and realist approaches. For realists, Iran‘s 
nuclear activities are an attempt to support its national security interests as a form of 
strategic deterrent. The constructivist perspective stresses a broader concept for Iranian 
nuclear capabilities which exports the revolution and captures Arab audiences. 
 
One must bear in mind that international relations theory is a huge field and there are many 
different ways to analyse issues and explain variables under studies. This thesis builds on 
the current literature of security studies by looking at variables related to the instability 
alongside Iran‘s behaviour and integrates both contextual and process factors into the 
analysis. Through a review of previous literature, it is suggested that it is not sufficient to 
deal with material power as the only factor in explaining the mechanism of the security 
dilemma. We also need to include soft power instruments in Iranian foreign affairs, via 
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non-state actors and asymmetric warfare, within the framework of religious ideology to 
reinforce its national security, by maximising its power in the region and beyond. The 
above discussions provided a framework which can be used as a basis to explore the theme 
of this thesis, to fill the gap in the literature. 
 
1.8.  Theoretical Framework 
 
The theoretical framework introduces and describes the theories that explain issues 
relevant to the research question by investigating the impact of the transformative power of 
Iran's foreign policy on regional security system to explore the dynamic process of the 
security dilemma. This can be seen by interpreting the distribution of soft power, including 
Iran's use of ideological proxies. This thesis with the use of theories is simply contributed 
to fill the gap in research by interpreting different drivers and motives of Iran‘s actions 
through its foreign policy. The core drivers and motives are based upon geopolitical 
interests and Shiite Islamic doctrine in line with ideologically strategic link between 
Tehran and its aligned groups around the region. The theoretical framework is divided into 
five sections, which will cover the theoretical approaches namely: firstly, the concept of 
the security dilemma, secondly, neo-classical realism, thirdly, constructivism, fourthly, 
neorealism, especially offensive realism, and lastly, the concept of speech acts.  
 
The study of international relations relies on a wide range of theoretical approaches 
(Savigny et al, 2011). Each approach rests on certain assumptions and epistemologies, 
where it is constrained within certain specified conditions, and seeks to obtain its own 
analytic goal. There are diverse schools of thought and none are right or wrong; indeed, 
each has its own approach that can be used to explore multi-causal phenomena and analyse 
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variables, to explain assumptions under study. Arguably, state behaviour cannot be 
explained without looking at both international system and domestic factors, on the one 
hand, and ideational influence and material power on the other.  
 
The objective of this section is to develop a theoretical framework for the empirical 
analysis of Iran‘s actions through its foreign policy, to delineate the security dilemma from 
its traditional realist confines (chapters seven and eight for more details). Traditionally, 
foreign policy analysis is often done within the realist paradigm, by depending on military 
power as a central variable, while the thesis at hand seeks to cover also ideational influence 
on state behaviour (Berridge, 1992). On this basis, I will limit my hypotheses to three 
intervening variables (regime identity, nationalism and decision-makers) next to three 
other substantial drivers of soft power (ideologies, pan-Islamism and revolutionary shiism), 
to explain Iran's foreign policy. In the case of intervening variables, this thesis will attempt 
to explore patterns of procedural complexities and interactions between the rings of power 
of Iranian structure in domestic politics impacting on behaviour and action. Equally, the 
importance of substantial drivers of soft power play crucial roles in guiding Iran‘s 
objectives and interests abroad. These variables and drivers have been used not only to 
counter external threats, but also to broaden Iranian growth ambitions and garner support 
from minority communities of Arab and Islamic streets who are looking for a champion 
(www.ar.farsnews.com/iran/news/13940918001252, 2015).  
 
According to neorealism, foreign policy may be understood as a product of rational choice. 
Hence, states usually act rationally through a process of self-help in the competition for 
material gains. This takes the form of armament policies, intervention and mutual rivalry 
(Waltz, 1979).  
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In contrast, constructivism rejects the basic assumption of neorealism about the effect of 
anarchy on the behaviour of states. Alexander Wendt (1992) argues that anarchy is the 
consequence of an ongoing dynamic process in line with the rules, norms, values, beliefs, 
ideas and identities that govern the interaction of states. According to social constructivists, 
identities and interests are central determinants of foreign policy which rely on ideational 
factors to interpret the international structure and foreign policy, rather than the material 
capabilities. 
 
In the case of the distribution of soft power, including Iran's use of ideological proxies, this 
thesis stresses the importance of values as a major factor in Iran's foreign policy. Since the 
1979 Islamic revolution, a new set of revolutionary values has dominated Iran's foreign 
policy. This can be seen in the overthrow of the Shah's regime, the Iran–Iraq War, in 
addition to exacerbating conflicts in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen and Bahrain 
(www.english.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13940717000218, 2015; www.aljomhoor.  
net/content/9444, 2015). 
 
1.8.1. The Security Dilemma 
 
The question of whether or not Iran has affected, or has been affected by, the major 
security events and phenomena (acceleration of geopolitical dynamics within unstable 
security environment), or by religious ideology, cultures, values and identities that have 
taken place in the Middle East in 2003-2013, is examined within the framework of the 
security dilemma. The term security dilemma is often used by realists, who argue that its 
fundamental cause is uncertainty. The security dilemma can lead to war and destabilisation, 
but is not the cause of all wars. The security dilemma plays a focal role in theories that 
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interpret international rivalry as a result of interaction between states. The main challenge 
confronting neorealism (structural realism) is to demonstrate how rational states that are 
focused only on security can nevertheless end up in intense rivalry or may even go to war.  
 
Robert Jervis, a defensive realist, contributed to the development of the concept of the 
security dilemma in his article "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma". Jervis 
explained a security dilemma as the result of the interaction between two states, where the 
gain of one is the loss of the other, which leads to uncertainty between the two states 
(Jervis, 1978). Kenneth Waltz (1979) argues that the international system provides 
incentives for expansion due to the anarchic environment (the absence of a universal 
government), which creates a situation where any security action plan decreases the 
security of other states. Arguing for offensive realism, John Mearsheimer (2001) claims 
that anarchy provides strong incentives for expansion, because only the powerful states can 
guarantee their survival. On the other hand, states attempt to maximise their power in order 
to expand influence and hegemony over others, which may harm or conquer them. The 
case study (Iran's foreign policy) will be discussed using the defensive and the offensive 
approaches, to identify the forces driving Iran's behaviour (in chapters 3 and 5). 
 
Booth et al (2008: 9) argue that ―a security paradox is a situation in which two or more 
actors, seeking only to improve their own security, provoke through their words or actions 
an increase in mutual tension, resulting in less security all round‖. In other words, the 
security dilemma is a brilliant concept to describe a situation where the actions of one state, 
in attempting to increase its security, cause a reaction in another, which in the end 
decreases the security of both states (Collins, 2004). Thus, the security dilemma or spiral 
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model used in international relations refers to a situation in which uncertainty, change in 
power status and mistrust can create conflict, even when neither side desires it.  
 
In defining the security dilemma, however, Booth et al (2008) move away from the 
mainstream definition found in the academic literature that focuses on the process of 
paradoxical security competition between defensive states. Booth et al (2008: 7) argue that 
―Security dilemma sensibility is an actor‘s intention and capacity to perceive the motives 
behind, and to show responsiveness towards, the potential complexity of the military 
intentions of others. In particular, it refers to the ability to understand the role that fear 
might play in their attitudes and behaviour, including, crucially, the role that one‘s own 
actions may play in provoking that fear‖. Booth et al (2008: 2) further argue that 
―according to most security dilemma theorists, permanent insecurity between nations and 
states is the inescapable lot of the living in a condition of anarchy‖. Hence, in order to 
understand the dynamic process of the security dilemma, it is better to discuss material and 
ideational factors to clarify all the semantic, political, historical and epistemological 
difficulties. 
 
On the other hand, the patterns of regional unstable dynamics in a certain region, such as 
the Middle East, can be a basic and ongoing process within the framework of the security 
dilemma, which consists of contradictions. These contradictions are not only based on 
material power, but also consist of ideational views of beliefs and values (Alfoneh, 2011). 
The Islamic Republic of Iran possesses a unique combination of religious/ideological 
beliefs, along with unconventional power and asymmetric warfare directed through its 
proxies of non-state actors and Shiite factions (Cordesman, 2007). These religious beliefs 
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and ideological values are derived from spiritual unquestioned concepts according to 
Islamic Revolution norms (Al-Nefisy et al, 2008).  
 
A security paradox in the Middle East is a situation in which some actors (state and non-
state) seek not only to improve their own security, by enhancing their material power 
(conventional and non-conventional), or by entering into a strategic alliance, but also to 
provide a prominent power status in the region, by using an ideational doctrine (Al-Nefisy 
et al, 2008). A root cause of the security problems in the Middle East lies in the condition 
of uncertainty about the intentions of other states (Iran in 2003, for example), a ‗dilemma 
of interpretation‘ as a result of anarchy in international politics (Booth et al, 2008: 4). 
Anarchy creates difficulties in communication between states, because it is difficult for the 
decision-makers in one state to understand or predict the intentions of those in the other. 
Uncertainty and the anarchic structure of the international system have led to a dilemma of 
response among states and non-state actors in the Middle East. The so-called the Islamic 
state, for instance, has broadened its scope from terrorist activities, assassinations and 
bombings, to efforts to build states, in Mosul and Ramadi in Iraq, Al Raqqah governorate 
in Syria, Hadhramaut governorate in Yemen, and Sirte in Libya. 
 
Game theory and the prisoner‘s dilemma are useful to this research. Rubinstein (2013) 
pointed out that the essence of game theory is not the empirical approach, because it 
focuses on how people will react and behave in the vastly complicated situation of real life, 
rather than on how people actually behave in strategic situations. This thesis analyses the 
best strategic decisions that have been taken by major players in terms of costs and gains, 
where a state's success in making rational choices depends on the choices of others. 
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Game theory is a model for sophisticated mathematical analysis to find the best way to 
make decisions that lead to the desired result, in conflicts of interest (Gelman, 2008). As 
such, game theory provides powerful insight into the nature of conflict and cooperation 
among players in the scope of competition and interaction, shaped by interests, values and 
beliefs, by taking into account all rational choices and possible outcomes (Myerson, 1997). 
Furthermore, game theory offers a realistic paradigm for political differences.  
 
Robert Axelrod's works are relevant to the central argument of this thesis. The prisoner‘s 
dilemma game has become an important paradigm for researchers to analyse a wide variety 
of strategic situations (Axelrod, 1997). The main argument of Robert Axelrod is based on a 
central research question in his book, The Evolution of Cooperation (1984), which is: 
under what conditions will cooperation emerge in a world of egoists without central 
authority? Axelrod discusses the role of factors and variables such as the number of 
players, the scope of possible choices, variation in the payoff structure, noise, and the 
population structure that led to a deeper understanding of the evolution of cooperation 
(Axelrod et al, 1988). Axelrod provides a model of analysis that shows how cooperative 
behaviour could construct and thrive in a hostile environment (Axelrod, 1984). It is a 
collection of concepts and paradigms about rational human behaviour in strategic 
situations, where how a rational player acts affects the way other players will behave. This 
paradigm could apply to warfare or other conflict issues, such as the regional conflict of 
the Middle East, in particular Iran and its allies, and the U.S. with regional Arab allies. 
 
To understand Axelrod's impact on game theory, we must first review some fundamental 
ideas of game theory. The prisoner's dilemma paradigm is the core of game theory and is 
related to the problem of collaboration and uncertainty among players towards each other 
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while taking decisions (Axelrod et al, 1985). Tit-for-tat is a well-known strategy in game 
theory in the context of the prisoner's dilemma (Axelrod, 2000). In this context, each 
participant in the prisoner's dilemma will follow both policies of cooperation and 
retaliation, depending on provocation by any player towards another (Axelrod et al, 1988). 
Tit-for-tat is based on reciprocity and allows more room for the development of 
cooperation. Despite that, in some situations individuals and states do not cooperate, even 
if it appears that it is in their best interest to do so (Axelrod, 1997). The Iran nuclear crisis 
is an example of this, as the Iranian regime was penalised with a series of sanctions, yet 
Iran insisted on continuing its nuclear programme and enrichment-related activities 
(Albright et al, 2006, 2012). 
 
In such a situation, each player's decision has short-term and long-term repercussions, risks, 
costs and gains for both players, as well as third parties. Axelrod et al (1985) argue that the 
strategy of game theory is based on reciprocity and can yield relatively high payoffs to a 
party against the other. Such a strategy assists the majority of states by punishing players 
who carry out uncooperative strategies and act irrationally. Iran, for example, may in the 
long run reach its goal of acquiring its own nuclear industries, while in the short run the 
scenario to end the Iranian nuclear project through political or even military means is still 
possible and under discussion (Mousavi et al, 2010). 
 
Tit-for-tat starts by collaborating and then diverts to retaliation by the other player, in case 
any defection leads to excessive retaliation within the principle of aggressive reciprocity, 
that perhaps encourages other players to exploit the situation (Axelrod et al, 1985). Over a 
wide range of historical regional cases, Iran's strategic challenges related to its nuclear 
programme have driven the UN to impose further sanctions and encouraged other players, 
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such as the U.S. and Israel, to exploit the situation and move forward with their own self-
interest, to the point of nearly reaching the edge of war (Katzman, 2004). 
 
In zero-sum game, conflict and competitiveness among players often result in a zero sum. 
Any gain for any party is a loss for the other party, therefore, conflicting interests between 
parties are irreconcilable, and all opportunities to cooperate would vanish (Axelrod, 2000). 
Shoamanesh (2012) argues that in a cooperative security paradigm, in lieu of seeing each 
other as threats, countries would often view the existing regional security dilemma as the 
core issue which needs to be seriously tackled, in order to minimise the cycle of violence 
and conflict. Schelling (1958, 1980) pointed out that a non–zero sum game is useful when 
applied to wars and threats, unrest, negotiations, civil wars and blackmail. 
 
Game theory has met with some criticism. Firstly, there is no scale to measure rational 
behaviour in political-security phenomena and international relations, as in economic 
interactions (the largest amount of benefit at the lowest possible cost). Secondly, it seems 
that the Middle East suffers from continuous fluctuations and overlapping of several 
variables, such as ideological trends, communications systems, the rules and objectives of 
the game, the general environment, payoff, mainstream values and the growing roles of the 
masses in international politics, that affect the decision-making process. Thirdly, in 
contemporary warfare, whether conventional or unconventional, the scope of operations 
often extends beyond territories of participants, including the victors, where regional 
security and international economy will be affected as well. Fourthly, proponents of game 
theory do not provide a standard of ethical behaviour. In addition, this theory does not 
provide an empirical framework for human behaviour in real life. Despite this, game 
theory remains a useful analytical tool in the field of international politics and also 
    
32 
 
contributes to aspects of decision-making in cases of cooperation and conflict, or the 
adoption of a systematic strategy to resolve political conflicts and security problems. Game 
theory attempts to provide alternative options for decision-makers, but it does not have 
immediate solutions for some complex cases.  
 
Above all, the security dilemma is a comprehensive framework for exploring and 
understanding the anarchical state in the shadow of uncertainty, mistrust, misunderstanding, 
threat, risk, danger, fear, mutual insecurity, cooperation in international relations that has 
taken place over half a century. After the end of the Cold War, security has expanded from 
a military understanding to political, economic, social, cultural. As a result, international 
security studies have reflected the security dilemma in a number of fields: military, 
political, economic, social, cultural and psychological. 
 
1.8.2. Neoclassical Realism 
 
Neoclassical realism emphasises the causal primacy of variables of international/regional 
structure, essentially the relative distribution of power, domestic policies and foreign 
policy outcomes (Taliaferro, 2006). In other words, neoclassical realism has advantages in 
terms of multi-level analysis of the link between systemic factors and internal factors, in 
order to reach an explanation for state behaviour and its foreign policy outcome (Lobell et 
al, Vol 11, 2009). Thus, domestic, foreign and security policies are interconnected. This 
thesis connects systemic pressures, on the one hand, and domestic and foreign policies, on 
the other, in order to determine factors behind Iran's behaviour and to identify the nature of 
interactions between variables which increase its relative power, by providing an inclusive 
framework to measure all variables and drivers related to outcomes (Juneau, 2009). It 
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could be argued that neoclassical realism can explain the origins of conflict, tension and 
crisis in the absence of war (material power). 
 
Neoclassical realism has its roots in classical realists such as Hans Morgenthau, Henry 
Kissinger, and Arnold Wolfers, who understand foreign policy and statecraft within the 
anarchic and uncertain environment that exists in the absence of a universal government. 
As a result, international conflicts occur (Lobell, et al, Press, 322, 2009: 1-4). Neoclassical 
realism ―carries with it a distinct methodological preference for theoretically informed 
narratives, ideally supplemented by explicit counterfactual analysis, that trace the ways 
different factors combine to yield particular foreign policies" (Rose, 1998: 153). In 
addition, Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro (2009: 1-6) argue that supporters of neoclassical 
realism based their arguments on the theoretical insights of the neorealism (structural 
realism) of Kenneth Waltz, Robert Gilpin, and others. However, Gideon Rose, a 
neoclassical realist, emphasises that the influence of international/regional structure is not 
always clear, because decisions are made by individual state leaders according to the 
uncertainty of their relative position of power. 
 
It has been argued that although neoclassical realists embrace the assumption that internal 
politics are a major factor in understanding state behaviour and foreign policy outcome, 
they do not provide the analytical inclusive framework for dealing with the actual process 
of implementing its policies. Thus, neoclassical realists need to take methodological issues 
into consideration in qualitative studies (Lobell, et al 2009: 800, 803). Therefore, this 
thesis covers the two major approaches in international relations theory, which consist of 
geopolitical interests (pragmatism) and ideational issues, within the framework of state 
identity, interests, ideologies and beliefs, in order to explain Iran's foreign policy, which is 
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based on countering foreign threats alongside expanding its geopolitical influence, and the 
consequences on the regional security system. 
 
1.8.3. Constructivism 
 
Constructivism is an empirical approach to the study of international relations which could 
be used to understand the socio-political construction of reality. It concentrates on 
intersubjective beliefs, identities, thoughts and discourses of understanding and meaning. 
These intersubjective beliefs interact among people on the level of individuals, states, non-
state actors and nations, and the structures of their external environment (Jackson et al, 
2007). Thus, "structures do constrain actors, but actors can also transform structures by 
thinking about them and acting on them in new ways" (Jackson et al, 2007: 163). The key 
debate between neorealism and constructivism is: ―do changes in ideas always come 
before changes in material conditions? Do ideas guide policy or are they justifications for 
policy‖? (Jackson et al, 2007: 175).  
  
Alexander Wendt is perhaps the most distinguished constructivist of the ―middle ground‖ 
in international relations theory (in Griffiths et al 2009: 124). Wendt (in Jackson et al, 
2007: 168) argues that, within processes of interaction, identities and interests of states are 
created, and ―structure has no existence or causal powers apart from process‖. On the 
contrary, in the view of neorealists, identities and interests are given, because states 
already know who they are and what they need in advance, before they initiate interaction 
with other states. However, neorealists and constructivists both agree that states need to 
maintain their security and survivability. The question is how far are they required to go to 
ensure it? Wendt emphasises the identities and interests as they are shaped in the 
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interaction between states; he disregards the role of domestic factors. He shares the same 
point of view regarding the concept of anarchy with Waltz, regarding interaction between 
states in an anarchic system (Jackson et al, 2007). However, Wendt argues that, ―anarchy 
is what states make of it‖ (in Jackson et al, 2007: 162). Wendt rejected the views of 
neorealists that "anarchy must necessarily lead to self-help", and that war, enmity, and 
arms races are inevitable outcomes (Jackson et al, 2007: 168). Wendt (in Jackson et al, 
2007: 169) argues that, ―material power and state interests are fundamentally formed by 
ideas and social interaction‖. 
 
Martha Finnemore focuses on the norms of international society that impact on states‘ 
identities, interests and interaction. She argues that state behaviour is shaped by identity 
and interests that are influenced by international norms and forces (Jackson et al, 2007). 
Finnemore and Wendt emphasise how vital the international environment is in forming 
state identities. There are some constructivists who concentrate more on the internal 
environment (regime identity, ideologies and decision-makers). Peter Katzenstein stresses 
the role of culture, identity and domestic norms in the realm of national security structure, 
and how these norms construct state interests and guide external policies (Jackson et al, 
2007). In other words, Katzenstein (in Jackson et al, 2007: 176) argues that ―the internal 
make-up of states affects their international behavior‖.  
 
Iran is a revolutionary state. It was founded by a Shiite movement (soft power), not 
material power. Since the 1979 Islamic revolution, Iran's foreign policy has adopted a new 
set of revolutionary values. Revolutionary Shiism, for instance, is one of the most 
prominent approaches in Iran' foreign policy, especially towards Sunni Arab states. Iran‘s 
behaviour was constructed on the doctrine of Islamic supra-nationalism, which places its 
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emphasis on the unity of the international Muslim community. Arguably, such a doctrine is 
incompatible with the principle of world order and international relations. Yet it could be 
argued that, "the current foreign policy dialogue is focusing on what is commonly referred 
to as 'soft power.' The concept has an important role to play in an integrated national 
security strategy‖ (www.asymmetricthreat.net, 2009). The U.S., for example, used a rich 
portfolio of soft power tools and established organisations to promote democratic values 
and ideals, during the Cold War era. Examples included cultural tours of foreign capitals, 
Voice of America, and the Peace Corps. In the light of asymmetrically current challenges 
of non-state actors to national security, the U.S. has found itself at a "strategic inflection 
point" where it must reassess its institutions, processes and resources to defeat violence 
and threats, and promote freedom, development and social justice around the world 
(www.asymmetricthreat.net, 2009). 
 
Ted Hopf concentrates on the domestic formation of identities of key decision-makers. 
Hopt‘s approach attempts to explore the causal link between the scope of national interests 
and outcomes of foreign policies (Jackson et al, 2007). In the case of Iran, when the 
political and military landscape remarkably changed after the fall of Saddam‘s regime in 
2003, the regional balance of power swang in Iran's favour. Iran's regime interests were 
based on maximising its influence and power over the region, by expanding revolutionary 
Shiite ideology to its neighbouring states, particularly to Arab Sunni states (Jones 2003). 
These geopolitical interests were based on ideology which derived from the values, beliefs 
and norms of the Islamic Shiite doctrine, reinforced by the supreme leader, Ayatollah 
Ruhollah Khomeini (Al-Nefisy et al, 2008). 
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In Iran, it is the supreme leader, not the president, who is the commander of the armed 
forces (Rakel, 2008). The constitution empowers the supreme leader alongside the Council 
of Guardians, half of whose members are appointed by the supreme leader, to disqualify 
potential presidential candidates. Finally, the constitution empowers the supreme leader's 
office to oversee directly different agencies, including the executive branch 
(www.parstimes.com, 1979; Sadjadpour, 2009; www.iranprimer.usip.org, 2014). It could 
be argued that the Iranian political system was devised in such a way as to ensure that no 
person or institution could monopolise power and use it against the religious authority of 
the supreme leader.  
 
An ongoing debate between constructivism and neorealism concerns "the core relationship 
between truth and power" (Jackson et al, 2007: 167). Constructivists reject the notion of 
objective truth, because there is no neutral ground from which to start and decide what is 
true. Therefore, constructivism and neorealism consider the world in different ways. 
Neorealism focuses on how the structure of anarchy constrains state actors. The 
constructivist critique of realists is that they ignore the contradiction between identity and 
sovereignty, also between nation and state; thus, realism shows its shortcomings in both 
exploring interactions between variables and explaining the causes of conflict. Therefore, it 
is essential for this thesis to explore the ideas and beliefs in the minds of the elites (Iranian 
nation and state) to understand regime identity, ideology, and values in the Islamic 
Republic of Iran.  
 
Constructivism explores how interests are developed through interaction with wider 
environments. According to constructivist philosophy (in Jackson et al, 2007: 164) ―there 
are no natural laws of society or economics or politics‖. Hence, constructivists have 
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attempted to diagnose the core causal links between truth and power, to reach a deeper 
understanding of the meaning of interaction and conflict. Ideas and material power are the 
key elements which have driven Iran to undertake assertive action in its foreign policy.   
    
1.8.4. Offensive Realism 
 
Although the Middle East is a suitable region to adopt both constructivism and neorealism 
in an extensive debate, offensive realism is a compatible approach in explaining the 
security dilemma in the context of the dynamics of the structural forces in international 
politics. In an anarchic environment, the state needs to maximise its power in order to be 
prominent and maintain its position in the system (Booth et al, 2008). Iran is no exception. 
 
There are two essential debates among neorealist scholars. The offensive version of the 
theory holds that the international system fosters conflict and aggression. Security is scarce, 
making international competition intense and war likely. Rational states are often 
compelled to adopt offensive strategies in their search for security. Defensive realists, on 
the other hand, argue that the international system does not necessarily generate intense 
conflict and war. States that understand the international system will realise that security is 
often plentiful and that defensive strategies are the best route to security (Snyder, 1999: 62). 
Offensive realism argues that states are innately aggressive; however, other powers deny 
them expansion of their territorial influence (Booth et al, 2008). These interactions, lead to 
the creation of a security dilemma through the escalation of instability.  
 
As a result, uncertainty, arms race and military/security alliances will continue and security 
becomes either a non-zero sum game (both sides have to win) which allows for some 
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cooperation between the conflicting parties through achieving only relative gains (Collins, 
2007); or a zero-sum game (one winner and one loser-- total loss or total victory) which 
probably pushes the situation into further escalation of conflict in a never-ending cycle 
(Cordesman et al, 2006; Connell et al, 2007). This thesis argues that Iran's foreign policy 
conducts a non-zero sum game when it deals with the U.S. administration, however, it 
adopts a zero-sum game towards its neighbouring states, especially the Arab Sunni states. 
According to Mearsheimer, conflict over power is unavoidable; hence, every state seeks to 
become a powerful state in the target region (Jackson et al, 2007).  
 
Mearsheimer argues that the ―security issue requires a state to have more power to harm 
another, and the ultimate safety comes only from being the most powerful state in the 
system‖ (Williams 2008: 23). In the case of the Iranian regime, due to the acceleration in 
rebuilding a massive conventional and non-conventional power, the security dilemma has 
arisen. Thus, regional hegemony became the ultimate goal for Iran. According to 
Mearsheimer, conflict over power is unavoidable. Offensive realist theory assumes that 
uncertainty in international politics can never be reduced; it is never possible for 
policymakers to fully understand or allay the security fears of other states. In spite of their 
defensive intentions, it is never possible for states to control paradoxical security 
competition. Offensive realist theory suggests that states are driven by the fatalist logic of 
insecurity (Sutch et al, 2008). 
 
The biggest criticism of neorealism is that it focuses on great powers and hegemony at the  
international level, by adopting political and security realms for analysing the structure of 
the international system, but has neglected other factors, such as the influence of religious 
ideology.  
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Most scholars, including neorealist theorists, would agree that no single theory can explain 
all the details of international politics (Snyder et al, 1999). Neorealism (offensive realism)  
can explain the origin of conflict, tension and crisis in the absence of violence. It is a 
visionary approach, as it can explore security issues and phenomena by focusing upon 
regional structure and international system.  
 
1.8.5. Speech Acts 
 
The Speech Act theory was developed in 1962 by a British philosopher of language, John 
Langshaw Austin. In his distinguished work ―How to do Things with Words,‖ he describes 
his theory of speech acts and the conception of performative language, in which to say 
something is to do something (Oishi, 2006). Austin offers an empirical analysis of 
linguistic structure for a general theory of communication goals and of human action. In 
other words, Austin has attempted to find a causal relationship between action and 
communication, in order to interpret the impact of linguistic phenomena on reality 
(Allwood, 1977).  
 
The speech act theory can be used to understand links between actions, phenomena and 
events according to rhetoric and the behaviour of a state in its international relations. It has 
been argued that people use language to apply their ideas and beliefs by making things 
happen in reality, in the shadow of communicative actions (Levinson 1980). Most of the 
time, the political rhetoric of the Iranian regime is based on threats from Iranian elites. In 
adopting such aggressive discourses and hardline rhetoric, speech acts are used as an 
instrument of power by Iran‘s foreign policy, either to deter regional and international 
threats, or to attain its interests and political agenda by imposing its ideologies, beliefs and 
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ideas on others (Takeyh, 2007). Acute discourse, speech acts and hardline rhetoric for both 
the supreme leader and Ahmadinejad go hand-in-hand with processes and actions in Iran's 
foreign policy. Ahmadinejad, for instance, in October 2005, restated Khomeini's "Israel 
should be wiped off the map" (Ahmadinejad, 2005). This statement was made in front of 
more than 3,000 students at a conference in Tehran. Ahmadinejad further referred to the 
state of Israel as a ―disgraceful blot‖ (Ahmadinejad, 2005). 
 
Ahmadinejad was at the time an unknown politician with no great influence, and Iran was 
a theocracy controlled by the clerical revolutionary leaders (mullahs), yet he became the 
most influential figure in the Middle East, when he came to power in 2005, with a hard-
line rhetoric against the U.S., in particular, and the West, in general. Additionally, 
Ahmadinejad made one of the strongest statements, when he referred to the eradication of 
Israel and that reflects the importance of radical political discourse (Takeyh, 2007). Such 
harsh language has been used by both the Iranian regime and its proxies of non-state actors 
and Shiite factions and is one of the notable elements in Iran's foreign policy (Bilgin, 2005). 
The Iranian regime and its proxies reject any effort for peace in the region. This can be 
seen through "Iranian support for peace process rejectionists such as Hamas and 
Hezbollah" (Fawcett 2009: 298). The secretary general of Hezbollah, for instance, Hassan 
Nasrallah, in his speech on the sixth anniversary of the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon on 
May 25, 2006, broadcast by Al-Manar TV, "calls upon the Palestinians to continue the 
confrontation with Israel, stressing that Hezbollah started using suicide bombing attacks as 
the main means of subduing Israel" (www.intelligence.org, 2006). Ahmadinejad, referring 
to Israel at a press conference on May 13, 2008, stated that: ―This terrorist and criminal 
state is backed by foreign powers, but this regime would soon be swept away by the 
Palestinians‖ (Teitelbaum, 2008: 10). Al-Nefisy et al (2008) argue that the presidential 
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phase of Ahmadinejad is a stage for enhancing influence and enabling power for the 
Islamic Republic of Iran, by comparison with the presidential era of Ali Akbar Hashemi 
Rafsanjani and Muhammad Khatami.  
 
Iran‘s foreign policy through aggressive speech acts and actions via its proxies have 
severely affected the core of the regional security system and the security dilemma. On the 
other hand, this has created a favourable environment for Iran‘s foreign policy and non-
state actors to confront their adversaries with their speech acts and actions, as an essential 
resistance to any aggression in the region. Speech acts and hardline statements go hand-in-
hand with processes and actions of Iran's foreign policy, especially on the basis of anti-
western, anti-Israel and anti-peace processes, leading to regional tension (Zalman et al, 
2009; Cilluffo, 2013). 
 
Speech acts theory does not provide solutions, but only enables one to understand the 
conditions behind the specific problem—the deep, ideological roots of the issue. It can be 
applied in various institutional settings or on various social, political and critical issues, by 
paying attention to what exactly people say and do (Van Dijk, 1999). Speech acts 
challenges us to move from seeing language as abstract to seeing our words as having 
meaning in particular historical, social, and political conditions. Our words (written or 
oral) are used to inform a broad sense of meanings and the meaning we convey with those 
words is identified by our immediate social, political, and historical conditions. Our words 
are politicised, even if we are not aware of it, because they reflect the interests of those 
who speak. 
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1.9.   Research Design 
 
The research design is a case study approach which is the favoured strategy when ‗how‘ 
and ‗why‘ questions are being posed, and when the research involves geopolitics and 
foreign affairs which contain several variables, factors and drivers and power relationships, 
and are difficult to explain a state‘s behaviour within the geopolitical dynamics in the light 
of power struggle and anarchic situation. This method of case study is useful for testing 
whether theoretical paradigms work in the real world situations. In other words, it is a 
useful tool to investigate security events and interpret state's behaviours in order to gain a 
better understanding of specific complex situations. Basically, a case study is an in depth 
study of a certain situation by narrowing down a very broad field of research into specific 
topic. Therefore, the scope of this thesis focuses on the four well documented historical 
issues, under test, which are interconnected with Iran's behaviour during 2003-2013. (See 
Chapter 7 for further details). This thesis is based on the security situation by examining 
how major actors such as Iran and its proxies (e.g. Hezbollah in Lebanon and Shiite 
factions), have responded in a dynamic security situation. 
 
1.10.   Research Methods  
 
This thesis adopts a qualitative approach, asking what happened and why. Qualitative 
research with analytical methods depends on exploration of phenomena and examining of 
variables in order to explain the assumptions under study and seek logical and reliable 
answers for the research questions. To answer the research question, a theoretical lens and 
empirical approach will interpret state behaviour and explain the development of events. 
Hancock (1998) demonstrated his concerns about developing explanations of social 
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phenomena. Hancock argued that qualitative research aimed to address questions 
concerned with developing an understanding "the world in which we live and why things 
are the way they are" (Hancock 1998: 2). Thus, this thesis seeks to address the following 
topics: 
 
1.      Why states behave the way they do. 
2.      How opinions and attitudes are formed. 
3.      How events are affected due to the state's interaction within an anarchic  
              environment. 
4.      How and why cultures have developed in the way they have. 
5.      The differences between religious groups. 
 
Merriam (2009: 4) refers to the so-called "action research", which has an objective to 
interpret a specific issue within a certain scope. This kind of research often covers, for 
example, geopolitical dynamics, states' behaviour and turn of complicated events. In this 
research project, my aim is to gain an in-depth understanding of states' behaviour and the 
reasons that govern such behaviour, in order to explore the mechanism of the security 
dilemma in the Middle East. In reference to the methods of collecting qualitative data, this 
thesis relies on a library-based research method and document analysis. Interviews, 
surveys and questionnaires were not used, as policy makers are not willing to say much 
more than what they actually put in documents, especially on such a sensitive topic related 
to security issues and regional conflicts. 
 
The materials studied are based on two sources of evidence gathered. First, primary source 
documents. These documents were gathered from official websites and newspapers such as 
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Fars news agency, Pars Times, Kayhan daily, English Fars News, the Middle East 
Newspaper, BBC, CNN and Reuters; foreign policy papers, international and regional 
organisation reports, national security archives, press interviews, archival material 
concerning security strategic issues; and government reports, testimonies of senate and 
congress, official statements and presidential speeches. 
 
Speeches of Iranian and U.S. leaders and decision-makers are among the sources. Such 
primary sources can be found on the following sites: 
 
1. Farda News Persian (www.fardanews.com/) 
2. Fars News Agency (http://en.farsnews.com/) 
3. Mehr News Agency owned by the Islamic Ideology Dissemination 
Organization (http://en.mehrnews.com/) 
4. The Iran Primer, United States Institute of Peace (http://iranprimer.usip.org/ 
resource/timeline-irans-foreign-relations) 
5. Mashregh News Agency, Persian (http://www.mashreghnews.ir/) 
6. Azad News Agency, Persian (http://www.ana.ir/) 
7. Iranian Cultural Heritage News Agency (http://chnpress.ir/) 
8. Iranian Labour News Agency (http://www.ilna.ir/) 
9. Iranian Students' News Agency (http://isna.ir/en) 
10. Islamic Republic News Agency (http://www.irna.ir/en/) 
11. Rasa News Agency (http://www.rasanews.ir/En/) 
12. Tasnim News Agency (http://www.tasnimnews.com/en) 
13.  Presidential Rhetoric (www.presidentialrhetoric.com) 
14.     Central Intelligence Agency (www.cia.gov/index.html) 
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15.     The Library of Congress (www.memory.loc.gov/ammem/index.html)  
16.     United Nations (www.un.org/en/) 
17.    The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) (www.fbi.gov/) 
18.     The American Presidency Project (www.presidency.ucsb.edu/) 
19.     The White House (www.whitehouse.gov/) 
20.     Anti-Defamation League (www.archive.adl.org/) 
21.     The National Security Archive: The George Washington University  
           (www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/) 
22.    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (www.iaea.org) 
23.    Federation of American Scientists (FAS) (www.fas.org/) 
24.      U.S. Department of State: Diplomacy in Action (www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/) 
 
Secondary sources were also a source of empirical data, and included reports compiled by 
academics and representatives of international and regional organisations, research centres 
for strategic and security studies, books, journals and articles in the academic literature. 
The aim of data collection was to generate facts, provide evidence and build a sense of 
rationality to interpret foreign policy decision-making, incidents and phenomena, such as: 
 
1.       The importance and influence of ideology as a key instrument of soft power     
                   in the regional and world politics. 
 
2. The impact of regime identity, nationalism and decision makers on Iran‘s 
foreign policy. 
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3. The leverage of soft power and the validation of Pan-Islamism and 
Revolutionary Shiism, including ideologies as leading drivers of Iranian 
foreign policy that play crucial roles in determining interests, likely 
behaviour and actions. 
 
4. The impact of Iran‘s strategic goals upon the security dilemma. 
 
5.    The security dilemma and its impact on the Middle East. 
 
The outcomes of the theses are the research findings that related to actual reality. These 
findings were synthesised from the discussions and results taken from the primary and 
secondary data. After each stage to analyse assumptions and findings, they are tested 
within the process of verification which is a part of the analysis process. During January 
2013, I discussed assumptions, evidences and findings related Iran's involvement in the 
Middle East issues such as Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. Professor Anoushiravan Ehteshami at 
Durham University and Professor Ali Ansari at St. Andrews University, for example have 
helped in enhancing my perception of regional security threats and the impact on the 
geopolitical dynamics. Both believe that soft power can be regarded as important element 
that motivate the movement to be involved in international and regional activities in 
general and in Iran's foreign policy in particular. 
 
I have evaluated the findings and outcomes of the thesis relative to the objective, 
assumptions and research questions. This evaluation depends on two approaches: first, the 
collective perspective. This means confirming a specific issue with more than one source. 
For example, agreement about Iranian support to Hezbollah and, in turn, the role of 
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Hezbollah in attacking Israel. Second, examining the Iranian perception and justification of 
its foreign policy through Persian sources: what has been written, spoken and observed. 
Examples of testing assumptions and research findings in line with the geopolitical 
dynamics of the Middle East are as follows: the motivational factors that influence the 
behaviour of states, the great importance of ideology in regional conflicts, speech acts and 
hardline rhetoric, the growing danger posed by militant groups, expansion of the scope of 
crises, increase the external threats towards Iran, Iranian responses in accordance with the 
general principles of Imam Khomeini's political thought. In order to explain the hypotheses 
and assumptions, this thesis follows ten steps before conducting the fieldwork: 
 
1. Studies theories, models and approaches related to the topic under study. 
 
2. Surveys major events and crises and assessed whether they threatened 
Iran‘s national security or not during 2003 and 2013, and beyond to some 
extent, particularly focusing on the four issues under study.  
 
3. Examines the impact of ideological proxies through using asymmetric 
warfare in line with the distribution of soft power in Iran‘s foreign policy. 
 
4. Explores the impact of intervening variables, especially regime identity, 
nationalism and decision makers on Iran‘s foreign policy. 
 
5. Reviews statements and political/ideological rhetoric in international 
relations, particularly in the peace process. 
 
    
49 
 
6. Explores Iran‘s tools and methods in engaging with the major Middle East 
issues and assesses the consequences of such engagement.  
 
7. Determines the role of non-state actors and especially Shiite factions on the 
security landscape and geopolitical dynamics. 
 
8. Clarifies the strategic alliance between Iran, non-state actors and Shiite 
factions abroad. 
 
9. Identifies and discusses the link between the geopolitical dynamics and 
power shift in the Middle East and Iran‘s national interests. 
 
10. Evaluates the interaction of values, interests and policies related to both Iran 
with its allies, and U.S. with its regional and international allies. 
 
This research project discusses contemporary topics that still have strong implications for 
regional security and world politics. Current conflicts in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, 
Lebanon, Egypt, for instance, have taken place within the timeframe of my research 
project.  
 
The particular period of time (2003-2013) has been chosen as a critical period for Iran‘s 
foreign policy. It is a time that includes the removal of Saddam‘s regime in 2003 and the 
reinforcement of conservative authority through the election and re-election of 
Ahmadinejad in 2005 and 2009-2013, a follower of the Islamic Revolution and loyal to the 
clerical leaders (Takeyh, 2010).              
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Several trips to the Middle East were conducted for the fieldwork, to Bahrain, Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and the UK, from 22 May 2013 to 11 
August 2013. The fieldwork involved data collection and a focus group discussion. See 
Appendix 1 (on page 324). All material collected was in the public domain with free 
access. I visited several Persian bookshops during my fieldwork, Security Affairs of the 
Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf in Saudi Arabia, the Centre for 
Research and Studies on Kuwait and the Centre of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies 
in Kuwait, the Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and Research in the United Arab 
Emirates, the department of National Security Affairs in the Arab League in Egypt, Al-
Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies in Egypt, Middle East Newspaper 
Published in London, and the British Library. 
 
The focus group discussion had nine participants. Three participants were experts in 
international politics, the Middle East, terrorism and radical movements, and Shiite 
ideology. Abdullah Al-Nafisi is a specialist in Iranian affairs and the security issues of the 
Middle East. Sami Al-Faraj is President of Centre for Strategic Studies and national 
security advisor to the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf. Dr. Abdullah 
Yousef Sahar is a university professor in International Relations, and Director General, 
Central Statistical Bureau. There were two specialists on Islamic sects: Sheikh Othman Al-
Khamees and Dr. Jasem Al-Fahad. Osamah Alsayegh is a professor in nuclear energy, and 
director of science and technological energy. Two military experts, especially in the 
deployment of American land and air forces in the region, Staff Air Major General Pilot, 
Khamis and Staff Major General Farhan. Mr. Askar Al-Enezi is a member of the Kuwaiti 
parliament. 
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1.11.   Organisation and Structure of the Thesis  
 
The thesis is divided into three sections, and ultimately consists of nine chapters. The first 
includes a general introduction to the thesis, the development of the analytical framework 
and the internal political system structure of Iran. This is done in chapters one, two and 
three. This section answers the question: To what extent does ideology shape Iran‘s foreign 
policy? 
 
The second section focuses on the establishment of the political/security background, 
which is based on an analytical overview of recent events of the Middle East, as a turbulent 
regional system controlled by various security dynamics. It will also discuss U.S., UN and 
Iranian strategic competition from an ideological and security perspective, and the foreign 
policies of Iran and its strategic political and security interests in the Middle East. These 
issues are covered in chapters four, five and six. This section addresses the second research 
question, which is: Which events, perceived as security concerns, influence Iranian 
ideology, identity and foreign policy? In addition, this section deals with the third research 
question which is: What instruments of power does Iran‘s foreign policy use to increase its 
power, to ensure its security requirements and meet its strategic interests? 
 
The concluding section includes chapters seven, eight and nine. This section examines the 
four documented issues under test in the shadow of security threats, and includes an 
analysis of the security dilemma and its impact upon the Middle East, while considering its 
links with Iran's foreign policy. This phase is analysed in depth via the primary research 
question, which is: To what extent have the geopolitical dynamics of the Middle East in 
the aftermath of the 2003 invasion of Iraq impacted Iran's foreign policy and, in turn, how 
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did soft power affect the security dilemma? Furthermore, this stage is discussed through 
the fourth research question which is: To what extent does the perception of the Iranian 
security threat to and by Middle Eastern states influence the security dilemma? The final 
chapter summarises the main findings and conclusions. It also points out the distinct 
contribution of this thesis to academic debates and some directions for future study. 
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Chapter Two 
 
Developing the Analytical Framework 
 
2.1.   Introduction  
 
Chapter two sets out a standardised analytical framework for exploring the factors and 
drivers that shape a state's behaviour (in this case, Iran's foreign policy) in the regional 
security system. Particularly, it focuses on epistemological methods and takes a 
jurisprudential approach, incorporating historical descriptions, to understand the Islamic 
doctrine, especially the Shiite doctrine that defines the Iranian regime. Building on earlier 
studies in this area, the purpose of this framework is twofold. Firstly, it seeks to develop an 
epistemological conceptual framework in the context of positivism. It considers the 
interactions of regional states and post-positivist epistemology in the shadow of social 
relationships and regulative constitutive functions of norms and behaviours (Lapid, 1989). 
Secondly, it demonstrates how the security dilemma works in the Middle East. 
 
The chapter focuses on the three structural questions, ‗What?‘, ‗How?‘ and ‗Why?‘, in 
order to elucidate the relationship between concepts and variables as follows: the question 
of ‗what‘ will clarify Islamic political thought from the perspective of Iran‘s regime. The 
question ‗how‘ aims to understand the creative path of Iran's external agenda to maximise 
power and expand influence on others. The purpose of ‗why‘ is to investigate the existing 
approach of Iran's foreign policy to establish a new revolutionary paradigm (Al-Nefisy et 
al, 2008; Juneau, 2009). Equally important is the clarification of concepts and the link 
between variables: the independent variables, the intervening variables at the domestic-
level, and the dependent variables. 
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The chapter is divided into four main parts. The first outlines the analytical framework. 
The second discusses an overview of the Islamic perspective, in view of international 
relations theory. The third provides more detail on the Islamic political thought from the 
point of view of the Iranian Shiite School, by focusing upon Ayatollah Khomeini‘s 
thoughts and beliefs, and the epistemological aspects of the Shiite School, particularly 
Twelver, who are followers of the Twelfth Imam. The final section analyses the new 
revolutionary paradigm of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the creative path to acquire 
power. It then considers the aftermath, by looking at regional instability and the nature and 
scope of the security dilemma in the Middle East.  
 
2.2.   Building the Analytical Framework 
 
The intention of the framework is not to provide a predictive model, but to provide a 
means of understanding complex events. This chapter gives a review of what should be 
considered, especially taking into account the issues of interactions within the social 
construction of reality, the relationship between ideational factors and identities, and the 
materialistic view of states (Jackson et al, 2007). It is essential to look for an effective 
procedure to determine what is relevant in relation to state behaviour (Iranian regime) in 
light of its regional interactions and security issues. 
 
2.3.   Islamic Perspective and International Relations Theory 
 
For a long time, the question of cultural, religious and identity factors has been neglected 
in international relations theory. However, these values are deemed a cornerstone in the 
decision making process and foreign policy behaviour for most Muslim countries (Acharya 
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& Buzan 2010). Constructivism provides a conceptual framework to assess ideational 
factors of norms, values, identities and ideologies. A constructivist approach is appropriate 
to understand intervening variables such as behaviour, among Islamic states, regarding 
regime identity, nationalism and decision-making. According to constructivism, a state 
may seek to attain its material interests; however, essentially it needs to legitimise its 
policy in accordance with norms and identities (Barnett 1998 in Acharya et al, 2010). 
 
Debates between Western and non-Western theorists have centred on whether Islam is a 
religion and whether the Islamic world is better as a region or a territorial nation state (Said 
et al, 2002). These debates have mainly focused on discrepancies between the foundation 
of truth and the quest for a good life (Acharya, et al 2010). Debates among Muslims have 
also taken place between Islamic traditionalists/ fundamentalists and Islamic modernists 
(AL-Sayyed, 1997). Tadjbakhsh (in Acharya et al, 2010: 180) urges Islamic modernism to 
open the door to dialogue and connection with the West, while the Islamic traditionalists 
reject ―ijtihad (the exercise of reason in the reinterpretation of religious sources) and tajdid 
(innovation)‖. In addition, the Islamic traditionalists believe in the importance of Islamic 
movements for changing the status quo, and Islamic ideologies such as beliefs and values 
for expanding power through imposing ideas on others, as part of their duty in life (Said et 
al, 2002).  
 
In this sense, Tadjbakhsh (in Acharya et al, 2010) argues that some classical schools of 
Muslim jurists formulated a paradigm of international relations which was based on two 
main conceptual divisions of the world, Dar al Islam/Salam (house of Islam, justice and 
peace), and Dar al Harb (house of war, injustice and oppression). Tadjbakhsh (in Acharya 
et al, 2010: 184) states that ―they take as the point of departure the fact that the divisions of 
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the world were not found in the Qur‘an (the central religious texts of Islam, and the 
verbatim words from God) and Sunna (or Sunnah, the exemplary practice of the prophet 
Mohammed (Peace be upon him); and, for Ithna ashari Shiite, that of the Imam), but were 
instead human attempts to make sense of relations between states‖. Tadjbakhsh (2010: 
178) stated that the ultimate aim of Islam is ―to establish the Umma (Islamic community), 
where the Sharia rules and defines the duties of Muslims‖. According to this point of view, 
Tadjbakhsh (2010: 178) conceives that ―the concept of power lies in the heart of such 
interpretation of Islam‖. 
 
Iran's regime has attempted through its foreign policy to export its ideologies, Islamic 
identity and revolutionary values derived from religiously inspired political movements 
(AL-Sayyed, 1997; Al-Nefisy et al, 2008). Most importantly, Owen (2007: 154) argues 
that "the study of religion in politics is not the study of religion per se, but of its influences 
on the policies and the distribution of power within a modern state. It follows that an 
examination of particular theories or systems of religious law is only relevant to the extent 
that these provide motives and programmes for political action". Anoush Ehteshami argues 
that Iran's foreign policies have adopted clear principles since the Islamic Revolution in 
1979 (www.mideasti.org, 2009). Ehteshami (2009: 128) mentioned that "these principles 
have been stated in the Iranian constitution and at the same time have been defined by 
Iran's approaches since the revolution". This can be seen through speeches of the supreme 
leader, Iranian clergy and political elites, relating to the concept of justice. Such principles 
and notions, which derive from a set of values and beliefs, have influenced Iran's macro 
policies on its foreign issues. Ehteshami (2009: 127) indicates that "like other 
revolutionary regimes, Tehran was determined to encourage the growth of its ideology and 
'export' it wherever possible". Constructivism and realism/neorealism, however, capture 
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the nature of Iran‘s foreign policy, both in theory and in practice: in its speech acts, the 
behaviour of the state and its elites, ideas, faith, justice, identity and religious morality, as 
well as material interests (Acharya, et al 2010).  
 
2.4.   The Islamic Political Thought in the view of Iranian Shiite School  
 
Shiism is a multi-dimensional phenomenon and a wide field of knowledge (Shams al-Din, 
1992). In essence, Imamah is a fundamental principle of the Shiite doctrine which is based 
on religious, spiritual and political leadership of the Islamic world "Ummah" (Shams al-
Din, 1985: 92). Hence, the role of Shiites to reform domestic affairs in countries where do 
they reside is a step to for the dissemination of experiences derived from the Islamic 
political school of Shiite to reconstruct of Islamic societies (Said et al, 2002). The Islamic 
Revolution of Iran in 1979 reinforced political Shiism, to become the manifestation of 
political movements, where the Iranian constitution stresses on the Muslim world to 
mobilize against the domineering system, as Shiite Islam is the starting point to reach 
Islamic dignity.   
 
This section considers research regarding Islamic political thought within the framework of 
the Shiite school, which is one of the main Islamic sources and provides the philosophy of 
Islamic thought, particularly by focusing on the largest and more active branch of Shiite 
called the Twelvers, or Ithna‘ Ashari, also known as Ahlal Bayt. This branch of the Shiite 
sect believes strongly in recognising the legitimacy of the Twelvers, divinely ordained 
Imams, beginning with Ali (the cousin and son-in law of Prophet Muhammad (Peace be 
upon him), who was the fourth ruler of the Islamic Caliphate and the eleven successors of 
his sons and grandsons. The Islamic Republic of Iran represents this largest subdivision of 
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the Shiite sect in the Islamic world. In other words, Iran is an overwhelmingly Shiite state 
(Kinzer, 2006). 
 
Svetla Ben-ITzhak (in Ishiyama & Breuning 2011), argues that Islamic political thought 
has been developing enormously over the last one thousand four hundred years, in terms of 
the relationship to religious affairs and Islamic concepts, as well as the role of government 
and nature of leadership. ITzhak (2011) writes that although social and political 
developments of Islamic thought have taken place throughout history, the theoretical and 
intellectual framework in Islamic thought has confronted obstacles regarding the 
perception of Islam as a static rather than a dynamic system of thought. In this context, 
ITzhak (in Ishiyama et al, 2011), argues that Islamic political thought sets a framework 
that is based on Islam, in which people derive knowledge and daily practices from the 
main sources of Islam: the Qur‘an (the holy book) and appended by the Hadiths (words 
and deeds about prophet Muhammad for understanding the Qur'an and in matters of 
jurisprudence). However, the death of Muhammad (Peace be upon him) in 632 CE was a 
starting point for disagreement over political and religious leadership for the Umma 
(Shams al-Din, 1985). The rebellion against Uthman, the third Caliphate, and the following 
battles between Ali's supporters (shiites) against the Umayyad dynasty (Sunnis), loyal to 
Uthman, and the violent death of Ali‘s son, Hussein, caused political conflicts and major 
divisions between Sunni and Shiite towards religious thought and political practices in the 
Islamic world (Ishiyama et al, 2011; Molavi, 2005). 
 
Bergman (2008: 7) argues that ―the Shiite faith was born out of a deep feeling of 
deprivation and grievance‖. Since then, "the Shiite developed the doctrine of the Imamah 
(the successor to Muhammad-Peace be upon him), which gave both religious and political 
    
59 
 
dimensions to the rules" (Itzhak, in Ishiyama et al, 2011: 569). A closer look at this 
doctrine discloses that the supreme leader, Khomeini, referred to himself as "the missing 
Imam, who had returned as a messiah or Mahdi" (Bergman, 2008). When Khomeini came 
to power, he advocated the revival of 'pure Islam' (Khomeini, 1985). It seems that this call 
was revolutionary in order to reshape Iranian identity, particularly Shiite political thought, 
by changing reality to favour Iran. Thus, political struggles and security tensions escalated 
as a consequence. It has been argued that Shiites believe in the legitimacy of power for 
political movement, especially the defense of the rights of all Muslims who are struggling 
against oppression and tyranny (www.parstimes.com, 1987). This can be seen in the 
attempts of Iran‘s regime to legitimise its political power using religious ideology, 
especially its efforts ―to export revolution‖, which ―typically led to military disasters‖ 
(Hinnebusch et al, 2002: 20). 
 
2.5.   The Political Thought of Ayatollah Khomeini 
 
In order to clearly demonstrate the contemporary distribution of soft power, including 
ideological proxies, as an independent variable, Iran‘s foreign policy outcome as a 
dependent variable, and the domestic-level in terms of regime identity, nationalism and 
decision-makers as intervening variables, the following research discusses the political 
thought of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and his influence on decision-making. 
 
In the initial stages of the Iranian Revolution in 1979, Imam/Ayatollah Ruhollah Musavi 
Khomeini (May 17, 1900 – June 3, 1989), a prominent Shiite Muslim cleric who became 
the political and spiritual leader of the Islamic Revolution beside the supreme leader and 
the paramount figure in the political system, had declared Iran an Islamic republic 
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(Khomeini, 1970). See for more details to abridged version of the original film after the 
return Ayatollah Khomeini from exile to Tehran in February 1979, and his attempt to turn 
Iran into an Islamic republic (www.news.bbc.co.uk/panorama/hi/front_ page/newsid_8083 
000/8083525.stm, 1981). In accordance with this, the Iranian revolution occurred in the 
centre of the Shiite world (Iran) on the basis of "seeking greater equality and on the more 
ideologically motivated movements committed to the overthrow of existing Arab regimes 
and the immediate establishment of an Islamic state" (Owen, 2007: 170). Khomeini stated 
that ―the government should be in the hands of the sages themselves‖ (Bergman, 2008: 9). 
Khomeini attempted to define the source of authority in a government under the control of 
the religious establishment. Khomeini extended his influence over the internal affairs of 
the country and became directly involved in foreign policy, including later policies 
regarding the war with Iraq (AL-Suwaidi, 2005). Khomeini also argued that the need to 
overthrow regimes is not only against the monarchical regimes which were no longer 
acceptable, but also any regimes who did not rule by religious authority (Khomeini, 1970). 
As a result, Khomeini's thought affected not only the national security of neighbouring 
countries, but also the regional security system. Khomeini‘s thought, therefore, was based 
on the confrontation between good and evil, where evil must be destroyed by good, and 
good must apply justice (Khomeini, 1987). In this regard, Khomeini regarded the Islamic 
Republic of Iran as the axis of the Islamic world and the leader of the resistance and 
liberation movements in the Middle East and the Muslim world (Khomeini, 1981; 
www.parstimes.com, 1987). 
 
Hollis (1993) points out that Iran is held responsible for "funding, training and generally 
encouraging Islamic militants set upon overthrowing governments across the Middle East". 
It is "accused of supporting the Islamist government in Sudan, seeking influence with 
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Islamist groups in Ethiopia and Muslim extremists in Egypt, managing Hezbollah in 
Lebanon and sponsoring Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement, in the 
Israeli Occupied Territories. Added to this, Iranian support for mujaheddin groups in 
Afghanistan continues and Iran is depicted as Turkey's rival for influence in the newly 
independent republics of Central Asia" (Hollis, 1993; www.watanserb.com/news/7005, 
2015). 
 
The Islamic revolutionary movements across the region have taken place while trumpeting 
support to revive Pan-Islamism, most notably support of Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Al-
Mahdi Army in Iraq and Hamas in Gaza (Barzegar, 2007; Cordesman, 2007; Al-Nefisy et 
al, 2008; Bergman, 2008). However, the essential theory of Khomeini's idea concerning 
Islamic government is the jurisprudent rule (Wilayat Al-Faqih), which is based on 
government by the religious jurist. This concept was developed by Khomeini and is 
embodied in articles of the Iranian constitution which uphold juristic authority 
(www.en.parliran.ir, 1989). In the following section, this concept will be discussed in more 
detail.   
 
Shiites believe in their right to defend tyranny and injustice in the world, even by force 
(Khomeini, 1985). The questions therefore arise: What is the definition of tyranny and the 
criterion of injustice, and who are the enemies and adversaries? Above all, in practice, who 
gives Iran the right to reform the world? It has been argued that the problem of Iran‘s 
revolutionary regime is that Iran has an external agenda that goes beyond its boundaries 
and territories, in accordance with the political mainstream of the Islamic Revolution of 
Iran (Takeyh, 2006). On the other hand, more importantly, the Islamic Republic of Iran 
reacts in an anarchic environment to confront any possible threats to safeguard its 
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geopolitical interests and to maximise its regional influence, by using all its instruments of 
power, whether conventional or unconventional. 
 
In this context, the ideological concept as one of the core instruments of soft power is 
thought to derive from God, because he (Ayatollah Khomeini) is acting on behalf of the 
missing Imam (Twelver) who has a spiritual link with the sky. This view is supported by 
Iran‘s constitution (Al-Theyabi, 2011). However, Khomeini‘s vision of Islamic 
international relations is based on the oppressed ‗mustadafun‘ (Khomeini, 1970, 1987). 
This term lies in the Qur‘an as the main source for the Islamic world which includes all 
mankind, and engages with the spirit of religion and the episteme of Islam 
(www.parstimes.com, 1987). It has been argued that the cause behind adopting the term 
mustadafun is to give Iran's foreign policy legitimacy in countering its opponents and 
expanding its influence and power on others, but also to gain more domestic, regional and 
international support, especially from the Islamic world (Acharya et al, 2010). In light of 
the above, the thesis discussed the intervening variables for the political thought of 
Khomeini which shapes decision-making and influences state behaviour and its foreign 
policy. The epistemology of Khomeini's thought concerning political movements is mainly 
grounded upon responsibility and righteousness, according to the Shiism perspective.  
 
2.6.   Essential Epistemological Aspects of the Shiite school (Twelver) 
 
This section discusses the important issues of the religious doctrine for the Shiite school 
(Twelver), in terms of theological and philosophical sources, which formulate the Shiite 
laws and approach. In order to demonstrate how the Iranian regime works, this research 
analyses the epistemological jurisprudential framework in the context of contemporary 
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Islamic political movements. One must bear in mind that this thesis uses ‗Twelver-Imams‘ 
in order to avoid confusion with other Shiite schools (Armanios, 2004). 
 
2.6.1.   Shiite Islam of the Twelver School of Thought (the Twelver Imams) 
 
Shiite Muslims represent the majority of Iran‘s Muslims and also in Iraq, Lebanon and 
Bahrain. Shiite is one of the main strands and second largest branch of Islam after the 
Sunni strand (Fuller, 2006); however, the focus of this thesis is the Twelver's Shiite. Shiite 
(Twelver) is stated in Iran‘s constitution of 1979 ‗details of the Iranian constitution are 
given in Appendix 2 (on page 334)‘ the official religion of Iran, it is crucial to give a brief 
introduction to the Twelver's Shiite. 
 
Shiites believe that they are the group that has the full support of God (Jawada, 2007). The 
power of Ali (the fourth Caliph) is supported fully by the Shiite political faction. Shiites 
recognise the legitimacy of a succession of twelve, beginning with Ali himself, who are 
known as imams (Armanios, 2004). Shiites believe strongly in the Twelve Imams, with 
legitimacy of political and spiritual power from God, who are the successors to the Prophet 
Muhammad (Peace be upon him), and the last Imam is ―Muhammad al-Mahdi, who is 
believed by the Twelvers to be actually alive and in hiding‖ (Ben-ITzhak in Ishiyama et al, 
2011:571). Thus, Shiites claim that in the absence of the Imam Twelver (a thousand years 
ago), elite clergies such as Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and Ayatollah Haajj Sayyid Ali 
Khamenei (the previous and current supreme leaders of the Iranian revolution), have the 
ability to understand fully Sharia Law, Islamic jurisprudential doctrine and the history of 
Shiite Islam (Al-Theyabi, 2011). AL-Sader et al (2004) for instance, argue that elite 
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clergies claim that Sharia Law, which is based on the teachings of Qur'an and the Twelver 
Infallible Imam, must be executed in its entirety.  
   
In contrast, throughout history these twelve Imams have not practised the rule of Islamic 
government with the exception of two, the first being Ali (the fourth Caliph), who was 
murdered in 661 AD while attempting to maintain his authority, and the second being his 
son Hassan, who ruled for just six months and then gave up power to the Sunni (Umayyad) 
(Jawada, 2007). For approximately one thousand three hundred and fifty years there was a 
major split between the Muslim strands. Most importantly, the battle of Karbala (south 
Baghdad) on 10 Muharram in the year 61 AH (October 10, 680 AD) was and still is 
considered one of the prominent events for Shiite Twelver (Shams al-Din, 1996). Ali‘s son, 
Hussein, the third Imam, was killed by the Caliph‘s soldiers, after Hussein‘s refusal to 
recognise the Caliph‘s legitimacy of Yazid, and his attempt to overthrow Yazid's power 
and reform the path of Twelver Imam (Kinzer, 2006). Since then, Kinzer (2006: 187) noted 
that ―the city of Karbala‘ is now a pilgrimage spot for Shiites‖. Furthermore, Hussein‘s 
killing is remembered every year, and the day is called ‗Ashura‘ (the tenth of Muharram in 
the Islamic calendar). "It is said by Shiites that every day is Ashura and every land is 
Karbala" (Al-Nefisy et al, 2008: 35). It has been argued that Hussein, Shiite Twelver, and 
Khomeini, for instance, adopt the same belief, which is based on radical change and a 
revolutionary approach against illegitimate regimes, tyranny and oppression (Shams al-Din, 
1996).   
  
Much like Hussein, Khomeini, the supreme leader of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, 
considers the Islamic Republic of Iran the axis of the Islamic world and himself the leader 
of the resistance and liberation movements (Puelings, 2010). There are some similarities 
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between Khomeini and Hussein, as they both adopted the revolutionary approach to social 
change and political reform and gave themselves religious legitimacy for establishing 
better societies based on justice, dignity, freedom and salvation (Jawada, 2007). Al-Nefisy 
et al (2008) argue that the myth of Hussein will remain as a revolutionary symbol against 
all tyrants and oppressors and he will continue as a symbol of dignity and freedom for all 
mankind, not only for the Shiites. Shiites have been protesting against all Muslim rulers, 
particularly the Arab governors, whose authority has not been legitimised (Bergman 2008). 
These protests and movements demonstrate the nature of the geopolitical dynamics in light 
of Iran's efforts to maximise its regional influence which in turn might bring security to 
Iran in the long run. Most importantly, Ben-ITzhak (in Ishiyama et al, 2011:571) writes 
that ―Shiite political thought focused mainly on the nature and origins of power during the 
Imam‗s absence‖. The Shiite approach is to look forward to the usurping of power in the 
name of Islamic Law, exporting ideological thought into other states. 
 
2.6.2.   Al-Mahdi Al-Montazar (the Awaited) 
 
Imam Al-Mahdi Al-Montazar (Awaited) is the last Imam, number twelve of the Twelve 
Imams, according to the Shiite Twelve doctrine (AL-Sader et al, 2004). The Shiite clergy 
elite insist upon Imam Al-Mahdi as a leader of social and political movement who derives 
his legitimate political and spiritual power directly from God (Jawada, 2007). Indeed, 
Shiites strongly believe that the Al-Mahdi is an infallible Imam, and he will solve the 
world‘s problems by fighting decisively injustice, oppression and ignorance, in order to fill 
this earth with righteousness, justice, and fairness. Theoretically, this principle is 
commensurate with Imam Khomeini‘s thought and Shiite doctrine. Hence, empirically, the 
Iranian regime adopts this doctrine because the supreme leader acts on behalf of Imam Al-
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Mahdi, until he comes to power, and puts this doctrine into practice through the 
establishment of an Islamic government (Al-Theyabi, 2011). It has widely been argued that 
Iran‘s foreign policy has derived its legitimacy from spiritual guidance via the doctrinal 
aspects of the Imam Al-Mahdi concerning confronting injustice and oppression, and for 
establishing a better life (AL-Sader et al, 2004). 
 
2.6.3.   The Theory of the Governance of Jurist (Wilayat Al-Faqih) 
 
The theory of Wilayat Al-Faqih (guardianship of the Islamic jurist) is central to the Iranian 
Islamic Revolution, particularly towards the supreme leader and elite clergies ―to 
strengthen the pillars of their rule‖ (Al-Nefisy et al, 2008: 28). Equally important, it denies 
the temporal ruler this authority. The preamble to the Iranian constitution defines the 
powers of the authority of Al-Faqih. In accordance with Article 5, the Faqih is the just and 
pious jurist who is recognised by the majority of political and clerical elites as best 
qualified to lead the nation. In both Articles 5 and 107, the constitution shows the process 
for succession of the position of Wilayat Al-Faqih, and Articles 108 to 112 specifies the 
qualifications, duties and the powers of the Faqih (www.parstimes.com, 1987).  
 
This section analyses the ideological authority of the Faqih (supreme leader) to run the 
state practically in accordance with political thought in Shiism. The issue of Wilayat Al-
Faqih holds two theoretical and practical dimensions. In terms of the theoretical account, 
Al-Nefisy & Abdullah (2008) argue that the supreme leader, as a religious and political 
authority, holds the reins of all branches of Iranian government institutions and other 
authority necessary to run a government internally and externally. Khomeini, for instance, 
claimed that Faqih (a jurisprudent) has power derived from the infallible Imam (Al-Mahdi) 
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who is accredited by God and, as such, can interpret Islamic law and hold the highest 
authority over others (Khomeini, 1981). It is clear, therefore, that the legitimacy of power 
for the supreme leader is dependent upon a religious factor rather than public opinion, 
although he is elected by 'ulama' (plural of the U'lim, people with the highest standard in 
the Islamic law and its sources) in the Assembly of Experts (Majles-e Khobregan) (Kinzer, 
2006: 146). 
 
The theory of Wilayat Al-Faqih originates from the idea that the prophet Muhammad 
(Peace be upon him) was not chosen by the people, and his power was given directly from 
God. This means Faqih is not subject to parliamentary and legal accountability, although 
he exercises political tasks beside religious matters. In this sense, the theory of Wilayat Al-
Faqih causes some confusion for Muslims concerning the sources of legitimacy in Islam 
(Al-Husseini, 2015). 
 
Indeed, the supreme leader's authority and his power ―was enshrined in the Iranian 
constitution‖ (Kinzer, 2006: 146). In this regard, the Iranian constitution gives the supreme 
leader full right to intervene in all aspects of the political system, by directing government 
policies when he is asked, or according to his wishes. Ideologically, however, the supreme 
leader has the top rank in Shiite sects and factions. This rank gives him absolute power to 
direct Shiites (Twelvers) in the Middle East states and elsewhere, via the guidance of Iran's 
foreign policy (Al-Nefisy et al, 2008: 28; Kagan, 2009). Despite the fact that Iran's 
political system is a multi-polar system that affects foreign policy, the supreme leader is 
the highest in the hierarchy of the political system and the office of State, and the strongest 
institution among decision-making powers on Iran's foreign policy. This stems from the 
theory of "Wilayat Al-Faqih" (Takeyh, 2007: 26). According to this theory, the supreme 
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leader takes over on behalf of the Hidden Imam (Al-Mahdi Al-montazar- the Awaited) in 
the management of affairs of the Muslims and this means that obedience is obligatory. This 
distinguished authority for the supreme leader is derived from the Iranian constitution 
according to articles 5, 107 and 110 (Takeyh, 2007: 26). 
  
The concept of Walayat Al-Faqih has influenced Shiite factions that live in the Middle 
East. It has been argued that the socio-political movements in the region, particularly after 
the removal of Saddam regime from power in 2003, have been guided by Wilayat Al-Faqih 
in Tehran and his idea of Islamic government (Al-Nefisy et al, 2008). The attempts of 
Iran‘s regime, through the theory of Wilayat Al-Faqih, to influence different Shiite 
movements to attain Iran's ideological agenda and geostrategic goals of imposing its 
hegemony over the region are a regional concern. 
 
In practical terms, the framework of government functions, administration, and execution 
of laws are a grave responsibility, rather than talk on Faqih's status. Such huge and 
complicated responsibilities can neither practically nor realistically be handled and 
managed by one person (Faqih). The Faqih, as an ordinary person, is likely to be forgetful 
and mistaken. In most Islamic states, leaders exercise their political duties, while the 
religious elites practise their ideological/religious tasks and most people have accepted this 
division. In contrast, the Shiite traditionalists accept the theory of Wilayat Al-Faqih, by 
which the supreme leader acquires a high Islamic qualification to execute correctly all 
Islamic laws through the government (Al-Theyabi, 2011). 
  
Some people argue that the theory of Wilayat Al-Faqih is aimed at protecting the Islamic 
revolution, via controlling the government domestically, and imposing power and 
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influence on other countries regionally, under the legitimacy of Islamic law. However, 
others argue that it is not imperative that the government be under the control of Faqih, 
because anyone can rule, but he has to have the permission of Wali Al-Faqih to dispense 
his authority. Wilayat Al-Faqih came as a result of an attempt to legitimise the Iranian 
Revolution in 1979, aimed at replacing a previous regime (Shah's regime) with a legitimate 
regime, and at influencing the Islamic world, resulting in increasing uncertainty among the 
Middle Eastern states. 
 
2.7.   A new Revolutionary Paradigm and the Creative Path to Reach Power 
 
In order to demonstrate how the security dilemma works in Iran‘s external affairs, this 
thesis analyses and discusses religious and political theories, to explain and understand the 
power of Iranian ideology and rhetoric legitimised by Islamic law. This approach allows 
interactions between variables (physical and intellectual) to be explored in the context of 
the Iranian foreign policy strategy and its impact on the entire Middle East region, through 
its ideological paradigm.    
 
In this sense, the thesis links the normative approach related to Iran‘s regime identity and 
religious ideology, by asking what should happen and how people/state will behave, to the 
empirical approach, in accordance with Iran‘s foreign policy outcomes and the impact of 
its transformative power on the regional security system. This will be achieved by asking 
what has happened or why events occurred as they did, according to the four issues under 
analysis. 
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Owen (2007: 154) argues that since the Islamic Republic of Iran was established, 
―religiously inspired political movements‖ have escalated. Moreover, Owen (2007) writes 
that religious ideology, along with Islamic identity and revolutionary values, played a 
crucial role, not only during the process for rebuilding state and nation, but also in shaping 
policies and distributing power. Thus, the combination of ideology and power is an 
appropriate approach to explore motives and understand political actions (Owen, 2007; 
www.dohainstitute.org, 2010). Iran's regime has elements of a revolutionary approach and 
a religious/ideological approach, in order to attain its political/ religious agenda of 
defending the rights of all Muslims and expanding its influence into neighbouring states. 
Iran‘s regime uses Shiite factions, where they reside, and non-state actors, to achieve its 
goals (Al-Ghareib, 2005). 
 
To understand Iran‘s foreign policy, it is essential that the era of Ahmadinejad (2005-2009 
and 2009-2013), one of the most conservative leaders and believer in Khomeini's 
principles and the Islamic Revolution, is discussed. Takeyh (2003, 2007) stresses that 
Ahmadinejad is an Islamic revolutionist, who continuously looks to the Middle East region 
as if it were a battlefield between the forces of secular evil and those who adhere to the 
Islamic identity. In order for Iran to achieve its ideological/political strategic agenda, 
domestic and external organisations and parties have been established as proxies for Iran‘s 
foreign policy to export principles of the Islamic revolution. As a result, ―several socio-
political movements and asymmetric warfare have occurred, for instance, Iraq, Lebanon, 
Israel, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Kuwait‖ (Al-Nefisy et al, 2008: 51). Hezbollah 
is a clear example of Shiite movements and Islamic resistance units (militia) that direct and 
manage the Iranian regime in Tehran (Fuller, 2006; Levitt, 2012). The Islamic Republic of 
Iran has always sought to improve transnational ties with Shiite groups in the Middle 
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Eastern countries, and the consequences of this relationship have escalated political 
domestic conflicts and regional security tensions, such as in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and 
elsewhere.  
       
2.8.   Regional Instability and the New Security Dilemma 
 
Although the security dilemma lies at the heart of structural realist theory, this thesis takes 
religious ideology, Islamic identity and revolutionary values into consideration according 
to constructivism, to explore how the security dilemma works in the Middle East. Due to 
the fact that the Iranian regime uses an ideological agenda, domestically and 
internationally, Iran's foreign policy has sought to spread this ideology by using proxies, 
non-state actors and Shiite factions that exist in other Middle Eastern states (www.fas.org, 
2006). Indeed, ideology and power play a decisive role, by maintaining the strategic 
interests of Iran‘s foreign policy and expanding its influence, as well as providing 
legitimacy to its policies (Barzegar, 2008). In this context, the strategic interests of Iran are 
based on the expansion of its influence on the Middle East region, by using all of its 
security means and unconventional capabilities (Shoamanesh, 2012; www.kayhan.ir, 2015). 
Debate on Iran‘s strategic role in the region, particularly from the perspective of the Iraqi 
Shiite thinker, Sabah Alkhozai, was shown on Al-Mustakillah TV on 27 June 2008 and 24 
January 2009; (see www.almustakillah.com/, 2008, 2009) video in Arabic language. 
 
Power does not always mean military force. Kagan et al (2012) argue that there are other 
dimensions of power such as economies, politics and ideology. Ideology is a cornerstone in 
Iran‘s foreign policy and is considered one of the most powerful methods to cross all Shiite 
sects and factions, not only in the Middle East, but also around the world (Jawada, 2007). 
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Since 1979, the Islamic Republic of Iran has continued to pursue coordinated strategies 
which combine both offensive and defensive strategies by using instruments of soft power, 
along with unconventional warfare through its ideological proxies to promote its 
geopolitical agenda and consolidate Tehran‘s position in the region (Kagan et al, 2012). 
The ideological factor is a strong instrument of power that links the Supreme Leader with 
Shiite sects. The expansion of Shiite ideology in post-invasion Iraq provides Iran, 
especially after the fall of the barrier of Baathist ideology and pan-Arabism and Saddam's 
influence and power, with the purpose of preparing for the arrival of the Imam AL-Mahdi 
(AL-Sader et al, 2004). Until Imam AL-Mahdi comes to power, clergies take the 
leadership to exercise the rule on behalf of the Imam (Jawada, 2007).    
 
The existing regional security dilemma reflects the interactions among states within an 
anarchic environment, present as a result of the absence of an active international system 
that controls the political relationships among its members (Leuprecht, 2010). Accordingly, 
each country seeks to protect and enhance its security needs and requirements, which 
creates more chaos regionally and internationally, especially for neighbouring countries, in 
terms of attaining a balance of power and counterbalance with each other (Griffiths et al, 
2008). As a result, an action-reaction dynamic between states creates a gap of uncertainty 
and mutual mistrust, which turns the security dilemma into an unending cycle (Booth et al, 
2008: 4-5).   
 
On the other hand, the existing regional security dilemma in the Middle East is not only 
based on relative distribution of conventional power in the structural dynamic of the 
international system; it also creates a fundamentalist mainstream among certain people and 
sects (believers in the Shiism of the Islamic Revolution of Iran). This situation leads to 
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intra-state divisions according to ideological/ religious faiths, and identities (Puelings, 
2010). Bilgin (2005: 125) argues that some fundamentalist groups and parties, such as 
Hezbollah, have attempted "to capture the state mechanism". Hezbollah is not under the 
control of the Lebanese Government. Indeed, Lebanon and Hezbollah are the best 
examples by which to assess the influence of Iran‘s foreign policy in the region.  
 
After 2003, new players have provided non-state actors and Shiite factions with 
unconventional and asymmetric capabilities in most Middle East countries, such as Iraq, 
Lebanon, Israel, the Gulf States, Egypt, and Yemen, for instance (Puelings, 2010; 
www.yemeress.com, 2014). A new player, the so-called Islamic state (IS), has its own 
leader with no control by other states on its action and behaviour, as in the case with Iran 
and Hezbollah. Sunni Islamic jihadist movements such as al-Qaeda have droven the 
security situation into more complexity by attacking civilian targets across the world (e.g. 
U.S., UK, Indonesia, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Yemen, for instance) (Nemer, 2003; 
Hoffman, 2006; Al- Oraibi, 2006). 
 
2.9.   Conclusion 
 
This chapter provided a detailed formulation of the underlying Islamic epistemological 
approach of the Shiite school, which is one of the main Islamic sources and philosophies in 
Islamic political thought, by focusing on the largest branch of Shiite Twelvers. The Shiites 
Twelver School provides legitimacy to the Islamic movement (AL-Sader et al, 2004; 
Jawada, 2007; Al-Nefisy et al, 2008). Most importantly, the issue of leadership (caliphate) 
in the Islamic world has been a major point of conflict between two main approaches 
(Sunnis and Shiites) in the Arab nation and the Islamic world (Kamrava, 2005). In this 
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sense, the central conflict of the issue of leadership and the ideological power struggle was 
based on Iran's legacy and Khomeini's political theology that shaped its foreign policy in 
line with the revolutionary values and the Imam's idea. Ideas do not move and evolve in a 
vacuum, but rather grow and develop in the context of historical and social reality 
(Mahfouz, 2006). Hence, the chapter stressed the history of ideas in Iranian politics, in the 
shadow of social, natural and cultural factors, and provided the analytical framework to 
explore the laws of intellectual development and regeneration as cultural factors.  
 
The chapter attempted to link concepts, variables and assumptions within an analytical 
framework of Positivist and Post-positivist theories. In the realm of Positivist/rationalist 
approaches, neo-realism, for instance, the thesis discussed causal explanations in terms of 
why and how power is exercised. Post-positivist theories such as constructivism came to 
play a significant role, stressing the importance of cultural determinants, national and 
religious heritage. Post-positivism asks fundamental questions: What is power? How it is 
experienced? How is it reproduced? 
 
The next chapter will focus on the domestic hierarchy of the Iranian political system and 
the dynamic interactions among intervening variables, clerical institutions and 
governmental institutions, that shape Iran's foreign policy. 
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 Chapter Three 
 
Internal Structure of Iran's Political System: Key Drivers for Foreign Policy  
 
3.1.   Introduction  
 
The main objective of this chapter is to give an insight into the domestic structure of Iran's 
political system in the context of power politics and different power centres, formal 
institutions and informal networks. This chapter discusses patterns of procedural 
complexities of Iranian institutions and the interactions between the rings of power 
dominated by clerical institutions. This chapter, therefore, explores the interactions in the 
power structure through the broad authority of the supreme leader. It will attempt to 
explain the interaction between governmental authorities that run the country internally 
and externally, and the enormous authority derived from the Iranian constitution, acting on 
behalf of the supreme leader, sometimes causing conflict between conservatives and 
reformers. The pragmatic policy of Rafsanjani's presidency and moderate Khatami 
Presidency will be discussed, as well as the decision structure, domestic opposition groups, 
and interest groups, in order to explain the patterns of change in Iran's foreign policy.  
 
Moreover, regime identity, nationalism and decision-makers that make up the intervening 
variables will be examined closely. Beside the pivotal role of the intervening variables, the 
religious dimension of three substantial drivers such as Ideologies, Pan-Islamism and 
Revolutionary Shiism play crucial roles in the decision-making process to determine 
interests, likely behaviour and actions. These three substantial drivers will be assessed 
within the framework of Iran‘s deployment of its main instruments of soft power, in order 
to understand Iranian political system catalysts, which may also be perceived as key 
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catalysts and drivers behind Iran‘s foreign policy. Soft power as a main tool could be used 
to garner support from minority communities in the region, in particular, and the Islamic 
street, in general, who are looking for a champion.  
 
3.2.   The Pattern of Interactions Between Power and Policy: A Theoretical Approach 
 
In order to understand the theoretical principles behind state behaviour, the black box of 
internal political system needs to be opened, to explore patterns of interactions between 
domestic actors. States behave differently due to differences in the internal structure of the 
political system. For example, while democratic systems stress equality of rights under the 
law among all actors, and institutionalise participation in the political process, especially in 
the decision making process, the leader‘s orientations play a strong role in shaping 
decisions and directing foreign policy in other, non-democratic, systems (AL-Suwaidi, 
2014). The question of whether the Iranian regime, run by the supreme leader with clerics 
and the Revolutionary Guard, is based on institutional rationality goes to the very heart of 
the debate. This debate is about which institution in Iran's power structure runs the foreign 
policy. This section will use neorealism (structural realism) to explain the influence of 
international/regional system on state behaviour; in addition, neoclassical realism 
combined with constructivism will be applied to explain domestic political factors and 
religious ideology, when examining the mechanism of decision making. 
 
Since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Iran's foreign policy has shifted from radical to 
pragmatic, and back to radical. It is important to explain the four different historical 
periods of Iran's modern history. These historical periods are: Firstly, radical in 1980s 
during Imam Khomeini‘s leadership; secondly, pragmatic in late 1980s and most of the 
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1990s during Rafsanjani‘s Presidency; thirdly, moderate in late 1990s and early 2000s 
during Khatami‘s Presidency; lastly, radical from 2005 to 2013 during Ahmadinejad‘s 
Presidency. 
 
During the first period (1980s), Iranian behaviour was radical and revolutionary. Iran did 
what it could to accomplish its strategic objectives through a radical foreign policy. The 
Islamic Republic of Iran endeavoured to export its revolution to its Arab neighbours, 
especially the Gulf oil states (Hinnebusch et al, 2002). The Iranian regime also rejected 
any proposal to stop the eight years of war with Iraq, when Iraq was eager to do so. This is 
due to its effort to overthrow the Ba‘ath regime in Baghdad, which would help achieve its 
major objective, to spread the revolutionary doctrine across the region. Furthermore, the 
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini issued a fatwa (legal opinion) on 14 February 1989, 
ordering Muslims to kill Salman Rushdie, due to the publication of his novel, The Satanic 
Verses, as well as his publishers. Such radical discourses and actions led to a political 
isolation and economic sanctions on the Iranian regime. 
 
According to neorealism, changes in Iran's foreign policy came in response to the 
development of the international/regional events. On this basis, the state responds to 
regional threats, international challenges and the uncertainties of regional anarchy 
(Morgenthau, revised by Kenneth & Clinton, 1948, 1993; Waltz, 1979; Collins, 2007). 
This response may be in the form of defence, for security, or offensive, for more influence 
abroad. Thus, when Iran is at war with its neighbours, its foreign policy will be radical. 
However, in times of peace, Iran behaves pragmatically (for example, towards Caspian and 
Central Asian states).  
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After the 1979 revolution, Iran became a radical state, as a result of the Iraqi attack and the 
support of some Arab states and Western countries given to Iraq (Ansari, 2006). Iran took 
a strategic rational decision and behaved radically, in order to restore its dignity.  
 
Why did Iran behave radically after Khomeini came to power in 1979? It is hard to argue 
that the structure of the international system drove Iran to the radicalisation, as neorealists 
would maintain. While neorealism can provide a logical explanation for why Iran became 
more radical in the 1980s, it cannot explain why Iran's regime became radical initially. In 
other words, despite the war with Iraq and the increase in oil prices, Iran's foreign policy 
was radical before these international/regional events occurred. The Iranian hostage crisis 
(04 November 1979, to 20 January 1981), for example, had taken place before Iraq 
attacked Iran. Iran adopted a religious ideology in order to achieve geopolitical objectives 
through exporting the Islamic revolution to the regional states, before the increase in oil 
prices. It could be argued that these international/regional factors did not give rise to 
radicalism, as much as provided reasons for Iran's leaders to enhance their radical 
orientations and redefine Iran's behaviour. 
 
During the second period (late 1980s and the most of the 1990s), however, Iran's foreign 
policy shifted from radical to pragmatic. After Khomeini‘s death in 1989, pragmatism 
became an approach for Iran's foreign policy during the administration of President 
Rafsanjani 1989 – 1997, which led to prominent changes in Iran's foreign affairs, towards 
being more open to the world, including Western countries. This change in foreign affairs 
was to combine economic change and balance realism and ideology (Yaqubi, 2009).  
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Rafsanjani began to refashion the role of religious ideology and revolutionary ideals, 
particularly in Iran‘s state identity. He realised that Iran could not modify the region‘s 
political map. He attempted to adjust Iran's foreign policy to deal with a new balance of 
power in the region, where the U.S. had been playing an important role in creating this 
balance of power. He endeavoured to initiate relations with Iran's neighbours, such as the 
Gulf states, notably Saudi Arabia. However, the Islamic revolution‘s principles remained 
present in the orientation of Iran's foreign policy. 
 
 Neorealism can explain why Iran's regime agreed to stop the war with Iraq in 1988 and 
why it became less radical and more pragmatic in the late 1980s. The neorealist would 
argue that Iranian leadership had agreed to stop the war with Iraq due to the pressure of the 
international/regional system to do so, especially after the military support to Iraq by the 
U.S., alongside some regional and international powers (e.g. the Gulf states and France). 
Therefore, Iranian leaders took a rational decision to stop the war, in order to conserve 
their regime and their revolution. Otherwise, Iran would confront serious challenges and 
unexpected repercussions. 
 
On the other hand, neorealism cannot provide a precise explanation for the shift in Iranian 
orientation from radical to pragmatic after Khomeini‘s death in mid-1989, because there 
was no significant change in the international system that might affect Iran directly. The 
question that needs to be asked is: why did Iran not establish good relations with its 
immediate neighbours, to mitigate its political isolation, neutralise them, and/ or to protect 
itself from acquiring more enemies? 
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During the third period (late 1990s and early 2000s), Mohammad Khatami was elected 
(1997 to 2005). He adopted a reformist approach, alongside the policies of a pragmatist 
approach. However, these policies encountered a number of political differences in 
domestic issues. These political differences led to the decline of the reformist component 
within the Islamic Consultative Assembly of Iran (Majles). The hard-line offensive against 
the reformists was part of a campaign to frustrate Khatami and his cabinet, and it was also 
a tactic used to weaken the pro-Khatami wing of the government, ahead of his presidential 
re-election in 2001. Despite the conservative wing's campaign against reformists, Khatami 
was re-elected with an overwhelming 77 percent of the vote. Internally, Khatami's 
government adopted some new values, such as civil society, freedom of speech, the rule of 
law and pluralism (Muhafaza, 2013). 
 
In addition, Iran tried to improve its reputation in international society, so the focus of 
Iran‘s foreign policy was on detente, dialogue of civilisations, besides the normalisation of 
Iran‘s relations with most other countries, including the U.S., but excluding Israel. 
Moreover, Khatami sought to reshape Iran‘s identity into one that adhered to international 
norms and acted in accordance with international institutions and conventions. He also 
stressed the importance of mutual respect and the need for peaceful coexistence, despite 
differences among states within international relations. This marked a departure from the 
state identity of the Khomeini era. This reformist approach with its new perspective 
brought about conflict between reformists (who sought to reduce the absolute authority of 
the Supreme Leader) and conservatives (who aimed to maintain religious power, 
revolutionary guards and political hegemony through repression and manipulation of the 
electoral process). 
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According to the neorealist explanation, U.S. military presence in the region made the 
Iranian leadership anxious not to antagonise the U.S., as the balance of power was/is on the 
side of the U.S. A military confrontation would bring defeat and humiliation to Iran. It 
could also be argued that Iran's political elites thought that reducing regional tensions and 
building good relations with the Gulf states, for instance, would force U.S. troops to leave 
the region. Otherwise, any radical policy towards regional states would escalate the tension, 
and drive some regional states to reinforce their security and military relations with the 
U.S., to secure themselves from the Iranian threat. However, as the U.S. military presence 
in the region has not changed since the 1990s, and oil prices did not change significantly 
since the mid-1980s, neorealism cannot provide a clear explanation why Iran shifted its 
behaviour from pragmatic to moderate in the late 1990s. 
 
Lastly, the 2004 parliamentary and 2005 presidential elections heralded the advent of a 
new era of Khomeinist ideologues, who aimed to revive the militant values of the Islamic 
Revolution of 1979, which were a setback to Khatami‘s achievements. Ahmadinejad 
(2005-2013) stressed the importance of clerical government and gave credence to a 
strategy to expand the role of ideologues, especially the Islamic Revolutionary Guard 
Corps (IRGC), in the country‘s economic and political activities, and, more importantly, 
curtail the progress of the reform movement in the electoral process.  
 
Iran's foreign policy shifted and became radical again between 2005 and 2013 (Takeyh, 
2007; www.english.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13940626000405, 2015). This can be 
seen in three prominent changes: Firstly, support for revolutionary groups of non-state 
actors in the Middle East region, in order to act for Iran as proxies of its foreign policy. 
Secondly, a revival in hardline rhetoric in Iran's international relations, by targeting some 
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countries in the Middle East as well as outside the region, particularly the U.S. 
administration and Israel. Thirdly, a challenge to the Western superpowers by following-up 
its nuclear programme, which led to increased skepticism and suspicion over Iran‘s 
behaviour. 
 
For Ahmadinejad, Islam was the only option for Iran's regime across all components of 
society, in accordance with the political-religious thoughts of Khomeini (Takeyh, 2010: 
37). Arguably, Iranian foreign policy has continuously been advancing Khomeini's 
political and Shiite religious thought, and implementing the Islamic Revolution principles 
since 1979. Tension between Iran and its Arab neighbours has escalated. Terrorist 
incidents in Iraq, political disturbance in Lebanon, chaos in Yemen, and most importantly 
the sectarian violence in the region, have been seen as evidence of renewed rivalry 
between major players (Iran with its regional allies e.g. Iraq, Syria and Lebanese 
Hezbollah, against most of Arab states and in particular, the Gulf states, Jordan, Egypt and 
Yemen). 
 
Neorealism can explain to some extent why Iran has become radical again. The presence of 
U.S. military forces in Afghanistan and in Iraq, including in the Gulf region, in addition to 
threats of a military attack against Iran's nuclear facilities, have led Iranian leaders to 
behave radically, in order to protect its national security and strategic interests. Therefore, 
neorealism would justify the assertive foreign policy of Iran‘s regime and its approach 
towards nuclear power, and even to acquire weapons of mass destruction (Booth et al, 
2008). Additionally, the increase of oil prices supports Iran's budget and reinforces its 
economy. This has given Iran's leaders the instrument to follow an assertive policy and 
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develop the country‘s military power, which might include developing Iran's nuclear 
activities and the development of ballistic missile systems. 
 
However, while neorealism argues that the structure of the international system and 
regional situation in the Gulf area, and the U.S. threats against Iran, have led and forced 
Iran to behave radically since 2005, the threats against Iran did not start in 2005. The 
anarchic situation in the region and sources of ongoing instability has existed for decades. 
Why did Iran not adopt a radical strategy 2001–2002?  
 
Realists argue that rational state actors pursue their national interests in accumulating 
power to ensure security in an anarchic world. Hence, the state needs to obtain material 
resources and reinforce its power capabilities in anticipation of any possible confrontation 
(Jackson et al, 2007). Neoclassical realists argue that the actions of states in the 
international system can be explained in accordance with several variables. These variables 
include the distribution of power capabilities, perception towards other states' intentions, 
and domestic factors such as state institutions, elites and societal actors. 
 
In contrast, a constructivist perspective sees the international system as composed of the 
social interactions, regime identity, and the meanings or ideas, rather than material power 
(Hopf, 1998). From this perspective, beliefs, ideologies and a leader‘s personality may 
guide leaders‘ decisions in line with personal history. The revolutionary tendencies of 
some Iranian leaders, such as Ayatollah Imam Khomeini, Ayatollah Imam Khamenei and 
Ahmadinejad, for example, may have taught them that certain values and religious 
ideology are the way of handling problems and dealing with other states. 
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3.2.1. Power Structures of the Political System of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
 
The political regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran is a mix of presidential democracy and 
theocracy, underpinned in religious and revolutionary principles, in accordance with 
syncretic politics guided by an Islamist ideology (Al-Ghareib, 2005; Al-Nefisy et al, 2008). 
In other words, its political system is based upon the timeless sovereignty of political- 
religious authority, according to the Iranian constitution, which granted the highest 
authority in the political hierarchy to the supreme leader, in Article 107 (Takeyh, 2007). 
 
The institutional structure of the Iranian regime is based on the post-revolutionary 
constitution, which accommodates a wide range of clerical views, particularly Khomeini‘s. 
Rakel (2008) however, argues that in the power circle of Iran's political system there is an 
ideological rivalry between the political elites and the clerical elites, which has led to 
critical debates concerning the power of the supreme leader, according to Wilayat Al-
Faqih's theory. The question of what role Islam has and the scope of clerical authority in 
the political arena have resulted in significant problems between conservatives and 
reformers (Takeyh, 2010).   
 
Moslem (2002: 33-34 in Rakel, 2008: 52) stated that "the formal political power structure 
of the Islamic republic of Iran is composed of the supreme leader and three sets of 
institutions, which are the religious supervisory bodies, the republican institutions and the 
religious foundations". The Iranian constitution and the doctrine of Wilayat Al-Faqih 
provide the supreme leader with broad powers for expanding his authority over political 
and religious institutions, by allowing him to engage in the process of decision-making 
(Nemani, 1998).    
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The republic‘s legislative, judicial and executive branches operate within a modern 
democratic system, but they face constraints and challenges, particularly the influence of 
religious foundations upon the mechanism of the decision-making process. In this context, 
the religious foundations play a crucial role in propagating the ideology of the Iranian 
regime and have become one of the major actors in the power struggle among clerical and 
political elites, especially for supporting conservatives financially (Takeyh, 2010). 
Notwithstanding the fact that such institutions claim to be charities and act with the official 
governmental institutions, they are responsible for the supreme leader and his local 
representatives, and the government has no control over their activities (Kagan, 2009). On 
the other hand, due to the absence of legal political parties within the structure of the 
power system in Iran, the informal power structure including political and clerical factions, 
and by virtue of their status in state's institutions which represent various segments of 
Iranian society, they exercise their influence on the political decision-makers and political 
discourse, directly or indirectly.  
 
Accordingly, the political system of Iran combines elements of Islamic ideology with 
elements of democracy. The Iranian governmental philosophy is torn between the 
influence of religion upon domestic and external political processes and the framework of 
parliamentary democracy. The process of political elections, for instance, takes place 
within legal, political, and religious structures of the executive branches of the government 
and is overseen by three bodies that are dominated by clergy: the Assembly of Experts, the 
Expediency Council, and the Council of Guardians. This process serves the status quo of 
the conservative regime, in order to maintain the theological power structure.  
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In this context, the political structure of the Iranian regime has two main aspects: Islamic 
law and the peoples‘ will. Elections point to the rule of the people, religious doctrine 
confers legitimacy to religious practices and ensures the role of the clergy and thus 
undermines the role of the people. The Iranian constitution in Article 4 mentions "All civil, 
penal, financial, economic, administrative, cultural, military, political, and other laws and 
regulations must be based on Islamic criteria. This principle applies absolutely and 
generally to all articles of the constitution as well as to all other laws and regulations, and 
the fuqaha' of the Guardian Council are judges in this matter" (Alamdari, 2009). It is 
important to note that, although parliament (majlis) is elected directly by the people for 
four years, all parliamentary candidates shall be subject to the approval of the Guardians 
Council, and this even applies to the selection of the president. Rakel (2008: 54) said of the 
Guardian Council that it has "supreme oversight of the elections for the majlis, the 
Assembly of Experts and the presidency". The distinct role of the supreme leader is clearly 
reflected in his control of the Guardians Council, through the appointment of half of the 
Council's members (six clerical), while the other half are appointed by the parliament, but 
after the recommendation of the head of the judiciary appointed by the supreme leader 
(article 110 [6] [b] constitution Iran), which eventually means that the supreme leader 
controls the composition of the Guardians Council (www.parstimes.com, 1979). Takeyh 
(2007), hence, argues that the function of the Guardians Council undermines the 
parliament's elected authorities, as long as the parliament does not have full sovereignty 
over its decisions without the presence of the Guardians Council.  
 
The Iranian constitution of 1979, and an amendment in 1989, established the country as an 
Islamic Republic and put into place a mixed system of government, in which the executive, 
parliament, and judiciary are overseen by several bodies dominated by the clergy (Takeyh, 
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2007). Kinzer (2006) argues that the justification for the mixed system in Iran's regime can 
be found in Wilayat Al-Faqih's theory, which gives the supreme leader the duty and 
extended authority in politics and religion. Therefore, at the head of the state and 
overseeing all institutions is the supreme leader, and the president is the second most 
powerful person of the political elite who exercises executive powers, except in matters 
relating to the supreme leader (Takeyh, 2010). More importantly, foreign policy and the 
armed forces are not under the president's control, but rather they are under the control of 
the supreme leader (Sadjadpour, 2009). 
 
3.2.2. Domestic Political Factors and the Dynamics of Iran's Foreign Policy      
 
The domestic structure of Iran's political system has different power centres of religio-
political elites. Leaders‘ orientations, the decision structure, domestic opposition groups, 
and interest groups are factors that can help explain the changes in Iran's foreign policy 
since 1979.  
 
These domestic factors will be used to answer the following questions: do leaders‘ 
orientations cause these changes, and if so, how? Does Iran's decision structure allow 
diverse actors to participate in decision making? If so, how can that shape and affect Iran's 
foreign policy? Is there an active domestic opposition? If so, how much pressure do these 
groups exert on foreign policy-makers? Moreover, do interest groups play a role in 
determining the final decision? If so, how can these groups press on political agendas? And 
finally, how much power does Iran's government have? 
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As to the patterns of leaders‘ orientations, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, is not only a 
pillar of Iran's political system, but also left a legacy in the form of the Iranian constitution 
and a powerful foreign policy doctrine (Khomeini, 1970). For example, Khomeini‘s 
thoughts shaped Iran's foreign policy while he was in power. As a consequence, Iran 
started its radical policy by exporting its revolution to its neighbors, such as Iraq and the 
Gulf States, as well as supporting revolutionary groups in some countries in the region, 
which became part of Iran's foreign policy. After Rafsanjani came to power with a 
pragmatic perspective, Iranian foreign policy attempted to reform by solving internal 
problems, as well as emerge from international isolation and economic sanctions (Kinzer, 
2006). President Khatami adopted a new approach reflected in Iran‘s moderate foreign 
policy. This new approach aimed to reduce tensions and start a dialogue with the world, 
except the US and Israel (Ansari, 2006). As Ahmadinejad, he immediately brought Iran‘s 
foreign policy back to the old days of Khomeini (Takeyh, 2003, 2007). He expressed his 
radical approach in his speech acts against Israel and the U.S., as well as in his foreign 
policy, through supporting non-state actors of revolutionary groups in the region.  
 
The decision structure is a very important factor in demonstrating how different domestic 
groups are dealt with and in understanding the scope of participation in decision making. 
Furthermore, it helps to assess structures of authority and state behaviour over different 
periods. It indicates who has the ultimate authority and the power to employ the economic 
resources of the state, as well as material forces towards a particular course of action in 
foreign policy. 
 
The decision structure in Iran authorises specific domestic actors to intervene and 
participate in foreign policy. Although opposition in parliament, for example, did not play 
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a major role during Khomeini‘s era, they played a strong role during the periods of 
Rafsanjani and Khatami (Kinzer, 2006). This can be seen in the opposition of 
conservatives in parliament towards Rafsanjani's foreign and economic policies, especially 
towards the U.S. Conservatives exercised their power to stop Khatami‘s moderate policy in 
the peace process between the Palestinian Authority and Israel, as well as towards the U.S. 
One must bear in mind that, despite the activity of domestic actors and political institutions 
in the decision process, the Iranian constitution grants the supreme leader a major role and 
ultimate authority in the decision process and in directing Iran's foreign policy. 
 
Participation in decision making does not necessary mean that decisions will be 
implemented. Despite the fact that the constitution of Iran allows the Islamic Republic's 
body politic to practise its role, and shows different actors their roles in decision making to 
some extent, these actors still need to follow the articles of the Constitution, revolutionary 
principles and the supreme leader's orientations. For example, whereas the president is 
elected by the people democratically, to be at the head of the executive branch (the head of 
the state), the supreme leader has the last word in any decision that the president takes. 
Thus, the president who is elected directly by the public is the second most powerful man, 
after the supreme leader (Sadjadpour, 2010). In accordance to the Iranian constitution of 
1979 and after revising the constitution in 1989, the supreme leader is given overwhelming 
power in making state policy. 
 
The influence of domestic opposition groups also needs to be discussed. It has been argued 
that "there are three areas of oppositions that make them very strong: first, divisions within 
the leadership itself, second, organised groups operating within (or having access to) state 
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and party institutions, third, mass-level activity in the wider political environment" (Hagan 
et al, 1995: 135). 
 
Two issues need to be addressed when discussing political domestic opposition. First, is 
the division within the ruling party? Is the central leadership fragmented? If so, there is 
strong opposition to the leadership. Second, we need to look at types of domestic 
opposition outside the ruling party and see how much they challenge the leadership. There 
is military opposition, opposition actors in parliament, and/or other political parties and/or 
groups. Moreover, how does the leadership respond to opposition inside and outside the 
ruling party? If opposition groups are very powerful in affecting foreign policy, the leader 
needs to find a middle ground solution in the decision making process. Otherwise, political 
opposition may play a strong role by constraining the domestic politics of the leadership, 
which could affect the direction of foreign policy. 
 
Indeed, domestic opposition groups who were amongst ruling elites in Iran played a strong 
role in the decision making process, which impacted Iran's foreign policy. The hostage 
crisis in 1979 and the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) are good examples. Rafsanjani was 
confronted by radical opposition groups in parliament, during his first term, and he also 
faced strong opposition from conservative figures and groups inside and outside parliament, 
during his second term (Rakel, 2008). As a consequence, Rafsanjani found it difficult to 
implement his integrated domestic and foreign policies. Furthermore, Khatami faced a 
severe challenge from conservative figures and groups inside and outside parliament, 
especially from the armed forces, which affected the outcomes of his plans, in terms of 
Iran's foreign policy. 
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While there is opposition inside and outside parliament, opposition also comes from the 
armed forces. The armed forces played an important role in the late 1990s in opposing 
Khatami‘s moderate policy. Commanders (all of whom are appointed by the supreme 
leader, not the president) warned Khatami about his moderate foreign and economic 
policies. In addition, the armed forces played an active role in supporting Ahmadinejad‘s 
radical policy, which is fundamental for him to propel and show his visions. He used the 
armed forces to show the world the Iranian capability to confront its challengers.  
 
Of the greatest importance is the role and authority of the supreme leader (Sadjadpour, 
2010). The supreme leader can draw and direct the general policy of the Islamic Republic 
of Iran, and then the president and his cabinet implement it. Rafsanjani received strong 
support from Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader, for his pragmatic policy 
after Khomeini‘s death. Without this strong support, he would have found it very hard to 
implement his pragmatic policy. In contrast, the supreme leader prevented Rafsanjani and 
then Khatami from advancing their policies towards the United States. Therefore, the role 
of the supreme leader within the Iranian decision structure cannot be ignored, since he is 
the number one figure in Iranian foreign policy.  
 
Finally, the role of interest groups needs to be considered. Iranian society has experienced 
active relations among the major socio-economic interest groups, such as bazaars 
(marketplaces), as well as conservative clerics, before and after the revolution. Before the 
revolution, the bazaars, for example, assisted the Islamic Revolution and continued to be 
staunch supporters of the regime. In addition to bazaars, some economic groups and 
organisations, such as the Dispossessed Foundation, supported by conservative clerics, also 
played a role in shaping Iran's foreign policy in accordance with principles of the Islamic 
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Revolution. Since the early 1990s, Iranian bazaars, guilds and the Dispossessed 
Foundation have played central roles in the economic and political history of the country. 
By having close relations with different groups inside parliament, these interest groups 
could stop Rafsanjani and then Khatami from opening the door to foreign investment that 
might go against their interests and reduce their benefits.  
 
Scholars such as Snyder (1991) argue that socio-economic interest groups can direct 
foreign policies. Since each community has interest groups, these groups seek to get their 
own business done. However, because each group has a different agenda, sometimes they 
compete with each other, which weakens them and prevents them from pursuing their 
objectives. These groups need to strengthen their positions by seeking to unify their goals. 
 
These domestic factors help explain the changes in Iran's foreign policy since 1979. They 
explain why Iran was radical in the 1980s, pragmatic in the late 1980s and the most of the 
1990s, moderate in the late 1990s and early 2000s, and radical again between 2005 and 
2013. Domestic factors can demonstrate why the state changes its policy from time to time, 
even though the regime structure stays the same.  
 
3.3.   The Extended Arms of the Supreme Leader       
 
As supreme leader, Khamenei exercises both direct and indirect control over the executive, 
legislative and judicial branches of the Iranian regime, as well as the military sector 
(Sadjadpour, 2010). He also transformed the Revolutionary Guard Corps into a pivotal 
player in the spheres of political, economic, educational, media cultural, religious, military, 
and security. This transformation reinforced Ayatollah Khamenei's authority. This 
    
93 
 
authority gives him influence on others (Shiite sects) even when they reside in other states 
and communities. The supreme leader is appointed for life by the Assembly of Experts, 
"there are no limits on the leader's term in office, but the Assembly of Experts may remove 
the leader from office if they find that he is unable to execute his duties" (Kinzer, 2006: 
146). Although the constitutional reforms in 1989 gave the president more powers in the 
field of Foreign Affairs, through the abolition of the post of Prime Minister, the Iranian 
constitution of 1979, and the power structure of Iran, gives tremendous power to the 
supreme leader, as he is the ultimate source of political power and spiritual authority in the 
country (Smyth, 2012). Besides his authority to guide and control general policies (internal 
and external) for the Islamic Republic of Iran and to have supreme command of the Armed 
Forces, there are other informal bodies under his authority, although they have no legal 
status in the constitution (Nemani, 1998).   
 
These institutions are "the Office of the Representatives of the Supreme Leader, the 
Association of Friday Prayer Leaders, and the Special Court for the Clergy". Their 
responsibility is to ensure that the path of the Islamic revolution remains undisturbed. 
These institutions penetrate all aspects of Iranian society, civilian and military institutions 
(Rakel, 2008:54). Rakel (2008: 55) argues that "the Friday Prayers have been very 
influential in setting the tone on important political issues, especially foreign policy issues". 
Thus, the Association of Friday Prayer Leaders carries out crucial duties to determine the 
speech acts of Iran's foreign policy. 
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3.4.   The Three Intervening Variables  
 
Neoclassical realists argue that the nature of the power structure of domestic politics has an 
impact on Iran's foreign policy (Lobell et al, 2007, 2009: 1-4). They propose three 
intervening variables as essential factors to identify the transformative power of Iran's 
foreign policy. As mentioned earlier, these intervening variables (control variables) are 
regime identity, nationalism, and decision-makers. These variables help explain the 
relationship between two variables which follow an independent variable (Iran‘s use of 
ideological proxies), but precede the dependent variable (the foreign policy outcome) in a 
causal sequence. In order to explore Iran‘s behaviour and outcomes of its transformative 
power, Zakaria (in Taliaferro, 2006) argues that we need to analyse regime identity in 
terms of its ability to use legitimate power resources available, such as ideologies, and 
implement these through its foreign policy after decision-making. Religion has been used 
as a political tool to gain power. Religious ideology has been used to gain authority, 
expand internal influence and maximise regional and international power (Bashiriyeh in 
www.mideasti.org, 2009). 
 
3.4.1.   A Regime Identity 
 
The concept of identity is at the centre of constructivist theory, which is crucial in both 
domestic and international politics. In Hopf's words, (1998: 71) "identity performs three 
necessary functions in society: they tell you and others who you are and they tell you who 
others are". Hence, each version of ‗you‘ is a product of your relationships with others 
(Hopf, 1998). The word identity refers to a person's purpose within a social relationship. 
The bottom line is, we have different identities based on who we are with, where we are, 
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the situation (socially and politically) we are in. In this sense, identity and politics are 
interconnected. As with other drivers, such as religious ideology, state identity implies its 
preferences and consequent actions. A state understands others and perceives threats to its 
security in line with the individual characteristics of identity, including cultural values, the 
nature of ideologies, and motivations that reflect behaviour and actions. In this sense, 
regime identity is the build-up of principles that determine the state‘s foreign policy 
orientation. In this thesis, the term state identity indicates the state‘s perception and 
understanding of the role it should play and its status among other states.  
 
In the case of Iran, regime identity is derived from its cultural and authentic identity as an 
Islamic nation. Initially, after the Islamic Revolution, Iranian leaders self-consciously 
pursued Islamic objectives in foreign policy. In a similar vein, Iran is a self-professed 
revolutionary state. Regime identity, however, refers to a particular set of ideas about a 
certain political society in which policy-makers use and drawn on to legitimate the general 
orientation of foreign policy in line with national interests (Aggestam, 1999). Ray Takeyh 
explains Iran's provocative foreign policy that helps it sustain an ideological identity. This 
can be found in the National Public Radio, 28 August 2012 (in www.npr. 
org/2012/08/28/160185199/ op-ed-irans-foreign-policy-driven-by-identity?ft= 1& f=1009,   
2012). 
 
Regime identity is a core variable between systemic pressures and foreign policy outcomes. 
Lobell et al (2009: 1-6) argue that regime identity is crucial in creating perceptions that 
determine state behaviour. Juneau (2009) argues that the process for the expansion of 
external interests came as a result of the regime's perception of its necessities and 
capabilities to increase power; therefore, the regime's identity determines interests by 
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prioritising alternatives. Juneau (2009) proposes a typology that is based on two key 
issues: state intentions and aspirations. In terms of intentions, the state may be content with 
the status quo, or have other inclinations and goals. As for aspirations, the state has options 
to be a small regional, or a great power.  
 
Iranian identity is both Persian nationalist, integrating all ethno-cultural peoples under one 
centralised authority, and Islamic Shiite, a universal political movement for socio-political 
reformation (Al-Ghareib, 2005; Al-Nefisy et al, 2008). These basic criteria of Persian 
nationalism and Islamic Shiite identity are derived from historical interactions between 
Iran's foreign activities with the surrounding environment that reconstructed Iran's identity 
today. Wendt Alezander (1992) argues that the historical framework of the nation 
constructs national identities. Accordingly, identities and actions come as a result of the 
way in which actors define their situations.  
  
The Persian Empire was defeated militarily by Greeks, Arabs, Mongols and Turks (Dake, 
2010). However, Iran, as other nations and states have done, has attempted to turn its 
military defeats into cultural victories. The cultural victories throughout history refer to the 
expansion of fundamentalist mainstream of Islamic Shiite, which provides legitimacy to 
Iran's actions towards other states, by using spiritual control over Arab and Islamic peoples 
to reinforce the Iranian regional role. Jamshid Amuzegar, the former Prime Minister of the 
Shah (in Forbis William, 1980), stated that Iran never lost its originality, despite the 
military and political collapses that confronted others throughout history. The Iranian 
regime with two identities, Persian and Islamist, demonstrates that interaction between 
state identity and conflict dictates Iran's position in the international-regional system, its 
alliances with non-states actors, and its foreign policy. 
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In this context, Al-Ghareib (2005) argues that the Persian heritage of cultural practices and 
the practices of Islamic Shiite ideology impacted upon regime identity and actions, placing 
it on the front line of confrontation with regional and international adversaries. Juneau 
(2009: 11), for instance, stated that "Iran's is a Shia, Persian, and religious government, 
living face to face and often in tension with Sunni, Arab, and conservative governments, 
many of which are monarchies". The bottom line is, every country has its own values and 
identity that constructs its foreign policy and provides legitimacy to its actions and 
behaviour. The Islamic Republic of Iran is no exception. 
  
It has been widely argued that, since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Iran‘s foreign policy 
has played and still plays an essential role in shaping the regime‘s identity (Al-Nefisy et al, 
2008; Al-Rashed, 2015). This can be seen through the nature and scope of the international 
relations between Iran and the rest of regional Arab countries (except Syrian and Iraqi 
regimes who share the same Shiite identity), as well as the U.S. and Israel (Fawcett, 2009). 
Most speech acts and hardline rhetoric of political and clerical Iranian elites challenge 
mutual interests between neighbouring states and the great power which reflects the role of 
Iran's regime identity upon state behaviour (Bilgin, 2005). 
 
3.4.2.    Nationalism 
 
Cottam (1979: 3) defines nationalism as ―a belief on the part of a large group of people that 
they comprise a political community, a nation, that is entitled to independent statehood, 
and a willingness of this group to grant their community a primary and the terminal 
loyalty‖. Accordingly, nationalism refers to independence and dignity, and deep sentiments 
for the history, culture and values of the nation, as well as the desire to protect and 
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preserve a national identity. Thus, the privilege of having Persian ethnicity and Islamic 
identities, being an ancient noble and imperial nation that controlled wide regions of the 
Middle East, and provided the world with a range of artistic, scientific, and architectural 
treasures (even before Islam came on the scene), created the Iranian self-image (Bar, 2004). 
On top of that, Iranian national identity reflects a sense of superiority over its Arab 
neighbours and pride in its pre- Islamic imperial past. In this context, Hinnebusch et al 
(2002) discuss Iran's external role as an Islamic actor in terms of its identity, which is 
derived from its historical importance and cultural superiority that has led Iran's foreign 
policy to a quest for regional supremacy. Iran regards itself as one of the oldest 
civilisations in the Middle East, which ―can and should have influence beyond its borders‖ 
(Hinnebusch et al, 2002: 286). Al-Ghareib (2005) argues that, in order to explain the 
influence of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the scope of its foreign policy, national 
identity should be considered part of the religion, ideology, and culture. Persian roots 
stretch back thousands of years, maintaining a strong connection to the past.  
 
Thaler et al (2010) argue that Iran‘s regime has used a sense of patriotism to gain greater 
support to reinforce its foreign policy. Indeed, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani used 
nationalist and Islamist ideology to justify Iran‘s right to name the region the Persian Gulf 
instead of the Arabian Gulf. This can be seen in the statement of Rafsanjani (in Thaler et al 
2010) that "there are valid documents about the Persian Gulf in religious and historical 
books, especially commentaries on the Holy Quran; therefore, no country has the right to 
alter the name". Nationalism, along with ideology, however, became a catalyst in Iran's 
external affairs to pursue its strategic interests and objectives in the Middle East, when the 
distribution of power swung in Iran's favour, after the removal of Saddam's regime. Thus, 
the nature of interaction of Iran's political behaviour with its neighbors and other nations 
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(in particular, the U.S.) is, first and foremost, influenced by a deep continuous tension 
between Persian and Islamic identities, and between conflicting self–images of national 
superiority and subjugation. 
 
Iran's regime attempts to interconnect revolutionary movements and Shiite groups present 
in its historical areas of interest, such as Central Asia, Iraq and the Gulf region, 
(www.english.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13940518000828, 2015). These attempts 
reinforce Iran's leadership in the region. Iran's nationalism, however, is strongly fueled by 
foreign interventions throughout history, manipulation, and exploitation of the country by 
superpowers. Hence, Iran stresses excessively the importance of independence and self-
reliance. Iran bases its claim for dominance in the Middle East on a highly accentuated 
Islamic-Shiite identity, on the one hand, and on a highly exclusive Iranian nationalism, on 
the other. 
 
3.4.3.   Decision-Makers 
 
It has been argued that it is important to combine the domestic, regional and international 
environments into the same conceptual framework within a complex paradigm of 
international politics, in order to explain all the potential factors, determinants, dimensions, 
and drivers in foreign policies (Mason, 2015). In other words, the overall balance among 
drivers, such as economic capabilities, the domestic environment, state structures, 
geopolitical imperatives, transnational identity of ideology (soft power), and the 
leadership's role, including external threats and constraints, are included in the process of 
foreign policy decision-making.  
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In order to understand decision-making in the Iranian regime, one must interconnect this 
issue with three fundamental drivers. These drivers are: firstly, the central principle of the 
Islamic Revolution of Iran (1979), which is based on independence from superpowers. 
Under this general principle, the priority of Iran is to reinforce unity among the Muslim 
world, by supporting the oppressed nations against the oppression of the existing 
international system. In light of this priority, the main driver of the Iranian foreign policy 
after the revolution, particularly during Imam Khomeini‘s leadership and Ahmadinejad's 
presidency, was the export of revolution abroad.  
 
Ayatollah Khamenei disavowed the policies of former presidents Rafsanjani and Khatami. 
Khamenei claimed that he was not responsible for soft policies that may encourage Iran's 
enemies to make bolder concessions. Furthermore, "Khamenei allowed the judiciary, 
intelligence, and media apparatuses to accuse various people in Ahmadinejad‘s circle of 
economic or moral corruption, connection with opposition movements, or links with 
Western governments" (www.iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2014/apr/11/report-how-khamenei-
makes-decisions, 2014). In contrast, initial signs demonstrate that there is a reasonable 
relationship between the supreme leader and president Hassan Rouhani, who was elected 
president in June 2013 (www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-22886729, 2013). The 
supreme leader has been remarkably supportive of Rouhani‘s efforts during the nuclear 
talks. 
 
The supreme leader has other governmental institutes under his authority. Ayatollah 
Khamenei frequently intervenes in legislative decisions, whether directly through letters to 
the speaker of parliament, or indirectly through his speeches. More importantly, Ayatollah 
Khamenei dominates the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), which has 
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responsibility for drawing Iran‘s defence and security policies and responding to internal 
and external threats. Despite the fact that Iran's president is the council‘s titular head, 
Khamenei‘s personal representative is the one who truly leads its deliberations, and most 
of the other members are his appointees (www.iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2014/apr/11/report 
-how-Khamenei-makes-decisions, 2014). 
 
Secondly, Articles 152 and 154 of the Iranian Constitution provide full support to Iran's 
foreign policy to achieve its strategic objectives (www.parstimes.com, 1979; Nia, 2011). 
Thirdly, the evolution of the situation in the Middle East region in line with the 
geopolitical dynamics, particularly the ongoing crises in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen, 
for example, drove Iran's regime to take hard decisions to deal with conflict situations. 
Policymakers are often forced to utilise every available instruments of power (conventional 
and unconventional) to respond and survive in an anarchic environment.  
 
In reference to the complicated motivational factors and nature of foreign policy decision-
making, the position of the supreme leader as the ‗balancer-in-chief‘ authorises him to find 
compromises between competing power centres. However, the supreme leader is not an 
individual decision-maker; he is rather a consensus-builder who makes his final decisions 
in accordance with compromises reached on the various views of the Iranian institutions, 
in line with the principles of the Islamic Revolution. In this sense, because the Iranian 
political system is a mix of religious hierarchy and parliamentary democracy, the decision-
making process reflects interactions in the power structure of the Iranian regime. In other 
words, even though Iran is an autocratic system (Sadjadpour, 2009), its decision-making 
process is dependent upon consensus-building and political negotiation, within the 
complex formal structure of a theocratic democracy. However, there is no open political 
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process with procedural checks to limit the ruling elite‘s options, except the supreme 
leader. 
 
Maleki (2008: 6) writes that the origin of multifaceted interactions in the circle of decision-
making reflects the nature of conflict in two trends. The first trend emphasises the 
enhancement of Islamic Revolution principles and the return to Islamic values, to "the 
retain the Muslim masses as faithful allies; to create close relations with Islamic countries; 
and to refrain from rapprochement with the United States, as the leader of the power bloc 
most responsible for the humiliations of the Islamic Ummah". The second trend, in 
contrast, urges the decision-makers to concentrate on state interests, and play a better role 
in international relations and world events. However, some argue that there is no 
incongruity between Islamic values and Iranian interests, whereas the Islamic identity is 
part and parcel of Iran's national interests. It is important to note that there are various 
political, clerical elites and security institutions that play decisive roles in making external 
decisions, such as the Supreme Leader, the Presidency, the Head of the Expediency 
Council, and the Foreign Ministry, the High Council for National Security, and the 
Revolutionary Guards. Nashat, Barzegar and Saghafi-Ameri (in www.mideasti.org, 2009) 
argue that for Iran's foreign policy and international relations, the choices between 
alternatives in the decision-making process are derived from ideological-religious factors 
along with pragmatism, to attain its interests and objectives.  
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3.5.   Three Substantial Drivers in line with Instruments of Soft Power  
 
Three driving forces constitute the basic pillars of the Iranian regime in its external affairs, 
ideologies, Pan-Islamism, and Revolutionary Shiism, all of which contribute to Iran's 
foreign policy and go hand-in-hand with the pragmatic approach, to reflect the mechanism 
of geopolitical realities. Al-Nefisy et al (2008: 16) and Al-Ghareib (2005) write that the 
three core drivers guide Iran's foreign policy in its strategic objectives. 
 
The Commander General of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, Major General 
Mohammad Ali Jafari, in a speech to journalists on the anniversary of the founding of the 
three forces of the Revolutionary Guard on 17 September 2012, stressed the values of the 
revolution, which urge to defend against injustice and tyranny (www.persiangulfnetwork. 
com, 2012). However, these principles and values of the revolution are derived from the 
Iranian Constitution in Article 2. Jafari added that today's wars were different, taking a 
different course towards soft wars (acts such as cultural invasions and psychological 
operations, which can influence all social and security aspects of a political system and the 
fundamental values and identities of a society); he stated that the Revolutionary Guards 
were ready to confront such wars. This statement by Jafari goes hand-in-hand with the core 
argument of this thesis that attempts to broaden the focus of the security studies away from 
the traditional and purely military aspect (www.persiangulfnetwork.com, 2012).  
 
3.5.1.   Ideologies 
 
An ideology is a set of cultural beliefs, values, and attitudes that dominate the mentality of 
a group of people and justify their discourses and legitimise their behaviour and actions 
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(Van Dijk, 2006). Hence, in human cultures and communities, ideology becomes an 
essential part of life that serves to explain and justify its own existence as a way of life. In 
this context, the Iranian regime is constructed upon Shiite ideology from the Islamic 
Revolution of 1979.  
 
Ideologies, loosely conceived as all-embracing, universalistic political doctrines, are 
alluring because they provide simple explanations of the human plight together with route 
maps designed to guide the chosen out of it. Chief among these ideologies are communism, 
liberalism, nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism. The view that such doctrines are a 
major source of conflict between states derives great strength from the turbulence which 
shook the Middle East following the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, notably in the 
Iran-Iraq war (Berridge, 1992: 66). Significantly, the aftermath of the 2003 invasion of 
Iraq was factual proof of the importance of ideology in the geopolitical dynamics.  
 
The Iranian regime's intervention in regional affairs aims to garner support for its foreign 
policy from minority communities that are looking for a champion, by showing Iran as the 
main defender against Zionism and imperialism. This intervention was implemented 
through transnational ideological networks (Shiite factions), as one of the central soft 
powers driving Iran's behaviour, in line with its active role (in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, 
Yemen) to defend its security and to maximise its geopolitical interests, as explained in 6.7. 
and 8.4.1. 
 
Shiite-Islamist ideology became the cornerstone of Iran's foreign policy. It is crucial in the 
Iranian regime identity vs Sunni Arab identity struggle (Al-Rashed, 2015). Since 1979, 
religious ideology has imposed its philosophy on Iran‘s political and strategic decision-
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making, on Iran's leaders and its foreign policy. In this context, ideology serves as a 
political instrument to mobilise material and political support for Iranian allies, such as the 
Syrian regime, Lebanese Hezbollah and Hamas in the Gaza Strip, and Jihad movements, 
particularly the Shiite factions. Arguably, Iranian foreign policy depends on its religious 
ideology to support Shiism and its spread across the region. Given the many evolving 
security challenges in the Middle East, the Iranian ruling elites endeavour to achieve their 
geopolitical interests through adopting both approaches, ideology and pragmatism. These 
two approaches have provided some remarkable successes for Iran's foreign policy, in 
terms of practical application, especially after the inefficient foreign policy during the 
eight-year war with Iraq (1980-1988), during which it relied on hard power, which did not 
achieve its objectives.  
 
When Ayatollah Khomeini came to power in 1979, he stated, 
 
We must strive to export our revolution throughout the world, and must abandon 
all idea of not doing so, for not only does Islam refuse to recognize any 
difference between Muslim countries, it is the champion of all oppressed people. 
Moreover, all the powers are intent on destroying us, and if we remain 
surrounded in a closed circle, we shall certainly be defeated. We must make 
plain our stance toward the powers and the superpowers and demonstrate to 
them that despite the arduous problems that burden us, our attitude to the world 
is dictated by our beliefs... What is certain is that the Islamic movements in Iran 
has released the power of the people of Iran as no other "ideology" or 
nationalist emotion could have done. The Islamic revolution is far from over; in 
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some ways, it is just beginning. The work of leveling the social order has barely 
begun  
   (Algar, 1981: 49).  
 
Neoclassical realists such as Schweller (in Lobell et al 2009: 1-4) integrate state ideology 
in their approaches. Rakel (2008) argues that Iran's foreign policy is usually described as a 
politicised religion and ideological factors play a crucial role in Iran's external affairs. 
Barzegar (in www.mideasti.org, 2009), however, is a pragmatic thinker and argues that, 
although Iran's regional foreign policy in the initial stage of the Revolution was defined as 
an ideological perspective, more recently, when security challenges and geopolitical 
factors predominated in the Middle East, Iran's foreign policy adopted a pragmatic 
approach based on an ideological current to serve the national interests of Iran's regime. 
Al-Nefisy et al (2008) argue that the Iranian regime has a tremendous ideological project 
to be applied onto other Middle Eastern states. The Shiite mainstream, however, forms one 
of the main branches of Islam which depends upon ideological faith as a universal concept 
and which uses an ideological discourse to expand the Islamic Shiite thoughts on the Arab 
and Muslim worlds. Barzegar (2008: 93) stated that "ideological forces do, of course, act 
as a stimulus in connecting people morally and in winning hearts and minds, as well as in 
obtaining their occasional mutual political support". 
 
Indeed, the Iranian Revolution began with a popular movement and ended with the 
establishment of an Islamic state, which has played a prominent role in the geopolitical 
landscape, in regional and international events. In other words, religious ideology became 
political reality, and Islam still possesses enormous attraction. The reverberation of Islamic 
ideology impacted on Arab societies. Indeed, the Arab street viewed Islam as the only 
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hope and solution to problems. Those problems were seen as being due to the weakness of 
Arab-Muslims, the loss of pride, identity, dignity, freedom, and the lack of democracy, 
equality and justice. 
 
Religious ideology has become an inspiration and tool against oppression, or counter-
hegemonic. In contrast, regional governments and the U.S. administration strongly oppose 
the Iranian activities that seek to change the status quo and to mobilise opposition to the 
West. The Islamic revolution, however, provided motives and programmes for political 
action in the framework of politico-religious movements.  
 
Al-Nefisy et al (2008) argue that Iran's foreign policy has attempted to exploit ideology 
(soft power) since the revolution to build a bridge between the Arab nation and the Islamic 
world, to serve the ultimate Islamic purpose of integrating the Islamic world under a true 
Islamic regime, the Islamic Republic of Iran. Puelings (2010) observes that the Iranian 
regime has attempted to export its revolutionary ideology to the regional countries through 
bolstering armed groups, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Supreme Council for the 
Islamic Revolution in Iraq. Iran‘s support for non-state actors via its foreign policy has 
played a significant role in attaining their mutual strategic interests in the Middle East. 
Hinnebusch et al (2002) argue that, as a result of exporting ideological revolutionary 
thoughts to neighbouring states, the eight-year war between Iran and Iraq (1980-1988) 
broke out.  
 
Al-Nefisy et al (2008) argue that it is essential to explore the role of ideology as a core 
drive of Iran's foreign policy, in order to analyse the four specific issues under study 
(Iranian policy in Iraq of 2003, Iranian support to Hezbollah, Iran's anti-Israel policy, and 
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Iran's policy towards the strategic communities of Gulf states). Much of what has been 
argued here is that the Shiite doctrine was and still perhaps represents one of the most 
remarkable political movements, along with several fundamentalist movements in Sunni 
Islam. Sunni movements, such as Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), 
or Islamic State (IS), have emerged with a fundamentalist ideology aiming to impose their 
extremist ideas on the ground by force, not only to counter Shiite expansion and Western 
values, but also to maximise their own power. 
 
3.5.2.   Pan-Islamism 
 
Pan-Islamism is the second substantial driver, and it is a product of the Iranian Revolution 
and one of the main currents of soft power (Connell et al, 2007). The call for Islamic unity 
is a central issue for both the Iranian Revolution and the survival of Iran's regime. The 
promotion of the idea of Pan-Islamism is a universal call that has reverberated across the 
Arab nations and the Islamic world. Bilgin (2005) refers to Khomeini and Hezbollah as 
Islamist actors who use the global Islamic rhetoric as a practical tool to capture the Muslim 
masses.  
 
One must bear in mind that this thesis concentrates on the doctrine of Shiite Islam within 
the framework of calls for Pan-Islamic unity. According to Fawcett (2009), this is the most 
effective approach for Iran‘s foreign policy to raise its relative strength in the region, 
especially for the call for Pan-Islamism which comes from the heart of the Islamic religion. 
It has been argued that the masses in the Middle East are religious and support any sincere 
call to revive religious values. Feste (1996: 11) argues that "both Pan-Arabism and Islamic 
fundamentalism have promoted a vision for the Middle East of empowerment, pride, and 
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independence. The dominance of these ideas has meant that domestic politics has always 
been interwoven with foreign policy".  
 
As previously mentioned, the impact of Pan-Islamism appeared in regional politics during 
the 1970s, after the decline of Pan-Arab nationalism and the arrival of Khomeini to power 
in 1979, with the theory of faqih for the application of true Islam, according to Shiite 
beliefs (Hinnebusch et al, 2002). According to the neoclassical realist Juneau (2009), the 
regional distribution of power between 2001 and 2007 proved to the benefit of Iran. In this 
context, Judith Yaphe writes that Iran is an "undisputed regional superpower" (Yaphe, 
2010). Fuller (2003) claims that Islamist movements are the main and growing force in the 
Muslim world today; Islamist parties in the region are the dominant movement in the 
political system and decision-making. Iran's foreign policy has attempted to reach out to 
political movements that have mutual interests with the Islamic Revolution, and share the 
same extremist approach to dealing with others. Hezbollah and Hamas, for instance, 
receive practical and political support from Iran, according to the Iranian constitution that 
states that "the defense of the rights of all Muslims" is its aim and duty and that Iran 
"supports the just struggles of the oppressed against the oppressors in every corner of the 
global" (Connell et al, 2007: 2). 
 
Bidjan Nashat (in www.mideasti.org, 2009) notes that the call for pan-Islamism goes hand-
in-hand with anti-Israeli discourse, an effective tool to gain public support, in order to 
spread its ideas to Arab and Muslim streets. 
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3.5.3.   Revolutionary Shiism 
 
Contemporary debates among Muslim scholars and the West, with regard to the Islamic 
Revolution, refer to an essential issue regarding Iran‘s regime: whether it is a Shiite, rather 
than a Muslim state (Connell et al, 2007; Al-Nefisy et al, 2008). 
 
Historically, the revival of Shiism is older than the power shift during the Ahmadinejad era 
and older than the Iranian Revolution. Therefore, since the Shiite branch (Twelver's Shiite) 
broke away from the Muslim community approximately 1,400 years ago, the revolutionary 
Shiite movement has become one of the most powerful political models against the 
majority of Sunni Islamic states. The principles of Shiite Islamic Revolution exceed 
Iranian borders to the demographic trend of the population in the region. Shiites are found 
in almost all Middle Eastern states and elsewhere as an Islamic minority, except Iraq, 
Bahrain and Lebanon, "until the start of the 16th century, when the Iranian Safavid dynasty 
under Shah Isma'il made it the sole legal faith of their empire, which then embraced the 
Persians of Iran, the Turks of Azerbaijan, and many of the Arabs of Iraq proper" (Gelvin, 
2005: 10; Kinzer, 2006: 187). 
  
After the Islamic revolution, overwhelmingly the people came to believe in the Ithna 
Ashari rite (the Twelver Imams), as a main source of epistemological philosophy and as an 
ideological revolutionary approach, based upon the spiritual power and political legitimacy 
of the Twelve Imams and their representative to lead the Islamic world (Al-Ghareib, 2005; 
Jawada, 2007; Al-Nefisy et al, 2008). Indeed, a critical question was raised by clerics in 
Iran, concerning the nationality of the supreme leader and the successors who represent 
Imam Al-Mahdi Al-Montazar (Awaited), the absent infallible Imam, to lead the Islamic 
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world. Ahmad Khomeini, son of Ayatollah Khomeini, raised a sensitive issue (in Al-
Gharib, 2005) supported by Jawada (2007) and AL-Sader et al (2004), and with almost 
unanimous agreement from senior clergies, that the Islamic government and the calls for 
Pan-Islamic unity should be based on the doctrine of Shiite Islam, and the Shiite leader 
must be an Iranian. In reality, Islam knows no nationality, no borders, no discrimination; it 
does not distinguish among human beings, whatever their colour, gender or ethnicity 
(Kennedy, 2010).   
  
This thesis argues that the issue of Revolutionary Shiism is not limited to the question of 
war and peace in a particular target region, but it is a combination of the geopolitical 
agenda and national identity. This claim is supported by Hojjatoleslam Kazzem Seddiqi, 
the senior cleric in Iran who stated, 
 
"The Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei has always declared the Revolution as 
being dynamic and it is an ethical, religious, and cultural revolution. He addressed 
those who claim that the Islamic Revolution has come to an end and said that the 
young generation has stepped into the path of progress and prosperity‖ 
 
Hojjatoleslam Seddiqi (the leader of 
Friday prayers in Tehran, Friday 
prayer on 18 September 2015)  
 
(www.english.farsnews.com/newstext.
aspx?nn=13940627000603, 2015). 
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On this basis, Iran openly announces its sponsorship and support for Islamic revolutionary 
groups in Iraq, Lebanon, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Yemen. The Iranian regime 
also denounced regional governments with pro-Western affiliations and ideas, as corrupt 
and un-Islamic, directly challenging their legitimacy. 
 
Iran's revolutionary aspirations reflect broader territorial ambitions, which often drove Iran 
into confrontations with its neighbours, with the superpowers, and with a host of Islamic 
governments and broader world. The three substantial factors (ideology, pan-Islamism and 
revolutionary Shiism) as instruments of soft power still play a crucial role in Iran, 
particularly among key sectors of the clerical elite. 
 
3.6.   Major Security Institutions and their Tasks  
 
The Islamic Republic of Iran depends essentially upon the major security institutions, aside 
from its military, not only to ensure its national security, but also to counter regional 
threats and to implement its strategic ideological goals and interests abroad (Cordesman, 
2007; Bergman, 2008; Burgess, 2010). Although there are major security and military 
institutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, such as the intelligent services, the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps, paramilitary militia known as the Basij and the regular armed 
forces, or Artesh, this thesis concentrates on the fundamental security institutions that 
serve the Iranian foreign policy and support its strategic goals abroad (Kagan, 2009). The 
essential security institutions of the intelligence services, and the al Quds (Jerusalem) 
forces, a security-military branch of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps known as the 
Pasdaran (Persian for Guards), are considered core components of the political power 
structure linking the Iranian regime and its proxies of non-states actors and Shiite factions 
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in the region, via the transformative power of Iran‘s foreign policy (Cordesman et al, 2006; 
www.whitehouse.gov, 2013). In other words, recognising the role of the security services, 
one must bear in mind that the intelligence services, particularly the Islamic Revolutionary 
Guard Corps (al Quds forces), are prominent instruments of power for Iran‘s foreign and 
security policies (Abizaid, 2006). 
 
The recent report produced by the Pentagon's Irregular Warfare Support Programme, 
published by the Library of Congress Federal Research Division, includes a section titled 
"Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS): A profile" (Gertz, 2013). The 
Washington Free Beacon obtained a copy of the unclassified report, showing that Iran's 
intelligence services include approximately 30,000 people who engaged in covert activities 
that ranged from spying to stealing technology, to terrorist bombings and assassinations 
(Gertz, 2013). The report concluded that MOIS actively supports Revolutionary Guards 
Corps and Special Forces of Quds of mullahs in Iran, has been involved in terrorist 
bombings, from Argentina to Lebanon, and is considered one of the largest and most 
dynamic intelligence agencies in the Middle East (Cordesman et al, 2007; www.ncr-
iran.org, 2013). The information in this report was collected essentially from Farsi and 
English official journals, online news Web sites and Iranian bloggers in which some older 
information from the FAS web site is cited (Aftergood, 2013). The report noted that MOIS 
provides financial, material, technological and other support services to Hezbollah, Hamas, 
and al Qaeda in Iraq, all classified as terrorist parties and organisations under U.S. 
Executive Order 13224. The report also claimed that MOIS operates in all areas where Iran 
has interests, including Afghanistan, Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, Centre Asia, Africa, Austria, 
Azerbaijan, Croatia, France, Georgia, Germany, Turkey, Britain, and the United States. 
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One must bear in mind that the MOIS is under the guidance and direct control of Iran's 
theocratic cleric, the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei (Gertz, 2013). 
 
This thesis addresses two tasks of the Iranian security services; firstly, to deter external 
threats via supplying lethal assistance to its proxies; secondly, to reinforce political and 
ideological roles for its regional allies, in order to enhance the transformative power of its 
foreign policy. Based on the realist view, Iran has attempted to bolster its regional position 
by confronting regional threats and gaining a strategic foothold against U.S. forces in Iraq, 
and Israel in Lebanon. The Iranian regime uses the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to 
reinforce its foreign policy, with the cooperation of militant organisations and in 
coordination with fundamentalist groups, to pressure or intimidate other states and, more 
broadly, to serve as a strategic deterrent. Its security strategy includes deterrence, 
asymmetrical retaliation and attrition warfare. 
 
Wenger (2004) and Thaler et al (2010) argue that the Ministry of Intelligence and Security 
in Iran (VEVAK) has close ties with the al Quds force; they have been directly involved in 
the planning and supporting of terrorist acts and continue to exhort a variety of groups, 
especially Palestinian cadres, Iraqi militant groups, and Lebanese Hezbollah. Kinzer (2006: 
162) notes that ―It also has conducted covert actions outside Iran in support of Islamic 
regimes elsewhere; for example, it was said to have provided military support to Muslim 
fighters in Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1990s‖.  
 
The supreme leader is the commander-in-chief and his responsibilities are those of chief 
commander of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps and the supreme commander of the 
Armed Forces as well (Kinzer, 2006). Equally, the Faqih (the Supreme Leader) influences 
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the security services' duties spiritually and practically, and both share a mutual ideological 
loyalty to each other. More importantly, the Iranian constitution states that the Iranian 
army and the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps are committed to the Islamic principles and 
will be responsible not only for safeguarding the borders, but also for accomplishing an 
ideological mission, that is, the Jihad for the sake of God, as well as for struggling to lead 
the way for the sovereignty of the word of God throughout the world. Accordingly, the 
intelligence services and the Islamic revolutionary Guard Corps (al Quds forces) adopted 
this primary mission (soft power) to export the Islamic revolution abroad (Rogers, 2006; 
www.watanserb.com/reports/8432, 2015).  
 
3.7.   Conclusion 
 
This chapter discussed the way domestic drivers and foreign factors interact with each 
other to address the internal structure of Iran's political system and its impact upon foreign 
affairs. Also the interaction between variables, factors and drivers within the framework of 
relevant theories, constructivism, neoclassical realism and realist. These theories and 
approaches have taken both domestic and foreign considerations into account. This chapter, 
therefore, captured patterns of procedural complexities, interactions between the rings of 
power of Iranian institutions, as well as religious ideology and its instruments of soft 
power, to illustrate the mechanism of the domestic political system and the power structure. 
 
The discussion included leaders‘ orientations, decision making, domestic opposition 
groups and interest groups, to explain patterns of change in Iran's foreign policy. 
Furthermore, intervening variables such as regime identity, nationalism and decision-
makers have also been discussed in light of their impact on Iranian power structure in 
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domestic politics and external affairs. Equally important, this chapter demonstrated the 
importance of the three substantial factors (ideologies, Pan-Islamism, and Revolutionary 
Shiism) that shaped Iranian identity and its actions, in line with its objectives and interests. 
Arguably, these intervening variables and substantial factors have played a crucial role 
(instruments of Soft Power) in pursuing Iranian growth ambitions, with the support of 
ideological beliefs and geopolitical interests abroad. These essential variables have been 
used to garner support from minority communities. 
 
The influence of regime identity on the decision-making process can be seen through the 
behavioural pattern of Iran's foreign policy and in its attempts to reconstruct Pan-Islamism. 
On the other hand, the most prominent factor driving Iran‘s behaviour is its improved 
relative power. Here neoclassical realism provides a useful framework for the study of 
foreign policy in the wake of changed relative power. Iran's perception of its power drives 
Tehran to endeavour to expand its interests abroad. Regime identity determines the 
national interests by narrowing or constraining the range of possible options. 
 
This chapter also showed the importance of clerical institutions, particularly the authority 
of supreme leader (Takeyh, 2007). This chapter addressed the role of key security 
institutions, intelligence services and the al Quds forces, core components of the political 
power structure linking the Iranian regime, and especially the supreme leader, with its 
proxies of non-states actors and Shiite factions in the region. 
 
The next chapter will give the modern historical and geographical background of the 
Middle East. It explores the regional security system and the interaction between regional 
and international states, and challenges patterns within the security environment. It also 
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highlights regional crises and geopolitical changes in pre-invasion and post-invasion Iraq, 
in the context of Iranian ascendance and regional threats. 
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Chapter Four 
 
Background of the Middle East: Changing Security Structure 
 
4.1.   Introduction  
 
This chapter discusses Iranian security at the regional level as a political struggle between 
two schools of thought: revolutionary ideological mainstream and western values. 
Ideological tenets, in fact, have an impact on states' agenda and influence events. For 
example, championing the Palestinian cause, is one of the core issues for Arab and Muslim 
states that affect geopolitical developments in the Middle East (Al-Samadi, 2014). 
 
The chapter asks the second and third research questions: Which events, perceived as 
security concerns, influence Iranian ideology, identity and foreign policy? What 
instruments of power does Iran‘s foreign policy use to increase its power, to ensure its 
security requirements and meet its strategic interests? Before moving to the discussion of 
the major historical events that impacted upon the regional security structure, it is 
important to highlight the geographical and demographic perspectives of the Middle East 
countries. The Middle East consists of fifteen states: Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, 
Yemen, Iraq, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, United Arab Emirates, Lebanon, Turkey, 
Israel and Iran. Some of these states do not have enough military defensive capabilities, so 
they entered into regional military alliances such as the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC), 
besides security arrangements with the U.S., and others have ambitions to be a prominent 
regional power. The political boundaries of the regional states, however, were drawn after 
the decline of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the 
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twentieth century. Since then, internal struggles, regional conflicts and international 
competition have dominated the entire region. 
 
Twelve Arab nation states in the Middle East are Sunni Muslim, with the exception of Iraq 
and Syria. The Syrian regime is an ‗Alawis,‘ which is one of the Shiite school branches 
(Fawcett, 2009: 151). In Iraq the majority of the population are 'twelver shiites' 
(www.parstimes.com, 1979; Hanlon et al, 2010). 
 
According to Armanios (2004: 6), the demographic distribution in the Middle East region 
is as follows: 
- Iran: Sunni 10% and Shiite 89% 
- Syria: Sunni 74% and non-Sunni Muslim 16% 
- Turkey: Sunni 83-93% and Shiite 7-17% 
- Lebanon: Sunni 23% and Shiite inc. Druze 45% 
- Iraq: Sunni 32-37% and Shiite 60-65% 
- Saudi Arabia: Sunni 89-90% and Shiite 10-11% 
- United Arab Emirates: Sunni 81% and Shiite 15% 
- Yemen: Sunni 70% and Shiite 30% 
- Kuwait: Sunni 60% and Shiite 25% 
- Bahrain: Sunni 30% and Shiite 70% 
- Oman: Sunni 85% and Shiite 5-10%   
- Jordan: Sunni 92% and Shiite 02% 
- Qatar: Sunni 90% and Shiite 10% 
- Egypt: Sunni 90% and a small number of Shiite 
-  Israel (Palestinian Territory): Sunni 95% and a small number of Shiite  
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Vali Nasr (2004), who specialises in Shiite affairs and sectarian studies, refers to the "Shia 
Revival" in his book, where he describes changes in the sectarian balance of power 
between Sunnis and Shiites in the region, stretching from Pakistan to Lebanon, as a result 
of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, after a long period of stability. Nasr (2004) stresses that 
religious and cultural ties among Shiites have been reinforced and have affected the 
political arena, which has led to a reshaping of the political and security landscape in the 
region. In this regard, it is important to shed light upon the distribution of other Shiite sects 
in the Middle East region and beyond that are associated with the doctrine of Twelver 
Shiite in some beliefs, desires, and practices. 
 
1.   The Ismailis or Sevener Shiite, who are scattered worldwide, but are    
  prominently in Afghanistan (under the Naderi clan), India, Pakistan and also    
  in East and South Africa. 
 
2.   The Zaydis, one of the minority sects of Shiite Islam, exist mostly in Yemen. 
 
3.   The Alawites, found mostly in Syria and Lebanon. 
 
4.   The Alevis, an offshoot sect of Shiite Islam in Turkey. 
 
5.   The Druze community in Lebanon, Syria and Israel. 
 
6.   The Twelver Shiite, prominently pervasive in Iran, Iraq, Lebanon,   
  Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Azerbaijan. 
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This chapter is divided into three main parts, and the discussion is conducted 
chronologically. The first provides an overview of the pre-Islamic Revolution, in terms of 
the phases that the Middle East as a regional system has gone through, as a way to gain a 
deeper understanding of its various dynamics. The second deals in more detail with the 
period after the Islamic Revolution and pre-invasion Iraq, concerning the structure of the 
regional security system. The final section explores the competing approaches in post-
invasion Iraq and considers the interactions between regional and external players that 
have changed the balance of power, particularly the security equation.  
 
4.2.   Modern History and the Geographical Background of the Region 
 
The Middle East and its sub-region, the Gulf region, have long been amongst the most 
insecure and volatile geographies in the world and major axis of global affairs, 
strategically, culturally/religiously and economically. The Gulf region has a high strategic 
and economic status that has been the focus of world powers. "More than 60% of the 
world's oil reserves" are in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, 
and "over 55% of the world‘s natural gas reserves" are in Iran, Qatar and Russia. "Iraq 
alone now has about four times the oil reserves of the entire U.S., including the Alaskan 
deposits" (Rogers, 2009:12). Due to the increasing need for energy sources, conflict over 
their control in the Gulf region and in the Middle East adds fuel to this unstable and 
heavily militarised region. 
 
The Gulf region has attracted foreign powers since the Portuguese intervention in 1507. 
The importance of the region increased after the discovery of oil in the Arabian Peninsula 
at the start of the twentieth century (Gelvin, 2005), and especially after the withdrawal of 
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Great Britain in 1971, and the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). The Iraqi occupation of Kuwait 
(1990–1991), the 2003 U.S.-led coalition occupation of Iraq, and the so-called Arab Spring 
in late 2010 and early 2011, have propelled the region into more instability. Both the 
Middle East and the Gulf region remain in a state of conflict that involves foreign powers 
and an increasing number of jihadist groups. 
 
The Gulf region provides favourable conditions to grow and embrace ideas and religious 
ideology. Since 1501, Shiism has been the state religion of Iran, and it stands as the major 
nation-state attempting to expand the Shiite faith system. ―Whether or not the Iranian 
Revolution opened up a new chapter in Middle Eastern history, it certainly drew the 
attention of social sciences and foreign-policy analysts to the phenomenon of 'Islamic 
politics'. The late 1970s and the 1980s seemed to mark the beginning of a golden age for 
Islamic political movements throughout the region" (Gelvin, 2005). Since there are Shiites 
in the regional states, Iran has expanded its influence to share a common ideological 
mindset with many of the citizens in countries where they reside (AL-Suwaidi, 2005).  
 
Iran is literally surrounded by Sunni countries. Most of the modern Middle Eastern states 
emerged out of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the 
twentieth century (Owen, 2007). From Iran's perspective, national identity and a sense of 
superiority towards its Arab neighbors have links to the past. Many countries in the Middle 
East are modern creations. Their territories and borders come not from the nature of natural 
evolution of ancient civilizations, but from colonialists. Between the mid-nineteenth 
century and World War I, most of the Middle East and North Africa were either already, or 
later came under different forms of colonial rule (Fawcett, 2009). Iran is one of world's 
oldest and most self-confident nations with a clear self-image and high self-esteem. In the 
    
123 
 
aftermath of colonial rule, the mechanism of change throughout the postcolonial era 
―contributed to early ideological divisions in the region between those willing to continue a 
cooperative postcolonial relationship with the West and those who were not willing to do 
so‖ (Hinnebusch, 2002: 65). By looking at the modern history of the Middle East, it is 
obvious that political competition and security conflicts dominate the region. 
 
Due to its size and location on rich oil and gas resources, all Iranian regimes have had the 
potential to make Iran a great regional power. Such regional power requires the possession 
of the essential material and ideational power resources to survive in an anarchic and to 
maximise geopolitical power in the regional system. However, this requires Iran to pursue 
an active role, ranging from assertive to offensive, in order to play this role effectively (Al-
Rashed, 2015). On the other hand, if any state (e.g. Iran) took measures to increase its 
security (e.g. upgrading its military capabilities or making alliances), another state (e.g. 
Saudi Arabia) would often respond similarly, by taking reactive measures to make up for 
the shift in the balance of power (Booth et al, 2008). Certainly, the dynamic process of the 
security dilemma will drive both states to take measures, creating a cycle of action and 
reaction. Regional tensions often escalate into conflict. 
 
Indeed, ideological factors and materialist power intersect in constructing the security 
system in the Middle East. The reality of geo-political and security environment in the 
Middle East is multidimensional and multifaceted (Hinnebusch, 2002). Border disputes, 
diversities and contradictions in the identity, nationalism, ethnicity, religion and economy 
are considered a cornerstone in shaping international relations within the Middle East and 
the sub-region (Ehteshami, 1998; Bilgin, 2005). 
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4.3.   Regional Security in the Middle East     
    
The Middle East is one of the world‘s most war-prone regions. The pre-existing religious 
ideology has turned to extremism and then into a lethal weapon. It has been argued that 
security umbrella schemes in the Middle East oblige nation states and non-state actors to 
enter into regional and international alliances to reinforce their security. U.S. interventions 
in regional affairs, and the current deployment of its forces in many locations in the region 
are seen as factors in the deterioration of regional security (www.en.mehrnews.com, 2014). 
Webster Tarpley, American historian, journalist and lecturer, criticises U.S. foreign policy 
and claims that terrorism is a product of U.S. behaviour in the Middle East region 
(www.watan.com/reports/4600, 2015). Arguably, the U.S. is the non-regional power most 
present in the region.  
 
Throughout history, the Middle East has been a region of rather than one of cooperation. 
The region suffers from historical rivalry (Persians and Arabs, Shiites and Sunnis), 
declining terms of intra-regional trade among partners despite its resources, a system of 
alliances based on confrontation and uncertainty, rather than common interests and needs 
(Owen, 2007). Incessant conflict in the Middle East has attracted global attention, 
especially after the dramatic changes in the global balance of power which reflected upon 
the changing power structure and power relations, including the geopolitical structure of 
the region and the security system. Changes at international and regional levels have led to 
more military risks and security challenges.  
 
Security issues in a changing regional environment should be analysed within the 
framework of an assessment of events, risks and challenges. Louise Fawcett (2005: 196) 
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refers to some major military events that took place in the region. These events are "the 
Arab-Israeli conflict punctuated the modern history of the Middle East with full-scale war 
in 1948, 1956, 1967-70, 1973 and 1982". Other events also occurred, such as the Lebanese 
Civil War (1975-1990) and the establishment of Hezbollah (1982), the Iranian Revolution 
of 1979, the Soviet war in Afghanistan (1979-1989), the emergence of al-Qaeda, the Iran-
Iraq War (1980-1988) and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (1990-1091).  
 
With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the shedding of the Iron Curtain, the Cold War ended 
(1989-1990). Western countries lost their powerful nemesis, the Soviet Union. Several 
countries found themselves in a situation where their bargaining power with the West was 
diminished. Iran was no exception. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Iran was 
concerned about the belt of instability of its North and Northern East regions (the Central 
Asian republics), which added a new set of challenges to its national security. With the end 
of the Cold War, however, military risks and the ideological threat of communism to the 
West ended. Mohsen Milani (in AL-Suwaidi, 2014: 83) argues that "this confuses the 
Western policy-makers, who for decades viewed the world through a Manichaean 
framework. It is also generating competing paradigms that explain the dynamics of the 
emerging new world order. In one of these evolving paradigms, militant Islam, with Iran as 
its heart and soul, is portrayed as a menace to the West".  
 
Since the September 11, 2001 attacks, geopolitical developments, with the military 
intervention of Western forces in Afghanistan, Iraq and Yemen, have put Middle East 
issues at the top of heated international debates (Barzegar, 2009). This is due to the link 
between the regional security system and the global security system. This thesis argues that 
the developments in the Middle East after 2003, with all their complexity, have led to 
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changes in the balance of regional powers in favour of Iran, with its strategic proxies. Iran 
has broadened its regional role by reinforcing its security activities, alongside 
strengthening its abilities to not only bargain in regional affairs, but also at international 
level, over its nuclear programme. 
 
4.4.    Pre- invasion Iraq and Iran’s Role in the Middle East 
 
Since the overthrow of the Shah, Iran's foreign policy, from the first stage of the Islamic 
revolution of 1979 until the invasion of Iraq in 2003, repeatedly met with failure in 
implementing its ideological-political agenda to expand its influence. This stage was 
characterised by international crises and war with regional states, internal political turmoil, 
economic crisis, acts of terrorism, armed insurrection and ethnic insurgency (Dawisha, 
1983; Kinzer, 2006). The Iraq-Iran war (1980-1988) and the second Gulf war of the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait (1990-1991) and its aftermath affected the geopolitical landscape and 
impacted upon the position of Iranian clerics and the credibility of political thoughts of 
Khomeini, at both domestic and regional levels. Furthermore, after eight years, once the 
war was over, the Iranian economy entered a critical stage, in which the promises of the 
revolution failed to appeal. The Islamic Revolution can be seen as a long dynamic process 
which is still evolving through gradual stages to reach its strategic objectives. The essential 
matter that confronts policy makers in Tehran is the available capabilities, in terms of its 
instruments of power on the ground. 
  
Undoubtedly, the Islamic Republic of Iran with its enormous capabilities, spiritual, 
conventional and unconventional power, as well as its geostrategic location and natural 
resources, is an important regional power. Iran expects the international community to 
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recognise it as such, and to treat it accordingly. In Tehran, clerical elites and policy makers 
do not see any reason why it should not have a similar right as the U.S., the European 
countries, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, or Egypt to behave freely in their foreign policy and 
engage in regional affairs. Alternatively, Iran has been seen as one of the troublemakers in 
the context of its radical revolutionary regime with a broad ambition, regionally and across 
the Islamic world. Paul Rogers (2015) noted that neoconservative and realist circles in the 
Bush administration were under the impression that "Iran was by far the greatest threat to 
U.S. interests in the region", rather than Iraq. Bruno (2011) and Kinzer (2006: 24) noted 
that U.S. President George W. Bush on 29 January 2002 described Iran, Iraq, and North 
Korea as an 'axis of evil' (www.presidentialrhetoric.com, 2002). 
 
In order to prove the credibility of the supreme leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of 
the Islamic Revolution, and the reliability of the revolutionary approach, Iran launched an 
intensive campaign towards the regional states through its assertive foreign policy, to 
export principals of the Islamic Revolution. In this way, it exploited the decline of Pan-
Arab nationalism. Ayatollah Khomeini advised a group of young Iranians who were going 
abroad: 
 
"Today we need to strengthen and export Islam everywhere. You need to export 
Islam to other places, and the same version of Islam which is currently in power in 
our country. Our way of exporting Islam is through the youth, who go to other 
countries where a large number of people come to see you and your achievements. 
You must behave in such a way that these large gatherings are attracted to Islam 
by your action. Your deeds, your action, and your behaviour should be an example; 
and through you, the Islamic Republic will go to other places, God Willing".  
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Imam Ayatollah Ruhollah Mostafavi 
Moosavi Khomeini (the supreme 
religious and political leader of the 
Islamic Revolution of Iran) 1979 
 
(Khomeini, 1981; Dawisha, 1983: 19) 
 
This Iranian campaign to export its revolution coincided with the establishment of the 
Muslim resistance in Afghanistan (Mujahideen) against the Soviet invasion in 1979, which 
diverted then to Al-Qaeda, the failed attempt to seize the Grand Mosque in Mecca (Saudi 
Arabia) by radical Islamic group led by Juhayman al-Otaybi in 1979, and the assassination 
of Egyptian President, Anwar Al-Sadat in 1981, by an Islamist fundamentalist group 
(Dawisha, 1983). These dramatic events, including the Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1979, 
captured the world's attention and focused on Islam as a radical ideological approach for 
internal transformation and regional/international change. The events post-September 11, 
2001, became a turning point in regional developments and world attention. Through the 
―war on terror‖ and the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. has enhanced its 
military presence in the region, causing a reaction (Barzegar, 2009).  
 
4.5.   Post- invasion Iraq in 2003 and Iran’s Role in the Middle East 
 
Since the fall of Saddam's regime in April 2003 the Iraqi crisis has escalated and the 
regional security system of the Middle East has witnessed profound changes (Barzegar, 
2008). The prominent historical adversary of the Iranian regime had been removed after 
the eight-year war, and so had the decisive confrontation between the secular regime of 
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Ba'ath Party under Saddam‘s rule, and the Islamic Shiite-ideology under the clerics‘ 
regime. Sovereignty, therefore, was transferred from Sunni rulers to Shiite rulers (Fawcett, 
2009). The traditional balance of power in the region has been upset by the removal of 
Saddam's regime. Certainly, when the United States led the international coalition to 
invade Iraq and remove Saddam from power, a security vacuum altered the regional 
balance of power (Barzegar, 2008). This regional vacuum provided Iran's foreign policy 
with a great opportunity to pursue its claim of regional leadership (Rubin, 2010). Iran‘s 
transformative power could fill this vacuum by expanding its influence. On the other hand, 
the war in Afghanistan in 2001 and the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the international coalition 
led by the U.S., despite the tacit agreement between the U.S and Iran to remove these two 
regimes, has led to new security concerns in Iran over the deployment of U.S. troops 
around its territory (Takeyh, 2010).  In Tehran, the consequences of these two events are 
perceived as a blessing and as a curse. 
 
U.S. combat troops are stationed in several locations, in Iraq and Afghanistan; in the Gulf 
region; in Turkey, a NATO member. There is military cooperation with Azerbaijan and the 
nuclear states Israel, India and Pakistan. In contrast, Iran is regionally and internationally 
isolated, with no allies except Syria and Shiite sects and factions. This has created an 
environment for indirect confrontation between regional and international players over 
power, control and self-interest.  
 
The reality on the ground indicates that neither the United States, nor Iran want to engage 
in military confrontations. The Iranian regime does not have conventional military 
capabilities to face a huge military arsenal from the United States. Al-Ghareib (2005) 
therefore argues that the competition to fill the security vacuum remains indirect, because 
    
130 
 
the U.S. avoids getting involved at asymmetric warfare and unconventional forces with, for 
instance, the Lebanese Hezbollah and the Al-Mahdi Army in Iraq. 
 
Ideology is paramount in Iran's foreign policy towards the new Iraq. As Shiite are the 
majority in Iraq, Iran's regime has rebuilt close relations at the level of the Shiite masses, 
including major Iraqi-Shiite political parties and their leaderships, such as Moqtada al-Sadr, 
the leader of Al-Mahdi Army, Nouri al-Maliki (the former Prime Minister of Iraq), the 
leader of the Islamic Dawa Party, Haider al-Abadi (the Prime Minister of Iraq), deputy 
leader of the Islamic Dawa Party, Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, leader of the Supreme Council for 
the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, and Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani (Barzegar, 2008; Felter 
et al, 2008; Loi, 2011). The great efforts of Iran‘s foreign policy in Iraq have enhanced the 
Shiite role in the power structure of the region. 
 
General Petraeus, (2007: 1), Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq, commented: "We 
have also disrupted Shia militia extremists, capturing the head and numerous other leaders 
of the Iranian-supported Special Groups, along with a senior Lebanese Hezbollah operative 
supporting Iran‘s activities in Iraq". Furthermore, Petraeus (in Loi, 2011: 47) noted that 
Iran was supporting Iraqi militias as a ―Hezbollah-like force to serve its interests and fight 
a proxy war against the Iraqi state and coalition forces". Iran's foreign policy has achieved 
many of its core interests in Iraq. Mostly, Iran's foreign policy has penetrated the Iraqi 
regime, even reaching the head of authority (the Prime minister) to control the political-
security affairs. Moreover, the holy historical places for the Twelver Shiite Muslims, 
Karbala and Najaf, have returned to the control of the Shiite masses. 
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Looking at Iran's geopolitical features and its ideological approach, we can conclude that 
the Iranian regime has become one of the key players in the region. 
 
4.6.  The Arab World in the Face of Regional Challenges: Iran's Role 
 
The Iranian regime has employed all means to increase its influence and power: politics, 
media, oil, arms, a nuclear programme, proxies of non-state actors and religious ideology. 
However, Iran‘s search for a bigger regional role and geopolitical influence affects the 
status quo by decreasing the security of other players in the region, such as the Arab states, 
Turkey, Israel and the U.S.  
 
Internal instability in the Arab world and growing political Islamic groups are the most 
prominent issues on the regional political scene, but also on the world agenda. The Arab 
world in general, and Saudi Arabia in particular, has seen its position weaken (Al-Qallab, 
2015; Al-Qashteni, 2015). Therefore, the sequence of events of "Operation Decisive 
Storm" on 26 March 2015, a military operation led by Saudi Arabia and supported by a 
Sunni Arab coalition of ten countries (Morocco, Sudan, Jordan, Egypt, Kuwait, the United 
Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain including Saudi Arabia and Yemen) against an Iran-linked 
Shiite militia in Yemen (the Houthi rebels), may change the regional equation by limiting 
Iran's expansion (Hadi, 2015; Spencer, 2015). 
 
At the same time, there is the U.S. Iranian rapprochement in the reign of Obama and 
Rouhani, to normalise their relations, especially around the Iranian nuclear programme. 
The Obama administration attempts to reach a satisfactory settlement with Tehran 
(Katzman, 2014). In return, Tehran should cooperate with Washington in the management 
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of conflict zones by taking account of U.S. interests (Al-Na'ami, 2015). There is also an 
intersection of interests between Washington and Tehran in the fight against extremist 
groups in the region, especially Sunni, such as Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS) and 
keen on Western interests in the region (Al-Khouri, 2015; www.alwatan.kuwait. tt/ 
ArticleDetails.aspx?Id=420467, 2015). 
 
4.7.   Conclusion  
 
Chapter four discussed the geopolitical developments that have existed in the Middle East 
throughout modern history. These geopolitical developments were discussed within the 
framework of a dynamic political-security environment, by focusing on the transformative 
power of Iran's foreign policy. This transformative power of Iran's behaviour is not new. 
Under Safavids, the Shah and the theocracies (mullahs) alike, Iran's geopolitical interests 
were at the core of its national identity and sovereignty. Then, this chapter outlined the role 
of Iran's foreign policy in the Middle East since 1979 to pre- invasion Iraq in 2003, 
showing its expansion. Furthermore, reverberations of the transformative power of Iran's 
foreign policy in post-invasion Iraq were discussed, and its attempts to expand its regional 
influence by depending on the distribution of soft power, including Iran's use of 
ideological proxies (Bruno, 2011). It has been widely argued that Iran continuously 
attempts to export its ideological beliefs and revolutionary ideas to the Arab regional 
countries, in order to maximise its interest abroad by guiding non-state actors and Shiite 
factions (Armanios, 2004).  
 
Since the September 11 attacks, and following the invasion on Iraq, the scope of regional 
distribution of power in the Middle East has changed to the benefit of Iran. The influence 
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of Iran's foreign policy has grown relatively in regional affairs, which has led to an 
increase in the expansion of its interests abroad. Fandy (2008: 1), an expert in Middle East 
security affairs, stated that "Today, a non-nuclear Iran uses Iraq as a platform for its 
influence and dominance in Lebanon, Gaza, Yemen, Bahrain, Kuwait, and other Gulf 
countries. If Iran has this influence in the region without a nuclear weapon, what will be its 
weight in regional affairs when it acquires a nuclear weapon and joins the international 
nuclear club?" Furthermore, the chapter addressed the impact of U.S. military presence in 
the region and the reaction of Iran to counter it. Iran and the majority of its Arab 
neighbours hold opposing views on matters related to regional security. While Tehran 
considers the U.S. a key factor influencing instability, its Arab neighbours see Washington 
as the foremost element in their defence. 
 
This chapter has been conducted within the theoretical framework of neorealist and 
constructivist approaches, linking issues of regional security, such as the anarchical system 
and states' interests, and the essential factors of ideology and nationalism. Constructivist 
explanations are based on the religious-ideological ties between the Iranian regime and its 
proxies, and take into account the unique share in culture, beliefs and religious identity. 
Burgess (2010: 2) states that "Iranian leadership pursues a security strategy intended to 
deter an attack on its territory and increase its relative power in the region." This is similar 
to the neorealist view (defensive and offensive) that 'countries seek survival', and to 
'maximise power' (Booth et al, 2008: 36-37). Neoclassical realists argue that the actions of 
a state can be interpreted by independent variables, such as the distribution of soft power 
capabilities, and also dependent variable such as Iran‘s foreign policy outcome, as well as 
intervening variables of domestic factors and religious drivers, which affect the power of 
action of the decision-makers in foreign policy. Hence, states respond to any possible 
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threat by using their available means (material and ideational power resources) to maintain 
their geopolitical interests. A state may employ its instruments of power, such as 
ideological proxies of non-state actors, or foreign aid to its strategic allies, in order to 
create spheres of influence. 
 
The next chapter will examine the interaction between Western and Eastern values and its 
impact on state behaviour, within the framework of foreign policy, justification and 
legitimation. 
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Chapter Five 
 
The US, regional players and the UN within Iranian Strategic Competition: 
Triangulating Security Perceptions 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter aims to present Iran's perspective and that of its strategic allies in the region, 
both nation-states (e.g. Iraq and Syria) and non-state actors (e.g. Lebanese Hezbollah and 
Hamas), which is said to be based on the role of protector of Middle Eastern values against 
any threat from international and regional players. On the other hand, Bilgin argues that 
"threats to security have been defined largely from the perspective of external powers 
rather than regional states or peoples" (Bilgin, 2004: 28). 
 
The Iranian regime sees these international players, including the US and the UN, as 
sources of problems and troubles for regional stability and security in all fields: militarily, 
culturally, politically and economically. Iran also views Saudi Arabia as a prime regional 
competitor, especially since the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003. Two other adversaries, 
Israel and radical Sunni groups, are deemed to be further prominent threats to Iran's 
geopolitical interests in the region. ―Since the state is an essentially political entity,‖ write 
Buzan, ―political threats may be as much feared as military ones‖ (1991: 119). Political 
and societal threats cannot be easily separated from each other, as they both threaten the 
patterns of culture, custom, religious and ethnic identity. Since the survival of a society 
relies on the maintenance of its identity, Iran has struggled to defend its identity as much as 
its sovereignty. In this sense, the dynamic process of the security dilemma in the Middle 
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East remains between Iran and its allies on one hand, and the US, its regional allies, radical 
Sunni groups, and the UN on the other, and deals with the other in its capacity as protector 
and defender of values, righteousness and freedom, while considering the other a meddler 
and a villain.  
 
The chapter seeks to show to what extent Western values and theological beliefs 
influenced US foreign policy during the George W. Bush administration. It focuses on 
human rights, democratic values, humanitarian assistance and environmental issues, 
alongside the support for Israel, after the 9/11 attacks, under the banner ―War on Terror‖. 
The chapter will address important stages of relations between the US and Iran within the 
framework of the impact of Western involvement in Iranian politics during the reign of the 
Shah (1941-1979). This chapter will also discuss Saudi-Iranian tension from the Iranian 
perspective. Two other adversaries, Israel and radical Sunni groups, will also be discussed. 
 
This chapter is divided into eight sections. The first provides a general overview of the 
chapter. The second discusses the fluctuations in relations between the US and Iran during 
the Shah era, the Khomeini to Ahmadinejad era, and lastly, the post-Ahmadinejad era. The 
third section focuses on relative power for rival actors between Iran and the US in the 
Middle East, within the framework of Iran's threat perception of the US, in cultural, 
security and military terms. The chapter discusses Iran's threat perceptions of Saudi Arabia, 
Israel and radical Sunni movements in sections four, five and six. The seventh section 
tackles the role of the UN and US policy towards the Iranian efforts in energy production, 
including Iran's nuclear issue and security concerns. The last section will be a conclusion. 
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5.2. The Historical Perspective: Fluctuating Relations between the US and Iran 
 
The US-Iran relationship has witnessed a series of decisive junctures: the Shah era (1950s-
1979), the Khomeini to Ahmadinejad era (1979-2013), and the post-Ahmadinejad era 
(2013 to present).  
 
During World War II, Great Britain and the Soviet Union, both US allies, invaded Iran. 
Relations between the US and Iran were good after World War II and until 1979 (Soltani et 
al, 2010; Bowen, 2013). However, when the Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq 
was overthrown in 1953 by the British Military Intelligence (MI6), supported by the US 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), relations on the level of regimes became stronger, but 
at the level of Iranian people deteriorated (www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-
23762970, 2013). "The Mossadeq period was a key period in the history of modern Iran" 
(Gelvin, 2005: 279). For Iran, Mossadeq was a visionary leader who attempted to follow 
the true essence of democracy in his policies. One of his greatest achievements was the 
nationalisation of the Iranian oil industry, which had been dominated by the Anglo-Iranian 
Oil Company (www.parstimes.com, 1987). Arguably, the 1953 coup was not only an 
intervention in Iran's sovereignty and its domestic affairs, but also an obstacle to progress. 
"The events of 1953 were a foundational moment in the construction of U.S.-Iranian 
relations and transferred Iranian suspicions from the historic Anglo-Russian axis towards 
the Americans" (Ansari, 2006: 70). 
 
The US attempted to justify its actions on the pretext of containing the communist tide 
during the Cold War period. There followed a very close alliance between Shah 
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's regime and successive US administrations. This was followed 
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by a dramatic shift in relations between the two parties after the 1979 Iranian Revolution 
and the subsequent significant events (Muhafaza, 2013). Notably, the Shah became a key 
player domestically and regionally, after eliminating threats by Prime Minister Mosaddeq. 
Domestically, he launched the so-called White Revolution which included several sectors, 
such as economic, social, educational, political and security. Regionally, in the 1960s and 
1970s the US provided Iran with military equipment not only to counter the spread of 
communism, but also to secure oil energy, transferred to the West through waterways. The 
Shah, a secular leader, became a strategic regional ally of the US and a protector of US 
interests in the region. "Under the late Shah, Iran turned into the major pillar in the 
American security policy for the Gulf, known as the twin-pillar policy" (AL-Suwaidi, 
2014: 138). The Shah of Iran was called ―the policeman of the Gulf‖. The overthrow of the 
Shah signalled the beginning of a new era. 
 
After the success of the Revolution in 1979, relations between the US and Iran deteriorated. 
Iranian students attacked and captured the US Embassy, taking employees as hostages, on 
04 November 1979. The American Hostage Crisis, with the detention 52 American 
diplomats for 444 days, contributed to the hostility between the two parties 
(www.news.bbc.co.uk, 1980). "And the seizure is interpreted in a context of more than one 
hundred fifty years of foreign interference in the country, particularly the involvement of 
the U.S. in the overthrow of Mosaddaq in 1935" (Ansari, 2006: 71-72). President Carter 
ordered sanctions and the freezing of Iranian assets in the US (www.news.bbc.co.uk, 1981; 
www.parstimes.com, 1987). Ayatollah Khomeini described the US as the ―Great Satan‖ 
and the main source of all contemporary Muslims' problems (Tait, 2007). In equally 
scathing language, President George W. Bush described Iran, along with Iraq and North 
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Korea, as the ―Axis of Evil‖ (www.presidentialrhetoric.com, 2002; Bruno, 2011; Kinzer, 
2006:24). 
 
Hostility between the US and Iran continued during and after the Iran-Iraq war. The US 
considered Iran one of the prominent threats to its strategic interests and regional stability. 
The Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) widened the gap in relations between the US and Iran. 
During the Iran and Iraq war, the US provided assistance to the Iraqi regime in a number of 
sectors, including intelligent information on deployments of Iranian forces, access to 
economic resources, and ensuring that necessary weaponry and military equipment go to 
Iraq (Gagnon, 2002). Military support was conducted in coordination with its regional 
allies, Egypt, Jordan and the Gulf states (except Syria). In the context of growing 
American support for Saddam, President Reagan removed Iraq from the list of sponsors of 
terrorism (Freudenheim et al, 1982). After the war, the US attempted to overthrow the 
Iranian regime by isolating it in economic and political spheres, through imposing more 
economic sanctions and containment policy on Iran, while turning a blind eye to the 
accretion of biological and chemical weapons, used on Kurdish citizens in Iraq 
(Hiltermann, 2004). The US administration condemned Iranian involvement and Lebanese 
Hezbollah in the attack on US marines barracks in Beirut, Lebanon in 1983, killing 241 
Americans (Levitt, 2013). An obscure group calling itself 'Islamic Jihad' claimed 
responsibility for the bombings, whereas US authorities found Iran liable for the bombing 
(www.news.bbc.co.uk, 2003). 
 
The US attempted to find a middle ground through the so-called "Iran-Contra scandal" in 
1985-1986. The Iran-Contra scandal involved secretly shipping American weapons to Iran 
in exchange for freeing American hostages taken by Hezbollah in Lebanon with Tehran's 
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help (www.news.bbc.co.uk, 2004). At the time, there was an embargo against selling arms 
to Iran. For more details, listen to Colonel Oliver North giving evidence before the 
congressional select committee about his role in the sale of arms to Iran, the profits of 
which funded the Contras in Nicaragua, broadcasts BBC-Archives, 10 July 1987, (see 
www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/articles/3CFJPYr5hxcCdvZ35vmDthr/oliver-north-s-role-in- 
iran-contra-10-july,1987). 
 
US relations with Iran remained very sensitive, despite some efforts during Hashemi 
Rafsanjani‘s and Mohammad Khatami‘s presidencies. Rafsanjani's policies concentrated 
on internal affairs, to solve economic problems, and on improving relations with countries 
in Central Asia and the Caucasus. In contrast, Khatami sought the normalisation of 
relations with Western and regional countries to promote peace and stability in the Middle 
East (Ansari, 2006). While the US-Iran relationship reached an unprecedented level of 
tension during the Ahmadinejad era, since 2013 they have achieved a level of relative 
convergence. 
  
5.3. Iran's Threat Perception of the US         
 
It is clear that the Iranian government perceives threats regionally and internationally. Due 
to the ongoing interventions of Western powers, in general, and the US, in particular, in 
Middle East issues, countries like Iran can be seen as fighting a defensive war to protect 
the region (www.arabic.farsnews.com/allstories/news/13940130000626, 2015). In 
reference to the security perception, "The fear of being exploited most strongly drives the 
security dilemma" (Jervis, 1978). The Islamic Republic of Iran has legitimate reasons to 
fear. Firstly, mutual historical hostility as outlined above. Secondly, the classification of 
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Iran as a state in the axis of evil. Thirdly, the overthrow of the regimes in Afghanistan and 
Iraq by the US. Fourthly, Iran has found itself surrounded by US troops. Lastly, the US 
occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq renders the US a threat to Tehran. 
 
Due to rapid changes in international and regional events, it seems clear that Iran's 
behaviour arises partly from its perception of geopolitical dynamics and foreign policies, 
US policy in particular, which involve intervention in regional issues. The removal of 
Saddam's regime in 2003, for example, was part of the US agenda to continue to ―spread 
Western values‖ in the post-Cold War era, even by force (www.georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031106-2.html, 2003; Gokay, 2006). 
Moreover, the American agenda has included waging the so-called war on terror, the 
dominant role of American foreign policy in world affairs, and the continuing threat of the 
Iranian regime. This threat has taken several forms, notably the launch of Western media 
campaigns towards Iran proclaiming the dangers of this regime, as it did with Saddam‘s 
regime, which could lead to potential and justified war against Iran (Gokay, 2006).  
 
Hojjatoleslam Kazzem Seddiqi, a senior cleric in Iran said that "the Iranian nation will 
continue resistance against the US under any kind of condition…Iran is on the path of 
swift progress and it will never surrender to the arrogant powers" (Hojjatoleslam Seddiqi, 
leader of Friday prayers in Tehran, Friday prayer on 18 September 2015,  
www.english.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13940627000603). 
 
Furthermore, Iran's Judiciary Chief, Ayatollah Sadeq Amoli Larijani proclaimed 
Washington one of the major sources in fomenting insecurity in the region. Larijani also 
said that "the bonds between the hegemonic powers and the reactionary governments 
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which don‘t know anything about democracy have created the extremist streams" 
(www.en.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13940916001240, 2015). 
 
In the words of John Mearsheimer, "the best defense is a good offense" (Mearsheimer, 
2001). In order to ensure their survival, states should maximise their power "to be the most 
powerful state in the system". It has been argued that the best opportunity for expanding 
influence was found in the anarchic environment after the removal of Saddam‘s regime, 
which led to the political/security vacuum (Barzegar, 2008). This vacuum provided the 
opportunity for Iran to intervene in the domestic affairs of its neighbouring countries via its 
proxies, not only to defend the rights of all Muslims through supporting emancipatory 
missions, but also to counter American policy in the region (Abadi, 2008; 
www.news.bbc.co.uk, 2009). 
 
Thomas Joscelyn, Long War Journal correspondent, reported on 19 August 2011 that the 
US State Department released its annual reports relating to terrorist activities in the world 
for the previous calendar year. Joscelyn stated that the State Department reported that Iran 
"remained the most active state sponsor of terrorism in 2010" (Joscelyn, 2011). Joscelyn 
also added "Iran's financial, material, and logistic support for terrorist and militant groups 
throughout the Middle East and Central Asia had a direct impact on international efforts to 
promote peace, threatened economic stability in the Gulf, and undermined the growth of 
democracy" (Joscelyn, 2011). 
 
Matthew Levitt, the Former-Wexler fellow and director of the Washington Institute's Stein 
Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, stated on 03 March 2014 that "over the past 
few years, Iran's state sponsorship of terrorism has increased dramatically to levels not 
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seen since the late 1980s and early 1990s. Some of this is terrorism carried out by the 
regime's own operatives from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Qods Force, and 
some by the regime's closest militant ally, Hezbollah. Events in Syria today have further 
cemented this partnership, with dire consequences for regional and international security" 
(Levitt, 2014).  
 
The new era of destabilisation led the security dilemma into a dark tunnel, throwing old 
security paradigms into question (Takeyh, 2007). It is argued that the regional security 
equation was complicated by the reaction of the US to the September 11 attacks, through 
the so-called War on Terror, which drove the US to broaden its agenda via military 
campaigns, imperial values and regional alliances, leading to the consolidation of 
principles of hegemony by using soft power (concepts of democracy, human rights, and 
freedom) supported by hard power (military machine) (Gokay, 2006). 
 
5.3.1. The Cultural Dimension 
 
The aim of this section is to examine the role and impact of culture on decision-making. 
Culture refers to a set of ideologies, religious, ideas, identity, norms and values. This part 
focuses on Western values and US foreign policy, concentrating mainly on the Christian 
Right and the Presidency of George W. Bush. Iran's perspective, the foundations of Islamic 
values for the Islamic Republic of Iran, was discussed in chapters two and three, and the 
following chapter will explain the role and impact of these values on Iran's political 
behaviour during Ahmadinejad‘s presidency.  
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Walter Russell Mead, in Foreign Affairs, argues that: 
 
Religion has always been a major force in U.S. politics, policy, identity, and 
culture. Religion shapes the nation’s character, helps form Americans’ ideas about 
the world, and influences the ways Americans respond to events beyond their 
borders. Religion explains both Americans’ sense of themselves as a chosen people 
and their belief that they have a duty to spread their values throughout the world. 
Of course, not all Americans believe such things – and those who do often bitterly 
disagree over exactly what they mean. But enough believe them that the ideas 
exercise profound influence over the country’s behaviour abroad and at home.  
 
          (Mead, 2006: 24) 
 
Despite the fact that the US Constitution establishes a separation between church and state, 
religious beliefs and values impose themselves on the American public agenda. In his 
Inaugural Address in January 2001, President George W. Bush expressed his faith in a 
divine calling to lead the world in the struggle between the forces of good and evil. In 
addition to that, Bush stated publicly that he had a mission to reshape the world in 
accordance with American values of liberty, democracy and the free market (Black, 2004; 
Mansfield, 2004). Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State, spoke about the relevance of the 
idea of religious freedom to American traditions, during her annual report on international 
religious freedom to the Congress in 2007. Rice said, ―Religious liberty is deeply rooted in 
our principles and history as a nation, and it is our belief this is a universal human right 
that leads us into the world to support all who want to secure this right in their lives and in 
their countries‖ (Rice, 2007).  
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Political culture is not only about a state‘s actions, or how we assess a specific regime 
through inputs and outputs. It is also a combination of identity, history, religion, values, 
language and environmental changes (www.globalsecurity.org, 2005). A comprehensive 
approach in needed to explain the behaviour of people and leaders (David et al, 1979). By 
looking at the principles of the Islamic Revolution, for example, and interpreting events 
before and after 1979 (e.g. the US-Iran hostage crisis on 04 November 1979 and its 
consequences), it becomes easier to interpret ideological strands and a regime identity 
within the overall atmosphere of Iranian society. Iranian society was ready to accept the 
revolutionary ideas of the Iranian regime, with its behaviour and actions against US 
policies and towards regional states. Iran's foreign policy and its assertiveness must be seen 
in the context of the political thought and religious ideology of Khomeini, which affected 
both Iranian society and its regional and international orientation, alongside the revival of 
Iranian nationalism (Takeyh, 2009). 
 
The position of the Christian Right was reinforced during the two presidential terms of 
George W. Bush (2001 and 2009). A high percentage of white evangelicals voted for 
President Bush. Edward Ashbee argued that nearly all the critiques of George W. Bush 
come together in stressing the role of religion in shaping his thinking. He is said to be the 
most devout president since Jimmy Carter, though Bush‘s beliefs and ties have almost 
always been portrayed in a more threatening way (Mansfield, 2004; Heywood, 2007). 
Indeed, it has been said that he is driven by messianic notions. From this perspective, 
―White House policy towards both foreign affairs and domestic issues, such as abortion, 
sex education and gay rights and the nomination of federal judges, has been dictated by 
faith‖ (Ashbee, 2007: 2). Arguably, President Bush is not the first American leader who 
connects his agenda with God's Will. According to this point of view, Bush's religious 
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values not only guide his domestic and foreign policies, but also determine his 
understanding of religious principles as a means for social development and political 
change. 
 
Madeleine Albright, former US Secretary of State, raised several questions in her book The 
Mighty and the Almighty, concerning thought, speech, and deeds of President George W. 
Bush, regarding the concepts of value, liberty and duty. Does the US believe it has a 
special relationship with God? Does it have a divinely inspired mission to promote liberty? 
What role, if any, should religious convictions play in the decisions of those responsible 
for US foreign policy? Does America, as George W. Bush has proclaimed, have a special 
mission, derived from God, to bring liberty and democracy to the world? (Albright, 2007). 
Albright writes, "He might have added that, in the Bible, God had assigned that same job, 
in the same words, to Moses". In addition to that, "political liberty is not a magic pill 
people can swallow at night and awaken with all problems solved, nor can it be imposed 
from the outside" (Albright, 2007: 19).  
 
On 29 January 2003, President George W. Bush mentioned in his speech before the 
invasion Iraq that "We will free people (www.presidentialrhetoric.com, 2003). This great, 
powerful nation is motivated not by power for power's sake, but because of our values. If 
everybody matters, if every life counts, then we should hope everybody has the great God's 
gift of freedom" (www.georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/11/200 
31106-2.html, 2003). 
 
On 12 December 2005, President George W. Bush said that democracy will spread out 
from Iraq to the neighbouring countries and will inspire reformers across the Middle East. 
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Moreover, he noted that free Iraq will allow us to disseminate the teachings of Christ in 
countries where laws restrict doing so (www.presidentialrhetoric.com, 2005). The Islamic 
Republic of Iran and many other countries in the Middle East region have focused on such 
speech acts, which formed their perceptions of US foreign policy. In accordance with their 
perceptions, American policies do not take into account the desire and will of the peoples 
of the region. Iran took the speech of President Bush as a hostile act and interference in its 
internal affairs. With the end of the Cold War and the emergence the so-called new world 
order, Islam was seen as the next challenge to the West. Therefore, there are Muslims who 
believe that the so-called War on Terror came as a result of tension between Christianity 
and Islam (Wahib, 2014). The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order by 
Samuel Huntington illustrates a possible origin of the tension between Islamic and Western 
civilization. Huntington stated that the essential problem between the two communities is 
that each nation has its own values and perceptions. Huntington argues that the heart of the 
tension between the West and Islam lies in the universality of Western culture and Islamic 
culture. This tension may increase when there are attempts from each side to spread its 
values and impose them on the other side (Huntington, 1996; Rafsanjani, 2008). 
 
5.3.2. The Security Dimension  
 
The Iranian regime realised that the strategic objectives of the US were stability, through 
its concentration on state building efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, alongside a policy of 
deterrence against any efforts to undermine Western policies in the region. In order to play 
a prominent role on the regional arena, Iran has strategically teamed up with non-state 
actors, such as Hezbollah, on the basis of a common ideology and geopolitical interests in 
undermining American expansionism or imperialism. Both Iran and the US have been 
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engaging in indirect fierce battles to demonise each other. Iran considers the US the most 
serious threat to its existence and interests in the Middle East (Nasr and Takeyh, 2008), 
while the US views Islamic fundamentalism as a threat in general, and the Islamic 
Republic of Iran as a threat to its security and economic interests in the region, in particular 
(Kemp, 2005; Takeyh, 2010). 
 
As far as Iran is concerned, Western propaganda has ‗sold‘ the Iranian risk. Freedman 
writes of ‗selling the threat‘ (Freedman, 2004). The US needed a strategy of ‗selling the 
threat‘ through the creation of a mechanism of legality and responsibility to justify waging 
war on Iraq, by linking Saddam's regime with the sources of threats, such as weapons of 
mass destruction and Islamic terrorism (Freedman, 2004). To illustrate this point, Miller 
sheds light on the techniques used to sell the war in Iraq in accordance with public opinion 
strategy (Miller, 2002). Before the invasion of Iraq, President George W. Bush had no 
choice but to work within a strategy to persuade the public, the Congress and the allies to 
wage war against Saddam's regime (Miller, 2002). The strategy involved raising the issue 
of danger and threat faced by the public, definining a crisis that needed to be handled. The 
Iranian regime also focuses on dangers and threats, while it perceives itself as always being 
in the spotlight of world media, world attention and the regional political scene. 
 
After the removal of Saddam's regime in 2003, regional competition escalated. 
Confrontation has taken the form of US military presence and Iran‘s soft power. While 
both countries have benefited from the overthrow of the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001 
and Saddam's regime in 2003, and their interests have converged in removing major threats 
(Sunni terrorism), Iran has always been concerned about US presence at its borders.  
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US interests in the region are based on three goals: securing energy supplies, preserving 
regional stability and protecting Israel (www.whitehouse.gov, 2010). The desire to 
increase regional influence is not unique, but Iran's approach (soft power backed by 
asymmetric warfare) to create a balance of power with the US (material power backed by 
Western values) is unique. During Ahmadinejad‘s presidency, Iran made regional security 
issues a top priority, using asymmetric warfare, enhancing a strategic alliance with Syria, 
supporting the opponents of the US in Afghanistan and Iraq, adopting hardline rhetoric 
towards the US, adopting an assertive policy towards Israel, and attempting to improve 
relations with neighbouring countries. Like any other state surrounded and threatened, Iran 
would use all its capacities to confront threats. "As the global hegemony maneuvers to 
squeeze, isolate, and weaken the Islamic Republic of Iran, it in fact strengthens the forces 
of extremism that continue to smoulder in Iran. Such policy risks crippling and humiliating 
the regional hegemon, and could cause it to pursue increasingly desperate and aggressive 
political activities. The greater the tension between the U.S. and Iran, the closer the system 
approaches violent explosion" (AL-Suwaidi, 2014: 114).  
 
Iran refuses to be labelled a terrorist state, instead preferring to define itself as a victim 
(AL-Suwaidi, 2005). For instance, Iran sees Islamic jihadist movements, Hamas in Gaza 
Strip, Al-Quds Brigades in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and Lebanese Hezbollah, as 
legitimate movements of national liberation, not terrorist groups. Articles 152-154, as 
stated before, emphasise the commitment of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the struggles of 
the oppressed and persecuted in every corner of the world. The US and Israel oppose this 
strongly. Therefore, the dynamic process of the security dilemma occurs in accordance 
with uncertainty, self-help and self-interests. The principle of self-interests, for instance, 
illustrates the difficulties to determine a common global list which includes all terrorist 
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organisations, and even the failure to set a standard definition to the term ‗terrorism‘. 
According to self-help, there is no other state that can be relied upon to help ensure the 
state's survival (Booth et al, 2008). Some argue that small states have no choice but to 
enter into security arrangements to guarantee their survival. A number of Gulf states are 
examples of this. Additionally, Iran's proxies of non-state actors rely substantially on each 
other to ensure their survival. 
 
Both parties realise each other‘s nature, influence and power. The US is aware of Iran‘s 
instruments of power in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen. Iran is also well aware of US 
military power in the region and its ability to change the status quo. This situation has 
made both parties less severe in dealing with each other in the shadow of a non-zero sum 
game. In game theory, in a non-zero-sum game solutions exist if all parties sought to 
accept the game in accordance with the status quo of regional reality. Therefore, all parties 
could gain, or all parties could lose.  
 
5.3.3. The Military Dimension 
  
There is no parity between the resources and capabilities of the two parties, either in terms 
of budget, or technological level and processing equipment. The majority of Iranian tanks 
are old, even older than the Iranian Revolution of 1979, and the same applies to the Air 
Force. The last military deal between Iran and Russia was in the 1990s to redevelop the 
Iranian military arsenal through buying a number of tanks type T-72, aircraft type MiG-29, 
and two submarines. Therefore, "Iran's armed services have quantity in Gulf terms, but 
they do not have the quality. This is due to several reasons including mismanagement, the 
arms embargo by the U.S., and the lack of enough funds to maintain and purchase new 
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weapons systems" (Cordesman et al, 2006). One must bear in mind that Iran is self-
sustaining in many areas of conventional and unconventional arms production. In terms of 
conventional weapons, Iran has sophisticated programmes, manufacturing equipment, and 
technology, because of the presence of experts from Russia, China, North Korea, and 
Argentine, for example, to help in expanding its manufacture of military sectors. These 
sectors include the components of different forces such as Land, Air, Maritime, Air 
defense, and short- to long-range ballistic missiles (AL-Suwaidi, 2014).  
 
There are some difficulties in estimating Iran‘s military power, due to the secrecy of its 
projects, ambiguity and exaggeration. Such projects are usually revealed only after their 
completion. Moreover, some of these military projects are used for propaganda, or the 
Iranian press misinterprets military statements, thus adding to the confusion (Cordesman et 
al, 2006).  
 
It has been argued that the US military involvement in the Middle East has been one of the 
major sources of radicalisation and terrorism (Bowman, 2008). The deployment of its 
troops in Lebanon to support international peacekeeping forces in 1982–1984 resulted in 
terrorist acts on 23 October 1983, against the compound of the US contingent of the 
multinational force at Beirut international airport, killing 299 American and French 
servicemen (www.paperlessarchives.com, 1983). The Islamic Jihad Organization claimed 
responsibility for the bombing. That was the time of the emergence of Hezbollah in the 
Lebanese arena with asymmetric warfare. Furthermore, there was a most significant 
operation in 1987-1988, after US warships escorted and reflagged Kuwaiti oil tankers to 
protect them from Iranian attacks through convoy missions, and also the aftermath of 
Operation Desert Storm in 1991, after the Iraqi invasion to Kuwait resulted in the 
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deployment and operation of US forces across the Middle East (Bowman, 2008). The US 
navy patrolled the waters in the Gulf region and the Red Sea and there was an increase and 
redeployment of troops in the Gulf states, including Afghanistan, Iraq and Turkey. The US 
enhanced its military power in the region to maintain permanent bases in the Middle East, 
to minimise any possible change in the regional balance of power that light threaten its 
interests, while Iran emphasised its strategy to gain more power both conventional and 
unconventional, to diminish US political and military power in the region. 
 
US predominance may force others to accept its leadership, but the Iranian regime neither 
accepts nor concedes to the American Administration; instead, it challenges through its 
proxies in the region (www.english.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13930730001608, 20  
14). Iran, therefore, relies heavily on its allies in the region, such as ―the Islamic Front for 
the Liberation of Bahrain, the Organisation for the Islamic Revolution on the Arabian 
Peninsula, and the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq‖ (Green, Wehrey 
and Jr. Wolf, 2009). This includes also other non-state actors, AL-Houthy rebellions in 
Yemen and Lebanese Hezbollah, for instance, who rely on asymmetric warfare and 
unconventional forces in their movements and actual activities. The US has major concerns 
over its interests in the region and potential threats to the flow of oil from the Gulf region 
(www.mubasher.aljazeera.net, 2015). This has led the US to intervene militarily, and such 
military solutions have led to the escalation of radicalism, growing fundamentalist 
thoughts and increasing terrorist attacks, as well as anti-American sentiments in Arab and 
Muslim streets. 
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5.4. Iran's Threat Perception of Saudi Arabia 
  
Diplomatic relations have existed between Saudi Arabia and Iran since 1928, but the 
nature of this relationship has varied over time. The Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979, 
and, more importantly, the 2003 invasion of Iraq, have brought a new reality in the 
regional political scene, which is based on geopolitical rivalry and the dispute over Islamic 
leadership. This rivalry and dispute has cast a shadow over security events with proxy wars 
that have become increasingly violent, with divided societies turning upon one another, 
drawing in external players offering their support for religious, ideological, ethnic, tribal or 
kin (Bruno, 2011). This rivalry has manifested itself within regional political fluctuations, 
such as the crisis in Iraq, the Lebanese issue, the conflict in Syria, the war in Yemen, and 
political turmoil in Bahrain. Sectarian issues, including disputes over energy policy, have 
resulted in increasingly violent conflict (Zweiri, 2012). Understanding the rivalry behind 
these conflicts helps shed light on Iran's relations with Saudi Arabia and the factors driving 
the conflict, especially since the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003. Saudi-Iranian relations 
and their impact on the geopolitical dynamics of the region will be discussed in this section. 
 
 
The Saudi-Iranian rivalry is, at its core, conflict that dates back several years, over power, 
influence and dominance in the Middle East. During the Iran-Iraq war, most Arab states 
supported Saddam Hussein‘s regime, Saudi Arabia included. Al-Jubeir, Adel (2016) 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Saudi Arabia, on 20 January 2016, stated that Iran behaves 
as a revolutionary state, aiming to export Iranian revolution by supporting the Shiite 
militants such as Lebanese Hezbollah, Shiite factions in Iraq and the Houthi rebels in 
Yemen in accordance to its constitution. The revolutionary principles form the basis of 
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their rivalry and perceptions of each other as dangerous and threatening. Additionally, US 
presence and support for the Saudi regime cannot be ignored. Iran perceives the 
relationship between Riyadh and Washington as a threat to its security, especially in the 
context of the growing military presence of the US in the region. 
 
From Iran's perspective, Saudi Arabia is actively attempting to keep Iran weak and 
incapable. In contrast, Saudi Arabia sees the Iranian Revolution as a threat to its existence 
and to the regional security order. Under the circumstances, a security dilemma emerges: 
when one side feels threatened, the reaction would be the reinforcement of its security by 
defence spending, and support for a regional proxy in order to guard against a perceived 
threat, or through alliances. The other side may perceive such actions as a threat, which 
compels a response. This is a process of cause and effect, of action and reaction (Booth et 
al, 2008). As one side feels more secure, the other side feels less secure. This increases, 
rather than decreases, the overall insecurity. It could be argued that Iran's regime and Saudi 
Arabia are regional powers that deal with each other in accordance with zero-sum game. 
On this basis, the more powerful Iran is, the less secure Saudi Arabia becomes, and vice 
versa. Undoubtedly, whenever competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia intensifies, the 
regional order is likely to worsen.  
 
Regional events have increasingly become violent, because of indirect confrontations 
between Iran and Saudi Arabia, based on proxy wars inside or outside their territories. 
These confrontations have manifested themselves in countries such as Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, 
Yemen, and Bahrain, resulting in violent conflict (www.english.farsnews. com/ news te xt. 
aspx?nn=13940611001258, 2015; Al-Marai, 2016). In order to discover the most 
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prominent driving forces of the conflict, it is essential to understand the nature of this 
rivalry. 
 
From the early days of the Iranian revolution, relations between Riyadh and Tehran have 
been shaped by two driving forces. The first is the religious institution. Iran's regime 
perceives Saudi Arabia‘s Wahhabi movement or Salafism, adopted in its foreign policy, as 
a threat, and one that goes beyond the Middle East to include the whole of the Islamic 
world. The second driving force is the military/security factor. This is interconnected with 
American alliances in the region, where Saudi Arabia plays a key role. Here there was a 
remarkable development when the former President of Iran, Mohammad Khatami, 
introduced the concept of dialogue among civilisations in 2001 and rapprochement with 
the Gulf states. Indeed, his rational policy reduced tensions between Riyadh and Tehran, to 
some extent. However, as a result of reformist policies internally and regionally, Khatami 
lost his position in the political scene, and religious trends and revolutionary guards 
returned to the Iranian political scene. Thus came the election of President Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad in 2005.  
 
There are four main issues affecting Riyadh – Tehran relations. The first is a religious 
sectarian issue. The second is competition for regional leadership. The third is the 
relationship with the West and particularly with the US. Finally, the oil issue, which 
includes policies of pricing and production.  
 
The sectarian issue has deep historical roots. Religious sectarianism casts a shadow over 
the geopolitical dynamics in a range of ways. Remarkably, Iran suspects Saudi Arabia of 
arming the moderate Syrian opposition (www.english.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13 
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940611001258, 2015). This suspicion is based on Saudi Arabia‘s tendency to deprive 
Tehran of a strategic ally (Syrian regime), with the ultimate objective of isolating Iran 
regionally. Saudi Arabia suspects Iran of backing the Houthi rebellion in Yemen 
(www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/americas/18380-un-report-iran-arming-houthis-since-
2009, 2015). Saudi Arabia believes that this is a step towards not only transferring anarchy 
to Yemen, but also towards overturning the regional order, which is so important to Saudi 
Arabia's security. 
 
In the competition for regional leadership and leadership of the Muslim world, both 
countries behave in accordance with their holy duty. Perhaps the Palestinian cause and the 
handling of this issue by the two countries is a testament to the depth of this rivalry. Iran 
has succeeded in gaining the support of the Arab/Muslim street through supporting 
vulnerable people, in parallel with its anti-Israeli stance. Several countries, including Saudi 
Arabia, have been criticised for striving to find a settlement for the Palestinian cause 
through a peace process. On this basis, Iran‘s support for Palestinian resistance movements 
is perceived with suspicion and is seen as an attempt to expand its geopolitical influence. 
 
With respect to oil policies, production and prices, Iran sees the Saudi oil policy as going 
hand in hand with the so-called western economic war (economic sanctions). Perhaps the 
Iranian nuclear programme is one of the major developments in Iran-Saudi relations, 
especially after the nuclear agreement with world powers in mid-2015. For more details, 
see chapters 5 and 6. Rivalry for leadership often takes the form of economic warfare, 
media war, diplomatic tension, and brinkmanship. In the case of Iran and Saudi Arabia, 
tensions in relations will remain as long as both sides believe in a different religious 
ideology. 
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5.5. Iran's Threat Perception of Israel 
 
Prior to the 1979 Revolution, Iran and Israel were close allies, collaborating with the US to 
spread Western capitalist values to counter the proliferation of Communism in the Middle 
East region. After Ayatollah Khomeini came to power, a dramatic reversal occurred 
between Iran, on the one hand, and Israel and the US, on the other, as their relationship 
turned from collaboration to enmity. Why and how did this enmity between Iran and Israel 
emanate? Rational accounts fall short of providing a sufficient explanation of their mutual 
foreign policies. A constructivist theory is needed to explain Iran's foreign policy towards 
Israel, with emphasis on the speech act model. Their mutual enmity reached a level of 
significant complexity, especially during the Ahmadinejad presidency. This enmity can be 
seen through the lens of geopolitical interests and religion.  
 
Iran adopts the Palestinian cause as the backbone of its foreign policy, as well as its 
existential struggle with Israel. Iran‘s commitment to the Palestinian cause is religio-
political in nature. Jerusalem (Al-Quds or Bayt Al-Maqdis in Arabic), is one of the oldest 
and holiest cities on earth for Jews, Christians and Muslims. For Muslims, Al-Aqsa 
Mosque or Haram al-Sharif (Noble Sanctuary) is the third holiest place in Islam, after 
Mecca and Medina in Saudi Arabia. It was also the direction for all Muslims to pray before 
God allowed Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) to pray towards Mecca instead. On 
this basis, Iran condemns Israel for the usurping of most of Palestinian territories. Iran sees 
Israel as one of the paramount threats to Iran and to the whole of the Islamic world. 
Khomeini and Ahmadinejad gave the Israeli-Palestinian conflict a religious dimension, in 
order to legitimise Iran's continuous interventions and to play a leading role in this cause, 
as a regional power who attracts the Arab street and Islamic masses, to reinforce its 
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geopolitical interests. President Ahmadinejad's speech to Al-Alam TV on 14 January 2009 
referred to the Palestinian cause as the "most important cause in our time, and the biggest 
injustice of history" (Ahmadinejad, Al-Alam TV, 14 January 2009). 
 
Iran is Israel's paramount threat, mainly due to its controversial nuclear programme. 
Tensions have escalated between them, to the point where Israel declared that, if Iran 
acquired the capability to construct nuclear weapons, the response would be overwhelming 
(see section 6.6. for details). On the other hand, the Iranian regime uses soft power and 
asymmetric warfare through funding groups like Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad and Hamas, as 
part of its effort to counter the Israeli threat (for details, see section 7.3. and 7.4.). The 
Israeli threat can be seen in its expansion policy on occupied lands in the West Bank, the 
Golan Heights and Sheba'a Farms. Hezbollah perceives Iran as the vanguard of the 
resistance movement in the region, standing against Zionist expansion. Thus, Iran‘s 
relationship with resistance movements can be viewed through its commitment to the 
Palestinian cause and its enmity towards Israel, in terms of religion, geopolitical interests 
and national security (www.english.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13940611000630, 
2015). 
 
5.6. Iran's Threat Perception of Radical Sunni Movements 
 
To understand the threat of Sunni movements, one must understand the scope of 
ideological disputes between Sunnis and Shiites. The origin of such disputes can be found 
in values and practices, and the rivalry for leadership to create a caliphate for over 1,400 
years (Al-Ghareib (2005). What we are seeing today is ideological movements turned 
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militant, as with the Shiite movements through Hezbollah in Lebanon and AL-Mahdi 
Army in Iraq, and the Sunni movements by Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS). 
 
It is important to note that both sides (Sunnis and Shiites) view each other from the 
perspective of ideological religious fundamentalism. On this basis, rivalry and conflict 
among players often results in a zero sum. In this sense, Iran perceives radical Sunni 
movements as a threat, not only to its religious ideology, but also to its geopolitical 
interests and regional security. The Sunni threat comes in the historical context of 
reconstituting pan-Islamism. Iran adopts the same approach, but in accordance with the 
Shiite Islamic doctrine. Indeed, the revival of pan-Islamism involves both Sunnis and 
Shiites, on the level of nation states and non-state actors, in the context of the transnational 
caliphate as a single political entity that would abolish existing states and align political 
reality with Islam (Shams al-Din, 1992). 
 
The Iranian regime is concerned about the attempts of Sunni Movements to impose their 
ideology on the region, against existing governments if necessary. Hence, declaration of 
asymmetric warfare against a regime is commonplace. Nowadays, there are several 
examples of this phenomenon, whether it is individuals, groups or organisations. The 
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Jordan, including the Islamic State in Iraq, Syria, 
Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya, are notable examples of Sunni-jihadist movements. 
The trouble is that some regimes support such radical movements in the mistaken belief 
that this constitutes preserving religious freedom. 
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5.7. Iran and the UN: Regional Perspectives 
 
It has been argued that the actions of the UN and the US, in pursuing engagement and 
harsh sanctions as a way of limiting Iran's nuclear activities and the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons in the Middle East, are the result of hardline policies that led to the failure of the 
UN to deal with Iran's regime and the nuclear issue. The nuclear programme would give 
Iran a regional hegemonic status, and ensure survival and bargaining power over regional 
and global matters. Therefore, Iran is no different from other states within the international 
system. Iran constructed bases for its security and foreign policy on principles of national 
choice. Global concerns and regional fears due to Iran's nuclear ambitions and its ballistic 
missiles programme, came as a result of Iran's external behaviour in the shadow of its 
transformative power (Bahgat, 2007). Its relationship with non-state actors and its 
intervening in others‘ affairs, in addition to delivering harsh foreign policy speeches, all 
contributed to disquieting perceptions of its nuclear activities and its foreign policy.  
 
Despite the arguments surrounding Iran‘s nuclear ambitions that threaten the regional 
stability, it is unlikely that such weapons would be used against others, but are only for 
deterrence. Still, this may prompt other countries in the Middle East to pursue nuclear 
options, as a reaction within the dynamic process of the security dilemma. 
 
5.7.1. Iran’s Role as an Energy Producer 
 
Undoubtedly, studying Iran‘s regional role necessitates demonstrating the importance of 
energy resources, which have become a priority in regional and world politics. Iranian 
authorities often claim that oil is an effective political weapon. The supreme leader 
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Ayatollah Ali Khamenei warned Western nations on 04 June 2006 that "attempts to punish 
Tehran would jeopardize the shipment of energy from the Persian Gulf" 
(www.theodoresworld.net, 2006). However, he added that the Islamic Republic of Iran 
would not be the country that begins war. Thus, economic interdependence connects the 
world's oil markets with Iran. During 2003, before the rise in oil prices, the Iranian regime 
relied on oil exports for 60% of its revenues, whereas the world oil markets depend on 
Iran's oil exports of 2.7 million barrels per day (Lowe et al, 2006).  
 
The rivalry between Iran and the US remains rooted on several regional issues, including 
the massive Silk Road project (www.aljazeera.com, 2012). The initiative of reviving the 
ancient Silk Road through a network of roads and maritime linkages, especially with the 
distinctive geographical location of Iran, could consolidate cooperation between the 
various regional blocs and could alter the economic and political landscape of a vast area 
stretching from Asia to Europe (Azarpay, 2009).  
 
On the other hand, Iran‘s energy resources serve as a source of funds for its nuclear 
programme, support for its proxies of non-state actors and clients of Shiite factions, and 
other activities to reinforce its foreign policy and as leverage over world players who 
condemn these activities. Abundant natural resources of oil and gas are available in Iran, 
but global oil demand will be affected from time to time, in accordance with international 
policies and great events. Great powers and industrial countries decisively use all the 
available means to control this vital resource, or at least to preserve and guarantee its flow 
to supply the international markets. Mahdi Mohammad Nia supports the argument which 
says that Iran plays an important role in world politics due to its strategic location, 
geopolitical importance and the huge natural resources in the Gulf region (Crist, 2009). 
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This important role drove Iran to be at the core of the global agenda, competing with 
regional and international players (Nia, Mahdi, 2010). Today, possession of huge natural 
wealth allows the regime in Tehran to challenge the influence of the US in the region. This 
has become a prominent issue on the international stage (Howard, 2007; Al-Husseini, 
2014). This type of challenge has many dimensions; it threatens not only US interests in 
the region, but also industrial countries and the wider world. Iran cannot stay silent or 
dormant. From the US point of view, Iran provides assistance to its proxies of 
fundamentalist organisations and Shiite factions loyal to it throughout the region, while its 
nuclear programme, allegedly for the production of civil energy, conceals a secret: to 
produce the war heads that are able to strike not only cities in South Europe and Israel, but 
also the oil wells in the Gulf States, in addition to threatening the watercourses to transport 
the oil across the Gulf, on which the American and the international economy, in general, 
are dependent.  
 
5.7.2. Iran's Nuclear Plans and Security Concerns 
 
It is not so easy to positively determine whether the Iranian nuclear programme is of a 
peaceful nature, as claimed by Iran, or it is a programme that goes side by side with or 
covers a military nuclear programme, as claimed by the US, Israel and other countries in 
the region. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) issued a report suggesting 
that "a range of activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device were 
conducted in Iran prior to the end of 2003" (Murphy et al, 2015).  
 
What is certain is the fact that the desire of the Iranian regime to acquire a nuclear 
programme and to develop such capabilities is met with pressure by the US and the UN on 
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Tehran, via sanctions and diplomatic isolation, as part of a Western policy to prevent Iran 
from doing so (Katzman, 2003; Cordesman et al, 2006). Therefore, attempts to prevent 
Iran from pursuing its nuclear programme are at the heart of the priorities of any US 
administration (Byman, 2012). For the past decade, the US, Israel and the UN have made 
the Iranian nuclear programme a priority and have launched a concentrated campaign 
against Iran, while Iran shows a very solid stance in its nuclear programme and activities 
and presents a challenge to the policies of the superpower and the international 
organisations (Addis et al, 2010). 
 
The military build-up in the Middle East has created a security problem, which forces 
regional countries to try to protect and defend their national security from numerous threats. 
The concern with arms race and nuclear proliferation in the region has been the subject of 
much debate. However, some regional countries, for instance, Israel, India and Pakistan, 
still have nuclear power with no staunch international procedures against them, or criticism. 
This has allowed these countries to develop their nuclear weapons programmes (Sevilla, 
2011). This dual policy, which suggests the implicit approval of the West and the UN, was 
one of the main reasons behind the current nuclear race in the Middle East, and Iran is not 
an exception. Israel, for example, clings to its nuclear stance, while fears are increasing for 
the attempts of some other countries, Iran in particular, to get equal or parallel capabilities, 
which may lead to changes in the regional balance of power (Mansour, 2001). 
 
So far, Iran has been negotiating through diplomatic channels with the United Nations and 
the superpowers very skillfully, while its nuclear programme remains its weak point, as 
well as its source of power. The weakness lies in the impact of sanctions on Iranian 
domestic affairs, while the Iranian nuclear programme is considered a winning hand in 
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Iranian diplomacy. Indeed, while P5+1 focuses on Iranian nuclear talks, Iran is making 
considerable, but little-noticed, strategic advances. Iran‘s proxies, with huge support from 
Iran's Quds Forces, are quietly occupying more of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen and 
further away, in a way that could soon create a Shiite arc of power in the region (Al-Sha‘er, 
2015; www.wsj.com, 2015). 
 
5.8. Conclusion 
 
The study of the role and contribution of the instruments of soft power in Iran's foreign 
policy making involves two important aspects: the role of religious ideology in 
international relations and the role of political/religious elites in the foreign policy making 
process. The discussion of the role of religious ideology in international relations is 
broadly dominated by the social constructivist approach, which stresses the role and impact 
of political/religious elites in foreign policy making. This chapter suggested that, in order 
to better understand US foreign policy during the George W. Bush administration, we need 
to think more about the contribution of social factors, Western values and theological 
beliefs, faith and ideas, as well as domestic actors, such as the Christian Right, as 
important factors in formulating foreign policy. Apart from that, Iran's perception of 
regional threats, like Saudi Arabia, Israel and radical Sunni movements, must be taken into 
account when trying to understand the geopolitical dynamics of the Middle East. 
 
In contrast, a realist school of thought usually rejects religion as part of its analysis in 
providing explanations as to how and why certain foreign policies came into existence. In 
accordance with realist perspective, foreign policy rests solely on material or rational 
justifications, such as on national or economic interest (Jackson et al, 2007). Therefore, 
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religion has no important role to play in society and states. On the other hand, social 
constructivists argue that international relations is a product of elements of social reality, 
such as thoughts, identity, norms, values and culture, with its own dynamic entity, that 
influences actors, rather than material variables (Hopf, 1998). 
 
Political ideologies inspire people, societies and states. They shape a worldview that 
contains some type of order and meaning. On this basis, Iranian foreign policy is based on 
long-term priorities and aims to promote its position upon the Islamic world, to reinforce 
Iranian sovereignty, to defend its nuclear ambitions and to extend its influence in the 
region and the Arab World. Iran‘s ability to intervene in regional issues and affairs remains 
significant and continuous in supporting extremist groups and fundamentalist organisations, 
so as to reinforce its influence on the region and to undermine the interests of regional and 
foreign countries, including radical Sunni groups (www.watan.com/reports/4327, 2015). 
Iranian concerns emerged largely as a result of US interventions in the region with a large 
army, massive military abilities and a huge arsenal of military-grade weapons in storage 
facilities in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Gulf states and Turkey, America‘s regional allies (Kemp, 
2005). Since the Islamic revolution, Iranian leaders have attempted to unite the Islamic 
world under an Islamic government, changing the regional policies to confront US policies 
and interests (Coughlin, 2010). 
 
Despite the regional environment that provided favourable conditions for expanding Iran's 
influence in the post-Saddam era, Iran sensed it was vulnerable to international pressure 
and regional isolation that prevented the attainment of its strategic goals with its Arab 
neighbours, to consolidate its status as an ascendant regional power (Kemp, 2005; Juneau, 
2009; Shoamanesh, 2012; Krauthammer, 2015). This is due to opposing perspectives 
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between Iran and its Arab Sunni neighbours on matters relating to regional security, where 
Tehran views the US as one of the key factors causing instability and disruption to any 
effort for unity. In contrast, most of Iran's Arab neighbours look to Washington as an 
essential element in their defence (Bahgat, 2007). Despite Iran's repeated calls to reinforce 
the regional security system, free from foreign influence, neighbouring Arab countries 
have shown little interest in such proposals, because of their concerns over Iran‘s rising 
power. In this regard, Iranian leaders, Ahmadnejad, for instance, always seek regional 
security without involving foreign states (Mansharof et al, 2010). In contrast, the 
differences in perceptions and interests made Iran's Arab neighbours rely on the US for 
their security and for the regional security system. 
 
This chapter discussed the possibility and suitability of the above theoretical arguments to 
gain a better understanding of the role of religious ideology and its contribution to the 
process of foreign policy making. It has been argued that these two theories 
(Constructivism and Realism) are compatible with each other, due to the fact that both 
accept the centrality of the state in international relations, and the importance of power 
(realism, material power, constructivism, ideational power) in foreign policy decision 
making. Both internal driving forces and external factors contribute to state behaviour, as 
they respond to the geopolitical dynamics. 
 
The next chapter will analyse the transformative power of Iran‘s foreign policy in post-
Saddam Iraq, between 2003 and 2013, particularly during Ahmadinejad‘s presidency, 
which was deemed a turning point for the interconnectedness of Middle East affairs, as 
well as a shift in the role of actors that challenge the status quo. 
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Chapter Six 
 
Iranian Foreign Policy and Strategic Interests in the Middle East 
 
6.1.   Introduction  
 
This chapter addresses the second and third questions, which are: Which events, perceived 
as security concerns, influence Iranian ideology, identity and foreign policy? What 
instruments of power does Iran‘s foreign policy use to increase its power, to ensure its 
security requirements and meet its strategic interests? This chapter also provides answers 
to the following supplementary questions: What is the main driver behind Iran's foreign 
and security policy? What are the paradoxes of Iran‘s foreign policy? To what extent do 
regional policies determine Iran‘s foreign policy? 
 
The chapter focuses mainly on Iran‘s foreign policy assertiveness between 2003 and 2013, 
through neoclassical realist, constructivist, offensive realist, and speech acts frameworks. 
According to Juneau (2009), Iran‘s use of ideological proxies is an independent variable, 
while Iran‘s foreign policy outcome is introduced as a dependent variable, changing the 
balance of power to the benefit of Iran's regional objectives. As a result, Iran‘s relative 
power has improved, which has led to it expanding its interests abroad. It is crucial for this 
thesis to demonstrate this change, because an essential element of the thesis is to explore 
the consequences of the transformative power of Iran‘s foreign policy upon the dynamic 
situation of the regional security system. Critical issues such as ideological beliefs and 
religious principles need to be taken into account in the decision making process and to 
interpret Iran‘s foreign policy.  
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Debate among scholars centres on Iranian foreign and security policy in terms of whether 
it is driven by religious/ideological drivers or by rational vision of its needs and 
requirements to survive in an anarchic regional system (Collins, 2007). There is no simple 
answer that can provide a comprehensive explanation of the impact of the transformative 
power of Iran‘s foreign policy, and the factors affecting the security system structure of the 
Middle East. As mentioned earlier, because this is a multi-disciplinary research project, 
this thesis relies upon more than one theory and approach to provide a better explanation of 
Iran's behaviour and understanding of the political and security regional reality. 
 
6.2.   Iranian Foreign Policy: between Ideology and Pragmatism  
  
The history of the Islamic Republic of Iran contains references both to its Islamic character 
and its Persian heritage, as well as its revolutionary traits and confrontations with any 
potential threat, mainly the US (Posch, 2013). However, after Iran‘s nuclear programme 
talks between the P5+1 and Iran, it seems that Iran chose a pragmatic approach.  
 
 As with other states in the region, Iran's foreign policy can be viewed as shaped by 
pressure from three environments. First, the national environment, one of intense rivalry 
between conservatives and reformers. Equally important, for Iranian elites and citizens, the 
past is as essential as the present. A paradoxical combination between a sense of pride and 
victimisation in Iranian culture has inspired a sense of independence and a resistance 
reflected in their international relations. Thus, Iran's foreign policy is built on these beliefs 
and perceptions that are widely held sentiments (R.K. Ramazani in www.mideasti.org, 
2009). Second, the regional environment, formed in the presence of a large US military 
presence in the region surrounding Iranian territory. In 2003 Iran was given the 
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opportunity to maximise its regional power through its attempts to apply its strategic 
agenda of the Islamic Revolution (Khomeini, 1981). This agenda involves controlling the 
capitals of regional Muslim countries, mainly the Arab states, such as Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, 
Yemen (Al-Sha‘er, 2015; www.wsj.com, 2015). Lastly, the global environment, in terms 
of the political isolation imposed by Western countries, particularly the US. Additionally, 
the economic sanctions and military embargo by international organisations (www.irannew 
sdaily.com, 2015). Pragmatic conservatives understand that the deterioration in relations 
between the US and Iran inhibits Iran's economic development, and also reduces the 
opportunities for international investors, who are loath to invest in a struggle zone. 
 
In spite of Iran's reputation since the end of the eight-year war with Iraq (1980-1988), and 
especially since the death of Ayatollah Khomeini (1989), the Islamic Republic of Iran has 
proved to be a well-institutionalised, rational actor, which has mainly followed its strategic 
interests before its ideological ones in questions of foreign policy, with the exception of 
Ahmadinejad‘s presidency. Ahmadinejad's foreign policy will be discussed in more detail 
in the following section. On the other hand, it has been argued that ―since the revolution, 
Iran's leaders have faced the challenge of balancing their ideological (idealism) and 
geopolitical (pragmatism) approaches to foreign policy. Since the advent of the Islamic 
Revolution, Iran's regional policies have been driven by ideology as well as geopolitics‖ 
(Kayhan Barzegar in www.mideasti.org, 2009: 134). The thesis argues that ideology and 
pragmatism are two sides of the coin of Iran's foreign policy. In other words, Iran's 
political behaviour derives its ideological doctrine directly from the concepts of Islamic 
revolution, and especially the thought of Ayatollah Khomeini, who built upon the Iranian 
Constitution, alongside with dealing with regional challenges and international risks. 
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Evidence of both approaches can be found in the behaviour of Iran after the invasion of 
Iraq in 2003. 
 
The invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the removal of the Sunni- Baathist regime, which was one 
of the most serious threats to Iran‘s interests, gave Iran‘s foreign policy a great opportunity 
to enhance its presence in Iraq and in other states in the region, through supporting Shiite 
sects and fundamentalist organisations. Bahgat (2007: 7) noted that "Iran seeks to expand 
its economic and cultural ties with neighbouring states, enlarge its sphere of influence, 
promote regional stability, and resist U.S. military and political presence and policies".  
 
Loi (2011) and Barzegar (2008) consider the concept of the Shiite Crescent including both 
Jordan and Egypt (see chapter 7, section 7.2.3. for more details). Recently, the Shiite 
Crescent has stretched to Yemen (Abu Hilal, 2014; Al-Qallab, 2015; www.aawsat.com/ho 
me/article/287646, 2015). This leads to a reinforcement of Shiite militias in these countries 
and elsewhere and allows their domination over the domestic political-security scene in 
which they reside, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and AL-Mahdi Army in Iraq, which 
reflects the geopolitical reality of the Middle East. In this context, the ultimate strategic 
interest of Iran‘s foreign policy is to capture ideologically the minds and hearts of Arab 
and Islamic people, through accessing Shiite sects in the Middle East. The so-called theory 
of Wilayat Al-Faqih remains a powerful tool for supporting Iran's foreign policy to 
interconnect spiritually Shiite sects with the clerical leadership in Tehran, particularly the 
supreme leader.  
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6.3.   Iran’s Tactical Foreign Policy Rhetoric  
 
Nations do not think, they only feel. They get their feelings at second hand through 
their temperaments, not their brains. A nation can be brought — by force of 
circumstances, not argument—to reconcile itself to any kind of government or 
religion that can be devised; in time it will fit itself to the required conditions; later 
it will prefer them and will fiercely fight for them.  
 
       (Twain, 1906: 139) 
 
"Revolutionary states often do not engage in cost-benefit analysis that other states do. The 
main goal of such states is to pursue their revolutionary mission and to construct a 
particular identity based on certain set of norms and values", writes Takeyh (Takeyh, 
2012). This thesis argues that Iran‘s foreign policy, to some extent, has advanced 
revolutionary discourses to manifest its identity and interests through interactions in its 
international relations. The revolutionary identity is reinforced by the history of hostility 
both internationally and regionally. The regional environment with its diverse geopolitical 
interests has led to hostility among states. This thesis explains not only the causes and 
effects of confrontations between Iran and Western countries, but also shows a causal link 
between the discourses and practices in foreign policy. 
 
The Islamic Republic of Iran has used speech acts in its foreign policy, through political 
rhetoric and religious discourse. Speech acts are used as an instrument of power to arouse 
feelings of terror and warn of threats. Austin and Searle (in Oishi 2006) argue that 
language is, fundamentally, action. Therefore, Austin (in Oishi 2006) refers to warnings as 
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utterances that could be implemented into action. In this sense, within the framework of 
Austin's model of actions, the understanding of the structure of language highlights the 
nature of reality. Official speech acts such as statements are likely to be linked with actions. 
Some speech acts, such as the announcement of a massive military exercise, are a kind of 
message towards others showing the state's quantitative and qualitative material power on 
the ground. In this context, Takeyh (2007) argues that speech acts are deemed an offensive 
approach in the context of the transformative power of Iran‘s foreign policy in post- 
Saddam Iraq and contribute to escalating regional tension and uncertainty. Zalman et al 
(2009) add that the Iranian acute rhetorical approach in its foreign policy drives the region 
into a more destabilised condition, with less integration of its international relations. Iran 
uses all means or instruments of power to reinforce its security requirements and increase 
its power to achieve strategic interests.  
 
In the initial stage of the Iranian Revolution and during Ahmadinejad‘s presidency in 
particular, the political rhetoric of Iran‘s foreign policy was based on threats; there was 
hardline rhetoric by both religious and political elites. This kind of aggressive discourse 
and hardline rhetoric is often used as a tool to express Iran‘s revolutionary identity to 
achieve its interests and geopolitical objectives, through expanding its ideological 
influence in neighbouring states, and also to deter regional threats. Ahmadinejad 
reintroduced and amplified Ayatollah Khomeini‘s rhetoric as a tactical weapon, which 
includes overcoming Iran‘s diplomatic isolation in the Middle East region and 
internationalising the crisis over its nuclear programme. Ahmadinejad, in order to 
overcome international isolation, used effective public diplomacy and anti-US, anti-Israel 
speech acts, and the rhetoric of resistance, which has been much more successful than the 
majority of policies of the Arab states in reaching out to several parts of the world. The use 
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of anti-imperialist and pan-Islamic rhetoric as a tool in Iran‘s post-revolutionary policy has 
enhanced its massive efforts to expand its security perimeter in the Middle East to include 
Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and the Palestinian territories (Nashat in www.mideasti.org, 2009). 
Bilgin (2005) argues that the Islamic Republic of Iran has been trying to show the world 
that it is a defender of Muslim and Arab issues.  
 
Iran gained popularity among the Muslim and Arab masses as a result of using tactical 
foreign policy rhetoric. Takeyh (2007: 53) notes Ahmadinejad‘s statement, "that any 
person, who provides any step towards Israel, will be burnt in the furnace of fiery wrath 
aflame by the Islamic nation". Takeyh (2007) argues that this statement is a message that 
the Islamic Republic of Iran, on behalf of the Islamic nation, would no longer recognise or 
accept any peace process agreements that have been, or will be, in the future between 
Israel and the Arab countries or Palestine. In this context, Zweiri (2007) writes that 
Ahmadinejad revived the hardline speech of Israel and the Holocaust, which had 
disappeared during Khatami's presidency. After an unprecedented speech in the UN 
General Assembly on 24 September 2012, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon warned 
Ahmadinejad of the dangers of incendiary rhetoric upon the Middle East region, due to his 
offensive and outrageous discourse against Israel and its existence (Charbonneau, 2012). 
Accordingly, Takeyh (2007, 2010) concluded that the government of Ahmadinejad would 
not only continue its support for radical Palestinian groups, such as Hamas, to prevent any 
deal concerning peace treaties, but would also revive the old policy aimed to overthrow the 
Arab regimes, which would normalise relations with the state of Israel. 
 
It has been argued that the concept of resistance and counter hegemonism is an integral 
part of Iranian identity and Islam in general (Dehshiri et al, 2008). The principle of 
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offensive realism is that nation states seek to gain supremacy, not to be dominated by 
others. The Islamic Republic of Iran is no exception.  
 
6.4.  Iran's Foreign Policy during the Presidency of Ahmadinejad 
 
This section discusses Iran‘s foreign policy during the Presidency of Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad, who led the country, during a critical period in Iran's modern history, into 
more hardline policies and assertive measures. When Ahmadinejad came to power in 2005, 
Iranian foreign policy shifted back to the fundamentalist mentality of the 1979 revolution. 
Ahmadinejad stressed a return to the revolutionary values of Khomeini and religious 
principles that must be implemented within domestic and external affairs (see Appendix 3, 
p. 402). Ahmadinejad had a military and revolutionary background. Marshall et al (2005) 
and Kinzer (2006) mention that during the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) Ahmadinejad was a 
senior officer in the special operations brigade of the Revolutionary Guard Corps; he was, 
perhaps, among the participants in the storming of the US Embassy in Tehran in 1979, 
taking 66 US diplomats hostage for 444 days.  
 
Here it is important to analyse three levels of variables: the level of the individual, which 
refers to the aggressive nature of human beings; the level of the state or regime, where 
some states act more aggressively in their foreign affairs than others; and the level of the 
regional and international system structure that may lead states to conduct war. At the first 
level, and in the neoconservative era under Ahmadinejad, an aggressive approach is taken 
that relies on the logic of force and hardline rhetoric, to attract audiences, to increase Iran's 
prestige and influence in the region, and this has become a paradigm in the era of his 
presidency. In order to clearly demonstrate Iran‘s foreign policy during Ahmadinejad‘s era, 
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it is crucial to discuss it in a way that assesses the relationship between religion and 
politics, on the one hand, and in the context of isolation, regional interests contradiction, 
the presence of huge forces of great power in the region, and a political and security 
vacuum after the removal of Saddam‘s regime, on the other. All these factors shape the 
regional distribution of power and clarify the role of Iran‘s foreign policy in the Middle 
East (www.english.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13931013001011, 2015). 
 
The second level is the regional distribution of power and the role of Iran's foreign policy 
in the Middle East. Certainly the Middle East has been affected by prominent changes in 
the regional security system after the invasion Afghanistan and Iraq. Although traditional 
threats to Iran's national security were removed, ideologically from the Taliban, and the 
Sunni Baathist military from Saddam's regime, a new and great security threat replaced 
them: the US military forces located on both flanks of Iranian territories, the Eastern wing 
in Afghanistan, and the Western wing in Iraq. These changes reconstructed Iran's foreign 
policy approach to confront threats and reshaped its role in dealing with regional and 
international actors. Iran‘s foreign policy during Ahmadinejad‘s reign, especially the 
Iranian Revolutionary ideas, and more assertive Shiite movements, led to concerns in 
Sunni states about their own citizens. Puelings (2010: 29) states that "the pragmatic Iranian 
foreign policy and its refined influence building are seen as a challenge. Sunni States like 
Egypt or Saudi Arabia fear losing their strategic position in the region and the Arab world 
towards the west to the 'Iranian camp'." 
 
The new threats in post-Saddam Iraq are caused by the US military presence in the region, 
and the frenetic competition among various players, such as Iran, the US and its regional 
allies, led Iran to respond by using all the instruments of power at its disposal. The non-
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equal power between Iran, on one hand, and great powers including their regional allies, on 
the other, caused Iran's foreign policy to provide direct support via its special forces of 
Quds Force to its proxies.  
 
This thesis argues that Iran‘s foreign policy during Ahmadinejad‘s presidency was a 
practical policy, in terms of a pragmatic approach to dealing with various challenges. This 
can be seen through the use of religious ideology and hardline speeches to earn the support 
of Arabs and Muslims to conduct asymmetric warfare against Iran's adversaries (Zweiri, 
2007). Indeed, the vulnerability of the regional security system makes it difficult for 
traditional military forces to confront asymmetric warfare, which allows Iran's foreign 
policy to be active and strongly present in any regional negotiations about any security 
arrangements (Barzegar, 2010). 
 
The third level is the way in which Iran's foreign policy drives external strategies in its 
international relations. Both offensive and defensive realism stress the necessity of states to 
ensure their survival. Defensive realism considers the balance of power as the best strategy 
of a state to ensure its survival, whereas offensive realism argues that the maximisation of 
power is the only guarantee for a state to ensure its survival. The Iranian political system is 
a theocratic system based on Islamic Shiite ideology, seeking survival in an anarchic 
international system and spreading its ideology into neighbouring countries to maximise its 
influence (www.yemeress.com, 2014). The export of Shiite ideology abroad needs an 
intensive campaign to overthrow the existing systems, including all cultural norms and 
values, and have them replaced by the doctrine of Shiite Islam (Al-Nefisy et al, 2008). This 
requires changing the status quo. Due to limited capabilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
to implement its ideological project abroad, synchronous in dealing with threats and 
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challenges, it needs proxies like Shiite factions, fundamentalist parties and paramilitary 
groups, to play offensive and defensive roles. 
 
The argument of this thesis is that Iran‘s foreign policy is based on the principles of the 
offensive approach of international relations, according to the argument of John 
Mearsheimer (Mearsheimer, 2001; Abu Hilal, 2014). Mearsheimer argues that the 
―security issue requires a state to have more power to harm another, and the ultimate safety 
comes only from being the most powerful state in the system‖ (Williams 2008: 23). In the 
case of the Iranian regime, due to the acceleration in rebuilding a massive conventional and 
non-conventional power, the security dilemma has arisen. Thus, regional hegemony 
became the ultimate goal for Iran. According to Mearsheimer, conflict over power is 
unavoidable. Offensive realist theory assumes that uncertainty in international politics can 
never be reduced; it is never possible for policymakers to fully understand or allay the 
security fears of other states. In spite of their defensive intentions, it is never possible for 
states to control paradoxical security competition. Offensive realist theory suggests that 
states are driven by the fatalist logic of insecurity (Sutch et al, 2008). It has been widely 
assumed that Iran's foreign policy is understood within the framework of defensive realism, 
while some consider Iran's foreign policy during Ahmadinejad‘s presidency a sort of 
hegemonism in the shadow of offensive realism. This thesis assumes that the foreign 
policy of Ahmadinejad was constructed around confrontation, activity, engagement and a 
more assertive approach which fluctuates between deterrence against Western forces and 
hegemony over the region.   
 
The thesis does not attempt to link Islamic ideology and offensive realism, as it uses three 
additional theories (constructivism, neoclassical realism and speech acts) to cover all 
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aspects of Iran's foreign policy outcomes and the impact of its transformative power on the 
regional security system.   
 
6.5.   Iran and Avenues for Regional Cooperation and Engagement with US policy 
 
Iran's foreign policy after the invasion of Iraq needs to be discussed within a broader 
historical framework of strained relations between Iran and US that includes the intensive 
US military presence in the region. This military presence ensures American strategic 
interests and regional commitments, and constitutes the biggest national security threat to 
Iran.  
 
Five elements define the conflict between the US and Iran. Firstly, the conflict is about 
power, influence and control of the Middle East region. Secondly, the Bush administration 
is classified as Christian Right, while Ahmadinejad‘s as conservative. Thirdly, the war on 
terror was part of Bush's foreign policy, the fight against the evils of terrorism, tyranny and 
oppression, while Ahmadinejad's foreign policy also adopted a similar hardline approach 
in the context of achieving the aspirations of the Iranian Revolution, the expansion of 
Persian influence in the region, and the unprecedented support to fundamentalist 
organisations under the pretext of helping the oppressed (Al-Nefisy et al, 2008). Fourthly, 
the US sent its soldiers to hotbeds of tension and conflict to spread Western values, while 
the foreign policy of Ahmadinejad also involved fighters acting in accordance with the 
theory of Wilayat Al-Faqih on governments and peoples (Mansfield, 2004; Al-Theyabi, 
2011). Finally, Bush believed in the necessity of cleansing the world of ‗evil‘ states 
(www.presidentialrhetoric.com, 2002), while Ahmadinejad believed it was necessary to rid 
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the world of aggressive states like Israel and the US (Ahmadinejad, 2005; 
mubasher.aljazeera.net, 2010). 
 
Washington reluctantly accepted the rise of Iran as a regional power and the regime's 
ability to survive in the shadow of the regional turmoil. They started a dialogue with Iran 
seeking to regulate and control any possible overt action or maximising of its power 
(www.tehrantimes.com, 2012). Washington adopted a policy of détente, as it did in the 
past with its obstinate enemies, the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea. As Iran is one 
of the largest states in the region geographically, militarily, and by population, it found 
itself faced with two choices, either coexistence or confrontation with the US. Despite the 
radical discourses of its leaders, Iran chose to avoid any direct military confrontation with 
great powers. In post-invasion Iraq, "regional players have also looked to develop 
multilateral cooperation, albeit from a low base. Most notably, the five years since the 
invasion have seen the convening of a number of meetings of foreign and interior ministers, 
in what has loosely come to be called the ‗Neighbouring Countries Initiative‘" (Fawcett, 
2009: 299).  
 
In May of 2007, Ayatollah Khamenei stated that he supported US-Iran talks in Baghdad 
about improving Iraq's security situation. However, he indicated that there was no change 
in Tehran's policy toward Washington (Jones, 2007). Khamenei warned that the talks 
would only concentrate on US responsibilities in Iraq and not the Iranian influence in its 
neighbouring countries. The same source confirmed that Iraqi Foreign Minister, Hoshyar 
Zebari, had affirmed this statement during a meeting with his Iranian counterpart 
Manouchehr Mottaki at the Organisation of the Islamic Conference in Islamabad, Pakistan 
on 16 May 2007. Zebari said that Iraqi, Iranian and US officials would discuss 
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arrangements for talks in Baghdad soon, in order to assist the Iraqi government in 
stabilising the Iraqi security situation and ease regional tensions (Jones, 2007). In line with 
these trilateral talks, "U.S. officials have said they do not oppose contributions from Iran-
supported Iraqi Shiite militias as long as they operate under the command and control of 
the Iraqi government" (Burns, 2015). Burns (2015) added that in accordance to two US 
defence officials, "Iranian forces have taken a significant offensive role in the Beiji 
operation in recent days, in conjunction with Iraqi Shiite militia". This military operation 
was conducted against Islamic State militants in Iraq during May 2015. Al-Nefisy and Al-
Rashed, however, expressed their deep concern about the US-Iran talks which go beyond 
Iraq's affairs to include the so-called "Grand Deal". Rashed argues that such a deal may 
also consist of arrangements or even agreements between both parties allowing Iran to 
engage in the Middle East issues such as Syria Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen, and even to 
proceed in its ballistic missile activities for example (Al-Rashed, 2015; Al-Nefisy, 2015). 
 
Axelrod's explanation of how cooperation can emerge in situations of conflict offers a 
paradigm of understanding US-Iranian relations (Axelrod et al, 1988). In accordance with 
the prisoner's dilemma, a non-zero-sum game allows competitors to cooperate in a wide 
range of areas, in an anarchic environment of uncertainty. On this basis, the players may be 
losing or winning together, because they have both competitive and cooperative interests 
(Jervis, 1988; Wu et al, 1995). Collaboration is the rational approach of the prisoner's 
dilemma through open diplomacy between the players. This diplomacy is the way to keep 
the lines of communication open in their relationships, which may lead to a settlement of 
differences by mutual concessions. This approach is based on a rational account for both 
players, who decide to compromise in the framework of preferred choice for both, in 
accordance with cost or gain (Fakhoury, 2009; Soares, 2010). 
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Iran and the US took a pragmatic approach, despite their different interests, and made a 
rational decision to find common ground, because they realised there was no winner or 
loser. This is due to the fact that each player had strategic instruments of power and tactical 
effective capabilities that could severely harm the other. These instruments of power and 
capabilities can be seen as a confrontation between asymmetric warfare (Iran) and 
traditional military power (the US). In other words, according to the practical perspective, 
the US and Iran have found that a non-zero sum game was a rational approach for both 
sides to a win-win game (Hollis et al, 1990; www.payvand.com, 2012).  
 
 6.6.    Iran's Nuclear Activities and Development of Ballistic Missile Systems 
  
The Iranian nuclear programme and the development of ballistic missile systems are a 
contentious issue and closely monitored by the international community, led by Western 
nations (Carter, 2004; Cordesman et al, 2006; Takeyh, 2006). However, the Iranian regime 
has rapidly advanced both programmes, nuclear and missile, over the past decade, with 
constantly increasing ranges, which potentially could be used to deliver nuclear warheads 
(Cordesman et al, 2006). Hence, these two programmes created a regional and 
international crisis and posed a serious challenge to regional security and world stability, 
by creating growing threats to regional countries and beyond. This section explains the 
regional risks of Iran's foreign policy in terms of the growing capabilities of its ballistic 
missiles, short medium and long range, which are capable of carrying nuclear warheads, 
and its consequences on the regional security system. Iran's national interests, however, 
require nuclear deterrence in the region in the face of Israel, the US military presence and 
India-Pakistan, to some extent (Moran et al, 2009). In contrast, countries such as Iran's 
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neighbours, the Gulf states, Israel and the US are deeply concerned over the growing 
geopolitical instability, but also stability worldwide (Cronin et al, 2011). 
 
Lawrence Freedman has taken these issues into consideration in his work. His notable 
article ‗Prevention, Not Preemption‘ (2003), discusses deterrence strategies in the shadow 
of the concepts of prevention and preemption. Freedman (2003: 107) defines prevention as 
a situation that "intends to deal with a problem before it becomes a crisis, while 
preemption is a more desperate strategy employed in the heat of crisis". In the case of 
Iran's nuclear activities, the US and Israel have attempted to wage preemptive attacks 
against Iran's nuclear facilities, in order to eliminate Iranian nuclear capability before it 
develops and poses a serious threat. The national security strategy suggests, even in times 
of crisis, that preemption can be managed in other ways, such as through diplomatic talks 
and technical advice, along with attempts to prevent an aggravation of the conflict, which 
may drive great powers to the use of force (Freedman, 2003). Many scholars argue that the 
realist approach provides a better lens to look at the power capabilities, which mainly 
dictates self-interests, self-help, and egoism (Sevilla, 2011). Iran, despite signing the 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1970, in the past decade has 
intensively pursued the development of its nuclear programme, ostensibly for peaceful 
purposes with Iran's decision to enrich its own uranium alongside an advanced missile 
system (www.nti.org, 2013). Iran has taken such a decision in order to reinforce its 
national security and to maximise its regional status. (Pollack et al, 2005). The other 
countries in the region, the Gulf States, Israel and the US react cautiously, viewing Iran as 
an actual threat to their existence, as well as to their self-interests, which lie on energy 
security, to continue the flow of energy to world markets (Katzman, 2003). 
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Social Constructivism puts the emphasis on ideas and identity in international relations, 
which have in turn been shaped by social interactions and intellectual perceptions. The 
Iranian national identity has been constructed on ideas that are anti-West, anti-American 
and anti-Israel, where Iran considers them enemies and assumes the inevitability of 
confrontation. However, the national identities of Arab states in the region, such as the 
Gulf countries, have been built on negative perceptions of the Islamic Shiite doctrine 
(Cronin et al, 2011). Add to that the concept of exporting the Islamic revolution and 
overthrowing monarchic regimes still entrenched in the minds of leaders and masses since 
1980s (Bahgat, 2007). Thus, these mutual tensions have created the conventional arms race 
and have introduced regional and international alliances among nation-states and non-state 
actors as well. The Iranian nuclear programme alongside its growing missile capabilities is 
more likely to escalate the regional tension and may lead to unconventional arms race 
(Kemp, 2005). 
 
US national interests towards a nuclear deterrence and means of delivery for missile 
systems stem from its international obligations for a nuclear non-proliferation agenda. 
These international obligations are based upon a combination of internal pressures, such as 
a range of hawkish Republicans, Israel lobby groups and self-interested department heads 
and advisors, on the one hand, and an external environment, derived from its global 
standing and prestige, on the other. Thus, it is clear that the regional situation of the Middle 
East is based upon a dynamic situation of action and reaction, in accordance with the 
process of the security dilemma regarding conventional and unconventional levels. 
Practically, the ongoing Iranian efforts to develop a nuclear programme in tandem with 
advanced missile systems reinforce its foreign policy to maximise its regional power. In 
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other words, acquiring nuclear weapons in addition to nuclear technologies provides 
deterrence power, negotiating power and prestige. 
 
After several rounds of talks between the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and 
Iran, concerning its advanced nuclear power programme, Tehran failed to report significant 
parts of its programme to IAEA, and insisted on developing not only all aspects of the 
nuclear fuel cycle (www.iaea.org, 2003; Albright et al, 2012), but also on working to 
acquire, develop, and deploy a wide range of ballistic missile systems with capabilities to 
carry nuclear warheads (Fisk, 2011). Iran has heavily invested in nuclear industries in the 
past two decades, including "nuclear reactors, uranium conversion facilities, heavy water 
production plants, fuel fabrication plants, and uranium enrichment facilities" (Albright et al, 
2006), while the IAEA inspectors have been prevented from accessing underground 
facilities for centrifuge sites, such as Natanz in Iran (http://isis-online.org/isis-
reports/detail/iran-constructing-the-40-mw-heavy-water-reactor-at-arak-despite-calls-not-
t/8#images, 2005; Borger, 2009). See a map of Iran's nuclear installations (Appendix 4, p. 
403). 
 
David Albright, President of Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), 
reported on 22 February 2007 regular clashes between IAEA inspectors and Iranian 
officials over the frequency of inspections and refusal to grant the inspectors multiple entry 
visas according to the agency's protocol, and stated that without more collaboration and 
transparency the IAEA "will not be able to provide assurances about the absence of 
undeclared nuclear material and activities or about the exclusively peaceful nature of that 
program" (www.isis-online.org, 2007). A robust nuclear infrastructure, including the 
insistence of the Iranian regime on broadening the scope of the nuclear fuel cycle and its 
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frequent declarations of successfully enriched uranium (www.isis-online.org, 2006), 
investing heavily in programmes to increase ranges of new missile technology, and its 
capabilities in pursuing a dual track strategy to develop industry for both solid and liquid 
propellant missiles, have led the majority of states to worry about the true intention behind 
acquiring nuclear ambitions  (Chipman, 2010). Thus, the interconnection between the two 
programmes, Iran's secret nuclear activities (www.isis-online.org, 2004) and the 
continuation of the development of the missile systems, pose serious challenges to 
international peace and security; regional and international destabilisation come as a result 
(Black et al, 2010). 'Image shows a tunnel construction in Isfahan nuclear facility in Iran 
(see Appendix 5, p. 404), and (Appendix 6, p. 405) a map of the range of Iran's missiles'. 
 
Collectively, members of the Security Council Committee on Iran Sanctions after reports 
from the panel of experts of IAEA on 23 June 2011 expressed concern about Iran's 
continuation of its enrichment activities and also the successful launch of a second satellite 
into orbit. The Chair of the Committee, Néstor Osorio, reported that, although the Iranian 
regime repeatedly declared that its nuclear programme was peaceful, Iran persisted in 
obstructing all efforts by the IAEA to confirm the fact of Iranian peaceful atomic activities. 
The UK representative indicated that Iranian behaviour was clear evidence of Iran's 
challenge to the Council resolutions and sanctions regime (www.un.org, 2011). Despite 
Iran's claims that the missile systems are strictly for defence purposes, a long-range 
ballistic missiles (surface-to-surface or ground-to-ground) with the capacity to load 
conventional and unconventional warheads are normally used to strike targets well beyond 
state borders. In contrast, air defence systems, such as Patriot missiles (surface-to-air), are 
classified as defensive weapons. The risk regarding Iran's ballistic missiles has increased, 
as "Iran is not a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and is 
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actively working to acquire, develop, and deploy a broad range of ballistic missiles and 
space launch capabilities" (www.nti.org, 2013). This can be seen through efforts to modify 
the Soviet missiles family R-17/R-300 (Scud-B) and R-17M (Scud-C); acquire Nodong 
missiles from North Korea (renamed the Shahab family of missiles 1/2/3), and develop 
both liquid and solid-fueled systems, in order to maximise the range missiles Ghadr-1, and 
the Sajjil-2 (Chipman, 2010; www.en.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13941119000608, 
2016). 
 
John Chipman, director general and chief executive of the International Institute for 
Strategic Studies (IISS) in London, argues that shortly after the end of the Iran-Iraq war the 
Iranian regime put all efforts towards developing one of the most sophisticated systems for 
ballistic missiles in the Middle East, which enable Tehran to deliver a conventional or a 
potential nuclear warhead against any country in the region and beyond (Chipman, 2010). 
Efforts to develop advanced missile systems for a longer range started in the late 1980s 
with the Shahab family of missiles of Shahab-1 (300km-range), Shahab-2 (500km-range) 
and Shahab-3 (900 km-range), (Cordesman, 2008). The Shahab-3 missile, which has 
payload of 1,000kg, entered into operational service in mid-2003. In 2004, the Ghadr-1 
missile, a modified version of the Shahab-3, was test-fired with a range of 1,600km, but 
with a smaller 750kg warhead. The Sajjil-2 missile was tested in 2008; it was capable of 
delivering a 750kg warhead to a range of approximately 2,000-2,200km. Operationally, the 
Sajjil-2 has been subjected to flight tests several times and is more likely to be deployed to 
military units (Cordesman, 2008; Chipman, 2010). Despite claims that Iranian ballistic 
missiles are limited and lacking in their militarily performance, due to their very poor 
accuracy, Iran has several hundreds of these kinds of missiles which are able to reach 
targets in its neighbouring countries (Fisk, 2011). Chipman argues that "nuclear warheads 
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have a much stronger strategic logic and all of Tehran‘s ballistic missiles are inherently 
capable of a nuclear payload, if Iran is able to make a small enough bomb" (Chipman, 
2010). The most likely missiles that could carry an Iranian nuclear warhead would be the 
Ghadr-1, and possibly the Shahab-3, and Sajjil-2. However, in 2006 the Iranian regime 
alleged that the Shahab-3 missile has the capability to strike enemy targets within a 
distance up to 2,000km (1,200 miles), including most of the Middle Eastern countries and 
beyond (Cordesman, 2008). In addition to that, some believe that the upgraded version of 
Iran's Shahab-4 would have a range of 4,000 km (2,400 miles), enabling Iran to strike 
Germany, Italy, and Moscow (www.fas.org, 2006). Iran publicly announced a new version 
of long-range ballistic missile named Shahab-4, which is a developed version of the 
Shahab-3. The most detailed information for Shahab-4 missile systems is available in the 
public domain. 
 
During testimony on global intelligence challenges to the US on 16 February 2005, Porter 
J. Goss, Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), reported that the supreme leader Ali 
Khamenei and the Iranian foreign minister Manouchehr Mottaki, insisted that Iran would 
proceed with enriching uranium. Goss stated that "we (U.S.) are more concerned about the 
dual-use nature of the technology that could also be used to achieve a nuclear weapon." He 
added, "in parallel, Iran continues its pursuit of long-range ballistic missiles, such as an 
improved version of its 1,300 km range Shahab-3 MRBM, to add to the hundreds of short-
range SCUD missiles it already has" (www.cia.gov, 2005). 
 
On 1 March 2005, Pierre Goldschmidt, IAEA Deputy Director General and Head of the 
Department of Safeguards, stated during his briefing to the Board of Governors of the 
agency that Iranian officials clearly acknowledged that "the Heavy Water Research 
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Reactor (IR-40) project is progressing" (isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/isis-imagery-
brief-kalaye-electric/8#images, 2005). John Negroponte, Director of the US National 
Intelligence, expressed to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence common concerns 
related to Iran, which are shared by many countries and organisations, such as Iran's 
neighbours, IAEA, and the US. Negroponte stated on 02 February 2006 that "Iran may 
weaponize missiles to deliver nuclear warheads". He also reported:  
 
The danger that it (Iran) will acquire a nuclear weapon and the ability to integrate 
it with the ballistic missiles Iran already possesses is a reason for immediate 
concern. Iran already has the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the Middle 
East, and Tehran views its ballistic missiles as an integral part of its strategy to 
deter—and if necessary retaliate against—forces in the region, including US forces 
 
                    (Negroponte, 2006: 11). 
 
Ehud Barak, Israel‘s Defence Minister, said in a speech in Washington on 28 February 
2010 that a danger of Iran's nuclear programme extends beyond Israel, which causes a 
serious worldwide challenge; thus, he stated, "I can hardly think of a stable world order 
with a nuclear Iran." "It means they (Iran) are not just trying to create a Manhattan-project-
like crude nuclear device," he added. "They are trying to jump directly into the second or 
second-and-a-half generation of nuclear warheads that could be installed on top of ground-
to-ground missiles with ranges that will cover not just Israel, but Moscow or Paris" (Keyes, 
2010). Greg Bruno reported that the US Defence Department in 2010 proclaimed that 
Tehran "is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons, if it chooses to do so" 
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(Bruno, 2011). The Pentagon also indicated there was advanced nuclear power in plant 
Bushahr for instance, with assistance from Russia. 
 
On 28 June 2011, on the second day of the Iranian military exercise named 'Great Prophet 
6' that lasted 10 days, the official media of Iran stated that the elite Revolutionary Guards 
launched 14 missiles, including medium-range missiles reaching over 1,000 miles. The 
Head of the Guards' aerospace division, Commander Amir Ali Hajizadeh, stated to the 
official media that "Iran's missiles have a maximum range of 2,000 kilometers (1,250 
miles) and are designed to reach U.S. targets in the region and the Zionist regime" 
(www.theisraelproject.org/site/apps/nlnet/content2.aspx?c=hsJPK0PIJpH&b=689705&ct 
=10890197, 2011). Hajizadeh also added that "the Zionist regime is 1,200 kilometers away 
from Iran, and we are able to target this regime with our 2,000-kilometer-range missiles" 
(www.theisraelproject.org, 2011). However, Victoria Nuland, spokesperson for the US 
Department of State, stated that UN Security Council Resolution 1929 prevents Iranian 
from developing missile systems for carrying nuclear warheads (Cordesman, 1999; 
Cordesman et al, 2006; www.theisraelproject.org/site/apps/nlnet/content2.aspx?c=ewJXK 
cOUJlIaG&b=7737551&ct=11145537#.UUyRMRwvloF, 2011). On the other hand, some 
have argued that Iranian ballistic missiles systems and nuclear programme could be used in 
the context of a deterrence strategy as a political weapon, technically, to wage 
psychological warfare and propaganda, and to substantially reduce the enemy's ability to 
fight, which might lower an enemy's morale by raising fear. This complex situation usually 
leads to arms race, uncertainty, tension which escalates the scope of the security dilemma, 
and likely to create favourable conditions for regional conflict. 
 
    
190 
 
Several satellite images obtained by the Institute for Science and International Security 
from Space Imaging and Digital Global from 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 
2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012, and 2013 (www.isis-online.org, 2013) show high security 
uranium enrichment facilities, such as Natanz using gas centrifuges, including Arak heavy 
water reactor and heavy water production facilities, tunnel entrances to the underground 
facilities (www.isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/tunnel-entrance-to-the-underground-facili 
ties-at-natanz-iran/8#images, 2005), as well as a suspected building for high explosive 
testing (Albright et al, 2004). These views of nuclear activities of Iran has led to a reaction 
from the IAEA Board of Governors and great powers as well (Albright et al, 2003; isis-
online.org/isis-reports/detail/new-satellite-images-show-tunnel-construction-at-esfahan-fac 
ility-in-iran/8#images, 2005; isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/New_Satellite 
_ Imagery_of_Iranian_Nuclear_Sites_on_Google_Earth_11October 2011.pdf, 2011). In 
this context, a video tour of Iran's nuclear sites, obtained by NBC News in 2005, and 
transcribed and translated by the Institute for Science and International Security in 10 April 
2009, which was produced by Iran as a promotional video with propaganda under the name 
of "Video Tour of Iranian Nuclear Sites", can be seen at www.isis-online.org, 2009. 
Moreover, David Albright, President of ISIS, spoke on 21 October 2011 on Iran's nuclear 
programme at George Washington University, Elliott School on video, which can be seen 
on (isis-online.org/conferences/detail/highlights-from-david-albrights-talk-on-irans-nuclear 
-program-at-george-was/8, 2011). In line with Iranian suspicious nuclear activities, the UK 
has informed the UN that "Iran is actively trying to buy nuclear technology through 
blacklisted companies, according to a confidential UN report that surfaced on 30 April 
2015". This can be found in Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, 01 May 2015 (in 
www.rferl.org/content/iran-nuclear-un-sanctions-blacklist/26988272.html, 2015). 
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On the issue of the Iranian nuclear crisis, debates arise from two perspectives. First, some 
believe that diplomatic initiatives and peaceful solutions are preferable to prevent Iran 
from acquiring nuclear weapons. Kenneth Waltz the founder of neorealism (structural 
realism), argues that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would increase the probability of 
international peace (Waltz, 1993). In his view, the mere possibility of nuclear use causes 
extreme caution all around. Waltz considers Iran's leaders, despite their extreme speeches, 
rational elites (Waltz, 1993). This is because the leaders of Iran are not suicide bombers, 
and perhaps a nuclear-armed Iran could be deterred by the deliberate use of a nuclear 
weapon or the transfer of nuclear equipment to terrorists (Waltz, 2012). In defense of this 
view, Waltz claims that there is no need for all these efforts to prevent the Iranians from 
developing a nuclear weapon, whether by the US and its allies, or the UN (Waltz, 1993). 
Hence, Waltz encourages diplomatic efforts by keeping the lines of communication with 
the Iranian government open, so as to be able to co-exist with a nuclear Iran (Waltz, 2012).  
 
The second perspective, on the other hand, favours imposing intensive international 
pressure and more sanctions, which could culminate in military action against Tehran to 
destroy its nuclear programme (Cordesman et al, 2006; Al-Hamid, 2013; 
www.theisraelproject.org, 2013). Colin Cal (2012) rejects Waltz's perspective on Iran's 
possession of nuclear power. He believes this may make the Middle East a more volatile 
place and even more prone to conflict. Iran should be prevented from acquiring nuclear 
weapons and developing ballistic missile systems (Cal, 2012). Cal also expressed his 
concern over Iran's nuclear activities, because they may support terrorist groups. Cal adds 
that without the use of military force it is hard to imagine how the Iranian regime can be 
prevented from developing nuclear weapons (Cal, 2012). 
 
    
192 
 
Ian Black et al argue that some regional states such as Israel prefer a military solution 
through launching an intensive air assaults on Iran's nuclear facilities. Black states that the 
majority of Arab states expressed their concern about Iran's possession of nuclear weapons, 
in referring to Iran as an "existential threat" and a power that "is going to take us to war" 
(Black et al, 2010). US Defence Secretary Robert Gates warned in February 2010 of the 
failure of diplomatic efforts, by saying that risks of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East 
may lead to an Israeli strike on Tehran (Sanati, 2008; Black et al, 2010). Prince Turki al-
Faisal, a former Saudi intelligence chief and ambassador to Washington, warned of a 
possible outbreak of nuclear conflict in the Middle East region if Iranian efforts came close 
to obtaining nuclear weapons. Al-Faisal stated, "If Iran develops a nuclear weapon, that 
will be unacceptable to us and we will have to follow suit" (Burke, 2011). Al-Faisal also 
added that the Gulf states, in general, and Saudi Arabia, in particular, cannot live in a 
situation where the Islamic Republic of Iran acquires nuclear weapons. This statement 
came as a reaction to continuous endeavours by the Iranian regime to maximise its regional 
power in both conventional and unconventional military sectors. 
 
Despite the fact that several rounds of talks about resolving the nuclear issue between the 
five permanent Security Council members including Germany (P5+1), those negotiations 
have failed, due to technical matters. This failure led to additional international sanctions 
on the Iranian regime (Negroponte, 2006; Albright et al, 2012). However, Iran's nuclear 
programme talks are approaching the final stages, after they hammered out a preliminary 
agreement in the first half of 2015 (Charbonneau, 2015). However, it is important to 
mention that Iran‘s missile power will not be included in the talks between Iran and the 
great powers (www.tehrantimes.com/images/pdfs/12158.pdf, 2014). In reference to the 
impact of sanctions, Ali Salehi, the former head of the Atomic Energy Iran's Organisation, 
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admitted in 2010 that Iran's enrichment programme had been delayed due to the 
international sanctions (www.whitehouse.gov, 2012; www.consilium.europa.eu, 2012). To 
conclude, this section discussed the scope of Iran's threats concerning its nuclear activities 
and missile capabilities, as an integrated unity that imposed a new comprehensive threat 
towards the regional security of the Middle East and beyond. 
 
6.7.   Iran's Foreign Policy and Non-State Militant Actors 
 
Buzan argues that non-state actors that are representing both the civil and paramilitary 
sides are really a matter of concern and play important roles in the security agenda (Buzan, 
Jones & Little 1993). This strategic alliance and Iran's behaviour are under test, in order to 
assess the nature and scope of correlation between the distribution of soft power, including 
Iran's use of ideological proxies that have been used as instruments for asymmetric warfare, 
and the geopolitical dynamics implications. 
 
Boosting Shiite Islam empowers Iran's foreign policy, not only because it enhances the 
spiritual influence of the Islamic Republic of Iran, but also because it broadens the 
capabilities of its proxies in asymmetric warfare. Sir Lawrence Freedman (2006), 
addressed a dilemma that confronted regular forces, especially Western armies governed 
by liberal values and principles in dealing with asymmetric warfare, during the course of 
their efforts to safeguard their regional interests and reinforce the national security of their 
allies. According to Freedman, this line of argument demonstrates the strategic challenges 
of the phenomenon of regional conflict, where non-state actors emerged as resistant forces 
using terrorist methods, and fight as national liberation movements against colonial powers 
or their regional allies. (www.media.clubmadrid.org, 2005). Iran's proxies are defined as 
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non-state actors like fundamentalist organisations (Hezbollah in Lebanon) and extremist 
groups (Al-Mahdi Army in Iraq) that share ideological beliefs and political-security 
agendas with Tehran (Cordesman, 2007; Byman, 2008; Fawcett, 2009; Puelings, 2010).  
 
This part of the thesis explains why, who and how the new political actors, particularly 
non-state actors of Shiite organisations, who have a strategic linkage with Iran, have 
influenced the regional security system of the Middle East. In contrast, and in order to 
explain the origin of the regional security landscape and the mechanism of the security 
dilemma, the role of radical Sunni jihadists is also examined. Organised militia groups, 
such as the so-called mujahedin in Afghanistan and the networks related to Al-Qaeda (the 
Al-Nusra Front and the Islamic State), are actively operating in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, 
Syria, Yemen, Arabian Peninsula, and Northern Africa, in order to implement their 
political agendas, and commit violent acts, in the name of freedom fighting and resistance 
(Al-Rashed, 2014). These militia groups have embraced Jihad to legitimise their activities 
to counter their adversaries, such as the Shiite factions, and neighbouring states that ally 
with the Western forces in the region (Miller, 2006; Byman, 2008).  
 
After the war in Afghanistan in 1979, the mujahedin reoriented their focus on the next 
target, instead of the Soviet Union. Their target has been the world. It has been argued that 
in the post-Cold War era and the aftermath of the 11 September attacks, new non-state 
actors have emerged on the terrorist scene, including violent groups that represent Islamic 
terrorism, such as Al Qaeda (Horgan, 2005). Robert Jervis supports this argument by 
saying that "a terrorist group, such as al-Qaeda, for example, could not carry out its 
terrorist activities without the compliance of one or more nation-states" (Jervis, 2005: 41). 
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Sunni organisations and Shiite factions are both receiving sponsorship and support, by 
individuals, groups or governments.  
 
Nowadays, terrorist incidents and acts of violence have become more complex. These 
complexities came as a result of expansionist activities of transnational terrorist 
organisations, resulting in increased difficulty in the face of the wave of violence. Al-
Qaeda's threats and its related networks of transnational Islamist terrorism, for instance, 
have grown at a very fast pace and spread across the region and beyond (www.memri.org, 
2003). Most importantly, the safe havens, possession of weapons and funding and 
sometimes the loss of control by the central authority (e.g. Iraq, Syria, Libya and Yemen) 
have driven the political situations and security landscape in the region into a dark tunnel. 
Undoubtedly, a compete for leadership and interactions between major players in the light 
of attaining their self-interests by depending on non-states actors have drove regional 
situation into more complex (www.memri.org, 2003; Abizaid, 2006; Jones, 2012). 
 
It has been argued that whatever the type of regime, Sunni or Shiite, non-state actors 
remain one of the active instruments of power for foreign policies. Freedman (2008) and 
Wehrey et al (2010) wrote that Iran has long supported non-state actors like Hamas in 
Gaza, Palestinian Islamic Jihad in West Bank, and Lebanese Hezbollah. Despite the 
differences between Iran and Sunni radical Salafi (Al-Qaeda) and the Muslim Brotherhood 
(Hamas), Iran's regime provides them with a safe haven and lethal military aid in line with 
its pragmatist approach. 
 
In this context, Freedman argues that, in a strategic concept, terrorist methodology is 
mainly designed for political gains by using excessive violence that affects the 
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psychological state in the short run, and loss of confidence in the legitimacy of the regime 
in the long run (www.media.clubmadrid.org, 2005). The patterns of terrorist activities can 
involve asymmetric warfare, kidnappings and suicide bombings in air, at sea and on land. 
Terrorist incidents have linked to al Qaeda have occurred in countries such as Saudi Arabia, 
the US, the UK, Kenya, the Philippines, Indonesia, Pakistan, Tunisia, Yemen, Iraq, 
Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Bahrain, Egypt and Kuwait. 
 
Notwithstanding America‘s counter-terrorism strategy, based on material power, the 
terrorist threat is still great. Terrorist groups, Sunni and Shiite, continue to perpetuate their 
struggle and attract new recruits locally and externally, and are able to replenish their 
resources (Hoffman, 2006). Religion is very important for Middle Eastern people and the 
Islamic world. As a result, US strategy against extremist religious ideology, a strategy 
involving the use of military power, remains questionable. 
 
Since 2003 the US administration has focused its concerns and its forces on Sunni militant 
groups, instead of Shiite militias (Al-Rashed, 2014). This gave Iran the opportunity to 
stretch its influence to Iraq and beyond, to include Lebanon, Syria and Yemen (Al-Habbas, 
2015), and even further to reach Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Kuwait, and other Arab states. 
It seems that the beneficiaries of the US invasion of Iraq were the Shiites and the Islamic 
regime in Tehran, while the big losers were the Sunni population of Iraq, who lost their 
traditional influence in political life. As a result, some Sunni opposition in the form of 
armed factions emerged. Iranian writer and political analyst Mohammed Sadiq Al-Husseini 
discusses the Iranian perspective on the regional situation by highlighting Iran's behaviour 
towards Arab countries, in particular, Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Al-Husseini argues that 
Yemen has been seized by Iran as it did in southern Lebanon and Syria. Al-Husseini says 
    
197 
 
that Saudi Arabia is going to collapse soon. This can be seen on Arabi 21 TV, London, 
Video-Archives (30 September 2014) in Arabic language (see www.arabi21.com/story/ 
779032, 2014). These Iranian efforts rely on proxies of Shiite factions wherever they exist 
across the region, and within regional geopolitical rivalries. Public Safety in Canada 
Minister Vic Toews pointed out that the Canadian authorities added Iran's Quds Force to a 
list of terrorist groups on 20th December 2012, as a result of the terrorist activities of Al-
Quds Forces, a special unit in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Toews said that the 
Quds Force was responsible for "exporting the Iranian Revolution" through arming, 
funding and paramilitary training to extremist groups, including the Taliban, Hezbollah, 
Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-
General Command (www.skynewsarabia.com, 2012; www.irna.ir, 2014). 
 
To summarise, the close link between non-state actors and the Iranian regime, especially 
with powerful Shiite militant groups such as Lebanese Hezbollah, affects Iran's foreign 
policy (Cronin et al, 2011). Iran and its proxies have behaved according to an ideological 
doctrine alongside a geopolitical approach to maximise their power in the region (Kinzer, 
2006; Owen, 2007).  
 
6.8.   Conclusion  
 
This chapter focused on Iran‘s foreign policy assertiveness and its strategic interests in the 
Middle East, by analysing its transformative power in post-Saddam Iraq between 2003- 
2013. This chapter discussed how religious ideology and material factors interacted, by 
addressing the independent variable (the distribution of soft power via ideological proxies), 
the dependent variable (Iran‘s foreign policy outcome) and intervening variables (the 
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domestic dimension). By linking these variables, it constructed bridges to explore a 
common epistemological ground for Iran‘s foreign policy assertiveness between 2003 and 
2013. It used neoclassical realist, constructivism, offensive realist, and speech acts 
approaches. 
 
The chapter began by discussing the strategic interests and geopolitical factors of Iran‘s 
foreign policy, concentrating on the ideological approach alongside the pragmatism to 
assist in the analysis of the dynamic processes of geopolitical realities of the region 
particularly, during Ahmadinejad‘s presidency (Al-Ghareib, 2005). 
 
There followed a discussion of the Iranian rhetoric of foreign policy as one of the 
instruments of soft power that supports its foreign policy and regional interests. The 
chapter showed that President Ahmadinejad managed to reinforce Iranian public 
diplomacy more successfully than the Arab states by reaching out to different parts of the 
world. Ahmadinejad‘s administration revived Imam Khomeini's revolutionary approach on 
the one hand, and amplified his rhetoric as a tactical instrument on the other hand to 
overcome Iran‘s isolation on the regional and international stage. On the regional stage, 
anti-Israeli, anti-imperialist, and pan-Islamic rhetoric, including the Israeli–Palestinian 
conflict were used as deliberate tools in the conduct of Iran‘s foreign policy in order to 
reach into the Arab street and put Arab governments on the defensive. On the international 
stage, the Iranian regime has succeeded in internationalizing Iran‘s nuclear programme by 
interconnecting it to regional issues, by stressing the themes of state sovereignty, 
international justice, and technological self-sufficiency. In contrast, the Western media, 
especially the U.S. beside Israel continuously launched media campaigns against Iranian 
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regime including hardline rhetoric which increased the regional tension and escalated the 
geopolitical dynamics in light of security dilemma in the Middle East region. 
 
The chapter highlighted the offensive approach alongside the defensive approach in Iran‘s 
foreign policy. When Ahmadinejad came into power in 2005, Iran's foreign policy shifted 
into greater assertiveness, becoming less favourable towards the US and Israel. The impact 
of his foreign policy on the region was discussed. 
 
Iran's foreign policy and avenues for regional cooperation and engagement with US policy 
were evaluated. This thesis argued that, despite the mutual historical animosity between 
the Iranian regime and the US, their clashing interests and policies, and the intensive 
military presence of the US in the Middle East, both countries have followed a pragmatic 
approach, deciding to find common ground, to ensure their strategic interests according to 
―no winner or loser‖ strategy (Hollis et al, 1990; Kinzer, 2006; Fawcett, 2009). This 
chapter also highlighted the complexities of the Iranian nuclear programme and 
development of its ballistic missiles, which are deemed not only a serious threat to the 
regional security system, but also a challenge to world stability. As Iran proceeds in its 
efforts to become a nuclear power, it has employed an assertive foreign policy that relies 
heavily on supporting foreign operations to further its perceived interests (Levitt, 2012). 
Referring to this assertive foreign policy, President Obama stated on 12 May 2015:  
 
It is important to remember that Iran is a state sponsor of terrorism and has 
already engaged in these activities without a nuclear arsenal. We can only imagine 
how Iran might become even more provocative if it were armed with a nuclear 
weapon. Moreover, it would become even harder for the international community 
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to counter and deter Iran’s destabilizing behavior. That’s one of the reasons why 
the comprehensive deal we’re pursuing with Iran is so important—by preventing a 
nuclear-armed Iran it would remove one of the greatest threats to regional security  
 
     (Al-Oraibi, 2015: 3).  
 
The next chapter provides further discussion of the four essential issues under study, in line 
with Iran's foreign policy outcomes and the impact of its transformative power on the 
regional security system. 
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Chapter Seven 
 
The Four Essential Issues under Study 
 
7.1.   Introduction 
 
The export of revolution via the weapon does not achieve the real objective of the 
Islamic Revolution. Therefore, the actual export by through developing the Islamic 
facts, Islamic ethics, and human ethics. The meaning of export our revolution is 
that, all nations and all governments awake to save themselves from these ordeals 
that they suffer. Indeed, our movement is expanding and moving into peoples  
 
(Imam Ayatollah Ruhollah Mostafavi 
Moosavi Khomeini, the supreme religious and 
political leader of the Islamic Revolution of 
Iran, 1979, in Khomeini, 1981: 38;  AL-
Sobagha, 2015: 11).  
 
In addition to the active role of asymmetric warfare, there are other instruments of power 
that can be used without firing a single shot (Hamourtziadou, 2016). Hamourtziadou writes 
that wars of words, wars of ideas, or discourse wars, have the power to influence 
successive generations, even after armed conflict has ended. She adds that wars that 
depend on soft power, such as the discourse on the struggle against imperialism, "enemies, 
of threats, of hegemony and of counter-hegemony, of freedom and of enslavement", can 
lead to armed confrontation at any time. This approach of soft power is an efficient 
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instrument to capture the hearts of the Arabs and the minds of Muslims who need a 
champion to represent them in the conflict. Moreover, soft power is less costly for the 
economy and infrastructure.  
 
Iran's official discourses are consistent with the direction of the leader of the Iranian 
Revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini (www.english.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=1394062 
5001158, 2015). In this regard, Lieutenant General, Hossein Salami, the Chief of the Joint 
Staff of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps of Iran, stated that "The Iranian Islamic 
Revolution is not only working on spreading the culture that wakes up and develops the 
mentality of the Muslim world, but it is also working toward activating confrontation, 
which has pulled the rug from under the foreign forces in the region" 
(www.iranprimer.usip.org, 2015). Salami added also that the region is still looking for "a 
new political and security order. The Islamic Republic of Iran is contributing to the 
production of this order. We have advanced on the enemy in this regard and we have the 
initiative in shaping this order" (www.iranprimer.usip.org, 2015). 
 
As previously mentioned, the Iranian Revolution is derived spiritually from the movement 
of the third Imam for Shiite Twelver, Hussein, Ali‘s son, when he tried to  revolt on 
Caliph‘s legitimacy of Yazid bin Muawiyah and overthrow his power and reform the path 
of religious leadership for Islam, but his mission failed and he was killed. So the question 
is how to put the idea of reform on the ground. Soft power is the answer. This chapter 
explores the relationship between the three essential variables. These are: independent 
variable, dependent variable and intervening variables. This will improve our 
understanding by examining how a state (Iran) and its proxies (non-state actors such as 
Lebanese Hezbollah and Shiite factions in Iraq) have been impacted by the geopolitical 
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dynamics and, in turn, how they have responded to a changing security environment which 
affected the security dilemma. 
 
This chapter is divided into four main sections. Each section discusses one of the issues 
connected with Iran's behaviour during the time frame of this study. These issues are: 
Iranian policy in Iraq post-2003; Iranian support to Hezbollah; Iran's anti-Israel policy; and 
Iran's policy towards the Strategic Communities of Gulf states. The chapter is designed to 
establish a conceptual framework to explain Iran's foreign policy and explore the nature 
and scope of the security dilemma. Article 152-154 of the Iranian Constitution (adopted in 
1979 and amended in 1989), as noted earlier, clearly explains the goals of Iran's foreign 
policy, which are "defense of the rights of all Muslims, non-alignment with hegemonic 
superpowers, and the maintenance of peaceful relations with all non-belligerent States" 
(www.parstimes.com, 1979). However, Iran's external activities have been condemned and 
suspicion has fallen on the role of its proxies of non-state actors, such as Hezbollah, Hamas 
and Iraqi militants, for undermining efforts to bring peace to the region and for reinforcing 
a regional influence of Iran (Feltman et al, 2010). Such activities are conducted in the 
shadow of common strategic interests around several regional issues that relate to Iraq, 
Lebanon, Israel, and the Gulf states and many others (Cilluffo, 2013).  
 
7.2.   Iranian Policy in Iraq 2003 
 
To understand Iranian policy in Iraq in 2003, it is essential to discuss the roots of the Iran- 
Iraq relationship and its impact on Iran's foreign policy in the post-Saddam era. A 
longitudinal study of the Iran-Iraq relationship by Potter et al (2002) reports that "for a 
long time, Iraq has been Iran's nemesis and it continues to represent the real threat and 
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danger to Iran's national interest". Al-Aderous (1999) points out that the Iranian view of 
Iraq is, and has always been, that of an intersection of Iranian grand interests and sources 
of threats and challenges. The removal of Saddam‘s military and ideological threat came 
with the liquidation of his regime in 2003, removing two barriers for Iran, which began its 
transformative foreign policy. For Iran, a collapsed Iraq was a pivotal point for expanding 
its ideological influence upon the Middle East region, by supporting Shiite sects and non-
state actors, to execute Iran's geopolitical interests in the long run (www.alwatan.kuwait.tt 
/articledetails.aspx?id=444988, 2015). 
 
Throughout history and especially during the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 religious 
and ideological ties between Iranian and Iraqi Shiite clergies in Najaf and Karbala (South 
Baghdad) were close. The Iranian bolstering of Iraqi Shiite organisations during Saddam's 
era began officially in 1979 (Al-Ghareib, 2005). Freedman (2008: 435) argues that the 
Islamic Dawa Party in Iraq, for instance, "was viewed in the West as a terrorist 
organisation, uncomfortably close to Iran". By forming the ad-Da'wa Al-Islamiya party 
and the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) as an umbrella 
organisation for Shiite political and paramilitary activity, the Quds Force of the Iranian 
Revolutionary Guard paved the way for unprecedented levels of coordination between 
Iraqi Shiite paramilitaries and the new theocratic regime in Iran (Freedman, 2008; Puelings, 
2010).  
 
The neoclassical realist explanation for the Iranian support of Iraqi Shiite factions 
interprets the transformative power in Iran's external behaviour, which is affected by 
domestic factors (Juneau, 2009). Constructivist explanations are based on a philosophy of 
ideational factors which interact among the Iranian regime and Shiite factions of Iraq, 
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within the framework of the social construction of reality that consists of consciousness of 
thoughts, beliefs, and cultural concepts that have been created through historical 
interactions (Jackson et al, 2007). Offensive realist explanations for Iranian support for 
various Shiite factions focus on Iran's adoption of asymmetric military capabilities, in 
order not only to protect its security position and national interests, but also to maximise its 
influence on Iraq geopolitically (Booth et al, 2008). Speech acts use hardline rhetoric 
between Iranian elites and the prominent Shiite factions such as Al-Mahdi Army in Iraq, as 
a means for identifying language similarity for specific practice, which can be used to 
formulate and impact on realities, and interpret linguistic phenomena and action (Allwood, 
1977; Bilgin, 2005). 
 
7.2.1.   Iran-Iraq Relations after Saddam  
 
The bloody eight-year Iran-Iraq war still fresh in Iran's memory, when the Iranian regime 
attempted to prevent a resurgent Sunni dictatorship from leading Iraq after the removal of 
Saddam's regime. After Saddam, Iraq became a first line of defence for Iranian national 
security against any external threats, via supporting Shiite governments loyal to the 
supreme leader in Tehran, according to the doctrine of Wilayat Al-Faqih (Beehner et al, 
2008; Smyth, 2012). Religious ideology, along with others factors, has constructed state 
identity and determined international relations and the construction of foreign policy. 
Fawcett (2009) noted that the Islamic Republic of Iran is probably the best-known case for 
using geopolitical Islamism, alongside Saudi Arabia, to expand their dominant position as 
a symbol of the real Islamic regime. Al-Ghareib (2005) points out that Iran classifies its 
alliances in the Middle East according to national factors and religious ideology. 
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Despite the fact that Iran and Iraq differ in their culture, ethnicity, language and history, 
the Islamic doctrine of Shiite and common interests link the two nations. Najaf and 
Karbala, located deep in the Shiite heartland of southern Iraq, are the holiest cities for the 
Shiite community, after Mecca and the Medina of Western Saudi Arabia. Iraq, in general, 
and Najaf and Karbala, in particular, were central to the reformation of political Islamic 
regimes through Imam Hussein‘s revolution attempt in 680 CE that led to his death in 
Karbala (Shams al-Din, 1996). Since then, Imam Hussein, has been deemed a reforming 
model for the Shiite political movement. His tomb became the central building in Karbala 
city and a place of pilgrimage for all Shiite Muslims in the world, and above all, a city of 
epic battles and martyrdom (Shams al-Din, 1996). 
 
On the other hand, geopolitical realities are essential factors that influence the Iran-Iraq 
relationship. Iran plays a major role in Iraq due to its geographic proximity, despite US 
attempts to mitigate Iran's engagement in Iraq's affairs. Rakel (2008) stresses the influence 
of Islamic Shiite thought on Iran's geopolitical external affairs. Iranian leaders have a clear 
vision and approach to foreign policy, driven by ideology. Iraq has played an important  
role in linking Shiites in the region.  
 
7.2.2.    Iranian Interests in Iraq 
 
One major interest for Iran's regime in Iraq is to collaborate closely with Iraqi Shiite 
groups, particularly Shiite elites and leaders, in order to enhance its influence on the socio-
political system of Iraq, through the formation of a strategic coalition (Puelings, 2010; 
www.english.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13930730001608, 2014). Geoffrey Kemp, 
director of regional strategic programmes at the Nixon Centre in Washington, D.C., stated 
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in his special report 156 on Iran and Iraq, ‗The Shia Connection, Soft Power, and the 
Nuclear Factor, Iraq and its Neighbours‘, in 2005, that, in the aftermath of the fall of 
Saddam's regime in 2003, Shiite Iran predominantly emerged with increased power and 
influence in Iraq and the Middle Eastern arena in general (Kemp, 2005). The US military 
in Iraq confirmed in early November 2011 that the armed groups belonging to Iran's Quds 
Forces were responsible for attacking US troops and Iraqi security forces (www.state.gov, 
2004; www.churchofscotland.org.uk, 2008). The Force Commander of the Revolutionary 
Guards Airborne, General Amir Ali Haji Zadeh, threatened America that if it targeted 
officers of Revolutionary Guards through assassinations, Quds Forces would kill ten US 
officers in Iraq and Afghanistan for every Iranian officer killed (www.aknews.com, 2011).  
The spokesman of the National Accord Movement, Hadi al-dalimy, announced to the news 
agency Kurdistan, that speeches of Iranian Commanders are deemed a new sign and 
evidence of the size of Iran's influence in Iraq. Al-dalimy added that such hardline 
discourse was also used by Ahmadinejad, when he said that Iran was ready to fill the 
vacuum after US withdrawal, and this demonstrates that they have the strength and allies 
on the ground. Hence, the statements, events and security provided evidence of Iranian 
power in Iraq and its influence on the regional security system (www.aknews.com, 2011).  
 
In the context of Iranian expansion in material power and regional influence, Fairuz 
Ahmady, responsible for the security and political situation in the province of Zanjan in the 
North-West Tehran, declared in a press statement that "Iran is no longer fighting inside its 
territories which are being fully controlled on them, but Iraq and Gaza have become 
shields for Iran to repel any potential attacks either by the United States or Israel" 
(www.watan.com, 2012). Ahmady added that what happened in Iraq confirms the success 
and ability of Iran. However, no further details were given to demonstrate the meaning of 
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‗Iranian success.‘ Such an official statement clearly demonstrates Iran's engagement in the 
domestic affairs of its neighbours, through coordination and strategic cooperation with its 
proxies of non-states actors with unconventional forces on the ground, in order to act on 
behalf of Iran.  Ayad Allawi, the interim Prime Minister of Iraq from 2004 to 2005, and 
Vice President of Iraq since 2014, criticised the role that Iran plays in the region. Allawi 
stated that Iranian behaviour and the active role of its foreign policy, along with regional 
ambitions, adds more fuel to volatile events, reflecting significantly on the regional 
security landscape (Allawi, 2013). 
 
As can be seen from the above, the linkage between the central question of this thesis 
which addresses how to understand Iran's foreign policy behaviour and the impact of its 
use of soft power on the security dilemma in the Middle East.  
 
7.2.3.   The Shiite Crescent between Reality and Illusion  
 
The term Shiite Crescent appeared in 2004, when King Abdullah II of Jordan warning of 
the emergence of an ideological situation and used "Shiite Crescent" (Fuller, 2006; Wright, 
2010) to describe his concern over the rising Iranian power in the region in post-Saddam 
Iraq in 2003, a situation dependent on Shiite empowerment in Iraq all the way through the 
Gulf region, Syria, and Lebanon. The former President of Egypt, Husni (Hosni) Mubarak 
(1981-2011) admitted in 2006 his concern about the Shiite Crescent two years after King 
Abdullah II‘s warning, stating that "Iran exerted strong influence over Iraq's majority Shia 
(Shiite) population and Shias (Shiites) living in other Arab countries" (Ehteshami and 
Zweiri, 2008: 120). Hosni Mubarak said, "Most of the Shiites are loyal to Iran, and not the 
countries they are living in" (Fuller, 2006: 145). In addition, the Saudi foreign minister, 
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Saud Al Faisal expressed deep concern over the spread of Iran's influence in the region, 
stating that "we all fought Iran to prevent its invasion of Iraq, but now all of us (Arabs) 
have delivered Iraq to Iran without reason" (Barzegar, 2007: 100; Al-Nefisy, 2015). 
 
Since the emergence of the Shiite Crescent as an ideological concept, debates on whether it 
is real or an illusion have become significant in major regional conferences (Freedman, 
2008). Al-Nefisy et al (2008: 8) stressed that in Article 12 of the Constitution of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran it says, "the official religion of Iran is Islam of the Jafari Twelvers 
Imam sect and this article is inalterable in perpetuity". Al-Ghareib (2005) and Al-Nefisy et 
al (2008) argue that the main objective of the Islamic Revolution was to export the Islamic 
Shiite doctrine abroad. 
 
In this context, Iranian Revolutionary Guard Leader, Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari, 
announced publicly that Iran's intervention in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen aims to 
reinforce the Shiite Crescent‘s in the region and to unite all Muslims (Khomeini, 1970, 
1981; www.mtv.com, 2015). This can be seen through speaker Abdullah Al-Nefisy, in a 
seminar in the bureau of Hussein Al-Dosari in Kuwait, who focuses on ―the transformative 
power of Iranian external behaviour in the shadow of growing Shiite influence and the 
impact upon regional stability‖ (Video 25 March 2013, Arabic language, see 
www.alziadiq8.com/17310.html, 2013). 
 
7.2.4.    Regional Implications of Shiite Revival in Iraq  
 
The removal of Saddam's regime and the dominance of Iraqi Shiites in centres of political-
security and economic authority upset the traditional balance of power in the region (Bilgin, 
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2005; Fawcett, 2009; www.aawsat.com/home/article/344651, 2015). Until 2003, the power 
of Iraq as a Sunni state was to act as a buffer between Iran's expansionist aspirations and its 
neighbouring countries. It is important to remember that much of the regional Iranian 
activism predated the 2003 invasion (Feste, 1996; Takeyh, 2007; Barzegar, 2009). 
However, it has been widely argued that the Iranian government in Tehran has long 
supported non-state actors, such as the Lebanese Hezbollah, the Supreme Council for the 
Islamic Revolution in Iraq, and more importantly, the ad-Da'wa Al-Islamiya party of which 
the former Prime Minister of Iraq, Nouri al-Maliki, is a member (Ehteshami, 2003). Nouri 
al-Maliki fled to Iran during Saddam‘s era, in order to revive local Shiite activism to obtain 
power through the means of democratic elections (Flintoff, 2007; Beehner et al, 2008; 
Puelings, 2010). This can be seen in a documentary about the dangers of the Marching 
Black, Ahwazi Arabestan Site, (Video, 21 March 2012, Arabic language, see 
www.arabistan.org/videoinfos.aspx?elmnt=96&ids=1395, 2012). 
 
Flintoff (2007) argues that Maliki came to power with the help of the leader of Al-Mahdi 
Army, Muqtada as-Sadr, who was accused by the US of receiving money, weapons and 
training from Iran, in order to keep fueling the fighting by engaging in asymmetric warfare 
to weaken American power in Iraq. In this context, President George W. Bush stated to 
reporters that he could "say with certainty that the Quds Force was providing the 
equipment to militants. What we do not know is whether or not the head leaders of Iran 
ordered the Quds Force to do what they did" (www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/02.1 
4.07.html, 2007). Gordon et al (2007) noted that the US administration ordered the Iranian 
regime to stop the involvement of the Shiite militants in Iraq. These militants had 
longstanding ties with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in Iran and Lebanese 
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Hezbollah militia, who trained in Iran and were equipped for conducting several attacks 
against the coalition forces (Cordesman, 2007; Nerguizian, 2013). 
 
The overthrow of Saddam's regime created the perception of increased vulnerability on the 
Arab side and led to concerns about Iran and its proxies of non-state actors (Al-Aderous, 
2002; www.aawsat.com/home/article/358431, 2015; www.iraqakhbar.com, 2015). In 2006, 
when Iraq's descent into sectarian conflict reverberated inside a number of regional 
countries, new pressure was put on governments stoking societal tensions (Wehrey et al, 
2010). However, this thesis shows different types of Iranian influence on Middle Eastern 
countries. Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Lebanon felt strongest the possibility of sectarian 
conflict in their communities, whereas Kuwait represents, to some extent, a special case 
concerning the consequences of sectarian conflict in Iraq, due to a more liberal political 
system and participatory political culture among all spectrums of society, which mitigates 
the socio-political congestion. Egypt and Jordan have relatively little concern regarding 
Shiite agitation, because of their low Shiite numbers.  
  
7.2.5. The Cycle of Violence in Iraq between Iranian Interests and Regional Threats 
 
Ehteshami et al (2008) argue that the Iranian regime views Iraq as a risk as well as an 
opportunity. The 2003 Iraq crisis was a turning point in modern history and has 
emphasised the interconnectedness of Middle Eastern affairs, which has allowed Iran to 
reinforce its ideological power over the region. Sandikli (in Gokay 2004:77) refers to the 
developments in Iraq as a regional crisis that stands at the top of the agenda today, since 
―the whole world will suffer the consequences of chaos or a possible civil war in Iraq‖. 
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This cycle of violence easily spreads across the region, due to the deep ideological and 
spiritual link among Shiites, and the centrality of leadership in Shiite communities. 
 
Despite the fact that sectarian violence between Shiites and Sunnis, which reached its peak 
in 2006 and 2007, decreased in Iraq over the following years (Hanlon et al, 2007; Hanlon 
et al, 2008; Hanlon et al, 2010; www.iraqbodycount.org, 2013), attacks are still taking 
place every day with thousands still being killed every year, after US withdrawal from Iraq 
in late 2011 (Hanlon et al, 2011; Hanlon et al, 2013; Crawford, 2013). "The human costs of 
the war in Iraq have been massive", wrote Rogers (Rogers (2009: 7). According to a public 
record of violent deaths following the 2003 invasion of Iraq, a minimum of 133,844 
civilians were killed between 2003 and 2013 (www.iraqbodycount.org, 2013). 
 
Since April 2013 and following an attack against Sunni protesters, violence is on the rise 
again, with over 7,000 civilians killed so far this year, as Iraq Body Count reports 
(www.iraqbodycount.org, 2013). The most frequent targets are members of the Shiite 
community, the security forces and government officials. Sunni insurgents, under the 
organisation of the Islamic State of Iraq, and other radical groups such as al-Qaeda in Iraq, 
have claimed responsibility for several of the attacks (Usher, 2012; Abouzeid, 2013). 
Thousands of Sunnis have held regular demonstrations and protest rallies in several Iraqi 
provinces since December 2012, accusing the Shiite government of the former Prime 
Minister Nouri al-Maliki of monopolising power in all sectors and affairs of Iraq. Violence 
has escalated dramatically, especially after the appearance of the Islamic State of Iraq and 
Syria that seized several Iraqi regions, such as Nineveh, Salahuddin and Al-Anbar, in June 
2014 (www.english.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13931007000908, 2014).  
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Iraq's most senior Shiite cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali Husayni al-Sistani, issued a fatwa to 
Shiite sects urging them to carry weapons against Sunni insurgents led by the Islamic State 
(www.bbc.co.uk, 2014). Indeed, the fatwa is an example of a speech act amounting to a 
declaration of war, after the militants widened their grip in the north and west of Iraq, and 
threatened to march south, towards Baghdad. Most importantly, Sadeq Amoli Larijani, 
Iran's Judiciary Chief, underlined in a meeting with Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi 
in Tehran on, 22 October 2014,  "Iran will continue its strong moral and material support 
for Iraq‖ and Iran's record in supporting Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein clearly 
indicates this (www.english.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13930730001608, 2014). In 
such sectarian violence and political infighting in Iraq, the critical question is whether 
regional competition for leadership, distribution of power and conflict in the Middle East 
has raised new fears, as it seems to be turning increasingly into sectarian confrontations 
that may spread across the region. Usher Sebastian sheds light on Shiite concerns about the 
consequences of events in Syria, should a new Sunni leadership take power, as it might 
sponsor more Sunni insurgency in Iraq and beyond (Usher, 2012). 
 
Muqtada al-Sadr, the leader of Al-Mahdi Army, the prominent militia in Iraq, (as reported 
in Karadsheh et al, 2011) urged thousands of his followers to "resist" and "disturb" the 
United States. Al-Sadr (in Karadsheh et al, CNN article, 2011) said in a fiery speech in the 
holy Shiite city of Najaf that "we continue to resist the occupier militarily, culturally and 
by all means of the resistance". This speech represents a mutual hardline between Iranian 
elite discourse and militia Iraqi leaders, based on resistance and violence, in order to 
change the status quo.  
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Hoshyar Zabari, Iraq‘s Foreign Minister, (in Flintoff, 2007) admitted that Iranian 
interference in Iraq has worsened the situation and made life harder. Zabari (in Flintoff, 
2007) also stated that Iran will still be next door after the US forces withdraw. Accordingly, 
Ali Mohammed Hussein (in Flintoff, 2007), an ordinary Iraqi person, when asked about 
the influence of Iran in Iraq, said, "Iran fights America here in Iraq; you do not need to be 
educated to know that". Ryan Crocker, former US Ambassador in Iraq, after a security 
meeting with Iran's Ambassador to Iraq in 2007, stated that the American administration 
repeatedly warned Iran about meddling dangerously in Iraq. He also noted that he had seen 
an increase in Iranian activities facilitating radical paramilitary and militia groups, to 
commit violent acts against Iraqi security forces, Iraqi civilians and coalition forces (Al-
Tamimi, 2012).   
 
The former British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, linked Iran to the global war on terror. It 
was the only nation-state that was directly linked by him during his speech on 
counterterrorism in London. Blair said that the struggle against terrorism in Madrid or 
London or Paris is the same as the struggle against the terrorist acts carried out by 
Lebanese Hezbollah, or Jihad in Palestine, or extremist groups in Iraq (AL- Oraibi, 2006). 
Accordingly, Blair pointed out, "When Iran supports such terrorism, it becomes part of the 
same battle with the same ideology at its heart" (AL- Oraibi, 2006). Regarding Iran's role 
in Iraqi affairs, Michael McConnell, former US Director of National Intelligence, stated to 
the Council on Foreign Relations in June 2007 that the US possess "overwhelming 
evidence" that there is Iranian interference in Iraq, by supporting terrorists, and that there is 
"compelling" evidence that it does the same in Afghanistan (Bruno, 2011). The 
Commission to Study the situation in Iraq, a report by the Baker-Hamilton that was 
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received by President George W. Bush, illustrates the scope of deterioration of security 
situation in Iraq (Baker et al, 2006; www.news.bbc.co.uk/hi/arabic/news/newsid_6210000 
/6210962.stm, 2006).  
 
Alla Mekki (in Flintoff 2007), a Sunni politician and one of the members of the 
Accordance Front, an umbrella Sunni party within Maliki's government, reported that Iran 
is providing lethal aid to extremists on both sides, Sunni and Shiite, with the intention of 
fueling the fighting and maintaining the destabilised condition, in order to keep US forces 
tied down in Iraq (details of the Speech by President Bush are given in Appendix 7, page 
406). Evidence for such interference in Iraq is clearly reported in the media and the 
American administration. In February 2008, a senior military spokesman, US Rear 
Admiral Gregory Smith, told the Chicago Tribune (in www.gwu.edu, 2004; Sly Liz, 2008) 
that US forces are expressing increasing concern regarding Iranian military supplies for 
Shiite militants, who are operating as Special Groups, by receiving training, funding, and 
arms from the Quds Force of Iranian Revolutionary Guard, in order to destabilise the 
security situation in Iraq through violent acts. 
 
Major General Rick Lynch, the commander of Multinational Division Central in Bagdad 
(in Roggio, 2007), also saw no indication of an Iranian reduction in the flow of lethal aid 
for the Shiite terror groups in Iraq. Furthermore, Lynch (in Roggio, 2007) reported that the 
coalition forces were still finding Iranian munitions, and the Iranian Special Groups were 
still active on Iraqi land to conduct their operations (Al-Attaway, 2011). Ahmad Jawwad 
al-Fartusi, the leader of the splinter group Al-Mahdi Army, that attacked British forces by 
using explosively formed penetrators in southern Iraq, was arrested by British forces. 
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Gordon et al (2007) reported that American intelligence concluded that al-Fartusi's group 
might have received training and armour-piercing explosives by Hezbollah.  
 
More importantly, General David Petraeus, Commander, multi-national Force-Iraq, 
reported to Congress on the situation in Iraq in 10-11 September 2007 (in Petraeus 2007) 
and described the situation in Iraq by saying that, despite the violence fueled by the Iranian 
Republican Guard Corps's Quds Force alongside Lebanese Hezbollah, through their 
support of Shiite militia extremists, US forces arrested a number of senior leaders and 
fighters ‗see Appendix 8 (on page 425)‘. Petraeus (2007) pointed to the arrest of the deputy 
commander of Lebanese Hezbollah department 2800, who was responsible for training, 
funding, and arming Shiite factions with advanced explosive devices provided by Iran; 
assassinated and kidnapped Iraqi governmental leaders; killed and wounded several US 
soldiers; indiscriminately rocketed the Green Zone and targeted civilians elsewhere 
randomly. Petraeus (2007) stated that Iran was attempting to turn the Iraqi Shiite factions 
into a Hezbollah-like force, through providing lethal aid to Iraqi Shiite militants to serve its 
interests domestically and regionally and fight a proxy war against the Iraqi state and 
coalition forces in Iraq. 
 
In an attempt to explain general trends in the rising violence in Iraq, unnamed US officials 
have made it clear that Iraqi Shiite militias, who have ties with Iran and access to supplies 
of military equipment via Iranian groups, are responsible and that therefore there is 
compelling evidence to prove that Iran is backing the Iraqi militias (Feltman et al, 2010; 
Ditz, 2011; Al-Tamimi, 2012). In this respect, some argue that Iran has reason to fear the 
US military presence in Iraq, as it may intervene not only to stop its nuclear programme, 
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but also to spread democratic values and norms that threaten the authority of Iran's clerical 
elite.  
 
Beehner (2008) argues that Iran neither allows the spread of democracy across the region, 
nor Iraq to become a US-backed client state, nor does Iran seek a failed Iraqi regime. 
Beehner (2008) argues that some have called Iran's foreign policy in Iraq ―managed chaos‖ 
with relative destabilisation, sufficient to eject US forces from Iraq, but not enough to enter 
into an extreme cycle of violence, which may lead to a wider regional sectarian war. 
Michael Eisenstadt of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (in Beehner 2008) 
observed that such Iranian policy, to some extent, keeps US forces tied down and 
incapable of being used against Iran. A failed state in Iraq, however, could lead to a power 
vacuum, as in Afghanistan, which may allow extremist groups and terrorist organisations 
to find a safe haven and a base from which to recruit, train, equip, and launch operations 
against neighbouring countries.  
 
This thesis argues that Iran‘s foreign policy has significantly achieved several of its core 
strategic gains in Iraq and therefore has reinforced its national interests in the Middle East 
during the time frame of this thesis. These gains were briefly highlighted in the 
introduction as follows: firstly, Iran has ridden the wave of Shiite activism in Iraq in order 
to reach out to Shiite communities throughout the Middle East region, despite the mini 
differences between some Shiite factions concerning ideological-political leadership; 
secondly, it ensured the removal of any threat from the Western flank of Iranian territory; 
thirdly, it established a Shiite Iraqi government with ideological loyalty to Tehran, as a 
first step to reconstructing an Islamic government led by the Islamic Republic of Iran, in 
accordance with principles of the Iranian Revolution and the Islamic Shiite Ideology; 
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fourthly, it kept US forces tied down in Iraq and  with their attention away from Iran, so it 
has had time to pursue its nuclear programme and reinforce its negotiating position and 
interests in the region; fifthly, it re-established active Shiite militias as non-state actors and 
proxies for Iran's foreign policy in the region. The influence of Iran's foreign policy in Iraq 
is unavoidable, as long as both countries share a border. 
 
7.3.   Iranian Support to Hezbollah 
 
This section discusses the strategic partnership between Iran and Hezbollah, in terms of the 
role of Hezbollah in domestic affairs, the organisation's funding of transfers of arms and 
material, militant operations, and interactions with neighbouring countries, and Hezbollah's 
official statements and speech acts. In the academic community for security studies, and 
the existing literature concerning regional security issues of the Middle East, the regional 
role of Lebanese Hezbollah (the Party of God) is at the core of regional and international 
matters (Addis et al 2010; White 2010). The leader of Lebanese Hezbollah, Secretary 
General Hasan Nasrallah, has often proclaimed that the organisation "is dedicated to 
liberating Jerusalem and eliminating Israel, and has formally advocated ultimate 
establishment of Islamic rule in Lebanon" (www.state.gov, 2004: 99; www.en.mehrnews. 
com, 2014). 
 
This statement supports the principles of the Iranian Revolution and achieves the speeches 
of political and religious elites of Iranian regime. It bears remembering that Lebanese 
Hezbollah is the first sectarian religious organisation in the region established in the early 
1980s after the Iranian revolution, and even before the emergence of al-Qaeda in 
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Afghanistan. The commitment of Hezbollah is to impose its will by force domestically and 
as a resistance movement regionally. 
 
Alagha (2006) and Feltman (2010) argue that, although there has been a shift in 
Hezbollah‘s priorities from Shiite resistance movement to a socio-political movement, 
Hezbollah is still one of the major Shiite militia groups supporting Iran's foreign policy and 
remains an essential component in any regional and international talks on the security 
arrangements of the Middle East. In March 2006, Condoleezza Rice, US Secretary of State, 
claimed that "Iran has been the country that has been in many ways a kind of central 
banker for terrorism in important regions like Lebanon through Hezbollah in the Middle 
East, in the Palestinian Territories, and we have deep concerns about what Iran is doing in 
the south of Iraq" (Bruno, 2011). For these reasons, in October 2007, the Iranian 
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was added to the list of foreign terrorist organisations 
for its continuation to support militant groups by the United States. Furthermore, in June 
2010, the UN Security Council agreed to the imposition of a fourth round of sanctions on 
Iran, which included members of the IRGC (Bruno, 2011). Hillary Clinton, the US 
Secretary of State, on 29 March 2011, accused Iran of using Hezbollah in shaping events in 
the Arab world (www.reqaba.com, 2011). This statement was made according to 
confidential reports, that Iran for the first time took a public stand in supporting Shiite 
uprisings particularly in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia (Abdul Qadir, 2013; 
www.arabic.farsnews.com/allstories/news/13940204000426,  2015; www.aawsat.com/hom 
e/article/358431, 2015). 
 
Hezbollah, in contrast to all the other non-state actors under study, presents a fairly clear 
case of a Shiite Islamist militia, paramilitary and unconventional warfare capabilities, 
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active political party, social welfare organisation, and above all it is a model of a unique 
relationship with the Islamic Republic of Iran ‗see Appendix 9 (on page 442)‘, with which 
it shares ideological beliefs and regional interests (Bergman 2008; Puelings 2010). 
Freedman (2008) argues that Hezbollah has been and still is one of the main proxies for 
Iran‘s foreign policy in the Middle East, deemed an instrument of power to implement its 
regional interests (Katzman, 2008; www.aljazeera.com, 2009).    
 
On 20 April 2010, the Pentagon released a report condemning Iran for its support of 
Lebanese Hezbollah with weapons and financial aid up to $200 million a year (Burns, 
2005; www.businessweek.com, 2010). On 4 August 2010, according to Fars News reports, 
Ali Saeedi, representative of the supreme leader to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards 
Corps, stressed support for "the Lebanese and Palestinian Islamic Resistance groups", by 
considering Lebanon and Palestine the "front line's confrontation with its enemies" 
(www.english.farsnews.com, 2010). Equally important, Saeedi pointed out that currently, 
"Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq are deemed as the front lines for any potential attacks against 
Iran, and our support for Hamas is aimed at protecting the front line of the global Islamic 
Revolution" (www.english.farsnews.com, 2010). Saeedi added that Iran has turned into the 
centre of Islamic awakening on the global scene.  
 
On 30 August 2010, Ahmadinejad spoke during a meeting with Lebanon's resistance 
groups (Shiite movements of Hezbollah and Amal), where he stressed the importance of 
reinforcing the alliance between Iran and Lebanese resistance groups, in order to confront 
arrogant powers and enemies of humanity. The Iranian Students News Agency (ISNA) 
quoted Ahmadinejad's speech as saying that "Iran and Lebanon share heavy 
responsibilities and missions" in this regard (Adkins, 2010). On 14 October 2010, in the 
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context of mutual coordination, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Hezbollah 
Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah met in Beirut secretly at the Iranian Embassy, to 
discuss domestic and regional developments (www.yalibnan.com, 2010).  
 
On 13 October 2010, Iranian President, Ahmadinejad, announced in a speech in Bint Jbeil 
(a city in south Lebanon) "today the resistance in Lebanon has become an example to the 
resistance of all the nations .... resistance is the key of victory to the Lebanese nation and 
all the nations in the region" (Macleod, 2010; Ibrahim et al, 2010). This can be seen on 
Aljazeera TV Mubasher (13 October 2010) Farsi language (see http://mubasher.aljazeera.n 
et/). 
 
On 14 October 2010, after the spokesman for the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin 
Netanyahu proclaimed that "Iran‘s domination of Lebanon, through its proxy Hezbollah, 
has prevented Lebanon from being a partner in peace and turned Lebanon into an Iranian 
satellite and a hub of regional terror and instability" (Ibrahim et al, 2010), Israeli Prime 
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu articulated on 17 October 2010 that, "Lebanon is rapidly 
becoming a new satellite of Iran, it‘s a tragedy for Lebanon" (www.google.com, 2010). 
Netanyahu‘s statements came after Ahmadinejad's famous visit to Lebanon on October 13 
2010 when he predicted Israeli destruction during a speech at a packed rally, in southern 
Lebanon, just a few miles from the Israeli-Lebanese border (http://www.aljazeera.com/new 
s/middleeast/2010/10/2010101416133587181.html, 2010). 
 
On 29 November 2010, Iran's supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, urged the former Lebanese 
Prime Minister, Saad al-Hariri, to reinforce his ties with Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah 
Secretary General, by stating "these relations must be more consolidated". Khamenei 
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added, "As long as the occupying Zionist regime exists, Lebanon needs resistance" 
(Adkins et al, 2010). 
 
Neoclassical realism explains the influential motives for reinforcing ideological ties 
between Shiites in Iran and Lebanon, and with Hezbollah in particular. This unique 
relationship between Iran and Hezbollah strengthened the status of this organisation in 
security calculations in the Middle East (Juneau, 2009). Constructivist explanations 
address the deep ideological ties between the Shiite of Iran and Lebanon, constructed on 
socio-political strategic relations and unity of ideational objectives (Griffiths et al, 2009). 
Offensive realist explanations for Iranian support to Hezbollah focus on Iran's adoption of 
asymmetric military capabilities to both deter challenges to survive, and to expand 
influence in Lebanon and beyond (Booth et al, 2008). Speech acts and discourse analysis 
illustrate a consolidated approach of similarity in practice, in using a hardline rhetoric, to 
impact on realities which lead to more chaotic situation, on the one hand, and obtain 
popularity from the Arab masses and the Muslim populaces, on the other (Bilgin, 2005; 
Oishi, 2006; Takeyh, 2007). 
 
7.3.1.   Ideological Links between Iran and Hezbollah 
 
"The blood of Khomeini rages in Nasrallah's veins; the confrontation is not only in 
Lebanon, but deep inside occupied Palestine and within the range of the Lion cubs 
of Hizbullah… no place in Israel will be safe"  
 
                                Gholam-Ali Haddad Adel, Iranian Parliament      
                                           Speaker, 18 July 2006, (www.memri.org, 2006)  
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The geopolitical dynamics of the Middle East has provided suitable conditions for non-
state actors, particularly Hezbollah, and Iran to pursue their mutual interests by interfering 
in regional issues, to attain their geopolitical objectives. In a speech, the Secretary General 
of Lebanese Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, on Al-Manar TV for Lebanese Hezbollah, 
illustrates the regional roles and strategic links between the Islamic Republic of Iran and 
Lebanese Hezbollah (19 November 2012) Arabic language (see www.almanar. 
com .lb/main.php, 2012). Ali Shirazi, the supreme leader's representative in the Quds Force 
of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, however, stated on 26 January 2015 that 
"Hezbollah was formed in Lebanon as a popular force like al-Basij. Similarly popular 
forces were also formed in Syria and Iraq, and today we are watching the formation of 
Houthi group (Ansarallah) in Yemen" (www.iranprimer.usip.org, 2015). 
 
Karagiannis (2009) shows that Hezbollah's ideology follows the distinctly Shiite Islamist 
ideology for the supreme leader in Tehran, particularly the doctrine of Wilayat Al-Faqih 
(www.tehrantimes.com/politics/117178-iran-wholeheartedly-supports-syria-iraq-lebanon- 
palestine-leaders-advisor, 2014). AL-Sadeq (2006) and Levitt (2013) argue that Iran is 
deemed a vital artery for Hezbollah, and a main centre from which he is issued his orders 
from Hassan Nasrallah, the Secretary General of Hezbollah (AL-Sadeq, 2006: 79). On 5 
March 1987, Ibrahim Al-ameen, the former spokesman for Hezbollah, stated, "we are not 
saying we are part of Iran, but, we are Iran in Lebanon, and Lebanon in Iran". Ghaddar 
(2011) and Shoamanesh (2012) refer to the fact that Nasrallah pays tribute to the Islamic 
government in Iran and its contributions to support Arab and Islamic issues, and 
commends the cooperation between Hezbollah and the Iranian regime.  
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The ideological alliance between Iran, Iraq and Hezbollah goes back to the 1960s and 
1970s, when groups of Lebanese Shiites studied in Najaf and after returning to Lebanon 
from Iraq attempted to revive the Shiite Islamic movement, spurring the political 
mobilisation of the country and marginalising the Shiite community. Furthermore, it has 
been widely assumed that the expulsion of radicalised Shiite clerics from Iraq during the 
1970s by Saddam Hussein, (includes Khomeini, the leader of the Islamic Revolution of 
Iran), contributed to the empowerment of the Shiite in Lebanon and the rest of the Middle 
Eastern countries. Hence, the Islamic approach has become the prominent alternative, 
instead of nationalism and secularism (www.aawsat.net, 2009).  
 
Al-Ghareib (2005) and AL-Sadeq (2006) argue that the Iranian Revolution of 1979 gave a 
major objective to Hezbollah, to establish an Islamic state in Lebanon. However, the shift 
in Hezbollah's priorities as a Lebanese Shiite resistance movement, to be a socio-political 
movement and one of mainstream political parties in Lebanon, needs to be analysed in 
depth, within the framework of the changes in the balance of powers in Lebanese domestic 
affairs, the transformative approach of Iran's foreign policy and the regional and 
international distribution of power. Hardline discourses and classic passive-aggressive 
speech acts such as resistance, tyranny, oppression, wiping Israel off the map, however, 
remain a common rhetoric among political and religious Iranian elites and Hezbollah's 
leaders.  
 
On 15 January 2010, in a series of speeches that emphasised the principles of resistance, 
Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah stressed that resistance is the only option and "would 
continue to recommend its soul to God and therefore achieve victory in any war" (Assi, 
2010; Moughnieh, 2012). Nasrallah said during the commemoration of the Arbaeen (the 
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anniversary of the death of Imam Hussein) that the path of resistance and arms, including 
the army and people, are the only guarantee for attaining security, dignity and stability in 
Lebanon (Moughnieh, 2012).  
 
On the other hand, on 13 October 2010, in reference to Sunni reaction to Shiite activities in 
Lebanon, the Abdullah Azzam Brigades (an Sunni Islamist militant group affiliated with 
Al-Qaeda and the global jihad movement) warned Sunnis in Lebanon of the danger of a 
strategic alliance between Iran-Syria-Hezbollah, by saying, "very soon will return the 
events of the early eighties of the past century in a similar fashion, and will return the 
slaughter of the Sunnis anew, and the mill of war will grind on two major axes: Lebanon 
and Palestine" (www.news.siteintelgroup.com, 2010). This statement reflects a fragile 
situation of regional security, the sectarian dimension and religious factor (Nerguizian, 
2013), which was one of the main causes of the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990). On 14 
October 2010, Hezbollah's member in the Lebanese Parliament, Mohammed Raad, 
declared "the resistance (Hezbollah) and Iran are linked ideologically. That‘s why we are 
seen as a threat" (Macleod, 2010). This statement from a senior official in Hezbollah is 
evidence of ideology being a factor, one of the major variables that shape the regional 
security landscape. 
 
7.3.2.   The Role of Hezbollah in Lebanon’s Domestic Politics 
 
The Lebanese civil war 1975-1990, the Israeli war on Lebanon in 1982, the Israeli 
withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000 and the 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli war have all 
led to the weakening of the Lebanese state, and reinforced Hezbollah‘s position 
(www.un.org, 2005; Morrison, 2006; Norton, 2007; Karagiannis, 2009). More importantly, 
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the vacuum of power after the withdrawal of the Syrian armed forces from Lebanon has 
strengthened the position of Hezbollah in domestic Lebanese affairs (Chehabi et al, 2006; 
Bergman, 2008; Levitt, 2014). Accordingly, Addis et al (2010: 21) argue that in the late 
2000s, events in Lebanon infer that "Hezbollah's domestic political interests and the 
transnational security priorities shared by Iranian and Hezbollah security officials create 
competing pressures in some cases". Addis et al (2010) mention that in 2008, in order to 
maintain operational effectiveness as a main Iranian militia proxy in the Middle East, 
Hezbollah imposed control over Beirut's international airport and also all roads leading to 
it as the only outlet from the air to the outside world, including shutting down Beirut's port 
and the national communication of Lebanese networks. Undoubtedly, this was an attack on 
the country's sovereignty and demonstration of force, despite the fact that Hezbollah‘s 
image had been badly damaged by reports of it as an Islamic resistance fighter providing 
national defense and deterring Israel (www.aljazeera.com, 2008). 
 
Judith Harik (in Chehabi et al 2006: 285) refers to the fact that "the Iran-Hezbollah 
partnership has produced large political dividends for the Lebanese party, for it permitted it 
to become a major patron in a country where patron-client relationships constitute the 
underlying exchanging pattern". Hezbollah largely depends on Iranian money to provide 
services and buy influence in southern Lebanon (Bergman, 2008; www.english.farsnews.c 
om/newstext.aspx?nn=13930614000529, 2014). Puelings (2010) pointed out that 
Hezbollah has control over extensive social initiatives in the south of Lebanon, where it 
supports the various needs of Shiites in the region. Hezbollah has already taken control of 
the powers and duties of the Lebanese government, through exercising its role to provide 
tremendous services to Lebanese Shiite community (Nerguizian, 2013). Hezbollah has 
many materialistic obligations in terms of provision of services such as hospitals, clinics, 
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schools, jobs for the unemployed, agricultural training centres, and other social services 
(Al-Abtah, 2015). These employees, in the Lebanese tradition, reward their benefactors 
with votes at election time. Those on the receiving end of Hezbollah‘s services express 
their thanks in a similar fashion. Hezbollah‘s accomplishments in the political arena well 
illustrate this point (Harik, in Chehabi et al, 2006: 285). Bergman (2008) reports 
furthermore that Hezbollah provides direct financial aid to the Lebanese people, 
particularly the Shiite sect whose homes and businesses were damaged by the fighting with 
Israel. Bergman argues that Hezbollah's success filled Shiites in Lebanon with pride. ―To 
an oppressed and wretched majority, living in a divided country full of conflicts, Hezbollah 
gave its Shiite followers a reason to be proud, and a compass pointing to good and evil" 
(Bergman, 2008: 86). 
 
It has been widely assumed that Hezbollah achieved a substantial victory by enhancing its 
own prestige and power in Lebanon, while successfully portraying resistance to Israel as a 
strategic victory not only for Lebanon, but also as a model for the founding of an Islamic 
state in Lebanon, as an extension of the Islamic regime of Iran (Al-Ghareib, 2005; Al-
Nefisy et al, 2008; www.english.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13940614001468, 2015). 
In this context, Islamist socio-political movements that have swept the Middle Eastern 
region are segmented by variations over approaches, means, strategies, and interpretations 
of the Quran. Nazih Ayubi (Ayubi, 1991: 123 in Karagiannis, 2009: 3) discusses political 
Islamisation in terms of an attempt to connect religion and political affairs by way of 
"resisting, rather than legitimizing, government; therefore, it is essentially a protest 
movement". Klandermans (1997: 2 in Karagiannis 2009: 3) provides a well-known 
definition of social movements as "collective challenges by people with common purposes 
and solidarity in sustained interaction with elites and authorities". In this sense, Hezbollah 
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and Iran have a mutual ideology, common political interests in Lebanon, and, more 
importantly, challenge the status quo and method of resistance as a strategic approach to 
their international relations. 
 
On 08 May 2010, Lebanese President Michel Suleiman implicitly admitted not only the 
capabilities and influence of Hezbollah locally and regionally, but also the weakness of the 
central leadership of the state and the Lebanese army. This can be seen clearly in 
Suleiman's statement:  
 
―To demand now, in this regional atmosphere full of dangers and the drumbeats of 
war that Israel is banging every day, and before we reach an agreement on a 
national defense strategy to protect Lebanon, we cannot and must not ask the Shiite 
resistance group (Hezbollah) … Give us your weapons and put it under the state’s 
command‖.  
 
           (Bayoumy et al, 2010:1).  
 
On 18 October 2010, US Representative lleana Ros-Lehtinen said:  
 
―U.S. assistance to the Lebanese armed forces cannot be reviewed in a vacuum, 
separate from the increasing influence of Iran, Syria, and their proxy Hezbollah 
over the Lebanese government. (…) Serious questions remain about whether U.S. 
security assistance to Lebanon advances American interests and whether it should 
continue‖. 
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                  (www.worldtribune.com, 2010: 1).  
 
Thus, in view of the increasing dominance of Iran over Lebanon through Hezbollah, its 
main regional proxy, the House and Senate members in Congress decided to withhold US 
military aid to Lebanese government to regard Lebanon as a military ally of Iran. 
 
On 18 October 2010, in the twelfth semi-annual report on UN Security Resolution 1559, 
UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon expressed his deep worry about Hezbollah's military 
arsenal, by saying that Hezbollah ―maintains a substantial paramilitary capacity that 
remains distinct from and may exceed the capabilities of the Lebanese Armed Forces‖ 
(www.un.org, 2010). Ban Ki-Moon pointed out that ―the United Nations continues to 
receive, on a regular basis, reports that Hezbollah is upgrading and expanding its arsenal 
and military capabilities‖ (www.un.org, 2010). In this context, the UN Secretary General 
urged Hezbollah's leader, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, to disarm his militants and divert into 
a political party. Ban Ki-Moon showed his concern for the growing Hezbollah arsenal, 
which creates a destabilised atmosphere and poses a major challenge, not only to Lebanese 
domestic affairs, but also to the wider security system.  
 
On 31 October 2010, Hezbollah Deputy Chief, Sheikh Naim Qassem, declared that 
Hezbollah's leadership would not hand its members to the Tribunal, regarding the 
investigation of Rafik Hariri's 2005 assassination (www.almanar.com.lb, 2010). Qassem 
also said protective measures for officials have already been taken at "any level politically, 
socially, and militarily" (www.old.naharnet.com/domino/tn/NewsDesk.nsf/0/3F74DA2E5 
54345DFC22577CD0035B614?OpenDocument, 2010).  
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On 29 September 2010, before the upcoming visit of Ahmadinejad to Lebanon on 13-14 
October 2010, Lebanon's largest parliamentary bloc, March 14 coalition, allied with the 
former Prime Minister Saad al-Hariri, expressed their deep concern over the visit of the 
Iranian President, due to "his anti-peace positions and his insistence on considering 
Lebanon an Iranian base on the Mediterranean coast" (www.khaleejtimes.com, 2010). 
March 14 coalition consists of the pro-US and the Gulf Sunni states that look to Iran as a 
staunch ally of the Lebanese Shiite group Hezbollah, which is also part of Lebanon's 
government. This visit came at a time of rising tension in Beirut regarding the indictments 
expected to be issued against Hezbollah elements, for the assassination of Rafik al-Hariri, 
on 14 February 2005. 
 
On 11 November 2010, Yazbeck reported that Secretary General of Hezbollah, Hassan 
Nasrallah, said in a speech to mark his militant group's Martyr's Day, on closed-circuit 
television in southern Beirut, that "the Shiite group would cut off the hand" of anyone who 
attempted to arrest any of its partisans over the assassination of Lebanon's ex-premier 
Rafiq Hariri in 2005 (Yazbeck, 2010). This radical rhetoric came as a result of the 
condemnation by the International Tribunal of some of the elements of Hezbollah for their 
involvement in the Hariri's assassination, which is part of a common hardline speech 
between non-state actors and Iran. Nasrallah challenged the UN-backed Tribunal:  
 
―The group will refuse to recognize indictments or arrests made against it by the 
UN-backed Special Tribunal for Lebanon. (…) Whoever thinks the resistance could 
possibly accept any accusation against any of its jihadists or leaders is mistaken -- 
no matter the pressures and threats ... Whoever thinks that we will allow the arrest 
or detention of any of our jihadists is mistaken‖.  
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                  (Yazbeck, 2010: 1).  
 
On 18 November 2010, Ahlul Bayt News Agency reported that Hassan Nasrallah, 
Secretary General of Hezbollah, stated in his speech, "our word is heard in Iran, and in 
Syria President Bashar Assad consults us regarding many issues." Nasrallah added, "We 
also have friends with whom we have been playing important roles in Iraq and Palestine" 
(www.abna.ir, 2010). "Hezbollah is now stronger than the Lebanese army… and without 
any doubt it proved its existence and ability to control Lebanon within hours," declared 
Lieutenant General Mofaz, adding, "The Arab world and Gulf countries should ally 
themselves with moderate Sunni forces against Hezbollah and Iran which are trying to 
control the entire region and transform its (population) into Shiite" 
(www.old.naharnet.com/domino/tn/NewsDesk.nsf/0/ED9E9C92AA565D10C22577F4002 
E0825?OpenDocument, 2010). In relevant remarks, Eyad Abu Shakra, in his article 
‗Awaiting the Birth of the Arab Project in the Middle East‘, points out that Iranian 
blackmail represented by Hezbollah still prevents the election of the President of Lebanon, 
due to the actual field domination of Hezbollah upon the Lebanese political scene, which 
created a political vacuum (Abu Shakra, 2015). This political vacuum indicates the reality 
in Lebanon, where Tehran wants to legitimise its hegemony over the country 
constitutionally, through attempts to elect the so-called 'Head doll', in order to enable 
Hezbollah to control decision making in Lebanon, then proceed towards their strategic 
objectives (Abu Shakra, 2015). A similar strategy is seen in Yemen through the Houthi 
rebels (AL-Hamid, 2014; Al-Nefisy, 2014; www.sabq.org/umzgde, 2015). 
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7.3.3.    Iran’s Role in Lebanon and Military Support to Hezbollah 
 
Since Hezbollah was officially established in 1982, from the heart of the Amal movement 
(Shiite organisation in Lebanon) during the Lebanese Civil War, Iran continuously 
supported it via Syria (triangle of strategic alliance) militarily, financially, and politically, 
as a long arm and instrument of power for its foreign policy. Norton (2007: 475) describes 
Hezbollah as the ―cat's paw of Iran". Bahgat (2007) and Addis et al (2010) refer to 
Lebanese Hezbollah as a strategic partner and proxy for Iran's foreign policy. In other 
words, Hezbollah is considered a long arm of Iran, which acts alongside Wilayat Al-Faqih 
in Tehran, according to Iran's wishes. Following Nasrallah's speech on 25 May 2013, a 
former Prime Minister of Lebanon, the head of the Future Movement, Fouad Siniora, 
stated that "Hezbollah" is not a party to the Lebanese, but "band Iranian working in 
Lebanon," dragging Lebanon into a quagmire of war (www.al-seyassah.com, 2013). The 
international and regional reaction came as a result of a harsh speech of the Secretary 
General of Lebanese Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, which came on the occasion of 
"Resistance and Liberation Day," the anniversary of Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon 13 
years ago, when Nasrallah declared unequivocally his party's involvement in the fighting in 
Syria against Free Syrian Army and its determination to continue fighting until his party 
achieved what he called Victory, in close collaboration and under the guidance of the 
Syrian regime and Islamic Revolutionary Guard corps-Quds Force (www.al-seyassah.com, 
2013). 
 
All available information concerning estimates about the overall size of military arsenal 
and combat capabilities of Lebanese Hezbollah, especially in its most advanced arsenal of 
ballistic missile such as Scud missiles, was drawn from public sources. In July 2006 war 
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analysts were surprised that Israel had underestimated the size, strength, and capabilities of 
Hezbollah's combat; in contrast, Hezbollah displayed sophisticated weapons and 
capabilities such as anti-ship, anti-tank, and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) (Schapiro et 
al, 2010; Schneider, 2010; www.en.mehrnews.com, 2014).  
 
The biggest threat by Lebanese Hezbollah is asymmetric warfare. However, Hezbollah 
presents a direct threat against Israel through its arsenal of missiles. Hezbollah retains a 
diverse modern arsenal with an estimate of 40,000 to 50,000 short- and longest-range 
missiles (www.europarl.europa.eu, 2008; Schapiro et al, 2010; www.i24news.tv, 2015). 
Others have argued that the size of Hezbollah's arsenal of missiles was about 60,000-
80,000 different types of ballistic missiles (Issacharaoff, 2009; Schapiro et al, 2010). 
Lieutenant Commander of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) Brigadier General 
Hossein Salami disclosed that "the Lebanese Hezbollah resistance group is in possession of 
over 100,000 missiles, which are all ready to launch and hit enemy targets" 
(www.en.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13941219000285, 2016). These types of 
ballistic missiles are ranging in between short-and medium-range missiles. Short-range 
rockets include Katyushas and a model of the Russian BM-21 Grad missile that has a 
maximum range of about 25 km. These kinds of rockets came directly from Iranian army 
stocks (Devenny, 2006). In 2006 images broadcast on Hezbollah's TV station as Al-Manar 
showed a Ra-ad-1 being fired. Military experts believe that these missiles were an Iranian-
made Shahin-1 with about a 13 km range (www.news.bbc.co.uk/2/ hi/middle _east/ 51 87 
974.stm, 2006).  
 
Rocket attacks on the northern part of Israel, the city of Haifa, during the 2006 Israel–
Hezbollah war, showed that Hezbollah acquired longer-range missiles, most likely from 
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the Iranian military arsenal. The Fajr-type missiles are a serious threat to Israel's security, 
as they can be launched from vehicles, making them relatively easy to move and conceal. 
The Fajr-3, with a range of 25 miles (40 km), and the Fajr-5, with a range of  45 miles (72 
km), each carries a 200-lb warhead, and the Zelzal-2 with the range of 200-400 km and can 
be fitted with a 600kg high-explosive warhead (Wright, 1992; Gambill, 2002). Reports 
indicate that Iran and Syria continuously provide Lebanese Hezbollah with sophisticated 
weapons to boost its military arsenal (Adkins, 2010). 
 
The UN Security Council Resolution 1701, following the July 2006 war, imposed 
restrictions on some movements and activities of Hezbollah's elements across their 
traditional territory in southern Lebanon along the Israeli border, constraining their 
military actions. The head of operations of the Israel Defence Forces, Brigadier General 
Aviv Kochavi, said in a briefing in December 2009 that "some Hezbollah rockets now 
have a range of more than 150 miles -- making Tel Aviv reachable from as far away as 
Beirut" (Schneider, 2010). From an Israeli perspective, Hezbollah is one of the major non-
state actors with connections to Iran and Syria, pursuing their mutual geopolitical interests 
and following their ideological trends.  
 
Retired Major General Giora Eiland, a former Israeli national security advisor who is now 
a senior researcher at Tel Aviv University's Institute for National Security Studies, pointed 
out that, if a conflict had taken place between Israel and Hezbollah, "Israel will not contain 
that war against Hezbollah" (Schneider, 2010: 1). Eiland added that, given Hezbollah's 
capabilities, "the only way to deter the other side and prevent the next round -- or if it 
happens, to win -- is to have a military confrontation with the state of Lebanon" (Schneider, 
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2010: 2). According to Eiland, Hezbollah and Iran pose a threat to Lebanese political 
leaders, Lebanon‘s national security, and to the regional security system as a whole. 
 
Indeed, Saad Al-Hariri, the former Prime Minister of Lebanon, at the opening of the Saudi-
Lebanese forum in Beirut, on 08 April 2011, gave this statement, reported by world news 
agencies, "Lebanon and many Arab countries, such as Kuwait and Bahrain, suffer from the 
blatant Iranian interference in their internal affairs particularly, in the political, economic, 
and security sectors" (Al-Hariri, 2011: 1). He warned Iran to cease all its attempts to 
extend its political influence in the region through supporting Shiite factions who are 
located in Arab communities. In this context, Al-Quwai'i (2011), a well-known Saudi 
editor, who concentrates on the socio-political issues of the Middle East, stated that he 
would not be surprised if some day we see the Iranian regime put all its weight behind 
Hezbollah in Lebanon. After all, the party was constructed by Iran as an organised militia 
force in southern Lebanon, belonging to Wilayat Al-Faqih in Iran, aimed at exporting the 
Khomeini Revolution to Islamic countries, especially those countries that have Shiite 
groups. This was in order to take control of the political and security system, by creating a 
foothold for Iran to interfere in the region, to achieve its national interests and expansionist 
religious goals (Levitt, 2012; Abu Hilal, 2014; www.aawsat.com/home/article/358431, 
2015; www.iraqakhbar.com, 2015). 
  
Iran has assumed full responsibility for taking care of Hezbollah‘s needs. AL-Sadeq (2006) 
refers to the annual budget of Hezbollah, provided by Iran, as follows: in 1990, a sum 
amounting to three and a half million dollars by some estimates, in 1991 fifty million 
dollars, in 1992 an estimated one hundred and twenty million dollars, and in 1993 one 
hundred and sixty million dollars. AL-Sadeq (2006) noted that during the Rafsanjani 
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presidency the budget to Hezbollah was increased to two hundred and eighty million 
dollars. Also, since the early days, the Al- Quds force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard 
Corps proceeded to develop this Shiite organisation and still continues in the development 
of Hezbollah today (Cordesman, 2007). The Al Quds Force provides financial support, 
military aid, training and logistical assistance to Lebanese Hezbollah, Iraqi militias and 
several Palestinian fundamentalist groups (Abizaid, 2006). It has been argued that 
operationally and strategically Hezbollah has become stronger than the official Lebanese 
Army. 
 
On 10 March 2010 debates resumed between the powerful Lebanese political parties on 
how to rein in Hezbollah's military wing and its role in domestic and regional affairs, 
where the discussions were divided over whether or not the group of Shiite militant 
(Hezbollah and Amal movement) should be allowed to continue keeping its military power 
fully on the ground (Blanford, 2010). On 13 April 2010 Israeli President Shimon Peres 
condemned Syria for its continuous supply of Scud missiles to Hezbollah, while the Syrian 
regime publicly talks about peace (www.google.com, 2010).  
 
On 27 April 2010, in a press conference during a visit to Washington, Israeli Defence 
Minister, Ehud Barak and U.S. Secretary of Defence, Robert Gates, said that ―Syria and 
Iran are providing Hezbollah with rockets and missiles of ever-increasing capability 
…we‘re at a point now, where Hezbollah has far more rockets and missiles than most 
governments in the world". It is obvious the whole region would be driven to 
destabilisation (www.defense.gov, 2010). 
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On 19 April 2010 the US called for an immediate cessation of any arms transfers to the 
group and other terrorist organisations in the region (Duguid, 2010). The State Department 
condemned the transfer of any weapons, particularly ballistic missile systems such as the 
SCUD to Hezbollah via Syria, and it also added that "the transfer of these arms can only 
have a destabilizing effect on the region, and would pose an immediate threat to both the 
security of Israel and the sovereignty of Lebanon" (Duguid, 2010).  
 
On 04 May 2010, the head of the research department of Israel's Military Intelligence (MI), 
Brigadier General Yossi Baidatz, stated that "weapons are transferred to Hezbollah on a 
regular basis and this transfer is organized by the Syrian and Iranian regimes. Therefore, it 
should not be called smuggling of arms to Lebanon – it is organized and official transfer" 
(Meranda, 2010). Brigadier General Baidatz briefed the Knesset's Foreign Affairs and 
Defence Committee on 04 May 2010 about the current state of affairs that Israel is 
becoming increasingly concerned with the transfer of weapons from Syria to Hezbollah, 
when he stressed, "today, Hezbollah has an arsenal of thousands of rockets of all types and 
ranges, including long-range solid-fuel rockets and more precise rockets" (Meranda, 2010: 
1). 
 
On 24 October 2010, WikiLeaks revealed a classified US military document that provided 
evidence that Hezbollah in 2006 had trained insurgents in Iraq, under Iranian coordination 
and supervision. The report added that training exercises conducted in Iran included a 
mission to kidnap US soldiers in Iraq, by the Shiite Al-Mahdi Army (www.washingtontim 
es.com, 2010). 
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On 26 October 2010 the French newspaper Le Figaro reported in detail how Hezbollah's 
arsenal is supported. Geographically, the data reveals that Syria is deemed a strategic link 
(re-supply and transmission) between Iran and Hezbollah (Feltman et al, 2010). There are 
three units that are responsible for arms transfers: Unit 108, which controls movement of 
arms in Syria to the Lebanese border; Unit 112, which controls movement across the 
border into sites in Lebanon; and Unit 100, which has received weapons training in Tehran 
(Adkins 2010).  
 
On 29 November 2010 US diplomatic documents released by WikiLeaks revealed that 
during the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war ambulances of Iranian Red Crescent were used to 
transfer weapons to Hezbollah's units and facilitate shipments to its elements, while 
conducting missions of medical supplies. Furthermore, some documents quote a witness 
saying they "had seen missiles in the planes destined for Lebanon when delivering medical 
supplies to the plane" (Adkins et al, 2010).  
 
More recently, on 30 May 2013, Nigerian Intelligence Agency claimed that the Nigerian 
army had found a weapons depot that belonged to the Hezbollah in the north of Nigeria, 
owned by a Lebanese national. A spokesman for the Nigerian army, General Aaliasso, 
Essa Abba, announced that the gear included rifles and anti-tank weapons and rocket-
propelled grenades, in a warehouse in the city of Kano, and three Lebanese citizens were 
arrested (www.bbc.co.uk/arabic/worldnews/2013/05/130530_nigeria_hezboallh_weapons. 
shtml, 2013). In this context, the director of the Nigerian state security apparatus in Kano, 
Bassi Aatang, stated at a news conference on 30 May 2013 in Kano, "what has just been 
discovered is a Hezbollah cell and what was seen here is a repository of weapons to 
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Hezbollah" (www.bbc.co.uk, 2013). Aatang added that Lebanese Hezbollah was planning 
to use such weapons against "Israeli and Western interests" (www.bbc.co.uk, 2013).  
 
7.3.4.   War beyond Israel and Hezbollah 
 
The conflict between Hezbollah and Israel, particularly the 34-day war in 2006, has led to 
much discussion of escalating tensions concerning the triangle of strategic alliance, Syria, 
Iran, and Hezbollah (www.intelligence.org, 2006; Miller, 2006; Addis et al, 2010). An 
important question is: what was the benefit of the war in 2006 and how could this conflict 
have provided benefits, and to whom? "In Arab eyes, Israel‘s 2006 war against the Shia 
Hizballah was an attempt to strike at the heart of Iran" (www.independent.co.uk, 2013; 
www.kayhan.ir, 2015; www.watan.com/news1/5003, 2015).  
 
US and Middle Eastern officials suggest that there are approximately 50,000 militiamen 
backed by Iran, to preserve and protect Tehran and Hezbollah's interests in post-Bashar 
Assad's regime (www.upi.com, 2013). On 02 June 2015, Qasem Soleimani, the 
commander of Iran‘s elite Quds force, stated that Iran has sent 15,000 additional troops 
including the militia force, made up of Iranians, Iraqis and Afghanis, to support Assad in 
Syria (www.aawsat.com/home/article/375511, 2015; www.alwatan.kuwait.tt/articledetails 
.aspx?id=437408, 2015; www.sabq.org/gI8gde, 2015).  
 
Iran's foreign policy has attempted to attain two strategic objectives in Syria: to support its 
strategic ally (the Syrian regime) to the end, and to prepare for major mischief, if Bashar's 
al-Assad‘s regime collapses. One US senior official told United Press International (UPI) 
that some Syrian militia receive military training from Hezbollah and the Quds Force of 
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Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps of Iran (Feltman, 2010; www.upi.com, 2013). The 
long history of the Quds Force shows an active role in other states, including the training, 
financing and arming of the Hezbollah militia in Lebanon. United Press International noted 
that the Quds Force reports directly to the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei (www.upi.com, 
2013). In February 2010, Ahmadinejad stated that "the people of Iran will stand with the 
people of Lebanon in the event of an Israeli attack".  
 
On 28 April 2010 the supreme court of Egypt convicted 26 men of spying for the Lebanese 
militant group Hezbollah and plotting terrorist attacks on high value targets in Egypt; the 
prison sentences ranged from six months to life and the verdict cannot be appealed 
(Feltman et al, 2010; www.seattletimes.com/html/nationworld/2011719390_apmlegypthez 
bollah.html, 2010). Egyptian security officials declared that this was the first incident 
related to Hezbollah that was prosecuted by Egypt's authorities, starting in August 2009, 
concerning plotting to destabilise the country. El Madany stated that Hezbollah's leader, 
Hassan Nasrallah, admitted that "one of the men was a member of the Hezbollah and had 
been working with ten others to supply military equipment to the Palestinians" (El Madany, 
2010). The case has shown the deep concerns of conservative Sunni countries such as 
Egypt, Jordan and the Gulf states, over the growing influence of Shiite Iranian militant 
groups. On 04 June 2015, Gebran Bassil, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants of 
Lebanon, said that Arab states must not permit Iranian expansion, and they need to take the 
initiative (Abbas, 2015). 
 
This thesis proposes a new way of looking at events. Syria is the centre of the Shiite 
Crescent, so bloody conflict in Syria is likely to separate the Shiite Crescent, which would 
affect dramatically Iran's geopolitical interests on the ground, as well as its ideological 
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influence. In other words, the main arm of Iran's foreign policy (Lebanese Hezbollah) 
confronts a serious threat where it is likely to be amputated. Bashar al-Assad's regime has 
always been a key lifeline of support to Hezbollah from its patron Iran via overland routes, 
and any decisive change in the Syria equation could weaken the ability of Iranian regime to 
influence the Levant and the Arab-Israeli conflict, including its impact upon Iraq crisis and 
on the Gulf domestic affairs as well (Nerguizian, 2013). 
 
Concerning the conflict in Syria, Iran and Hezbollah have adopted a policy of double 
standard towards the so-called resistance axis. While Iran and Hezbollah often claimed that 
their policy is to counter authoritarian regimes and stand beside resistance movements (e.g. 
Al-Houthy rebels in Yemen, opposition in Bahrain), they have supported the Syrian regime 
(www.seattletimes.com/html/nationworld/2011911587_apmljordanussyria.html, 2010; 
Nerguizian, 2013). Through this policy, Hezbollah has undermined its regional popularity 
and position as a liberation movement and resistance, and has become a sectarian and 
ideological adversary to a wide popular sector (Ghaddar, 2011). At the same time, they 
back the Shiite resistance movements in Bahrain (Abdul Qadir, 2013; 
www.arabic.farsnews.com/allstories/news/13940204000426, 2015). In contrast, they 
confront militarily the Sunni movement in Syria, as noted above. Hence, the majority of 
Arab and Islamic masses no longer see Hezbollah as an Islamic paradigm for resistance, 
freedom and dignity, but instead as a sectarian instrument of power, especially after 
Hezbollah's mask fell in the burgeoning Arab attention (Ghaddar, 2011). Keeping Assad's 
regime in power and preserving the resistance axis with Iran, Hezbollah seems to have 
chosen the most appropriate strategic alternative in accordance with Iran-Hezbollah's 
perspective. Despite the deterioration of Hezbollah's influence on the domestic and 
regional level, the Shiite organisation still has some allies inside and outside Lebanon, 
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particularly among the Shiite community and, on top of that, Hezbollah has a large arsenal 
of weapons, which allows its militants to dominate domestic affairs (Nerguizian, 2013).  
 
Hezbollah‘s main priority today is its weapons and it is not willing to concede its interests 
as long as its weapons are protected (Berti, 2012). Daniel Byman's testimony at a Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations on 25 July 2012 clarifies that Hezbollah is, and will 
remain, one of the main proxies of Iran's foreign policy, and Iran is the major sponsor of 
Hezbollah, although the main geopolitical chain (Syria) and the bloody conflict have 
affected the cohesion of the Shiite Crescent (Byman, 2012). 
 
7.4.   Iran's anti-Israel Policy 
 
Iran's anti-Israel Policy began during the Islamic Revolution of 1979, alongside anti-
Americanism and anti-imperialism, and is deemed the foundation of its foreign policy and 
its international relations (Khomeini, 198; Takeyh, 2007). Juneau (2009: 12) stresses that 
"Iran's opposition to Israel is a core pillar of its foreign policy". Bahgat (2007) however, 
argues that Iran's foreign policy has gone through fluctuations between militancy and 
moderation towards Israel and Western countries, as shown by the Iran-Contra scandal 
during the mid-1980s (illegal supply of weapons to Iran by Israel and the US), but both 
countries, Iran and Israel, perceive one another as enemies. In order to tease out the 
underlying dynamics of the Iranian-Israeli relationship, this thesis focuses on three key 
issues: speech acts of Iran's political and clerical elite against Israel, the Palestinian cause, 
and the support of Hamas and Palestinian Fundamentalist Organisations.   
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Israeli Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Avigdor Liberman, stated 
during the annual ministerial meeting of the UN General Assembly about the peace 
processes on 28 September 2010, that "in truth, the connection between Iran and the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict was precisely the reverse: Iran could exist without Hamas, 
Islamic Jihad and Hizbullah, but terrorist organizations could not exist without Iran" 
(www.un.org, 2010). Liberman also thought that Iran could foil any settlement between 
Israel and the Palestinians, or with Lebanon, at any given time, through relying on its 
proxies. As a result, Liberman said, in order to deal with "the true roots" of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict and find a durable agreement with the Palestinians, "the Iranian issue 
must be resolved" (www.un.org, 2010). Verjee (2011) noted that Benjamin Netanyahu, 
Israeli Prime Minister, said to CNN, on 05 May 2011, that after Osama bin Laden‘s death, 
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iranian supreme leader, is now the biggest threat to peace in the 
world. Verjee (2011) argues that Netanyahu also stresses that Iran's supreme leader was 
more worrying than its president, Ahmadinejad, and the future of the Middle East is 
certainly at stake. 
 
Constructivist explanations of Iran's anti-Israel policy emphasise the binding religious and 
cultural values that unify the Iranian people against the state of Israel. These values assist 
Iran to ally with Palestinians and Arab and Muslim masses against Israel and its allies, 
although differences in ideological doctrine between Shiite ideology in Iran and Sunni 
Palestinians remain. Offensive realist explanations focus on Iran‘s attempt to use the 
Palestinian cause as a means for allying itself with some Arab neighbours against Israeli 
power as a defensive policy, and to gain the support of the Arab street to spread the 
revolutionary approach, to recast a vanguard of Muslim unity and attain a potential 
regional hegemony as an offensive approach (Booth et al, 2008). Speech acts and hardline 
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rhetoric are instruments of power that reach the hearts and minds of the Arabs and 
Muslims, by showing Iran as the main challenger of Zionism and imperialism. 
 
7.4.1.   The Rhetoric against Israel 
 
Hardline rhetoric can be seen in the speech acts of Iranian and Israeli leaders (Hinnebusch 
et al, 2002; Cole, 2009). Israel focuses on the dangers of Iran's nuclear activities and the 
consequences on regional stability, while Iran concentrates on the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict as a core dilemma for Arabs and Muslims (Bilgin, 2005; Bard, 2011). Relations 
between Ahmadinejad and leaders in Israel are characterised by contentious speeches and 
hardline statements, including what many politicians and researchers perceive to be calls to 
eliminate the country (Ahmadinejad, 2005; Netanyahu, 2012). After he was elected 
president of Iran in June 2005, Ahmadinejad launched more hardline discourse towards 
Israel and adopted harsh foreign policies, which stepped up his anti-Israel rhetoric. Cole 
(2009: 193) argues, "president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a Holocaust denier who believes 
the coming of the Shiite messiah is imminent, has been the face of Iran since his election in 
2005". Ahmadinejad (2005) furthermore stated, "they have created a myth today that they 
call the massacre of Jews and they consider it a principle above God, religions and the 
prophets". Equally important, Karagiannis (2009) illustrates common aggressive discourse 
by the Iranian elite and Hezbollah, when he refers to the speech given by the secretary 
general of Lebanese Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, in the July 2006 war, stating that Israel 
is a regional enemy and aggressive in nature with historic ambitions to control our land, 
waters and natural wealth.  
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There are many debates around the relationship between discourse and reality. It has been 
argued that Iran was one of the countries whose political rhetoric has been used as 
propaganda that rarely matched its actions. Still, Iran‘s regional role has increased 
remarkably through its opposition to any Israeli military operation in Gaza 
(www.en.mehrnews.com, 2014). At a time when all Arab regimes stayed silent, Iran has 
actively moved to urge the international community through the UN to take swift action. 
The consequences of such Iranian aggressive rhetoric against Israel have allowed "Iran to 
pressure regional governments to forego dialogue or rapprochement with Israel, by seeking 
to drive a wedge between Arab governments and their populations when they pursue non-
confrontational policies" (Juneau 2009: 13). 
 
7.4.2.   Adoption of the Palestinian Cause  
 
The Islamic Republic of Iran has always been considered Israel's most serious enemy 
(Cordesman, 2006; www.tehrantimes.com/politics/117416-iran-ready-to-support-palestini 
an-resistance-in-every-area-irgc-chief-, 2014). Arguing from a realist perspective with 
emphasis on perceptions of threats to national security and strategic interests, Cordesman 
(2006, 2008) writes that the Iranian regime is one of the key players in the region (Crist, 
2009) and it has been classified as one of the major sources of money and weapons, 
destabilising regional security. Due to its foreign policy, anti-Western attitude and extreme 
interpretation of Islamic law, Israel has characterised Iran as a sponsor state of terror (El-
Gogary, 2013). Moreover, Iran is blamed for delivering light, medium and heavy weapons 
to Hezbollah, Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and also for providing safe haven 
to many regional and international terrorists, to enable them to further destabilise security 
in Israel and beyond (Blair, 2010; www.english.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=1393060 
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3000905, 2014). This continuous Iranian support is viewed as integral to its effort to 
challenge Israel and Western influence in the Middle East, which reinforces the role of Iran 
in the political landscape and consolidates its external policies (Burgess, 2010; Cronin et al, 
2011). 
 
In the course of strategic cooperation between Iran and Syria, on the one hand, and Iran 
and non-state actors such as Hamas, on the other, Yan reported through Syria Arab News 
Agency (SANA) that the Secretary of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council, 
Saeed Jalily, met on 04 January 2009 Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and some leaders 
of Islamic Jihad (Yan, 2009).  The meeting included all of Khalid Meshaal, the exiled 
Hamas politburo, and Secretary General of the Islamic Jihad, Ramadan Abdullah Shallah 
(Yan, 2009). The meeting centred on the situation in the Gaza Strip.  
 
In order to demonstrate what is behind Iran's anti-Israel policy, it is essential to explore the 
nature and scope of Iran's commitment to the Palestinian cause and the impact on the 
destabilised condition. Indeed, Saad-Ghorayeb (2011) discusses the causal variables: 
ideology, national security, strategic interests, and ontological security. Al-Ghareib, (2005) 
and Al-Nefisy et al, (2008) refer to these variables as based on historical, religious, 
ideological, cultural, and political factors that have consecrated the ideological and 
strategic constants of the sanctity of religious shrines. The organic alliances between Iran, 
Hamas in Gaza, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in West Bank, and other resistance 
movements, are considered cornerstones for hostility towards Israel, in accordance with the 
cleansing of the holy land. The resistance axis, led by the Islamic Republic of Iran, often 
claims the destruction of the Zionist regime and liberation of Jerusalem as the core 
political and ideological doctrine in Iranian politics (http://www.tehrantimes.com/politics/ 
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117416-iran-ready-to-support-palestinian-resistance-in-every-area-irgc-chief-, 2014). This 
can be seen in the speech by the supreme leader of Iran, Ali Khamenei, in the ceremony 
reviving World Jerusalem Day and solidarity with the oppressed Palestinian people, on the 
last Friday of the holy month of Ramadan of 2009 (Video-Archives of Iran, 23 February 
2009, Arabic language, see www.irannegah.com, 2009). 
 
On the other hand, Iran's foreign policy has been much criticised for failing to implement 
its discourses into reality and to translate its policy towards Palestine into action during the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflicts particularly and the Israeli invasion on Gaza in late 2009 
(Bilgin, 2005; Saad-Ghorayeb, 2011). It has been widely assumed that its speech acts and 
hardline rhetoric from the Iranian elite, and its active foreign policy are a paradigm for 
Arab regimes to follow (Bilgin, 2005; Owen, 2007). According to the foundation of the 
Islamic Shiite doctrine, and the Iranian constitution (Al-Ghareib, 2005; Saad-Ghorayeb, 
2011: 15), the Islamic Republic of Iran is responsible for the support of the struggle of 
peoples for freedom and national independence, as, 
 
―the foreign policy of Iran is based upon the rejection of all forms of domination, 
both exertion of it and submission to it, the preservation of the independence of the 
country...the defense of the rights all Muslims, non-alignment with respect to the 
hegemonic superpowers‖.  
 
The Palestinian cause is the key issue for Arabs and Muslims, as Khomeini called upon 
every Muslim to be armed and in high alert against Israel. Karagiannis (2009) refers to the 
religious legal duty of Hezbollah to resist Israel and provide lethal aid to Palestinian 
militants as one of the key non-state actors in the region, with ideological commitments 
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towards resistance movements. Accordingly, these calls have attracted some audiences in 
the region who view the Palestinian cause as an existential struggle against Israel (Feltman 
et al, 2010). More importantly, Iran and its allies have imposed a political dilemma upon 
regional regimes, which led to an escalation of the security dilemma. Iran put the Arab 
leaders in front of their citizens, in order to prevent any attempt for peace with Israel, as 
this would create internal problems with their people (Feltman et al, 2010).    
 
This thesis considers the Palestinian cause a paradigm for changing the status quo in the 
Middle East, through geopolitical expansion which has been used by some leaders, such as 
Jamal Abdul-Nassir, former President of Egypt, and Saddam Hussein, former President of 
Iraq, to exploit the mainstream Pan-Arab nationalism during 1950s-1970s. The Palestinian 
cause was used by Iran to legitimise its foreign activities and policies (Hinnebusch et al, 
2002; Bilgin, 2005).  
 
7.4.3.   Support of Hamas and Palestinian Fundamentalist Organisations 
  
This thesis discusses Iran‘s foreign policy outcomes and the impact of its transformative 
power on regional security policy, in the context of Islamic commitments (Saad-Ghorayeb, 
2011) to defend the rights of all Muslims by supporting resistance movements, such as 
Hamas and other Palestinian fundamentalist groups and organisations. Such a policy may 
lead to attaining its geopolitical interests in the long run: to maintain its national security, 
maximise its regional power, end its international isolation, gain respect and sympathy 
from Arabs and Muslims and reinforce its negotiating position for any security 
arrangements in the future. However, in terms of the levels of individual, people, and state, 
the Islamic law (Sharia law) which originates from sources of the Qur'an and Hadith, urges 
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three levels of commitments towards others Muslims to form the basis of Islamic 
commitments based on a mandatory legitimate duty, rather than options imposed by 
national factors such as pan-Arab Nationalism. In other words, those who abandon their 
duties towards Islamic commitments, for instance by failing to provide support to 
oppressed Muslims (medically, financially or morally via praying to God or any other 
means of support such as food, clothes and shelter), will be thought of as unrighteous. 
 
On 12 February 2012, on state TV, in reference to the continuation of the Islamic militant 
group's resistance against Israel, Supreme leader Ali Khamenei addressed Hamas leaders 
and said Iran would always stand by the Palestinian struggle. Khamenei sent a warning to 
"compromisers" in this regard (Karimi, 2012: 1). Iran's president Ahmadinejad stated also 
that Iran has a "duty" to stand beside the Palestinians (Karimi, 2012: 1). Saad-Ghorayeb 
(2011: 12) argues that the strategic-ideological commitments between Iran and Hezbollah 
in support of the Palestinians, with both military and political input, particularly from 
Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, also achieve geopolitical interests through 
exporting its "political culture of regional liberation, which in turn, has contributed to its 
status as a regional powerhouse". Haddad-Adel, Majlis speaker of Iran, refers to the impact 
of Islamic Shiite values and the regional influence of Iran's foreign policy when he states, 
"Iran is powerful and popular in the region because it defends the independence of nations 
and opposes the United States' dominance in the region" (Gholam-Ali, 2008: 1).  
 
In this sense, Iran's foreign policy sings outside the flock in a dissonant tune with the rest 
of the regional countries which have been affected by its international relations and 
geopolitical dynamics. In contrast, it has gained popularity with Arabs and Muslims and 
also with radical movements across the Middle East (Feltman et al, 2010). Support for 
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resistance movements in Palestine, particularly Hamas in the Gaza strip, is part of the 
Islamic identity of Iran and its survival. Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari, the 
commander of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC), confirmed this argument, by 
saying on 04 August 2014 that the Palestinian resistance against Israel is increasing, and 
the Islamic Republic of Iran will support resistance in every area (www.tehrantimes.com/p 
olitics/117416-iran-ready-to-support-palestinian-resistance-in-every-area-irgc-chief-, 2014; 
www.english.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13930614000529, 2014). 
 
 It could be argued that Iran will not abandon its commitment to provide assistance to 
regional resistance movements (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2011; www.kayhan.ir, 2015). In terms of 
military support, Iran and Hezbollah have provided assistance to Hamas in Gaza and to 
other resistance factions with training, finance, weapons, and tactics of guerilla warfare 
(www.english.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13930614000529, 2014; www.english.fars 
news.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13940625001158, 2015). Over and above this, Saad-
Ghorayeb (2011) sheds light on the involvement of Lebanese Hezbollah in transferring 
logistic equipment to the Palestinian resistance, which was captured by Egyptian 
authorities between the Egyptian-Israeli borders, as the main proxy for Iran's foreign policy 
in the Middle East.  
 
The geopolitical dynamics in the Middle East will continue, as long as non-state actors 
remain on top of the regional agenda, whether they have been supported by Iran or other 
parties, such as the US, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, or Turkey (www.globalresearch.ca, 2014). 
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7.5.    Iran's Policy towards the Strategic Communities of Gulf States 
 
―The feeling among all successive Persian governments is that the Arabian-
Persian Gulf is from the beginning of the Shatt al-Arab (a waterway in South-
Eastern Iraq) to Muscat (capital of Oman), with all its islands and ports (passing 
through Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and 
Oman), without exception, ending up to Fares (Persia), evidence that it is a 
Persian not an Arab Gulf‖.  
 
(Halanjei Mirza, Prime Minister of 
Iran, 1822, in AL-Nifesy, 2009: 3). 
 
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was established in 1981 in response to regional 
security concerns, including the emergence of the Islamic Republic of Iran and its attempts 
to export its revolution abroad, as well as to confront their security challenges and military 
threats during the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) collectively. The GCC includes Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman (Knights, 2006). Despite 
promoting economic ties and free trade between member states, however, security issues 
and military concerns remained a priority in terms of reinforcing their regional interests. 
Thus, in 1982 the GCC states established "Peninsula Shield Force" (PSF), as a defensive 
and offensive force against any external and internal threats of the Gulf States (Fulton et al, 
2011). Current troop levels number of PSF are at approximately 50,000. However, in July 
2011 the Gulf states approved a proposal to double PSF troop levels by the end of 2012. 
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Relations among Iran and the Gulf states have historically been strained by Iranian efforts 
to export the Islamic Revolution to the Gulf states, specifically during the 1980s, including 
Iran's coup attempt in Bahrain in 1981, and continuous incitement of Shiites, whether 
resident in Saudi Arabia or visiting during the annual hajj pilgrimage to Mecca, to foment 
unrest and disorder. Iran's external roles and its regional activities usually increase in light 
of tensions or crises, which leads to a deterioration of regional situations, such as the 
unstable situation in post-invasion Iraq, the crisis of Syria after the Arab Spring and 
uprising of Shiites in both Bahrain and Eastern province of Saudi Arabia (Cronin, 2011). 
As a result, the escalation of Shiite uprising in the Gulf States leads to further strain in 
relations.  
 
Bahrain will be taken as a model for Iran's ideological attention, due to the high percentage 
of population from the Shiite sect, compared with the rest of the GCC states. Moreover, 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait will be discussed regarding the engagement of Iran's foreign 
policy in their internal affairs. However, this thesis will discuss Iran's policy towards the 
Strategic Communities of Gulf States as a bloc. The thesis assumes that whenever there is 
a higher presence of Shiites, this leads to increased socio-political movements demanding 
political reforms, including political regime change to Shiite Islamist, which is subject to 
the supreme leader in Tehran. This leads to more internal conflicts, which impact upon the 
stability of the region. The security triangle of the Gulf region consists of Iran, the GCC 
and the US with its military presence. The complex relationships that link these three 
include patterns of regional collaboration and domestic conflict that continually change the 
status quo. By identifying and isolating these relationships, one may develop a better sense 
of the regional security arrangements. 
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Neoclassical realism provides a clear explanation of the influence of the intervening 
variables of the Iranian regime. Regime identity links the geopolitical interests of Shiite 
sects in the Strategic Communities of Gulf States, in order to pursue their strategic goals of 
maximising its regional power. Constructivist explanations are based on the essential 
ideological factors of the Islamic Shiite doctrine that unites Twelver Shiites in the GCC 
communities, who share many tenets with Iran in accordance with the doctrine of Wilayat 
Al-Faqih, the supreme leader in Tehran. Offensive realist explanations fit the Gulf region 
and intersect with the geopolitical interests and power expansion of the partners. Speech 
acts and hardline rhetoric have been used since the Iranian Revolution to export the Islamic 
revolutionary principles to neighbouring countries, particularly the GCC states. Hardline 
rhetoric still continues in Ahmadinejad‘s presidency, to attract Shiite masses and direct 
them to support foreign policy in the region, through intervening in domestic affairs.  
 
Arab leaders of the Gulf Cooperation Council have expressed their condemnation of Iran's 
external policies in the region and warned the Iranian regime to stop its continuing 
interference in the affairs of Arab countries. Bahraini Foreign Minister, Sheikh Khalid bin 
Ahmad al-Khalifah, said to reporters at a press conference at the closing of the 33rd Gulf 
Cooperation Council summit, on 26 December 2012, that the Iranian regime posed a "very 
serious threat" with its continuation interfering and meddling with Gulf states' affairs 
(www.ncr-iran.org, 2012). In this context, Mrs. Maryam Rajavi, President-elect of the 
Iranian Resistance, expressed her appreciation to Sheikh Khalid al-Khalifah's proposal to 
hold a conference for "Friends of Iran," emphasising that religious fascism ruling Iran is 
pursuing a ruthless battle domestically against its people and a hidden war against 
countries and nations of the region such as Iraq, Lebanon, Bahrain and Yemen (www.ncr-
iran.org, 2012; Al-Suhaimy, 2012). 
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7.5.1.    Mutual Perceptions, Impediments and Scope of Antagonists: GCC and Iran 
  
Historically and geographically, the relationship between Iran and its immediate 
neighbours in the Western bank of the Gulf is different from Iran's relations with the other 
Arab states. Al-Aderous (2002) and Al-Ghareib (2005) refer to geographical proximity and 
Persian human migrations to the Arabian Peninsula that go back hundreds of years, with 
the presence of huge Iranian expatriate workers in all of the GCC countries, as well as an 
economic relationship in the oil sector and re-export trade. All these factors contribute to 
the perceptions of regional foreign and security policies that sometimes stand in the way of 
closer relations, and often lead to distance, due to fear and mutual suspicion.  
 
Firstly, Potter et al (2002) refer to the impact of nationalism between Arab and Ajam 
(Persian) that some argue is a relationship between the two nations with roots in the 
seventh century. Anti-Arab sentiments had been confirmed in Iran during the Iran-Iraq war, 
when almost all Arab states in the region except Syria decisively supported Saddam's 
regime. Secondly, Hunter (2000) mentions the further contribution of the Iranian bellicose 
posture and occupation of the three United Arab Emirates Islands, Greater Tunb, Lesser 
Tunb, and Abu Musa, in 1971, and the declaration to seize them by whatever means 
necessary; the ongoing dispute between Iran, on the one hand, and Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia, on the other, regarding the Continental Shelf of the Gulf and its claim about the 
Dorra oil field (Potter et al, 2002). Thirdly, the situation is further exacerbated by the 
continuous debates around the Iranians' insistence on naming the Gulf's water, which 
divides Arabs and Persians, "Persian Gulf" or "Arabian Gulf". From the Arab perspective, 
"this demonstrates the arrogance and hidden agenda for dominance that the Iranians harbor 
toward them" (Potter et al, 2002: 222). The Arabs counter by saying there are eight 
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countries bordering the "Arabian Gulf" and Iran is the only state that is not Arab. Fourthly, 
Iran's dilemma is based on the lack of respect of its vital regional role through its exclusion 
from any security arrangements in the Gulf region by both the GCC states and the US, 
despite its strategic location, its ancient civilisation, its large population and its huge 
military forces. Iran perceives its role as one of regional leaderships that should not be 
ignored. However, Arabs view with unease the objectives of Iran in the Gulf region and its 
intention to dominate and become an unrivalled regional superpower. Fifthly, the 
considerable US military presence in the region, in accordance with military and defence 
agreements with the GCC states, and the sale of huge military weapons to these states, are 
a source of great concern to Iran (Jones, 2003; www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/ne 
ws/2015/05/mil-150503-irna01.htm?_m=3n%2e002a%2e1407%2ehy0ao05h7s%2e1aid, 
2015). Lastly, continuous threats to close the Strait of Hormuz by Iranian leaders have 
become most problematic, not only for the GCC states, but for world markets as well 
(www.eia.gov, 2012). 
  
The deputy commander of the naval force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, Brigadier 
General Ali Reza Asgari, on 21 January 2013 announced that Gulf security was in the 
hands of the Revolutionary Guard forces (arabic.farsnews.com, 2013). A strong 
condemnation came from the Kuwaiti parliamentary deputy, the chairman of the 
Committee of Interior and Defense, Askar Al-Enezi, in a press statement, that the security 
of the Arabian Gulf is the responsibility of the Gulf states and their armed forces, in line 
with the system of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Al-Enezi noted that the Gulf states do 
not need Iran to protect regional security (www.alaan.cc, 2013). Al-Enezi said that the 
statements of military leaders of Iran have regularly included provocative remarks against 
the Gulf states, in an attempt to show Iran as the dominant power and assert its control of 
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the region. Such statements reflect a desire to express its influence over the region and its 
neighbours, which increases fears and uncertainty among people in the region, regarding 
Iranian threats and expansionist ambitions. Al-Enezi concluded by saying the Gulf 
Cooperation Council countries stand firmly together in the face of Iran's endeavours in 
interfering in internal affairs, and they will confront decisively any attempts for Iranian 
regional expansions, which may lead to prejudice the balance of power in the region 
(www.alaan.cc, 2013). 
   
7.5.2.    The Gulf Region: The Security Threat in Post-Invasion Iraq 
 
The Gulf region has long been viewed as an area that best fits the realist view of 
international politics, for which state is the key actor in foreign policy, and leaders have 
had an interest in expanding the autonomy and security of the state. A zero-sum approach 
to the Gulf region security has predominated. This approach is based on persistent attempts 
to export the ideology of the Islamic Revolution to Iran's neighbours, to overthrow the 
governments and replace them with a Shiite Islamist government under the leadership of 
the supreme leader in Tehran (Khomeini, 1970).  
 
It is widely believed that the Iraq-Iran war and Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on 02 August 
1990 show regional attempts to maximise power (offensive realism) through using military 
power during Saddam's era. Al-Ghareib (2005) and Barzegar (2009) argue that in post- war 
on terror in 2001 and particularly in the aftermath of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, there began 
to emerge some awareness of the need to adopt a fresh approach to the security issues in 
the Gulf region specifically, and the Middle East generally (Nemer, 2003). This formation 
of a new political and security landscape has led to new political realities. In this respect, 
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Al-Qalam Mahmoud (in AL-Suwaidi, 2005) and Cronin et al (2011) argue that a frenzied 
regional rivalry between the conservative bloc, the pro-Western bloc such as the GCC 
states, Egypt, and Jordan, on the one hand, and the anti-American populist bloc, such as 
the Shiite's Republic of Iran and its, on the other, has become more obvious at the level of 
regimes and people. In other words, given the regional rivalry and the ongoing geopolitical 
developments in the Middle East, the religious ideology of both has become one of the 
most prominent factors guiding their politics. 
 
Despite the competition, Iran is keen to maintain good bilateral relations with each of the 
GCC countries, rather than as a bloc. Cronin et al (2011) refers to the continuous Iranian 
attempts to play the role of regional hegemon, threatening the GCC monarchies and the 
Western troops in the Gulf region. Cronin et al (2011: 5) noted that "Iran's long-term goal 
is to marginalise, rather than destroy, the GCC organization". The threat that the GCC 
states feel comes from the dangerous and radical discourses of Ahmadinejad and his 
foreign policy approach towards the Middle East and the Arab Gulf states. In this context, 
―Iran has considered its own hegemony to be natural and inevitable, and the Gulf a 
‗Persian lake‘ ‖ (Marschall 2003: 5 in Cronin et al, 2011: 3). Therefore, the majority of 
regional states find themselves driven to possible confrontation, considering Iran's 
geopolitical agenda, at a time when Iran considers itself a major resistance front against 
Israel and the US (Thaler, 2010). The continuing rivalry and friction, including 
competition, ideological schism, the nuclear issue, terrorism, oil prices and the threat to the 
Strait of Hormuz push the region into further escalation of conflict in a never-ending cycle 
(Cordesman et al, 2006; Connell et al, 2007).  
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In reference to perspectives of Arab elites towards Iran's regional ambitions, Dr. Abdullah 
bin Abdul Mohsen Al-Turki, Secretary General of the Muslim World League, issued a 
statement expressing his gratitude for Association organisations and Islamic centres, and 
condemned the position of Iranian hostility and provocative intervention in the affairs of 
the Saudi Arabia and affairs of the GCC states (www.aawsat.com, 2011). AL-Hamid, 
Tariq (2012), the editor of Middle East newspapers and well-known Saudi writer, stated 
that Tehran is acting as if it considers the Gulf states hostages, on whom to implement its 
agenda in accordance with nuclear, political, or sectarian issues. Furthermore, Dr. Ahmed 
Al-Tayeb, Al-Azhar Sheikh (highest religious centre and university of Muslim scholars 
and the centre for fatwa in Egypt) urged Iran to stop interfering in the affairs of the Gulf 
states, and respect Bahrain. Al-Tayeb emphasised his rejection of the expanding Shiite 
influence in Muslim countries. This statement was made directly to president Ahmadinejad, 
after his visit to Egypt to attend the Islamic Conference, which held its second summit in 
Cairo on 05-06 February 2013 (www.bbc.co.uk/arabic/, 2013). Islamic preacher Sheikh Dr. 
Nazim al-Misbah supports Al-Azhar's position that the Iranian regime should stop 
interfering in the affairs of Arab Gulf states by spreading Shiite ideology in Sunni 
countries. Al-Misbah said in a statement received by Alwatan news that Iran's activities 
will escalate sectarian domestic conflicts in region states, which would only fuel sectarian 
hostilities and lead to further escalation of regional confrontation (www.alwatan.kuwait.tt/ 
ArticleDetails.aspx?Id=253077, 2013). Salman Al-Ouda, Saudi cleric, urged the Gulf 
states to construct a Sunni front to counter the growing Shiite influence (Al-Ouda, 2015). 
 
This thesis maintains that Iran‘s involvement in regional activities leads to the 
deterioration of the regional security system. As a consequence, "the GCC states have 
responded to the changing geopolitical realities with uncertainty" (Cronin et al 2011: 32). 
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Perceptions of the deadly threat of the Iranian Revolution have once again dominated the 
GCC leaders‘ agenda. The new threat of the transformative power of Iran's foreign policy 
is the ideological threat targeting the domestic affairs of the GCC states, setting Shiite 
factions and non-state actors against their regimes, in order to conduct socio-political 
reforms, then raising the ceiling demands to change the political regime to the Islamic 
regime similar to the Islamic Republic of Iran (Al-Nefisy et al, 2008). Such a threat is 
difficult to counter, because direct domestic adversaries are indirectly guided by a third 
player in Tehran, Wilayat Al-Faqih, and they use asymmetric warfare doctrine, rather than 
military force.  
 
7.5.3.    Iran's Strategic Role in the Gulf Region 
 
This section aims to analyse the causal links between the efforts of Iran to construct 
friendly relations with the Arab Shiite factions and the Persians who live in the GCC 
countries, through reinforcing their mutual roles and continuing to build an ideological 
Shiite Crescent, and how these efforts maximise regional influence. One must bear in mind 
that the Shiite communities in the Gulf states are ruled by Sunni regimes.  
 
Al-Fayez, Faisal (2011), Chairman of the Jordanian parliament, on the occasion of his visit 
to Kuwait, in 2011, stated that the Iranian Crescent in the region has translated into a 
reality and became the full moon crescent. Al-Fayez (2011) pointed out that Iran's 
involvement is clear in the region, in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Kuwait. He called for 
a unified Arab stance, including the GCC states, against Iran's regional ambitions and its 
continuous interference in the internal affairs of the GCC states, in particular, and the Arab 
states, in general. Abdullah Al-Nefisy sheds light in the second episode of his discussion 
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about 'national dialogue' and the strategic roles for Iran's foreign policy in the Middle East 
and the Gulf region, in particular (Video, 24 March 2013, Arabic language, see 
www.alziadiq8.com/17055.html, 2013). Gulf sources in the security sector revealed to 
Alwatan, Kuwait‘s daily newspaper, on 15 March 2011, the existence of documents and 
evidence obtained by the security agencies and intelligence in many states in the Gulf, 
which confirm the involvement of the Iranian regime with the direct support of the 
Supreme Leader of Iran, Ali Khamenei, in fueling the security situation in Bahrain and the 
pursuit for chaos and destabilisation in the countries of the region, to accelerate the 
implementation of the scheme Iranian hegemony over the region (Al-Husseini, 2015). 
 
In the case of Yemen, Yemeni authorities and the US administration confirmed that a 
weapons ship seized on 23 January 2013, in Yemeni territorial waters in the Arabian Sea, 
by coordination between both sides, was Iranian (www.jpost.com, 2013; Jones et al, 2015). 
The ship had four containers of illegal arms hidden, including explosives, rocket-propelled 
grenades and surface-to-air missiles, which were Russian-designed, such as SAM 2 and 
SAM 3 anti-aircraft missiles (www.focus-fen.net, 2013; Starr et al, 2013). Reuters reported, 
quoting the state news agency Saba of Yemen, that these weapons were destined for 
insurgents, most likely Shiite insurgents in Yemen (Abdel-Fattah et al, 2013; Jones et al, 
2015). A confidential UN report revealed that "Iran has been arming the Houthis since 
2009, confirming accusations made by Arab and Western countries against Tehran 
regarding its support of the Houthis" (www.middleeastmonitor.com, 2015; 
www.dailymail.co.uk, 2015). As a result of continuous Iranian interference in political and 
security affairs of Yemen, Yemen's President, Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, accused Iran of 
meddling in Yemen‘s affairs and he asked his Iranian counterpart to stop supporting armed 
groups, otherwise such a policy would force the Yemeni government to react accordingly, 
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especially at a time when the diplomatic links between the two countries are suffering 
(www.alwatan.kuwait.tt/ArticleDetails.aspx?Id=252971, 2013; www.sabq.org/WC6gde, 
2015). 
 
In this context, the president of Yemen's National Security Board, Major-General Ali al-
Ahmadi, accused Tehran of supporting the Houthi rebels who operate in Northern Yemen, 
near the border with Saudi Arabia. Ahmadi added in an interview on the sidelines of a 
conference in Bahrain on 10 December 2012, that despite the lack of hostility between 
Yemen and Iran, Iran continuously interferes in Yemeni domestic affairs, training and 
funding Shiite Muslim rebels, who along with al-Qaeda-backed Islamists and southern 
separatists threaten to bring chaos and tear the country apart (McDowall, 2012).  
 
After the state news agency Saba reported, in July 2012, that Yemeni security authorities 
had arrested members of a spy ring led by a former commander in Iran's Revolutionary 
Guard, which had operated in the Horn of Africa and Yemen, Secretary General of the 
Gulf Cooperation Council States, Dr. Abdullatif Al-Zayani, praised on 23 July 2012 in 
Riyadh the efforts of the Yemeni security services, which revealed an Iranian spy network 
aimed at destabilising the security and stability of Yemen. Hence, Al-Zayani said that the 
Gulf States support all steps and efforts by the Yemeni government to strengthen security 
and stability in Yemen and the preservation of its sovereignty, unity and independence 
(www.sabanews.net/ar/news275850.htm, 2012).  
 
On 13 January 2013, the Yemen News Agency SABA announced that the US ambassador 
to Yemen, Gerald Feierstein, expressed the worry of the American administration towards 
the regional security situation specifically, its concern over the escalating Iranian activities 
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in Yemen. In a press conference held in Sana'a (capital of Yemen), Feierstein accused Iran 
of being responsible for destabilising Yemen and the region as well, saying that "there are 
evidences that prove Iran's support for some radical members of the Southern Movement 
that calls for separation" (www.sabanews.net/en/news294891.htm, 2012). Moreover, 
Feierstein voiced his country's concerns about the Houthi rebels, who share a common 
ideology with Iran (a Shiite doctrine), who are implementing Iranian policy and are being 
the surrogates for Iran in Yemen. For these reasons, in late 2014, Ali Akbar Velayati, a 
senior advisor to the supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, proclaimed that Iran supported the 
"rightful struggles" of the Houthi (Ansarullah) group in Yemen, and "considers it as part of 
the successful Islamic Awakening movements" (www.ncr-iran.org, 2015). Ali Shirazi, the 
supreme leader's representative in the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard 
Corps, mentioned also that "The Houthi group is a similar copy to Lebanon‘s Hezbollah, 
and this group will come into action against enemies of Islam" (www.iranprimer.usip.org, 
2015).  
 
In this context, General Mohammad Bagherzadeh, senior military official in the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps stated recently, after the Houthis took over control of the 
capital city of Sanaa in September 2014, "The al-Houthis victory in Yemen was not a 
simple or an ordinary and a transient one, but it is a historical victory for the Islamic 
Republic of Iran that has decided to relieve the oppressed in the Islamic world by using the 
Islamic model" (www.ncr-iran.org, 2015). On 02 May 2015, Hossein Amir Abdollahian, 
Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister, stressed that "security in Yemen is intertwined with that 
of the Middle East region and Iran (www.english.farsnews.com/Newstext.aspx?nn=139402 
13000238, 2015). 
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Shiites in regional countries are divided into two broad categories. First, Shiites who owe 
allegiance to the regimes where they reside and are willing to participate in political affairs, 
despite differences of ethno-national and/or religious identities. Second, Shiites who owe 
allegiance to Tehran within the ideological political thought of Wilayat Al-Faqih that is 
consistent with Iran's strategic agenda (Al-Ghareib, 2005). Most of this second category of 
Shiite follows one of the religious authorities (Marja‘iyya), either in Tehran, or in Karbala 
and Najaf in Iraq, obeying orders and giving guidance to their community inside a national 
context (Puelings, 2010). Obeying orders often involves the implementation of hostile acts 
and escalation of conflict through demonstrations, strikes, and acts of violence that affect 
security in the short run and lead to the impediment of development plans and progress in 
the long run (Connell, 2007). So, in light of this tense situation, general discontent among 
large sectors of the population lies behind the deteriorating political situation and promises 
further turmoil and chaos, which pushes the security situation through a dark tunnel of 
destabilisation (Russell, 2007). Accordingly, the regimes of the GCC states have 
confronted serious domestic dilemmas resulting from the transformative power of the 
Iran's foreign policy in post-invasion Iraq (Al-Nefisy et al, 2008). Furthermore, the shift in 
the political balance in Iraq since 2003 towards Shiites has led to a new security challenge 
among Arab countries and the GCC states.  
 
In the context of the GCC national security, Al-Salem Ahmed (2011) addressed a 
statement of Ali Motahhari, member of the Iranian Parliament, via Iranian media, on 07 
April 2011, and said that the regimes and monarchies of the GCC states will fall sooner or 
later. Al-Salem (2011) mentioned also that Motahhari warned Saudi Arabia will pay a high 
price for killing Iranian pilgrims in 1987 in Mecca (Potter et al, 2002). In 1987, after 
approximately 400 people, including 275 pilgrims from Iranians, died following a riot in 
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Mecca, the tension came to a climax, as a result of urging by Ayatollah Khomeni to 
overthrow the Saudi monarchy (Wallace, 1987; www.lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/satoc.html, 
1992; Levitt, 2015). This left a deep psychological scar on the Iranian masses, both official 
and popular. AL-Sadeq (2006: 54) referring to the events of 1987 during Hajj, indicated 
that the "Kuwaiti Hezbollah" was also involved in this incident, by using toxic gases in a 
tunnel of "Alma'asam" in Mecca, which injured and killed hundreds of pilgrims 
(www.aljazeera.net/programs/al-jazeeraspecialprograms/2016/3/5/, 2016). This shows the 
cooperation between Shiite factions in the GCC states, with close coordination by the 
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps of Iran. As noted above, the general assertions of 
Iranian sovereignty over the water of the Gulf, an Iranian claim to Bahrain occasionally 
resurfaces, and the Iranian seizure of the three islands of the United Arab Emirates, have 
been part of Iran's foreign policy.  
 
Alvandi Roham (2010) argues that, as part of a broader strategy, since the changes in 
power at the regional level after the withdrawal of Britain as the leading power in the Gulf 
region in 1971, Iran has attempted to exercise its regional power and influence on the 
national security of the GCC states. Concerns regarding the possible use of Shiite 
communities as the cat's-paws of Iran to manipulate the security condition and stability are 
raised in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Kuwait. The fear is that their regimes might be 
overthrown and replaced by Shiite Islamist governments. 
 
In the case of Saudi Arabia, its relationship with the Islamic Republic of Iran, a historic 
rival, is at stake. During the 1980s, a series of clashes cast a shadow over relations between 
the two sides. Iran chose to follow the Shiite doctrine as one of the main branches of Islam, 
while most of Islamic world, including the Arab neighbours, are predominantly Sunni 
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(Cronin et al, 2011). Potter et al (2002) discussed these two key factors, religious and 
ideological diversity within a security perspective, which led to increasing tension between 
the Islamic Republic of Iran and Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia and Iran have found 
themselves in ideological schism and political competition which has led to engaging in 
proxy conflicts across the Middle East region, notably, in Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, Bahrain, 
Syria, West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran have not 
always been hostile. Nevertheless, ideological schism, competing for leadership in the 
Islamic world, mutual hardline speeches, political and security conflicts and alliances have 
dramatically shaped their foreign policies of rivalry (Potter et al, 2002; Wehrey et al, 2010; 
Cronin et al, 2011).  
 
In terms of alliances, Saudi Arabia focuses on the macro level of nation-states and official 
organisations in the international arena, whereas Iran deals with micro level units of non-
state actors, who consider themselves freedom fighters and resistance against tyranny and 
oppression, whose mission is to reconstruct principles of justice, dignity, and glory, such as 
the Lebanese Hezbollah, where these principles exist clearly in Iran's constitution in 
Article 2, 3, 152 and 154 (www.parstimes.com, 1979). Since 1979, and increasingly after 
2003, minority Shiite in Saudi Arabia gained inspiration of revolutionary principles and 
thoughts of Ayatollah Khomeini. Accordingly, relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia 
have severely deteriorated due to several attempts to put these principles into practice by 
using protests, uprisings and violent actions (www.lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/satoc.html, 1992). 
In the context of this deep competition, Iran has launched violent campaigns against Saudi 
Arabia by employing speech acts of hardline rhetoric, when it was at the height of its 
revolutionary fever, causing a number of incidents that exacerbated the tension between 
Iran and Saudi Arabia and the GCC states. 
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AL-Sadeq (2006: 48) argues that, in the early 1980s, the Islamic Republic of Iran 
established an organisation called "Organisation of the Islamic revolution to liberate the 
Arabian Peninsula", based in the Eastern region of Saudi Arabia, led by Sheikh Hassan al-
Saffar. As mentioned earlier, in the mid-1980s, the military wing of the organisation was 
established and called "Hezbollah Hejaz" (AL-Sadeq, 2006: 53). Al-Saffar invited the 
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps to construct Hezbollah Hejaz under the supervision of 
the Iranian intelligence officer Ahmad Sharifi. Some Saudi Shiites students, who were 
studying Islamic Shiite jurisprudence in the holy city of Qom in Iran, were recruited. It has 
been argued that the fundamental goals of the party are to export the Islamic Shiite 
revolution to the Muslim world and to liberate the Arabian Peninsula (Saudi Arabia) from 
the Sunni rulers to Islamic Shiite rule, following the doctrine of Wilayat Al-Faqih in 
Tehran (Al-Ghareib, 2005; Cordesman et al 2006). The party adopts violence coordinated 
by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, as a means of destabilising the situation 
particularly, in the days of Hajj, and also in major cities such as Makkah, Madina and the 
Eastern province (Potter et al, 2002).  
 
Since the 1980s several bomb attacks on Saudi facilities abroad and assassinations of Saudi 
diplomats have been connected to Saudi Shiites, supported by Iran (Fulton et al, 2011). In 
1989, the Saudi government accused Iran of being responsible for two bombings, after 
which it imposed quotas on Iranians traveling to Mecca (Fulton et al, 2011). On 25 June 
1996, the Khobar Towers facility in Saudi Arabia near Dhahran was bombed, in Eastern 
province of Saudi Arabia, killing 19 American servicemen,  when elements of Hezbollah 
Hejaz detonated a huge truck bomb, near the apartment complex of Khobar. They had been 
trained and equipped by Iran (Freeh, 2006; Burgess, 2010; Levitt, 2015). Prince Turki al-
Faisal, a former Saudi intelligence chief and ambassador to Washington, stated during an 
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unpublicised meeting in June 2011 in England at the Royal Air Force (RAF) station near 
Molesworth, that Iran was a "paper tiger with steel claws" that was "meddling and 
destabilising" the region (Burke, 2011). Diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and 
Iran have fluctuated since the Islamic Revolution. The former Presidents Akbar Hashemi 
Rafsanjani and Muhammad Khatami employed more conciliatory tactics and less extensive 
use of revolutionary rhetoric than Ahmadinejad.  
 
In the case of Bahrain, fears about Iran intervening in Bahrain‘s affairs started in the early 
stage of the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979. With continuing reactions to Iran's 
attempts to violently export the Islamic Revolution to the Gulf states in the 1980s and 
1990s, ties between Iran and Bahrain fluctuated, although the two countries have political 
and economic ties.   
 
In late 1979 and the mid-1990s, Bahraini Hezbollah took several names, such as "Islamic 
Front for the Liberation of Bahrain", which was led by Hadi Al-Madrasi, located in Tehran, 
then "Organisation of Direct Action", "Free Movement to Bahrain", "Organisation 
Usurped Homeland", and, recently, "Al-Wefaq National Islamic Society" led by Ali 
Salman, but all refer to Bahraini Hezbollah (AL-Sadeq, 2006: 37, 40). The main objectives 
of the party are to overthrow the Bahraini Sunni regime (monarchy of Al- Khalifa), 
establish a Shiite regime similar to the revolutionary Khomeini regime of Iran, achieve the 
country's independence, isolate it from the GCC states and link it to the Islamic Republic 
of Iran (www.todayszaman.com, 2009; www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/07/09/156881.htm 
l, 2011; Abdul Qadir, 2013). This Shiite movement has adopted violence to attain its goals. 
Initially, in late 1979, it conducted demonstrations that coincided with demonstrations in 
the Shiite city of Qatif in Saudi Arabia, near Bahrain (Solomon, 2011; www.bbc.co.uk/new 
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s/world-middle-east-16543013, 2012). In December 1981, Bahraini authorities arrested 
approximately 73 people, following a failed coup attempt to seize power in Bahrain, led by 
Mohammad Taqi Al Madrasi (AL-Sadeq, 2006). The same source reported that Bahraini 
Hezbollah emerged as an active militia organisation (military wing) in the mid-1980s, after 
more than 3000 Bahraini Shiites were recruited and trained in Iran and Lebanon, under the 
command of the leader of the party Abdul- Amir al-Jamri and then his successor Ali 
Salman. 
 
The security situation in Bahrain deteriorated in the mid-1990s, when the Shiite majority 
violently demanded economic and political reforms and social promotions. Shiite demands 
led to substantial political reforms, which included the participation of the Shiite majority 
in governance (Sanati, 2007). However, sabotage, bombing, and arson took place in 1996. 
On 14 March 1996, a Shiite faction burnt a restaurant on the island of Sitra, claiming 7 
victims; on 21 March 1996, Bahraini Hezbollah burnt one of the largest motor shows in 
Bahrain called Zayani; on 6 May 1996, the same members of the party also burnt and 
destroyed 9 famous commercial shops, as well as a number of schools, hotels, and banks, 
in order to paralyse the economic sector. Furthermore, Shiite factions in Bahrain have 
participated in civil disobedience. Most of these events were in coordination with the 
Kuwaiti Hezbollah (Al-Nefisy et al, 2008). 
 
The tension between Iran and Bahrain has resulted in an aggressive mutual diplomatic 
campaign, where both sides issue inflammatory statements against each other. Notably, in 
February 2009 Ali Akbar Nateq-Nouri, a former Iranian parliament speaker and current 
adviser to the supreme leader, Ali Khamenei also re-claimed that, historically, "Bahrain 
was (Iran's) 14 province and had a representative at the parliament", which strained 
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bilateral ties (Cronin et al, 2011; Fulton et al, 2011). Later, Manouchehr Mottaki, a former 
Iranian Foreign Minister, apologised for the statement during a visit to Bahrain. The 
Iranian elite continued their demands to conquer Bahrain through Ahmad Jannati, the 
radical cleric, Chairman of Iranian Guardian Council, on 09 July 2011, when he claimed 
that national dialogue between the Bahraini government and Bahraini opposition is useless, 
and that the Bahraini regime should be changed by overthrowing the monarchy and 
governing by Islamic law (www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/07/09/156881.html, 2011). 
These claims have provoked stormy reactions in Bahrain, and also created tension between 
the GCC states and the Islamic Republic of Iran (Al-Hubail, 2015). 
 
A major question arises about the loyalty of Arab Shiites and Persian Shiites in Bahrain 
and in the rest of the GCC states. Are they committed to their national identity, ethnicity, 
or ideological faith? There is a general perception among peoples of the GCC states and 
most of the Arab street that the Persian Shiites across the world, as well as Arab Shiites, 
are loyal to the Islamic Republic of Iran due to their ideological spiritual links with 
Wilayat Al-Faqih in Tehran, (Al-Ghareib, 2005; Jawada, 2007; Al-Nefisy et al, 2008), 
particularly when bearing in mind the statement of Hosni Mubarak in 2006 that the Shiites 
who reside in the Middle East often express their loyalty towards Iran more than their 
countries (Bazargar, 2007). Dramatically, in early 2011, conflict between the Shiite sect 
and the Bahraini monarchy escalated. This was perhaps the biggest crisis in Bahrain's 
modern history. Cronin et al (2011) argue that this crisis showed the fundamental 
contradictions of ideology alongside democratic participation in political realms, which led 
the Shiite majority to conduct an alleged coup attempt and create sustained political unrest 
in Bahrain. 
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The so-called Arab Spring has further inflamed relations between the Gulf States, as 
Bahraini authorities have always claimed that Iran and its regional proxies are behind the 
unrest and violence in Bahrain. Cronin et al (2011) argue that pro-democracy protesters 
(Shiite demonstrators) erected tents at Pearl roundabout at the heart of Manama, the 
Bahraini capital, for several days, in an attempt to replicate the success of the Egyptian 
revolution of 25 January 2011. The demands continued until the prime minister, His Royal 
Highness Prince Khalifa bin Salman Al-Khalifa, was overthrown, despite a number of 
wide ranging socio-political and economic reforms by Bahrain's King Hamad bin Isa Al 
Khalifa (www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-16492812, 2012). The Bahraini 
leadership requested urgent assistance from other GCC states, particularly Saudi Arabia, in 
the Peninsula Shield Forces, when it felt that there were outside parties involved in the 
internal events of Bahrain. As a result, relations between Iran and the GCC states 
deteriorated and led to a media war and a diplomatic war between both sides (Cronin et al, 
2011). 
 
On 15 March 2011, in response to Iran's external activities against Saudi Arabia, the 
Bahraini government recalled its ambassador from Tehran, because of Iranian criticism 
which constituted blatant interference in the domestic affairs of the country 
(www.latimesblogs.latimes.com, 2011). On 17 March 2011, the Bahraini diplomatic action 
against Iran led to a similar reaction, through recalling Iran's ambassador in Bahrain back 
to Tehran, claiming that the move was taken in protest at Bahraini government actions 
against Shiite protestors (www.cbsnews.com, 2011).  
 
On 19 March 2011 the secretary of Iran's Expediency Council, Mohsen Rezai, insisted that 
the participants in the anti-government protests in the Middle East and North Africa 
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between January and March 2011 viewed Iran as a role model (www.english.farsnews.com, 
2011). On 22 March 2011 Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Iranian supreme leader, claimed 
that Iran's support for the Bahraini opposition was unconnected to sectarian objectives; 
Iran‘s attempts were to assist all "anti-despotic" movements. Khamenei stated that his 
country "will not make a differentiation between Gaza, Palestine, Bahrain, Yemen, Egypt, 
Libya and Tunisia" (Fulton et al, 2011; www.mehrnews.com, 2011).  
 
On 05 April 2011 the Saudi foreign minister, His Royal Highness Prince, Saud Al- Faisal, 
remarked to the German news agency that Iran was moving in the wrong direction. This 
came in response to a question from the press (following the meeting of thirty one of the 
Ministerial Council of the GCC states in Riyadh) about Iran's recent moves to destabilise 
Bahrain (www.al-madina.com, 2011). Al-Nahham, Ibrahim (2011) reported that Abdullah 
bin Huwail Al-Merri, Parliamentary member in Bahrain, stressed that Iranian interference 
in the internal affairs of Bahrain was in order to set Wilayat Al-Faqih as an approach for 
expanding its regional influence and historical hegemony, by using Shiite opposition. 
 
On 19 April 2011 the King of Bahrain, Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa stated that there are 
several extremist Bahraini Shiite groups that have formed an alliance called 'The Coalition 
for a Republic,' with ties to Iran (www.foreignaffairs.com, 2011). According to the same 
source, King Hamad admitted that there is a noticeable number of Bahraini Shiites who 
prefer a religious regime similar to the paradigm of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and they 
are willing to take up arms to achieve it.  
 
On 20 April 2011 the members of Gulf Cooperation Council called Iran to stop interfering 
in the domestic affairs of Gulf countries (www.eu-un.europa.eu, 2011). 
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On 25 April 2011 Bahrain submitted an official report to the UN alleging that Lebanese 
Hezbollah has trained Bahraini opposition members in Lebanese and Iranian camps. 
Sheikh Khalid bin Ahmed al-Khalifa, Bahrain's foreign minister, is quoted in the report as 
saying that "some foreign countries have actively provided logistical support to Hezbollah 
to assist in destabilising Bahrain over recent months" (Solomon, 2011).  
 
On 06 May 2011 the Iranian legislative body claimed, via its representative Mostafa 
Kavakebian, that it would comprehensively review the massacre of Bahraini people; 
equally, the Iranian government announced it would be investigating the military actions of 
Joint Gulf Forces for Peninsula Shield Force, in particular, Saudi action against Shiite 
protestors in Bahrain (www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2011/05/06/Iran-to-investigate-
Saudi-role-in-Bahrain/UPI-36721304702031/, 2011).  
 
On 06 July 2011 Bahrain's high criminal court sentenced three people working in the 
Iranian embassy in Kuwait - one Bahraini citizen and two Iranians- to ten years each in 
prison for spying on behalf of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps of Iran 
(www.google.com, 2011). 
 
In this context, the King of Bahrain, King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa, during a meeting with 
a number of Bahraini officers and troops of Peninsula Shield Joint, declared that external 
aggressive plans (Iran and its proxies) against the national security of Bahrain, which had 
been planned for approximately twenty or thirty years, had failed. The King of Bahrain 
added that the external plot that targeted Bahrain was a first step, but, had it succeeded, it 
would have progressed sequentially in the GCC states one country after another 
(www.arabic.cnn.com/2011/bahrain.2011/3/21/plot.bahrain/index.html, 2011).  
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The Foreign Minister of Bahrain, Sheikh Khaled bin Ahmed Al-Khalifa, in a letter to the 
Secretary General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-moon, provided evidence of the 
involvement of Iran and Hezbollah in the internal affairs of Bahrain, in order to threaten its 
national security (www.arabic.cnn.com/2011/bahrain.2011/4/26/bahrain.hezbollah/index. 
html, 2011). The report also included indictments against Hezbollah and Iran to overthrow 
the royal family and the training of Bahraini opposition members in Lebanon and Iran to 
not only carry out violent activities in Bahrain, but also in the neighbouring Gulf countries. 
Moreover, the report included details of meetings between the Secretary General of 
Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah and the senior officials of Bahrain's Shiite opposition, Al-
Wifaq and Al- Haq, the prominent Shiite Islamic parties (www.arabic.cnn.com/2011/bahra 
in.2011/4/26/bahrain.hezbollah/index.html, 2011). 
 
The Interior Minister of Bahrain, Lieutenant General Shaikh Rashid bin Abdullah Al-
Khalifa, on 19 February 2013, revealed details about an Iranian terrorist cell recently 
uncovered. Major General Tariq Hassan, head of Bahraini General Security, pointed out 
that eight suspects had been arrested, five of them Bahrainis, three of them foreigners, 
while four others were still being sought. Major General Hassan said the aim of the 
organisation was to create a terrorist cell nucleus to establish a so-called "Army Imam", to 
engage in terrorist activities in the Kingdom of Bahrain (Abdul Qadir, 2013). In response 
to a question by "Akhbar Alkhaleej" (Gulf News), Major General Hassan stated that the 
members of the organisation had trained in sites belonging to the Iranian Revolutionary 
Guard in Iran and sites affiliated with "Hezbollah Iraqi in both Karbala and Baghdad. This 
process was managed by an Iranian nicknamed "Abunasser", who belongs to the Iranian 
Revolutionary Guard (Abdul Qadir, 2013). 
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The case of Kuwait is similar to the rest of the GCC states. Despite diplomatic and 
economic ties between Iran and Kuwait, several events and issues negatively affected their 
relations. Iran and Kuwait share cultural links, as an estimated 30% of Kuwait's population 
is Shiite and 4% of Kuwait's total population is Iranian (Fulton et al, 2011). Kuwait 
considers Iran‘s regional role and activities a threat to Kuwait's national security. Hence, 
Kuwait's government has enhanced its domestic security and upgraded its military arsenal, 
particularly its Air Defence System of Patriot Missiles, to counter Iran's growing military 
threat. In addition, the security agreements between great powers, such as the US and the 
UK, and the Kuwait government, have been renewed (Cordesman et al, 2006). Moreover, 
on 19 December 2006 Kuwait signed a security agreement with NATO (Fiorenza, 2006; 
www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_128684.htm, 2016). 
 
Kuwaiti Hezbollah was established in the early 1980s and has taken several names, such as 
"Harbingers of Change of the System of the Kuwaiti Republic", "Voice of the Free Kuwait 
People", "Organisation of Islamic Jihad", and "Forces of the Revolutionary Organisation in 
Kuwait", but all of these names refer to the Kuwaiti Hezbollah (AL-Sadeq, 2006: 57). It 
includes only the Kuwaiti Shiite sect who studied in the religious city of Qom in Iran, and 
most members have connections with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and have 
been trained by it. Its fundamental goals are similar to the other branches of Hezbollah in 
the GCC states. It aims to overthrow the Kuwaiti regime and establish an Islamic Shiite 
government following the doctrine of Wilayat Al-Faqih, the supreme leader in Tehran. 
Ideologically and operationally, these branches of Hezbollah in the GCC states are tightly 
linked. The major terrorist operations carried out by the Kuwaiti Hezbollah in coordination 
with Lebanese Hezbollah were during the mid-1980s and included numerous terrorist acts 
in Kuwait, attributed to domestic Shiite instigated by Iran (Pape, 2003; Levitt, 2012). 
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Among the events and issues that severely affected relations between the two countries are 
the following. 
 
From 1980-1988, Kuwait's support for Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war led to further strain, 
especially in 1987-1988, when the Kuwaiti government asked the US to re-flag Kuwaiti oil 
tankers and provide them with naval escorts in Gulf waters, to prevent potential Iranian air 
attacks (Lenczowski, 1990). In early 1983, Lebanese Hezbollah hijacked a Kuwaiti 
airplane that landed in Mashhad airport in Iran. Furthermore, they set fire to Kuwaiti oil 
facilities during the 1980s (AL-Sadeq, 2006; Levitt, 2015). On 12 December 1983 the US 
embassy in Kuwait was attacked by Hezbollah, killing seven of the embassy staff (Pape, 
2003). On 25 May 1985, in addition, the Emir of Kuwait, Sheikh Jaber Al-Ahmad Al-
Sabah, survived an assassination attempt by Hezbollah, through a car bombing (Pape, 
2003; Levitt, 2014). 
 
On 05 April 1988 another airplane was hijacked by Emad Moqniya, the chief of staff of 
Lebanese Hezbollah and chairman of the coordinators between numerous Shiite factions in 
the Middle East and elsewhere (AL-Sadeq, 2006). On 29 March 2011 a criminal court in 
Kuwait sentenced two Iranians and a Kuwaiti national to death for spying for the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guards Corps of Iran (Sandels, 2011). On 01 April 2011 the Kuwaiti 
newspaper Al-Qabas, said that the Iranian spy network is one of eight espionage networks 
in Kuwait; two of them were armed and they were intent upon explosions, car bombings 
and militia activities (www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/04/01/143793.html, 2011). The 
same source also reported that Ali Dahrany, head of the tourism office in the Iranian 
Embassy in Kuwait, was an intelligence officer of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 
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and responsible for coordinating Kuwaiti cells and other cells in the Gulf region 
(www.alarabiya.net, 2011). 
 
Accordingly, many members of Kuwaiti Parliament, such as Faisal Al-Muslim, 
Mohammed Hayeif, and Dleahy Al-Hajri, urged the Kuwaiti government to focus on its 
security measures and to review its relations with Iran (Al-Sabah, 2011). On 02 April 2011 
Kuwait's government expelled three Iranian diplomats accused of spying for Iran since 
2003. Sheikh Mohammad al-Sabah, the Kuwait's Foreign Minister, announced that the spy 
network planned to attack strategic sites inside Kuwait with explosives. Sheikh al-Sabah 
pointed out that the spy network had extremely sensitive military information that 
threatened Kuwaiti national security (Sandels, 2011; www. ca.reuters.com, 2011).  
 
On 10 April 2011 Iran expelled three diplomats of Kuwait, in response to Kuwait's 
decision, on March 2011, to throw out three Iranian diplomats accused of spying for Iran 
(www.in.reuters.com, 2011).  
 
Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, on 27 June 2011, signed a contract 
with Raytheon Company, a major American defence contractor and Industrial Corporation, 
to upgrade their air defence system as a reaction to the increasing security threats by Iran 
(www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2011/06/27/Raytheon-gets-17-billionPat 
riot-deal/UPI-74681309198406/, 2011). 
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7.5.4.   US Strategic Commitment towards the Regional Security System 
 
American commitment towards the regional security system, particularly the GCC states, 
began after Britain's withdrawal from the region in 1971, which opened the way for the US 
to play a strategic role in this troubled region. Notably, this vital strategic role has 
significantly increased in 1990-1991, after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the war on 
terror in 2001 (Hinnebusch, 2002; Barzegar, 2009). The transformative power of Iran's 
foreign policy towards the GCC states, and its impact on the regional security system, 
cannot be fully comprehended without taking into account US strategic policy in the region, 
due to the fact that the US military presence is the third element of the three dimensions of 
the security triangle of the Gulf region, of which Iran is the first element, and the GCC 
states are the second. There are three major reasons why the US and the GCC states are so 
intertwined and interdependent:  
 
1. With the power vacuum after the fall of Saddam's regime in 2003, the US is 
the only country to have an indisputable military capability and influence in 
the Middle East that can rein in Iranian regional expansion and hegemony. 
 
2. From an Iranian perspective, the US represents the most serious threat to the 
national security of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the main obstacle to 
proceeding with its nuclear programme and geopolitical agenda.   
 
3. At a time when Iran sees itself as the most influential actor and as a 
potential regional hegemon, the GCC states and the US administration view 
Iran's foreign policy as a source of domestic, regional and international 
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threats. This can be seen in its ideological interventions at the GCC internal 
affairs, which threaten US regional interests through using non-state actors, 
asymmetric warfare, nuclear capabilities and international markets.  
 
As Iran increases its influence in the Gulf region, Iranian threats to its neighbours may be 
countered militarily by its neighbours and superpowers (www.globalsecurity.org/military/ 
library/news/2015/05/mil-150503-irna01.htm?_m=3n%2e002a%2e1407%2ehy0ao05h7s% 
2e1aId, 2015). Details of the Iranian threat can be found in Appendix 10 (p. 443). It is 
important to remember that after the Gulf war in 1991, "most of the GCC states had signed 
security agreements with the United States" (Lee, S 2008: 49). These agreements ensured 
American troops‘ presence with their military arsenals in the Arabian Peninsula and the 
Gulf region, in order to deter regional threats. Although these security agreements with the 
GCC states do not ensure internal security, Western powers are essential in guaranteeing 
protection from regional military threats, conventional or unconventional. The GCC states 
depend on the US military and security umbrella, because of the disparity between their 
own minimal military capabilities, and Iran's and its proxies‘.  
 
The GCC states have seen the transformative power of Iran's foreign policy as a direct 
threat towards their national security. As for Iran, it has deemed the security agreements 
with the US as a regional threat. Hence, changing the geopolitical reality has led to 
uncertainty and the continuation of the security dilemma in the Gulf region, and the Middle 
East more generally. It could be argued that the GCC states adopted a defensive approach 
through conducting a cooperative military and security agreements with the great powers 
to strengthen their national security and reinforce their regional interests. On the other 
hand, Iran embraced an offensive approach in line with its an ideological revolutionary 
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approach aiming to expand its regional influence, to change the status quo according to the 
Islamic Shiite doctrine and establish a central Islamic government. 
 
What can satisfy some of the security requirements of the region? Hollis suggests, 
arrangements can and should be worked out with the Arab states of the Gulf to enhance 
cooperation between them and Iran. Foreign forces, however, must be excluded from the 
region, and the U.S. in particular is not welcome there since it is seen as following its own 
ambitions at the expense of local interests and Muslim values (Hollis, 1993). 
 
7.6.   Conclusion 
 
This chapter focused on the primary research question: To what extent have the 
geopolitical dynamics of the Middle East, in the aftermath of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, 
impacted Iran's foreign policy and, in turn, how did soft power affect the security 
dilemma? It also answered the fourth question: to what extent does the perception of the 
Iranian security threat to and by Middle Eastern states influence the security dilemma?  
 
Changes in the regional balance of power and the distribution of soft power led to 
recalculations. The distribution of soft power created a new dimension in the security 
landscape and the geopolitical dynamics. A security threat to internal stability, rather than 
a conventional military threat, was perceived by neighbouring states, coming through 
Iran‘s foreign policy. This came as a result of Iran using ideological Shiite mainstream and 
proxies to defend its geopolitical interests and achieve its regional aspirations. Iran‘s 
regional influence has expanded through its interventions in regional security issues. The 
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strategic interests of Iran and its proxies, mainly the Hezbollah, are a key element of the 
regional security equation. 
 
In reference to Iranian expansion in the region and beyond, Matthew Levitt asserted that 
"Iran not only continues to expand its presence in and bilateral relationships with countries 
like Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, but it also maintains a network of 
intelligence agents specifically tasked with sponsoring and executing terrorist attacks in the 
western hemisphere" (Levitt, 2013: 1). Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has urged 
Iran to stop its efforts to dominate the Middle East. President Erdoğan stressed that this has 
become disturbing, and Iran must withdraw its forces in Yemen, Syria and Iraq 
(www.azamil.com, 2015).  
 
In an exclusive interview to the Middle East newspaper, on 12 May 2015, President 
Obama openly declared,  
 
Iran clearly engages in dangerous and destabilizing behavior in different countries 
across the region. Iran is a state sponsor of terrorism. It helps prop up the Assad 
regime in Syria. It supports Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in the Gaza Strip. It 
aids the Houthi rebels in Yemen. So countries in the region are right to be deeply 
concerned about Iran’s activities, especially its support for violent proxies inside 
the borders of other nations"  
 
     (Al-Oraibi, 2015: 3).  
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Understanding state responsibility for regional instability, through the sponsoring of 
violent activities of non-state actors, is among the more critical issues to scholars of 
security studies. This chapter addressed the issue by investigating the causal relationship 
between Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah, Hamas in the Gaza Strip, Al-Mahdi Army in Iraq 
and other Hezbollah groups in the Gulf states. This thesis provided evidence to illustrate 
the role and activities of Iran‘s regime. These roles and activities rely extensively upon 
instruments of soft power and have changed the security dilemma. 
 
Iranian interference has been observed in Iraq, Lebanon, Israel and the Gulf states, also 
Yemen and even Bulgaria. Iranian support has a powerful, yet indirect, impact on decision-
making and violent activities of non-state actors, by shaping the options available to 
groups and party leaders. In addition, Iran can also directly shape strategic decisions of 
armed non-state actors, forcing its proxies to either expand, or restrict their domestic 
activities and regional roles. The Iranian security perspective and its political identity can 
be coextensive with, and constitutive of, strategic national security.  
 
The anarchic environment is the most important variable that shapes state behaviour. From 
a realist perspective, the Iranian regime has adopted a more assertive approach, due to the 
geopolitical dynamics of the region. This approach has taken various forms in the pursuit 
of its geopolitical agenda, such as defiance towards the international community, 
concerning its nuclear programme, and interference in the internal affairs of others. 
Moreover, it has taken the form of unlimited support for Lebanese Hezbollah and other 
Shiite factions, as well as Sunni organisations such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the 
Palestinian territories. This support is rhetorical, political, military and financial. On the 
other hand, constructivist explanations of Iran‘s support to Hezbollah, Hamas and Syria 
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stress Iran‘s revolutionary ideals and its national self interest reflecting Imam Khomeini's 
philosophical/political thoughts and aiming for the establishment of an Islamic government 
(Shiism) based in Tehran (Khomeini, 1970). These philosophical thoughts serve Iran's 
foreign policy objectives in ideological and practical terms. Speech acts and hardline 
rhetoric are other instruments of power that can be employed to reach minority 
communities in the region, in order to garner support for the benefit of Iran, from among 
those looking for a champion, by showing Iran as the main challenger of Zionism and 
imperialism. 
 
The next chapter will discuss the dynamic process of the security dilemma, its impact on 
the regional security system of the Middle East, and its link with Iran's foreign policy 
interests in the region. 
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Chapter Eight 
 
The Security Dilemma and its impact on the Middle East 
 
8.1.    Introduction  
 
This chapter discusses regional security strategic threats, analysing the dynamic process of 
the security dilemma, within the framework of the interactions of the variables, 
independent, dependent and intervening, thus linking the distribution of soft power, the 
foreign policy outcomes and the domestic policies in Iran that are derived from regime 
identity, nationalism and decision makers. In order to interpret the mechanism of the 
security dilemma in the Middle East, it needs to understand the impact of the 
transformative power of Iran's foreign policy on the geopolitical dynamic, particularly in 
post-2003 Iraq. These threats have become a cornerstone to regional and international 
security, not due to traditional war itself, but as a result of the intensive effort of Iran and 
its proxies to counter external threats by expanding their regional influence, after the 
removal of two regional enemies, the Taliban and Saddam's regime. This chapter explores 
the paramount priorities in Iran's foreign policy and whether the ideological or pragmatic 
approach takes priority, in the short and in the long run.  
 
It is divided into seven sections. The first section provides a brief introduction. The second 
discusses the origins of the security dilemma and its mechanism in the Middle East. The 
third assesses the interactions of three variables, independent, dependent and intervening, 
all essential to evaluate the security structure of the Middle East, in the shadow of Iran's 
grand strategic policy for regional domination. The fourth section explains the 
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consequences of the security dilemma in the Middle East, in connection with non-state 
actors, asymmetric warfare and unconventional forces, continuous threats to world markets, 
and a conventional and unconventional armaments race. The fifth section discusses the 
main features of the regional ascendance of Iran. The sixth section addresses the natural 
avenues of the security dilemma as an ongoing process in the Middle East. The final 
section is a conclusion.   
    
8.2.   The Origin of the Security Dilemma in the Middle East  
 
Arguments regarding the security dilemma have shed light on the most profound questions 
about the variables that impact on anarchy and actual and potential threats, at both 
international and regional levels. Tang (2009) argues that several areas of disagreement or 
confusion exist among international relations theorists about the dynamic process of the 
security dilemma. In this section, this thesis explores three distinct theoretical approaches, 
offensive realism, constructivism, neoclassical realism, and to some extent defensive 
realism, to revisit the concept of the security dilemma and some of its most significant 
extensions, and advance a coherent and systematic restatement of the concept, to explain 
how security dilemma dynamics occur in the Middle East.  
 
Although the offensive realist approach to the security dilemma is based on the uncertainty 
of international politics, trust and cooperation among states is unlikely. Therefore, it rejects 
the idea that paradoxical security competition between defensive states can be mitigated, a 
view that has been challenged by constructivists and defensive realists on the subject 
(Jackson et al, 2007). Constructivists and defensive realists claim that it is possible for 
uncertainty in world politics to be reduced, and rational states are capable of finding ways 
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for conciliation about misperceptions and lack of trust, in order to reduce uncertainty to 
levels where it no longer impedes cooperation, and hence mitigate the security dilemma.  
 
Taliaferro (2001: 132) argues that "neorealism seeks to explain international outcomes, 
such as the likelihood of major war, the prospects for international cooperation, and 
aggregate alliance patterns among states". Taliaferro (2001) noted that realist theorists 
disagree on the logical implications of anarchy and this is the core of the debate between 
offensive and defensive realism. According to offensive realism, due to the absence of a 
worldwide government of universal sovereign, all states strive to maximise their power 
relative to other states, so as to guarantee their own survival (Booth et al, 2008). 
Mearsheimer (in Jackson et al, 2007) argues that the risks of uncertainty are paramount, 
hence the security dilemma must be resolved according to offensive approaches; in this 
context all states see each other as opponents and react offensively. This perspective 
enhances the key argument of this thesis in accordance with the transformative power of 
Iran's foreign policy in post-invasion Iraq in 2003. Hollis et al (1990) argue that states 
usually seek to proceed in attaining their expansionist policies, when and where the 
benefits outweigh the costs. As such, in this situation, states have no choice but to 
reinforce their relative power positions via arms buildups, diplomatic activities, economic 
relationships, and military-security agreements with great powers (Shoamanesh, 2012).  
 
On the other hand, a constructivist approach is adopted by others, indicating that the 
security dilemma is created via interactions among states according to selection policies. 
Wendt (1992) argues that a security dilemma is a social structure, consisting of 
intersubjective understandings in which states can undertake social acts through which 
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they learn more about one another's identity, thereby enabling them to reinterpret the 
nature and meaning of their relationship and be aware of each other's fears. 
 
Neoclassical realism seeks to explain the foreign policy strategies of individual states. 
Rose (1998: 145, in Juneau 2009: 5) argues that in terms of various patterns of outcomes 
concerning interactions among states, theories of foreign policy "seek to explain what 
states try to achieve in the external realm and when they try to achieve it". Neoclassical 
realism, therefore, provides a conceptual framework that allows detailed accounts of a 
certain state's foreign policy to be dealt with at a given time, or under specific conditions. 
Juneau (2009) adopts a perspective closer to Zakaria's, but similar to Rathbun's. Juneau 
(2009) argues that neoclassical realism is one of the best approaches to explain the 
transformative power of Iran's foreign policy. He agrees that states should respond to 
structural pressures, so as to maximise their security. In political reality, however, states 
cannot neglect the intervening variables of domestic pressures that shape their external 
policies to maximise their influence and power in an anarchical environment.   
 
The differing perspectives point to an academic debate between offensive realism, 
constructivism, neoclassical realism, and to some extent defensive realism, over the extent 
to which policymakers can find a middle ground. The uncertainty and mutual mistrust 
among states in the Middle East are based on ideological as well as material threats. From 
Iran‘s perspective, to solve the security dilemma in the Middle East, all monarchic regimes 
in the region need to be overthrown and replaced with the Islamic Shiite governments, for 
which the command centre will be in Tehran (Khomeini, 1981).  Nearly a billion and a half 
Muslims worldwide would need to change their ideological doctrine, religious practices, 
daily activities, identity, culture, dignity and history (Al-Nefisy, 2008). 
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Relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and most Arab countries have been strained 
over different geopolitical issues, such as interpretations of Islam, national identity, 
aspirations for leadership, oil export policy, and relations with the US and the West. 
Jawada (2007) stresses that uncertainty, tension, hostility and indirect confrontation in the 
region began due to the competition over leadership in the Islamic world, particularly 
between Iran and Saudi Arabia, which grew to ideological hostility.  
 
Iran has attempted to justify its right to command the Islamic world by promoting the 
Islamic Shiite doctrine as the correct approach. In order to demonstrate the link between 
the Islamic Shiite Doctrine and contemporary political reality, the origin of the conflict in 
the Middle East needs to be discussed and understood in the context of the security 
dilemma. As previously mentioned, political and religious conflict in the Middle East is 
like an inheritance of civilisations, passed down to generations. The Shiite conflict has 
turned from an ideological conflict to a geopolitical one, and even into ethnic conflict, such 
as in Iraq against Sunni Arabs (www.churchofscotland.org.uk, 2008). The core argument 
can be seen in a documentary (www.arabistan.org/videoinfos.aspx?elmnt=96&ids=1395, 
2012) which sheds light on Iran's foreign policy, alongside roles and activities of Shiites in 
the region (video, 21 March 2012, Arabic language).  
 
The majority of people in the region have accepted and followed one approach of Islam 
(Sunnah which is based on Quran and Hadith), then the Shiite doctrine came, as a result of 
struggles over leadership with the Sunni majority. The Shiite doctrine emerged attempting 
to divert Islamic concepts and political reality, in order to maximise its own power, 
causing uncertainty, conflict and chaos (Al-Ghareib, 2005). The Islamic Shiite doctrine 
strongly believes that leadership (Imam, Caliph, President, King, commander) is the 
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position of God, and it is God who appoints the selected people who belong to the Shiite 
doctrine of the descendants of the Prophet Muhammad (Peace be upon him), through his 
son-in-law, Ali and his successors of Twelver Imams (Shams al-Din, 1985). Leaders who 
have been selected through democratic elections, or by any other means, should be 
removed from power, because they do not have legitimate authority from God. Thus, 
whatever the popular votes and the practical policies for leaders in the past, present and in 
the future, they are illegal and must be removed and replaced with a government that 
follows the Shiite Islamic curriculum in Tehran, under the command of the supreme leader. 
Otherwise, tension, violence and bloody conflict, such as the current ones in Iraq, Lebanon, 
Syria, Yemen and Bahrain, are the consequence. 
 
To what extent does Iran's foreign policy constitute a security threat to Middle Eastern 
states? From an ideological Shiite perspective, Iran's foreign policy is boundless, until 
domination is accomplished, regionally and beyond. It attempts to impose theories, 
doctrines and thoughts on others by asymmetric forces, via interference into domestic 
affairs to neighbours, rather than diplomatic means of dialogue and persuasion through 
seminars, forums and regional conferences. The natural reaction of Iran's neighbours is to 
confront the Islamic Shiite doctrine that guides Iran's foreign policy. They reinforce their 
national security, by continuing to build a huge military arsenal, and by renewing military 
agreements and security treaties with great powers. Indeed, the security dilemma does not 
pay attention to religious and ideological factors, but this thesis demonstrates how the 
more ideological activities are increased via Iran‘s foreign policy, the more it can expand 
its regional influence, leading to increased regional threats and tensions that reduce the 
chance of stability and security among states. 
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8.3.   Interactions of the Independent, Dependent and Intervening Variables 
 
This thesis explores the causal link between the three essential variables, to determine their 
major components. Christopher Layne (in Juneau, Thomas 2009: 8) argues, "all three 
variables are operationalised and linked". The first variable is ‗X‘ (independent variable) - 
the distribution of soft power, including Iran‘s use of ideological proxies. There are two 
basic components in the case of Iran. The first is non-state actors with asymmetric 
capabilities. The second is Shiite factions as militias. These components have a dual role, 
to use asymmetric warfare and to capture the power structures of political systems. This 
explains the nature and scope of the geopolitical dynamics. The second variable is ‗Y‘ 
(dependent variable) - Iran‘s foreign policy outcomes. The dependent variable is the entity 
under observation and is affected by the response to the independent variable. This can be 
seen through the continuation of Iran's foreign policy of engaging with regional issues and 
crises. The third variable is ‗Z‘ (intervening variables) - the domestic-level that comprises 
regime identity, nationalism and decision-makers.  
 
In modern Iranian history, these three variables contributed to the understanding of the 
geopolitical dynamics and framing of security events after the Islamic Revolution, 
especially in post-Saddam Iraq. There are essential issues that need to be borne in mind: 
Ideologies, Pan-Islamism, and Revolutionary Shiism, all of which go hand in hand with 
Iran's identity, guiding and justifying its foreign policy in line with its geopolitical interests 
and its role in the region. 
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8.4.   Consequences of the Security Dilemma in the Middle East    
 
The aftermath of the Iraq invasion in 2003 was a turning point for Iran and provided an 
opportunity to reinforce its regional influence and to counter external threats. 
Simultaneously, a new era of geopolitical dynamics has emerged, that has led to more 
instability. Four critical issues have inflamed and complicated regional and international 
relations. They will be addressed next. 
 
8.4.1.   Increased Influence of Non-State Actors: Asymmetric Warfare and  
Unconventional Forces  
 
After the regime change in Iraq in 2003 and the disbanding of the Iraqi Army, as well as 
the war on terror, violence escalated in the region (Hanlon et al, 2007; Dodge, 2009).  
Political violence performed by non-state actors has become one of the most prominent 
issues of international relations (Barzegar, 2009). Terrorist groups, such as the 
transnational fundamentalist organisation of Al-Qaeda, Sunni extremist militias and the 
regional fundamentalist organisation of Lebanese Hezbollah, have increased their violent 
activities (Feltman et al, 2010). Byman (2008) argues that the engagement of such 
fundamentalist groups, parties and organisations is increasingly provocative locally, 
regionally and internationally, and has complicated the security dilemma. In some cases, 
these activities of non-state actors have been the catalyst for instability and tension 
between states and within states (Levitt, 2012). The scope of the discussion will be 
narrowed by focusing on two key issues. Firstly, the interactions between non-state actors 
and policy-makers and their impact on domestic and regional security dilemma; secondly, 
the impact of asymmetric warfare and unconventional forces on the security dilemma. 
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Non-state actors have emerged as new political actors, sharing aspects of fundamentalist 
ideological ideas based on anti-Israel, anti-West and anti-peace processes (Zalman, 2009). 
In essence, a new perception of the security dilemma has emerged, due to the activities of 
non-state actors, their involvement in regional issues causing a political dilemma for 
policy-makers, when dealing with them as political oppositions, or as terrorists. Different 
definitions of non-state actors create a dilemma. While the US with its regional and 
international allies perceive Hezbollah and Hamas, for example, through the lens of 
terrorism, in contrast, Iran deals with them as freedom fighters and resistance movements 
(www.presidentialrhetoric.com, 2006; www.irna.ir, 2014). 
 
Palestinian Hamas, as an insurgent movement and freedom fighter, and Lebanese 
Hezbollah, as a resistance movement, attempt to gain political victory over Israel, in order 
to obtain greater popularity with Arab and Islamic populaces, but also to destroy images of 
the conservative political elite in the region. It seems that non-state actors have attempted 
to set a trap for the Lebanese government and the rest of the Arab regimes, through 
implicating their decisions and policies in potential internal or external crises. This can be 
seen through the reaction of states towards Hezbollah activities and their response. If the 
response was positive to Hezbollah, the costs would be very high at all levels, because 
Hezbollah would appear as if it had won the battle (political victory), directed against the 
entire Arab regional countries, to gain popularity and implement a strategic regional 
agenda for Iran's foreign policy. In contrast, if states responded harshly to Hezbollah 
activities, they would be faced with significant domestic and regional pressures. As a result, 
regimes may lose their popularity, which may lead fundamentalist Islamic parties to power 
through parliamentary elections gained from grassroots. The choice between two 
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unsatisfactory options is a form of dilemma. This is what Iran's foreign policy has 
attempted to accomplish (Bergman, 2008; Byman, 2008; Abbas, 2015). 
 
It has been argued that the criteria of victory between state and non-state actors are 
extremely disparate. If a state attained nine victories, but was defeated in one, it would 
mean the government failed. In contrast, if non-state actors obtained one victory and failed 
nine times, it would mean that the fundamentalist organisations had triumphed. More 
importantly, non-state actors are prepared to fight and win a political conflict, while states, 
Israel, for instance, are prepared to fight a military conflict. In other words, Israel stood to 
lose by winning, but non-state actors stood to win by losing. As a result, a classic dilemma 
is a state facing non-state actors and terrorist organisations. 
 
However, it is important to note that the media has provided non-state actors with one of 
the greatest instruments of power. The media have become a battle space and have been 
intensively used by non-state actors, in order to deliver their voice and expand their 
influence to the populace (Bergman, 2008). Hezbollah, for instance, ―in line with Iranian 
propaganda tactics, have made maximal use of mass media‖ (Bergman, 2008: 87). 
Hezbollah‘s radio station, television station of Al Manar and official website 
(www.hizbollah.tv, 2012) contain up-to-date information on Hezbollah‘s activities in all 
realms and are an effective tool to support their activities and convince people of their 
issues. This can be seen in the speech by the Secretary General of Lebanese Hezbollah, 
Hassan Nasrallah, on Al-Manar TV on 19 November 2012. 
 
Another organisation, the Islamic State (IS), particularly during the second half of 2014, 
used social media to recruit fighters, spread its propaganda and garner financial support. It 
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has been argued that there are hundreds of users subscribed to the application on the 
internet, or their Android smart phones, using the Google Play store. Furthermore, this 
jihadist group has also started recruiting fighters through an online magazine, ‗The Islamic 
State Report‘, that explains the principles, concepts, approaches and motives of the group, 
including the nature of life for Jihadists, and how an envisioned Islamic state would look 
(Ajbaili, 2014). IS attempts to present itself "as a vanguard movement in the global 
defence of Islam at a time when Islam is under attack and leaders of Muslim states across 
the Middle East are either apostate or utterly untrue to the tenets of Islam". Moreover, "the 
Islamic State is leading this historic renewal against the 'far enemy' of the US and its allies 
that have brought chaos to Afghanistan and Iraq, killing over 200,000 Muslims and 
wounding many more in the process" (Rogers, 2014: 2). This includes the killing of 
Muslims in Somalia, Nigeria, Mali, Pakistan, Libya and Yemen.  
 
Western military campaigns in Muslim countries during the last few decades have created 
a favourable environment for jihadist organisations to gain legitimacy for their activities. 
Most jihadist groups are prepared to fight for victory or death. Military operations against 
religious ideology are not easy, and conflict in the Middle East will continue as long as the 
rules of engagement (the conventional materialistic power of states vs ideational proxies 
with asymmetric warfare) are different between the two sides. Indeed, for more than thirty 
years the Western military machine has not stopped in the face of militant groups, however, 
the quality, quantity, efficiency and scope of confrontation have increased significantly 
(Rogers, 2014). 
 
Paradoxically, both the Islamic Republic of Iran (nation-state) and the Islamic State (non-
state actor and fundamentalist organisation) have endeavoured to create an Islamic 
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Government. However, the geopolitics and religious ideology have put them in opposition 
to each other, not only via political and media propaganda, but also on the ground, rather 
than cooperation. 
 
Non-state actors have not only become more active in political and media propaganda, but 
are also able to engage in asymmetric warfare and unconventional confrontation against 
their domestic and regional opponents (Feltman, 2010). As pointed out earlier, Iran's 
proxies in the region have conducted several operations and activities in domestic affairs, 
in Iraq and the Gulf states, for example, aided by the provision of arms, training, funds and 
safe haven. In addition, the security of the regimes in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, 
Lebanon, Yemen, Egypt, Iraq and Jordan remains under threat (www.presidentialrhetoric. 
com/speeches/12.04.07.html, 2007; www.mehrnews.com, 2011; Burke, 2011; Fulton et al, 
2011; Byman, 2012; www.state.gov, 2013). Miller (2006) and Burgess (2010) pointed out 
that the efforts of the Iranian foreign policy to involve itself in the regional issues and 
domestic affairs of its neighbours destabilises the Middle East. Equally, Cordesman et al 
(2006) linked the foreign operations branch of the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and 
Security, particularly the Quds Force, with several militant organisations and 
fundamentalist groups, and the disturbance of the political situation in Iraq. 
 
In this context, American Defence Secretary, Leon Panetta, confirmed in an interview by 
the Wall Street Journal on 01 February 2013 that intensive efforts at regional and 
international level are being made to counter the Iranian threat to destabilise the Middle 
East (Barnes et al, 2013). Panetta accused Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Iran's 
paramilitary forces of supplying anti-aircraft missiles called "manpads" that can be carried 
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by a single person to its militant allies (Barnes et al, 2013). Such weapons are a risk not 
only to military jets and helicopters, but also to commercial airlines.  
 
The US State Department, on 30 May 2013, announced that Tehran‘s ally Hezbollah, 
through close collaboration with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force 
(IRGC-QF), conducted terrorist activities since the 1990s (Wehrey, 2009) in Southeast 
Asia, Europe, and Africa (www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2012/209978.htm, 2012). In 2012 
authorities in Thailand prosecuted a Hezbollah member for his role in assisting and 
conducting terrorist attacks. In 2011 IRGC-QF was implicated in a plot to assassinate the 
Saudi ambassador to the US in Washington, DC (Levitt, 2015). In addition, in 2012 IRGC-
QF came under suspicion for directing terrorist attacks in Georgia, India, Thailand, and 
Kenya. Furthermore, on 5 February 2013, the Bulgarian government condemned 
Hezbollah for the July 2012 bombing against Israeli citizens in Burgas (Levitt, 2013). 
Moreover, on 21 March 2013, authorities in Cyprus found a Hezbollah operative guilty for 
his surveillance activities, carried out in 2012, on Israeli tourist targets. The report 
concluded that both Iran and Hezbollah were crucial in providing assistance in a broad 
sense to the Assad regime, as he continues the brutal crackdown on the Syrian populace 
(www.state.gov, 2012). 
 
Regarding the second issue, asymmetric warfare is a war doctrine that differs from 
traditional military war at the operational level. Strategically, asymmetric warfare is an 
open war and, tactically, it has no rules of engagement. During any conflict, the first rule 
for non-state actors is that there are no rules to be followed. Thus, nothing is forbidden. 
The battlefield is unlimited and includes every corner of the globe. Furthermore, in 
asymmetric warfare, there is no distinguishing between military or civilian targets. Non-
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state actors rely heavily on religious worldviews to justify their actions to the public 
(Roach et al, 2005). In other words, religious ideology is a concept that provides legitimate 
cover to target anybody, anywhere, through conducting asymmetric warfare. Iran and most 
fundamentalist organisations (whether Sunni or Shiite) believe in the notion of martyrdom, 
which brings the greatest reward from Allah (God). Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh (Khadduri 
1955 in Acharya et al, 2010) argues that people who conduct asymmetric warfare in the 
name of Jihad consider death for the sake of Allah as the best way to get to Paradise.   
 
Nation-states face a serious dilemma concerning asymmetric warfare (Neumann et al, 
2005). Any retaliation against non-state actors located in the host country, or the country 
itself, would force the state to make difficult choices and critical decisions (Freedman in 
media.clubmadrid.org, 2005). The Israeli war on the Gaza Strip in late 2008 and early 
2009, for example, was called the Gaza Massacre in the Arab-Muslim world and all around 
the world as well (Barzegar, 2009; Cordesman et al, 2009). Clearly, nation-states always 
face the dilemma in any conflict with non-state actors that put them under pressure, 
problems and risk, whether domestically, or with neighbouring states, or the international 
community. It is important to note that several of Hezbollah‘s factions have entered Iraq 
through Syria and Iran in order to support extremist Shiite groups, from Baghdad to 
Southern Iraq (Puelings, 2010). Poole (2007: 137) writes, ―Hezbollah is further implicated 
by the sheer number of suicide bombings in Iraq. It is the Hezbollah-affiliated Palestinian 
organizations that have adopted the suicide attack as their favorite tactic‖.  
 
In modern societies, in asymmetric warfare, there are opportunities to kill many innocent 
people in a short amount of time and authorities have difficulty in responding, due to the 
enemy's ambiguity. At operational and tactical levels, asymmetric warfare is mainly used 
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from the lowest tactical levels by conducting its mission in cities. Lebanese and Palestinian 
asymmetric forces (guerrillas), for instance, normally operate with a small number of units 
that provide them with the opportunity to penetrate urban areas and hide inside civilian 
cities and villages, making them difficult to locate  (Poole, 2007).  
 
During the Hezbollah-Israel War in 2006, Al Jazeera Television network reported, ―Al-
Manar, Hezbollah‘s satellite channel... showed footage of Hezbollah firing rockets from 
civilian areas and produced animated graphics showing how Hezbollah fired rockets at 
Israeli cities from inside villages in southern Lebanon‖ (www.Web.archive.org, 2006). 
Moreover, it is important to note that forces in asymmetric warfare usually wear civilian 
clothes instead of uniforms. Therefore, identification of these forces can be difficult, 
bearing in mind that they can be a civilian during the day and a terrorist at night (Poole, 
2007). In essence, in asymmetric warfare, forces are quick-moving and can conduct their 
tasks of violence from multiple locations autonomously and independently. Moreover, this 
kind of warfare of non-state actors uses all the available means to have enormous impact.  
 
One of the major dilemmas of states, with regard to non-state actors, is the zero-sum game. 
Most fundamentalist organisations and groups emphasise their mutual interest, with no 
negotiation and no compromise concerning their objectives. In this context, there is only 
one winner and one loser. Thus, total loss or total success. The primary aim for states is to 
maintain and protect people‘s right to survive. Asymmetric conflict seeks to achieve 
political and psychological objectives, rather than one decisive military victory (Poole, 
2007). The aim of most non-state actors in the Middle East is to not only kill many 
adversaries, but also to destroy the infrastructure of target states. Asymmetric conflict 
escalates the level of uncertainty for/between state actors. 
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8.4.2.    Strait of Hormuz: World Markets and Iranian Threats  
 
This section focuses on the impact of Iran's behaviour on the Strait of Hormuz and the 
implications for world markets. Iran's foreign policy of proceeding with its nuclear 
programme, continuing its support for radical movements by lethal aid, increasing the tone 
of speech acts of hardline rhetoric and its involvement in regional issues, raise tension 
regionally and internationally. As a result, the security dilemma will escalate to the point 
where the Iranian regime will take action, by threatening the flow of global oil supply and 
contributing to higher global oil prices. 40% of world oil flows daily via the Strait of 
Hormuz (Cordesman, 2007). The Strait of Hormuz is one of the vital waterways in the 
world, and the sole route leading out/ into the Gulf waterway region (www.eia.gov, 2012). 
In this sense, the Strait of Hormuz is one of the critical issues that intersect regional and 
international interests (www.eia.gov, 2012). The Strait of Hormuz is one of the 
fundamental arteries of the global markets, and is in the grip of Iranian Maritime Forces 
(Katzman et al, 2012).  
 
The Strait of Hormuz is under threat by Iranian military forces that have occupied three 
geo-strategic islands (Abu Musa, Greater Tunb Island, and Lesser Tunb Island) of the 
United Arab Emirates in Gulf waters since 1971. This has given Iran a great opportunity to 
control and threaten the routes to/from this essential mobility corridor. The question is not 
whether Iranian forces are capable of harassing shipping and destroying and sinking 
dozens of oil tankers. Rather, the question is what would the reaction of the international 
community and great powers be towards Iran and the impact on international markets 
(Talmadge, 2008). No doubt, Iran‘s naval forces are able to threaten the shipping traffic in 
Gulf waters. This can be done by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and/or Special 
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Forces by maritime forces, sea mines and long-range ballistic missiles. In 2006 Admiral 
Ali Fadavi, from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, claimed that Iran had a 
sophisticated system of weapons, which ―no warship could escape because of its high 
velocity". Iran also claimed that there were new weapons being tested for attacking big 
ships and submarines (Cordesman, 2007).  
 
Any tension or military conflict in this regard could cause oil prices to rise severely, and 
would damage the environment as a result of oil spills, which would be catastrophic to the 
natural marine life, the local water supply Gulf Arab states depend on for desalination, as 
well as their economies (Talmadge, 2008). Iran has threatened to close the Strait of 
Hormuz if it was attacked by any regional power, such as Israel, or international powers, 
under the pretext of proceeding with its nuclear programme (Mansharof et al, 2008; 
www.latimesblogs.latimes.com, 2012). Mohammad Reza Rahimi, Iranian Vice-President, 
warned that "not a drop of oil will pass through the Strait of Hormuz," if the West imposes 
more sanctions over its controversial nuclear programme (www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
middle-east-16344102, 2011). In this context, at the same source, Admiral Habibollah 
Sayari, the Iranian maritime chief, mentioned that closing the Strait of Hormuz would be 
"easy". For these reasons, Gosden (2012) states that on Monday 16 January 2012, after a 
fresh threat to close the Strait of Hormuz, by an Iranian senior official, oil prices rose 70 
cents to $111.14 a barrel. Iranian leaders' threats have ranged from closing the Strait of 
Hormuz to attacking US targets in the region, including in the GCC states, as well as 
targets in Israel, through employing revolutionary Islamic fighters. The Strait of Hormuz 
remains a vital card for Iran's foreign policy to apply pressure at any future negotiation.  
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8.4.3.   A Conventional and Unconventional Armaments Race and the Likelihood of  
Spreading to Non-State Actors across the Region and Beyond  
 
This section focuses on both the conventional and unconventional arms race, and the 
likelihood of spread to non-state actors in the Middle East and elsewhere, by explaining 
these matters in relation to action-reaction and offensive-defence patterns. Schelling (in 
Booth et al, 2008) writes of the interplay between the psychological and the material, 
within the framework of dynamic situations of uncertainty and mutual mistrust between 
two or more players. In the case of nation-states, Schelling (in Booth et al, 2008: 43) 
provides an example of an action-reaction situation and how it works; he notes, "if I go 
downstairs to investigate a noise at night, with a gun in my hand, and find myself face to 
face with a burglar who has a gun in his hand, there is danger of an outcome that neither of 
us desires". Self-defence in such situations becomes ambiguous in terms of mutual 
uncertainty and the reactions through the confrontation, as each party thinks the other may 
shoot first.  
 
In the context of the security dilemma, threat is increased if the security situation escalates, 
and, when it reaches the level of crisis, the need for weapons will be absolutely necessary 
among all players in the region (Hollis et al, 1990). In terms of offensive/defensive 
weapons, as John Mearsheimer, argued, weapons speak through the cognitive system of 
their interpreters (in Booth et al, 2008). In other words, when state deploys defensive 
weapons for peaceful purposes, it is hard to distinguish their strategic and operational tasks, 
especially in light of the possibility of modifications, for instance, in terms of increasing 
their range and the combat effectiveness to become offensive rather than defensive 
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weapons, which leads to actual threat to neighbours and beyond. The ensuing military 
spending and arms imports will probably escalate the conflict (Jackson et al, 2007). 
 
On the other hand, the danger posed by weapons of mass destruction (WMD), chemical, 
biological, nuclear, and radiological weapons has dwindled with the end of the Cold War. 
Although most countries have abandoned their arsenals of weapons of mass destruction, 
the Iranian regime is still proceeding with the development of its nuclear programme 
alongside ballistic missile systems. These Iranian efforts are challenging the International 
Atomic Energy Agency, and the policies of the Great Western states (www.fas.org, 2006; 
Cordesman, 2007). This is a crucial issue that threatens the regional security system and 
violates multiple Security Council resolutions, as it continues to develop its uranium 
enrichment and heavy water at nuclear reactor activities, and also to develop ballistic 
missiles, that can carry and deliver nuclear warheads. Byman (2008) argues that the 
behaviour of Iran in the past indicated that it is not likely to provide either chemical, or 
biological, or radiological, or nuclear elements to terrorist organisations and 
fundamentalist groups. These lethal weapons can be devastating even for friends and are 
seen as heinous, destroying the image of both the group and its state sponsor. Byman 
(2008) and Waltz (in Cal, 2012) point out that the Islamic Republic of Iran is unlikely to 
deliver weapons of mass murder to its proxies, despite its ability to do so. Collins (2007: 
271) warns, "if the threat posed by WMD proliferation to state actors is of increasing 
concern, then the possibility that these weapons could fall into the hands of terrorists is 
alarming". 
 
Iran believes that to ensure its strategic interests it needs to obtain nuclear weapons 
capabilities, to reinforce its diplomatic, military, and economic instruments of power. That 
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is, it needs to join the nuclear club of Israel, Pakistan, and India. Katzman (2003) pointed 
out that John Bolton, undersecretary of State of America, on 09 October 2002, told the 
Congress that Iran is building a nuclear fuel cycle to support a nuclear weapons 
programme. Turki al-Faisal warned, in a security forum in Riyadh, that Saudi Arabia has 
no choice but to seek nuclear weapons, if Iran obtains them (Kahn, 2011). This statement 
expresses the threat of a nuclear arms race in the Gulf region between Iran and the GCC 
states. Indeed, it might be argued that the debate surrounding the attempts of some states in 
the Middle East to obtain conventional or unconventional weapons is a natural 
consequence of an anarchic environment, due to uncertainty and mutual mistrust. Iran's 
decisive efforts to expand its influence in the region, the arms race between nation states 
and the possibility of non-state actors obtaining some elements of weapons of mass 
destruction severely threaten the regional security and international stability.   
 
8.5. Regional Ascendance of Iran between Reality and Illusion 
 
To what extent does the perception of the Iranian security threat to and by Middle Eastern 
states influence the security dilemma? This section discusses this issue within the 
framework of the fourth research question.  
 
A broad international survey was conducted by the BBC World Service between 
December 2011 and February 2012, which included more than 24,000 persons from 22 
countries. The findings showed the ranking of countries‘ influence on the world negatively. 
The world press and international news displayed the results of the poll, which showed that 
Iran was ranked first, having the worst image and the most negative influence on the world 
(Ravid, 2012). Mountains of official documentation prove that the image of Iran is derived 
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from reality, which is concrete, physical, visible, rather than imaginary, conceptual, 
hypothetical, or speculative (Lee, 2008; Sadjadpour, 2009). Since 2003 Iran has attempted 
to expand its geopolitical power and ideological influence on its neighbours, during 
Ahmadinejad‘s presidency, by using an assertive approach as follows: (i) using hardline 
rhetoric in the speech acts of Iranian political and clerical elites; (ii) supporting 
fundamentalist organisations and groups of non-state actors; (iii) challenging UN security 
council resolutions by proceeding with its nuclear programme, which led to more 
economic sanctions. As a result, relations have deteriorated between Iran and most 
countries, and its foreign policy has been viewed in a negative light (Al-Ghareib, 2005; 
AL-Sadeq, 2006; Al-Nefisy et al, 2008; Ehteshami et al, 2008).  
 
Ideologically, AL-Sader et al (2004), Al-Ghareib (2005) and Jawada (2007) argue that the 
Islamic Republic of Iran is a global religious player that sees the world as divided into a 
colonialist, exploiting West led by the US and its allies, and the others, who attempt to set 
themselves free from the Western grip. Bulent Gokay and Darrell Whitman (2004) argue 
that throughout history religion often served the politics of the nation. These policies need 
to follow a programme of action in line with government agenda, and not just promises 
and political discourses. Otherwise, promises and discourses will lose credibility and 
reliability and become merely illusions of power (Gokay et al, 2004).  
 
In essence, in the real world, Iran has been attempting to maximise both influence and soft 
power by using conventional and unconventional instruments of power, such as the pursuit 
of its nuclear programme, alongside building a large military arsenal, as well as strategic 
collaboration with non-state actors and Shiite factions. In this context, the interaction 
between ideas, interests, ambitions of hegemony, threaten perceptions, and capabilities, in 
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line with Iranian geopolitical agenda, has created a visible reality for Iran's foreign policy, 
which has had a severe impact on the regional security system and international stability. 
Details of the Iranian threats to world security are given in Appendix 11 (p. 444). 
 
8.6. The Security Dilemma as an Ongoing Process in the Middle East    
 
This section explores how the security dilemma works in post-invasion Iraq, using 
ideological and psychological paradigms. These paradigms are inter-subjective, that is, 
they are related to a process of mutual interpretation and representation of the regional 
activities. Collins (in Booth et al, 2008: 6) argues in The Security Dilemma and the End of 
the Cold War (1997: 20), and The Security Dilemmas of Southeast Asia (2000: 6-10), that 
the nature of the security dilemma and the situation of uncertainty and mutual mistrust, 
when required to choose between two equally balanced alternatives, leads to negative 
outcomes which are "unavoidable". In fact, "according to most security dilemma theorists, 
permanent insecurity between nations and states is the inescapable lot of living in a 
condition of anarchy" (Booth et al, 2008: 2).  
 
Hinnebusch et al (2002), Bilgin (2005) and Owen (2007) argue that this region is one of 
the trouble spots worldwide and has been an arena of incessant conflict, attracting global 
attention. Although the countries in this region share religion, race, culture, identity, and 
landscape, still tensions, conflicts and wars have become common features among the 
regional states. Some of these conflicts are religious, others national or ideological. For 
instance, the Arab-Israeli conflict (1948, 1956, 1967, 1973 and 1982), the Iran-Iraq war 
(1980-1988), the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (1990), the Second Gulf War (1991), the 
invasion Iraq (2003), the Hezbollah-Israel War (2006), and the conflicts and crises that 
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have taken place after the so-called the Arab Spring, in Libya, Egypt, Yemen, Syria, 
Lebanon, and Iraq, all shaped international relations and the regional security system. 
 
This thesis accepts the claim of both constructivism, which believes in the power of ideas, 
culture, identity, ideology, and social norms (the Islamic Shiite Doctrine), and offensive 
realism, which stresses increasing the maximum amount of power to reinforce the position 
of state in the system (the continuous efforts to enhance Iranian conventional and 
unconventional capabilities to support the hidden Imam Al-Mahdi who will direct the 
Shiite Muslims to rule the world). The security dilemma in the Middle East has been based 
on the sectarian threat within the Arab-Sunni states (except Syria), which comprise the 
majority in the Middle East. This threat rests on the existence of a national security 
dimension, not a political conflict or military threat, which could be negotiated and solved.  
There are mutual attempts between players (decision-makers) to understand each other‘s 
motives and intentions concerning the material power they possess. These psychological 
factors are a cornerstone of international relations, whether based on trust and cooperation 
and/or based on decisions of war and peace according to mistrust, fear and uncertainty in 
an anarchic environment. 
 
It has been widely argued that the Islamic Republic of Iran has a mixed project, combining 
a historical pride in Persia and a religious ideological fundamentalism, that directs its 
foreign policies towards attaining its grand geopolitical interests (Dake, 2010). Iran needs 
to exercise active external policies that necessitate interfering in the domestic affairs of 
target states. The consequences of that are domestic instability, regional destabilisation, 
and international tension. This thesis argues that instability is a suitable environment for 
Iran and its proxies of non-state actors, as it allows them to meddle in regional affairs to 
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expand their influence and maximise their power. Stability and peace, however, are 
contrary to the philosophy of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, that is based on the principle 
of reform, the Iranian constitution, principles and thoughts of Khomeini, methods both of 
the supreme leader Khamenei and President Ahmadinejad, and a core theory of Shiite 
Islam of the Twelver school of thought, Imam Al-Mahdi Al-Montazar (the Awaited). In 
this sense, stability not only constrains major duties and tasks for Iran's foreign policy, but 
also invalidates some articles of the Iranian constitution, such as Articles 152-154, which 
urge to continue Iran's leadership, guidance, and its fundamental role in ensuring the 
principles of the Islamic revolution, support the world's oppressed and confront all forms 
of corruption (Nia, 2011; www.irna.ir, 2014). 
 
Stability would undermine the theory of Imam Al-Mahdi, as his mission to reform the 
world through spreading justice and peace would be unnecessary. The Islamic Republic of 
Iran faces a serious challenge in a peaceful and stable environment. The Iranian political 
and constitutional institutions would likely lose their legitimacy and credibility, both 
internally and externally. The theory of Imam Al-Mahdi says that the world‘s problems of 
injustice, oppression and ignorance will be replaced by righteousness, justice, and fairness 
when he comes to power. With peace and stability there is no need for Imam Al-Mahdi, 
this means the authority of the supreme leader who acts on behalf of Imam Al-Mahdi will 
not be required. A favourable environment to the transformative power of Iran's foreign 
policy and its proxies of non-states actors, to obtain legitimacy for their activities and to 
attain their strategic geopolitical interests, is an unstable environment. 
 
Winning does not always mean gaining something at the expense of one‘s adversary. 
Winning can be defined as gaining relative to one‘s own value system: a country wins 
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when it is able to secure and maintain its social values and economic and political 
constructs. The absolute win is to limit, control, and reduce conflict, while establishing a 
strategic balance with which both sides can live and this is referred to as a variable-sum 
game (Grieco et al, 1988). In the security dilemma of the Middle East, when Iran and its 
allies declare there are no mutual interests to negotiate and no compromise for their 
objectives, the conflict in the Middle East becomes a zero-sum game, where there is one 
winner and one loser—total defeat or total victory. 
 
The argument thus far has concluded that two irreconcilable forces in the Middle East, 
which share the same geographical region but have conflicting interests, especially in post-
invasion Iraq, have reshaped the mechanism of the security dilemma in accordance with 
their polar opposite views. Each of these poles has a bloc of allies, its own political agenda 
and regional interests. The first bloc comprises most regional countries supported by the 
West, particularly the US, that support the peace process among all regional players, and 
the second bloc is Iran, Syria and non-state actors, who believe in changing the status quo, 
via imposing an ideological influence and geopolitical power on others, using asymmetric 
capabilities. Despite using material power in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and Yemen, US and 
coalition forces have not managed to eliminate the ideological element. Militant Islamist 
groups and fundamentalist organisations are able to survive, hide, renew and reproduce 
their cells no matter what material damage has been inflicted on them. 
 
One must bear in mind that, since the Islamic Revolution, especially in post-invasion Iraq, 
Iran's foreign policy has attempted to re-build massive socio-political movements in the 
region, in order to compensate for its materialistic weakness, compared to great powers 
(Barzegar, 2008; Puelings, 2010). The common efforts by the Iranian regime and its allies 
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to expand their ideological influence and geopolitical interests have caused the structure of 
the regional security system to crack (Al-Ghareib, 2005; Felter et al, 2008). Consequently, 
the security dilemma in the region will continue as it is, as long as the mutual perceptions 
of threats and interpretations of motives and intentions remain (Booth & Wheeler 2008). 
The ongoing process of the security dilemma in the Middle East is infinite. Even if Iran 
achieved its ultimate interests and goals, the regional and international reaction would be 
counter to the new status quo, and so on (Jones, 2003). 
 
8.7. Conclusion  
  
Chapter eight addressed the fourth and last research question: To what extent does the 
perception of the Iranian security threat to and by Middle Eastern states influence the 
security dilemma? The aim of this chapter was to discuss the issues regarding the 
geopolitical dynamics of the Middle East between 2003-2013, by focusing on the impact 
of the transformative power of Iran's foreign policy on the security dilemma. Above all, 
this chapter has contributed to an understand of the security dilemma as an ongoing 
process in the Middle East, in line with the interactions of domestic and regional factors, 
along with international pressures.  
 
The chapter focused on the root cause of the security dilemma in post-invasion Iraq, 
between Iran and its allies of non-state actors and Shiite factions, and Arab Sunni regimes. 
Competition for leadership of the Islamic world and geopolitical influence has become a 
key factor in deepening tensions and uncertainty between the key players. This leads to a 
backlash and reaction, and this is the mechanism, nature and scope of the security dilemma 
(Hollis et al, 1990; Hinnebusch et al, 2002; Collins, 2007; Booth et al, 2008). The situation 
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between the major regional competitors (Iran vs Saudi Arabia) drove their relationship to a 
zero-sum game (one winner and one loser-- total loss, or total victory). Therefore, tension 
is in a never-ending cycle (Axelrod, 2000; Cordesman et al, 2006; Connell et al, 2007).  
 
Why would Iran be willing to accept potential risks of further economic sanctions or 
military actions by adopting an assertive policy? From a realist perspective, self-interest is 
one of the prominent motives of foreign policy that lead to compete for power and security, 
through the pursuit of coercive power and diplomacy. In constructivism, by contrast, 
persuasive ideas, cultural values, and identities play crucial roles in foreign policy. This 
thesis concluded that both motives have served as engines in Iran's foreign policy, and 
have influenced its strategic objectives. With this in mind, this thesis stresses that Iranian 
long-term objectives are not defensive in nature, but rather the expansion of ideological 
influence and maximisation of regional preeminence. 
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Conclusion and Questions for Future Study 
 
9.1.   Introduction 
 
The chapter is divided into four sections. It starts with a summary of the chapter. Section 
two discusses the outcomes of the research. Section three assesses Iran‘s grand strategy 
and its impact on the region, alongside US policy. The discussion focuses on the role of 
religious ideology, revolutionary principles and geopolitical pragmatism. Section four 
makes recommendations and suggestions for further research. 
 
The engines that drive the core argument of this thesis are religious ideology and 
geopolitical interests, in line with the instruments of soft power for control and 
survivability. These patterns organically are associated with the three main themes of the 
security triangle: Iran's foreign policy as one of the key players with its allies, particularly 
non-state actors and Shiite factions; the US military presence in the region and its regional 
and international allies; the Middle East region as the empirical reference for examining 
interactions, competitions, challenges, and opportunities that are interconnected with Iran‘s 
behaviour and the pre-existing security dilemma.  
 
This research is a multi-disciplinary study examining the impact of the transformative 
power of Iran's foreign policy on the regional security system, in order to explore the 
geopolitical dynamics of the Middle East within the context of regional rivalries that fueled 
the security dilemma 2003-2013. The focus was on patterns of the distribution of soft 
power, competition for leadership, changing power structure and power relations. 
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Interactions between soft power and military power have played a crucial role in shaping 
the political and security landscape of the region. 
 
This thesis has argued that Iran has countered interference by big powers, particularly the 
increasing interference of the US in regional affairs, and has also defended Muslim values 
and rights. Iran has adopted a strategy of so-called offensive deterrence. It has employed 
all its unconventional instruments of power and asymmetric warfare to resist regional 
threats to its national security and to maximise its power by spreading its religious 
ideology.  
 
9.2.   Summary of the Main Findings 
 
This thesis explored Iran's behaviour and considered its impact on geopolitical dynamics, 
using international relations theories and approaches, neoclassical realism, together with 
constructivism, offensive realism and speech acts, to analyse, interpret and explain policy 
options, foreign policy behaviour and decision-making, and to understand the causal link 
between domestic policies, external relations and activities of nation-states and non-state 
actors. These theories have been used to interpret events and phenomena after the fact, to 
explore different perceptions and motivations for all players under study in their dynamic 
relationship. This thesis has tried to bridge the gap between theoretical concepts and 
security reality on the ground, concerning geopolitical dynamics, behaviour patterns of 
states, and foreign policy outcomes. 
 
The core issue of Iran's foreign policy since the Islamic Revolution has been an attempt to 
spread revolutionary thought and ideological Shiite belief. The theory of Wilayat Al-Faqih 
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was one of the approaches it has used to expand its influence regionally. This approach 
was established by Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Iranian revolution and the 
originator of the constitution, in order to impose a Revolutionary Shiite Islamic regime in 
the region. 
 
This thesis has carried out original work in a number of ways. The originality lies in the 
fact that the security studies were extended beyond a purely military focus to include roles 
and activities of non-state actors and unconventional forces, alongside ideological 
dimensions, revolutionary values and speech acts. In doing so, it provided further insight 
into the nature of the confrontation between Iran and its allies, on the one hand, and most 
of regional countries with their Western allies, on the other, in terms of distribution of 
power, competition for leadership and geopolitical interests. It has contributed to the 
understanding of the formulation and implementation of Iran's foreign policy, and to the 
interpretation of the outcomes of its transformative power on the regional security system. 
This interpretation shows interaction between variables and drivers within a geopolitical 
dimension, which paved the way for reframing the scope of the security dilemma in the 
Middle East. 
 
In this context, international relations theories are crucial for several reasons. They allow 
one to ask how and why specific events have occurred and how they are linked. The 
theories also provided analytical tools to make sense of how the world works and how 
elites, policies and actions relate to one another, by simplifying the way to identify the key 
features of related variables, drivers and factors that serve self-interests and counter 
security threats. 
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In order to gain a better understanding of Iran's motivation to be the dominant state in the 
Gulf region and an indispensable regional power in the broader Middle East, on the one 
hand, and to counter security threats on the other hand, it was necessary to address the 
domestic factors, to demonstrate their influence on external affairs. Neoclassical realism 
and constructivism make this possible through the attempt to connect domestic politics 
with foreign interests and actions abroad. These theories provide alternative variables to 
examine a number of the central themes in international relations theory. These include the 
relationship between state identity and self-interest, the balance of power, an elaboration of 
power, and the prospects for change in international politics. 
 
Power is a central theoretical element for both neorealist and constructivist approaches to 
international relations theory, but their conceptions of power are different. Constructivism 
argues that ideas are a form of power. Hence, power is more than brute force, it is material 
and ideological. Offensive realists argue that states must always endeavour to maximise 
their material power, not just for survival, but to be the most powerful in the system. 
However, defensive realism focuses on survival within an anarchic environment (Collins, 
2007).  
 
The findings presented in this thesis suggest that Iranian foreign policy is the result of a 
complex mixture of different religious drivers: ideologies, pan-Islamism and revolutionary 
Shiism. Intervening variables, regime identity, nationalism and decision-makers, play a 
prominent role in power calculations in Iran's political system. This domestic role has been 
linked with Iran's foreign policy to achieve its geopolitical interests and to counter threats. 
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Speech acts in Iran's foreign policy are derived from a leitmotif in the Iranian constitution 
on justice and resistance through supporting oppressed and fighting the world's tyrants. 
The thesis uses the idea of speech acts as a helpful means to demonstrate how identity is 
constructed. This approach enables us to explain the sets of ideas and values embedded in 
Iranian identity. A combination of speech acts and a constructivist approach has been used 
to study Iran‘s foreign policy. Political and clerical discourses originate from Islamic 
political thought, Shiite ideology, the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, speeches 
of Imam Khomeini and its historical background. Equally importantly, Western democratic 
constitutions are based on the principles of freedom, liberty and human rights, principles 
guiding their domestic affairs and foreign policies. 
              
Ideological and pragmatic approaches can be found in Iranian foreign policy. Ambitious 
geopolitical moves, such as the nuclear programme, anti-imperialism, or extensive 
geopolitical involvement in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, have been conducted within 
the framework of self-interest, and its components of Islamic internationalism (religious 
ideology) and foreign policy (geopolitics). Arguably, in each period of Iran's presidency 
and according to the culture and identity of the ruling elites, specific layers of religious 
ideology were emphasised. However, Iranian national identity along with religious 
ideology remains within the framework of the consolidated guidelines of the supreme 
leader, alongside the state's foreign policy. 
 
When it comes to distribution of power, the neorealist account would be that the Islamic 
Republic of Iran was an objective threat to its neighbours and Western interests. A 
constructivist account would be that a state's identity, such as Iran's, is rooted in domestic 
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sociocultural milieus. Regime identity produces understandings of oneself and others (in 
this case, Shiite allies) based on religious ideology and geopolitical strategic interests. 
 
Iran is seen by the US and other Western states as a theocratic regime connected to 
terrorism, while the US perceives itself as the protector of a particular set of values, both at 
home and abroad. At the same time, Iran and its allies perceive the US military presence in 
the region as a threat to their national security and to the regional security system. On this 
basis, perceptions and interactions between parties determine foreign policy. 
 
The thesis also makes a substantial contribution to the recently emerging literature about 
regional security studies in the Middle East and establishes new avenues for research 
concerning causal links between geopolitics and religious ideology. In other words, the 
thesis re-assesses religious ideology as soft power. Although it is not tangible, it is one of 
the greatest instruments of power for the Islamic Republic of Iran. Asymmetric warfare, as 
one of its essential instruments of power, has played a crucial role in countering the US 
military presence in Afghanistan and in Iraq.  
 
This thesis has endeavoured to bridge the gap between the security dilemma and Iran‘s 
foreign policy in literature. It explained how and why perceptions of the security dilemma 
were affected by the removal of Saddam's regime, shifting from regional military threats to 
domestic and regional security threats, leading to further instability. 
 
This thesis combined positivist and post-positivist theories, asking what is power, why and 
how power is exercised, and how it is reproduced. The thesis distinguished between facts 
and normative judgements, or values. 
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The research relied on document analysis, a literature review, participant narratives and 
journals, and a focus group. 
 
9.3.   Thesis Revisited 
 
This thesis has provided a deeper understanding of the security dilemma in the Middle East 
in the period 2003-2013. Since 2003, the geopolitical dynamics have influenced Iran‘s 
decision makers. Iran has faced diverse threats and the Iranian regime has responded by 
exporting revolutionary Islamic thought, imposing the Shiite doctrine on its neighbours, 
supporting resistance movements and engaging in several regional issues through its 
proxies, using the legitimacy of Islam (Abu Shakra, 2014). The thesis explored the links 
between religious ideology, historical relations, challenges, beliefs, national identity, 
discourses and practices that guide Iran's foreign policy, and the geopolitical dynamics that 
contributed to the destabilisation of the region. 
 
9.3.1. Assessment of the Grand Strategy of Iranian Foreign Policy 
 
Some believe that Tehran will now enter the international system as a responsible actor, 
especially after signing a historic nuclear deal with the P5+1; however, such optimism 
ignores the fact that Iran's current government still bears the imprint of a long imperial 
history and a longstanding Persian revolutionary and ideological approach. It still has 
grand strategic ambitions, derived from the political thought of Ayatollah Khomeini, for 
regional domination.  
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After the Iran – Iraq war, Iran realised that conventional military doctrine would no longer 
suffice. Ali Khamenei and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps developed asymmetric 
warfare tactics aimed at building Iranian influence through sectarian and political alliances. 
Hence, Iran played the role of the guardian of the broader Shiite sect in countries such as 
Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen and Bahrain. Iran has rebuilt networks of Shiite militias such 
as Lebanese Hezbollah, Yemen's Houthis and Iraq's Badr Corps and Al-Mahdi Army, and 
developed strong ties with Sunni groups, such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the Gaza 
Strip.  
 
Recently, given the political landscape in the Middle East and events on the ground, Iran 
has become a rising power and is a key regional and international player. Since 2003, the 
Islamic Republic of Iran has exercised the de facto control of several major Arab countries, 
such as Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen (Cagaptay et al, 2015; www.mubasher.aljazeera. 
net, 2015).  
 
Ali Akbar Velayati, senior advisor to the Leader of the Islamic Revolution and director of 
the Strategic Research Center at the Expediency Council, said during a speech at a national 
conference on the role of research on legislation, that the Iranian sphere of influence 
expands from Lebanon to Yemen. Velayati stated on 15 December 2014, "Our current 
power was not imaginable for anybody in the world, because Iran has Yemen to Lebanon 
under its influence" (www.tehrantimes.com/images/pdfs/12158.pdf, 2014; www.yemeress. 
com, 2014). The Supreme National Security Council in Iran, in coordination with National 
Council of Resistance, issued a confidential report regarding the latest regional 
developments. This report was issued after a visit by Ali Shamkhani, Secretary of the 
Supreme Council of the Iranian National Security to Syria on 30 September 2014. The 
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report stresses the need to defend Bashar al-Assad's regime and to take all necessary steps 
to complete the construction of the Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen axis, in order to 
encircle the rest of the Arab countries (Abu Hilal, 2014; https://www.watan. com/ 
reports/2157, 2014).  
 
Iranian influence and its geopolitical interests in the Middle East usually do not announce 
in the public domain; however, Ali Shirazi, the representative of the supreme leader Ali 
Khamenei in the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, acknowledged 
directly that "the Islamic republic directly supports the Houthis in Yemen, Hezbollah in 
Lebanon, the popular forces in Syria and Iraq ... officials in the country have reiterated this 
many times" (www.mubasher.aljazeera.net, 2015). (www.iranprimer.usip.org, 2015). 
General Mohammad Bagherzadeh, a senior military official in the Islamic Revolutionary 
Guard Corps, boasted that the regime's borders now extend from Yemen to the 
Mediterranean. He added, "Arab leaders cannot imagine how far Iran can reach, because 
Iran has a motivating influence in Islamic nations and the Islamic world" (www.ncr-
iran.org, 2015). Such Iranian expansion and the activities of its proxies in the region have 
paved the way to escalate the violence, especially the sectarian violence between Sunni 
factions and Shiite factions in Lebanon, Syria and especially in Iraq (Hanlon et al, 2007; 
Hanlon et al, 2008; Hanlon et al, 2010; Hanlon et al, 2011; Hanlon et al, 2013; Crawford, 
2013).  
 
Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut and Sana‘a are now under Iranian influence and part of the 
Shiite axis (www.mubasher.aljazeera.net, 2015). As a consequence, the Gulf countries may 
be trapped inside a circle of Iranian influence (www.watan.com/reports/2157, 2014). Such 
geopolitical dynamics create a situation where the actions of one state trying to increase its 
    
319 
 
security or to maximise its power cause a reaction in a second, which leads to the 
decreased security of the first, and vice versa. In this context, the military operations of the 
Arab coalition against Al-Huthies in Yemen, Iran's proxies, on 26 March 2015, were a 
clear example of a reaction to Iran‘s foreign policy.  
 
9.3.2.   Assessment of the Mechanism of the Security Dilemma  
 
Freedman (1998:48) argues that "international security therefore deals with the most 
fundamental questions of war and peace and, consequently, with the highest 
responsibilities of government". However, between war and peace, there is a situation of 
political conflicts and security tensions between major players who attempt to avoid 
military confrontation. Iran's foreign policy conducts a non-zero sum game (both sides 
have to win), when it deals with the US administration, because direct confrontation by 
conventional military power is unequal and benefits the US. Iran and its ideological 
proxies launched asymmetric warfare and terrorist attacks against US military troops in the 
region, in order to combat Western influence and military power, which threaten Iran. No 
doubt, non-state actors need a suitable environment to conduct their operations. Roach et al 
(2005) argue that an active environment can be logistically or tactically favourable for the 
terrorist organisations and fundamentalist groups, in terms of escape versus pursuits and 
restrictions versus maneuvers. A favourable environment for non-state actors, such as a 
power vacuum and instability, provides justification for its behaviour and legitimacy for its 
activities.  
 
There is a zero-sum game (one winner and one loser, total loss or total victory) towards 
neighbouring states of Iran, especially the Arab Sunni states. Al-Kulayni (2001) and AL-
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Sader et al (2004) refer to the importance of ideological and religious factors, which have 
caused conflict among Islamic regimes, within the framework of competition about 
leadership of the Islamic world, as discussed in chapter two. In this context, the Islamic 
Republic of Iran has no choice but to win the leadership spiritually and geopolitically. 
Thus, others must lose. 
 
After the so-called Arab Spring, Iran has enjoyed relative internal stability, compared to 
Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, the Gulf states, Yemen, Egypt and Libya. This relative internal 
stability facilitates Iran's foreign policy, as Tehran can decide when, where and how to 
proceed and advance its goals. 
 
Jackson et al (2007: 71) argue, "power is understood to be not only a fact of political life, 
but also a matter of political responsibility". The concepts of power and responsibility 
cannot be separated. Iran's actions through its foreign policy and its impact on the regional 
security system, on the one hand, and the counteractions against these policies by 
neighbouring countries and the great powers, particularly the US, to maintain the balance 
of power and their regional interests, on the other, are not merely an empirical statement 
about the way regional politics are expected to operate. For Iran it is a legitimate goal 
based on the importance of ideological and religious factors and the responsibility of the 
clerical and political leadership "to support the just struggle of the vulnerable against 
tyrants around the world" (article 154 of the Iranian constitution, Mahmoud Al-Qalam in 
AL-Suwaidi, 2005: 190); others also have a responsibility to defend people‘s right to 
choose a way of living and their national security, as well as their own grand interests.  
 
 
    
321 
 
9.4. Recommendations and Suggestions for Further Research   
 
Based on the findings of this thesis, and taking its limitations into account, subsequent 
follow-up work seems substantial and promising, and the following three research topics 
are recommended. 
 
1.  Iranian-Turkish Relations: Mutual Cooperation and Security Concerns 
 
Although Tehran and Ankara have managed to cooperate in several spheres, especially in 
trade and tourism, they still compete for regional influence. There is a limit as to how 
much Turkish-Iranian relations can deteriorate, as well as to how much they can improve. 
Turkey and Iran have different security concerns and requirements. Topping the list are the 
Syrian crisis, the Kurdish issue, the Islamic State, Syrian refugees, and border security. 
Further research is needed to explore Iranian-Turkish relations. 
 
2. The New Equation in the Middle Eastern Security Triangle: US and Iran    
                  vs the Islamic State (IS) 
 
A shift in US-Iranian relations has recently occurred, because of two issues: the nuclear 
issue and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (Mohseni, 2014). Indeed, warning bells may 
sound in Sunni-dominated countries such as Jordan, Egypt, the Gulf states and Turkey, due 
to the possibility of changing the rules of the regional equation. The US and Iran find 
themselves on the same side in countering IS in Iraq and Syria, which may have 
implications for nuclear talks (Al-Na'ami, 2015). Therefore, the equation in power 
relations is under question.  
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3. Beyond the regional security perspective: Iranian nuclear capabilities and 
missile programmes 
 
Iranian nuclear capabilities and missile programmes are a crucial issue that needs a 
comprehensive analysis, because the threat will not be limited to the Middle East region, 
but will go further. The nuclear deal with Iran alongside sanction relief may allow the 
Iranian regime to practise its regional and international roles freely as a real regional power 
with advanced ballistic missile programmes. Iran's foreign policy will influence any 
political and security arrangements and may impose its geopolitical agenda regionally and 
internationally. Groves (2012) noted that David Cameron, the British Prime Minister, on 
06 March 2012, warned members of parliament that Iran is developing nuclear missiles 
that were potentially a direct threat to the United Kingdom, because they have capabilities 
to hit London. Tehran is attempting to develop intercontinental missiles that may trigger a 
nuclear arms race in the region. This warning came after the cabinet was given a secret 
briefing by MI6 chief, Sir John Sawers, and by the government's national security adviser, 
Sir Kim Darroch, on the threat posed by Iran.  
 
Middle East security is very much in a state of flux and, in light of current developments 
with regards to Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and Libya, there are no certainties 
concerning the future political structure. What is certain is that the Islamic Republic of Iran 
will maintain its religious ideology and revolutionary approach, as well as its ambitions. It 
will continue to pursue its nuclear activities and use asymmetric warfare, essential to its 
geopolitical interests. Ali Yonsei, who served as intelligence minister in the reformist 
government of President Mohammad Khatami, spoke at a forum about "the Iranian 
identity" in Tehran, on 08 March 2015, where he said: 
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―Iran today has become an empire as it was throughout history and its capital is 
Baghdad now, which is our civilisation and our culture and identity today as in the 
past. (…) All Middle Eastern region belongs to Iran (…) We will defend all the 
peoples of the region, because we consider them as part of Iran. (…) Islamic 
extremism, disbelief, atheism, neo-ottomanism, the Wahhabis, the West, and 
Zionism will be repulsed by Iran‖ 
 
                     (Yonsei, 2015:1).  
 
In this context, Yonsei refers to the Persian Sassanid's Empire before Islam, which 
occupied Iraq and made Ctesiphon its capital. His speech reflects Iran's objective to 
exercise its soft power across the Middle East, and its efforts to change the current status 
quo geopolitically and demographically. This is the transformative power of Iran's foreign 
policy in post-2003 Iraq.  
 
Iran's foreign policy was, and still is, driven by plans of geopolitical expansion in parallel 
with an ideological basis for action. Other actors, such as the US, the Gulf states and Iraq, 
are also involved in the geopolitical dynamics. Although Iran's ultimate goals are similar to 
those of other actors, in terms of expanding its control over the region, Iran has its own 
insecurities and threats to which it must respond, using all available means. 
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Appendix 1 
 
List of Discussed Issues at Focus Group 
 
 
 
No. Background information Statement 
 
 
 
1. 
 
The Middle East region is one of the most trouble 
spots worldwide. 
 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
 
 
Disagree 
 
 
 
 
Neutral 
 
 
 
 
Agree 
 
 
 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
Comments: 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
 
 
 
 
2. 
 
The image of the Islamic Republic of Iran has 
damaged badly from most of states both West and 
East. 
 
 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
 
 
Disagree 
 
 
 
 
Neutral 
 
 
 
 
Agree 
 
 
 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
Comments: 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                    
 
 
 
3. 
 
The role of foreign actors and implications on the 
Middle Eastern balance of power in the post 2003.  
 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
 
 
Disagree 
 
 
 
 
Neutral 
 
 
 
 
Agree 
 
 
 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
Comments: 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
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4. 
 
Do religions and beliefs (Christian values and Islamic 
values) guide policies or justify foreign policy? 
 
 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
 
 
 
Disagree 
 
 
 
 
 
Neutral 
 
 
 
 
 
Agree 
 
 
 
 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
Comments: 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
       
 
 
 
 
5. 
 
Do you think speech acts are used by applying ideas 
and beliefs to make things happen in relity? 
 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
 
 
Disagree 
 
 
 
 
Neutral 
 
 
 
 
Agree 
 
 
 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
Comments: 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. 
 
The most significant factors affect the security 
dilemma in the Middle East since 2003 or post–
invasion Iraq. 
 
 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
 
 
 
Disagree 
 
 
 
 
 
Neutral 
 
 
 
 
 
Agree 
 
 
 
 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
Comments: 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
       
 
Iran’s Foreign Policy Behaviour and the U.S. perception 
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7. 
The primary strategic goals of Iran‟s Foreign Policy 
in the Middle East. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
Disagree 
 
 
Neutral 
 
 
Agree 
 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
Comments: 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
 
 
 
8. 
 
The Scope of Transformative Power of Iran‟s Foreign 
Policy in post – Invasion Iraq in 2003.  
 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
 
 
Disagree 
 
 
 
 
Neutral 
 
 
 
 
Agree 
 
 
 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
Comments: 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
 
 
 
 
9. 
 
What is your general perception on the issues of faith 
in the shadow of U.S. - Iran‟s foreign policy? 
 
 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
 
 
 
Disagree 
 
 
 
 
 
Neutral 
 
 
 
 
 
Agree 
 
 
 
 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
Comments: 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
       
 
 
 
 
10. 
 
How important and influential is the Foreign Policy 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Middle East? 
 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
 
 
Disagree 
 
 
 
 
Neutral 
 
 
 
 
Agree 
 
 
 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
Comments: 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
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……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
 
 
 
 
11. 
 
The primary strategic goals for Iran‟s Foreign Policy 
in the Middle East are to maximize its geopolitical 
power and expands its ideological influence. 
 
 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
 
 
 
Disagree 
 
 
 
 
 
Neutral 
 
 
 
 
 
Agree 
 
 
 
 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
Comments: 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
 
 
 
 
12. 
 
What system does Iran use to increase its power to 
ensure its security requirements are met in controlling 
internal and external situations? 
 
 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
 
 
 
Disagree 
 
 
 
 
 
Neutral 
 
 
 
 
 
Agree 
 
 
 
 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
Comments: 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
       
 
 
 
 
13. 
 
Regional Ascendance of Iran as a reality in the 
shadow of Shiite Crescent. 
 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
 
 
Disagree 
 
 
 
 
Neutral 
 
 
 
 
Agree 
 
 
 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
Comments: 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
  
The main challenges that the international system 
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14. 
confronts today when it comes to Iran‟s security and 
Foreign Policy are: nuclear programme, hard-line of 
speech acts and anti-Israeli rhetoric, anti-peace 
process, regional interventions and support for 
terrorism. 
 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
 
Disagree 
 
 
 
Neutral 
 
 
 
Agree 
 
 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
Comments: 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
 
 
 
15. 
 
What are the paradoxes of Iran‟s Foreign Policy? 
 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
 
 
Disagree 
 
 
 
 
Neutral 
 
 
 
 
Agree 
 
 
 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
Comments: 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
 
 
 
16. 
 
How does the Iran‟s Foreign Policy implement its 
grant strategic goals and interest in the region? 
 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
 
 
Disagree 
 
 
 
 
Neutral 
 
 
 
 
Agree 
 
 
 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
Comments: 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
 
 
 
17. 
 
Why does Iran‟s Foreign Policy behave the way it 
does? 
 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
 
 
Disagree 
 
 
 
 
Neutral 
 
 
 
 
Agree 
 
 
 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
Comments:  ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
                     …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                     …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                     …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                     …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                     ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….  
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18. 
 
To what extent do you think the Islamic Republic of 
Iran has reshaped the security dilemma in post–
invasion Iraq during the period 2003 – 2013? 
 
 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
 
 
Disagree 
 
 
 
 
Neutral 
 
 
 
 
Agree 
 
 
 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
Comments: 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
            
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
 
The nature of the regional security environment and the patterns of destabilization 
 
 
 
 
19. 
 
Can you tell me about your perception towards 
George W. Bush and some of his foreign policies? 
 
 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
 
 
 
Disagree 
 
 
 
 
 
Neutral 
 
 
 
 
 
Agree 
 
 
 
 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
Comments: 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
       
 
 
 
 
20. 
 
The main factors contribute to the destabilised 
condition in the Middle East since 2003. 
 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
 
 
Disagree 
 
 
 
 
Neutral 
 
 
 
 
Agree 
 
 
 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
Comments: 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
            
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
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21. 
 
Do you think George W. Bush was motivated by his 
personal religious conviction in conducting foreign 
policies, for example, the Faith Based Initiative? 
 
 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
 
 
 
Disagree 
 
 
 
 
 
Neutral 
 
 
 
 
 
Agree 
 
 
 
 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
Comments: 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
22. 
 
The vacuum in balance of power in post–Iraq 2003 
has shifted the balance of security power in Iran‟s 
favour provided the opportunity for Iran‟s Foreign 
Policy to maximize its power through intervention in 
the domestic affairs of its neighbouring countries via 
its proxies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Disagree 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Neutral 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Agree 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
Comments: 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
            
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23. 
 
What do you think about U.S. foreign policy towards 
the following issues: 
- International Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Assistance. 
- International Religious Freedom. 
- War on Terror. 
- Israel and Middle East policies. 
 
 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
 
 
 
Disagree 
 
 
 
 
 
Neutral 
 
 
 
 
 
Agree 
 
 
 
 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
Comments: 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
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……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
       
 
 
 
 
24. 
 
Belief + Desire + Capability = Action which likely 
lead to deterioration of regional stability. 
 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
 
 
Disagree 
 
 
 
 
Neutral 
 
 
 
 
Agree 
 
 
 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
Comments: 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
25. 
 
The influence of non–state actors such as militant 
Lebanese Hezbollah, Al-Mahdi Army in Iraq, Al-
Houthi rebellion in Yemen and Hamas in Gaza Strip 
upon the security situation in the region and beyond. 
 
 
 
 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
 
 
 
 
Disagree 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Neutral 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Agree 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
Comments: 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
            
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
26. 
 
Regional and international concerns of 
unconventional forces of non–state actors who have 
ideological doctrine and geopolitical agenda which 
increased particularly the Islamic resistance units. 
 
 
 
 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
 
 
 
 
Disagree 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Neutral 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Agree 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
Comments: 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
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……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
            
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
27. 
 
These unconventional forces could not carry out their 
roles and activities in order to attain their political 
agenda without the compliance of one or more nation 
– states.  
 
 
 
 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
 
 
 
 
Disagree 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Neutral 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Agree 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
Comments: 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
            
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
The strategic interests between Iran and non-state actors in the region   
 
 
 
 
 
28. 
 
Nature and scope of the coordination between Iran‟s 
Foreign Policy and the fundamentalist organisations 
and parties in the Middle East and what are the 
interests that bind them? 
 
 
 
 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
 
 
 
 
Disagree 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Neutral 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Agree 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
Comments: 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
             
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
 
            
 
 
 
29. 
 
The relationship, if any, between Iran‟s Foreign 
Policy and destabilised condition in the Middle East. 
 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
 
 
Disagree 
 
 
 
 
Neutral 
 
 
 
 
Agree 
 
 
 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
Comments: 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
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……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
            
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
30. 
 
The transformative power of Iran‟s Foreign Policy 
alongside its proxies has led into more deterioration 
of political reality and security structure for the 
Middle East. 
 
 
 
 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
 
 
 
 
Disagree 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Neutral 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Agree 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
Comments: 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
            
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
 
Final questions 
 
 
31.       
 
Is there anything else you would like to add that you believe is important to explain Iran‟s 
Foreign Policy and the patterns of destabilization in the Middle East that I have not been 
covered in this discussion? 
 
 
Comments: …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
                   ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
             ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
                   ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
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Appendix 2 
 
In the Name of Allah, the Magnificent, the Merciful 
The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
Last amended in 1989 
Constitution Review Council 
 
نيحشلا ِيوح َّشلا الله ِنِست 
 ِظِسقلِات ُساٌَّلا َمَُْقِيل َىاَزيِولاّ َبارِکلا ُُنَِعَه َاٌلزًَأ َّ  َِد ٌَِّيثلات َاٌَلُسُس َاٌلَسَسأ َذَقل... 
“We sent aforetime Our Messengers with clear signs, and we sent down with them the 
Book and the Balance that mankind may uphold justice....” (57: 25) 
 
Preamble 
 
Chapter 1 (General Principle) 
Chapter 2 (The Country`s official Language, Script, Calendar and Flag) 
Chapter 3 (The Rights of People) 
Chapter 4 (The Economy and Finance) 
Chapter 5 (National Sovereignty and Powers Derived from it) 
Chapter 6 (The Legislature) 
Chapter 7 (The Councils) 
Chapter 8 (The Leader or the Leadership Council) 
Chapter 9 (The Executive) 
Chapter 10 (Foreign Policy) 
Chapter 11 (The Judiciary) 
Chapter 12 (Radio and Television) 
Chapter 13 (The Supreme Council of National Security) 
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Chapter 14 (Revision of the Constitution) 
 
Preamble 
The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran sets forth the cultural, social, political, and 
economic institutions of the Iranian society, on the basis of Islamic principles and norms, 
which represent the earnest aspiration of the Islamic Ummah. This principal aspiration was 
defined by the very nature of the great Islamic Revolution of Iran and the course of 
struggle of the Muslim masses from its early stage to final victory, as expressed in the 
decisive and forceful slogans of all segments of the society, and now, at the dawn of this 
great victory, our nation seeks its realization wholeheartedly. The very distinctive 
characteristic of this revolution, as compared with other movements taken place in Iran 
during the past century, is its ideological and Islamic nature. Having gone through the 
Constitutional Movement against despotism and anti-colonial movement relating to the 
Nationalization of Oil Industry, Muslim people of Iran learned from this costly experience 
that the main reason for the failure of these movements can be clearly attributed to their 
lack of an ideological basis. Although the Islamic line of thought and the leadership of 
militant religious leaders played a major role in these movements in recent history, 
nonetheless, the struggles waged in the course of these movements floundered due to 
departure from the genuine Islamic positions. It was at this juncture that under the 
leadership of the eminent marji„taqlīd (juristic authority), Āyatullãh al-„Uîmã Imam 
Khumayni, the awakened conscience of the nation realized the need for pursuing an 
authentic Islamic ideological course in its struggles. This time, the militant „ulamã‟ 
(clergy) of the country, who, in conjunction with committed intellectuals and writers, had 
always been in the vanguard of popular movements, found new impetus through his 
leadership. (The birth of this movement of the Iranian people is set at 1382, lunar year) 
corresponding to 1341 H. Sh. (solar Islamic calendar) or 1962. 
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The Dawn of the Movement  
The U.S. conspiracy known as the “White Revolution”, intended to stabilize the 
foundations of despotic rule and reinforce political, cultural, and economic dependence of 
Iran on world imperialism, met with the devastating protest of Imam Khumayni, who 
initiated a widespread movement of the people culminating in the momentous revolution, 
marked with much bloodshed, of the Muslim Ummah in the month of Khurdad 1342 H. Sh. 
(June 1963). This revolution, which in reality marked the birth of this majestic and 
widespread uprising, confirmed the axial role of Imam Khumayni as Islamic leader. The 
firm bond between the Imam and the people endured despite his exile from Iran resulting 
from his protest against the humiliating law of Capitulation (which provided legal 
immunity for American advisers), and the Muslim nation, particularly committed 
intellectuals and militant „ulamã‟, continued their struggle in the face of banishment, 
imprisonment, torture and even execution. Throughout this time the conscious and 
responsible segment of society enlightened the people from the strongholds of mosques, 
the centres of religious teachings, and universities. Drawing inspiration from the 
revolutionary and fertile teachings of Islam, they led an unrelenting and conclusive 
struggle to raise the level of ideological awareness and revolutionary consciousness of the 
Muslim people. The despotic regime, which had begun the suppression of the Islamic 
movement with barbaric attacks on the Feydiyyah Theological School, Tehran University, 
and all other active centres of revolution, in an effort to evade the revolutionary anger of 
the people, resorted to the most savage and brutal measures. In these circumstances, 
execution by firing squads, medieval torture, and long-term imprisonment were the price 
our Muslim Ummah paid, marking its resolve to continue the struggle. The Islamic 
Revolution of Iran was sustained by the blood of hundreds of young men and women of 
faith who raised their cries of “Allãhu akbar” (God is the Greatest) at daybreak in 
337 
 
execution yards, or when they were gunned down by the enemy in the streets and 
marketplaces. Meanwhile, the regular declarations and messages of the Imam, issued on 
various occasions, extended and deepened the consciousness and determination of the 
Muslim nation. 
 
Islamic Government  
The idea of Islamic government based upon wilãyat al-faqīh (rule of the jurist), as 
presented by Imam Khumayni at the height of the period of repression by the despotic 
regime, was path breaking for a genuine struggle based on Islamic teachings. It produced a 
new well-defined and consistent motive for the Muslim people, giving a new impetus to 
the struggle of militant and committed Muslims both within the country and abroad. The 
movement continued on this course until, finally, popular discontent and intense public 
rage, caused by the mounting repression at home, as well as by the exposure of the regime 
by the „ulamã‟ and militant students and the reflection of the struggle at the international 
level, shook the foundations of the regime violently. The regime and its sponsors were 
compelled to tone down the repression and to “liberalize” the political atmosphere of the 
country. This, they imagined, will serve as a safety valve which would prevent their 
eventual downfall. But the people, aroused, conscious, and resolute under the decisive and 
unfaltering leadership of the Imam, embarked on a triumphant, unified, comprehensive, 
and countrywide uprising. 
 
The Popular Outrage  
The publication by the ruling regime of an outrageous article on 15 Day, 1356 (January 7, 
1978) meant to malign the sanctity of the „ulamã‟, in particular Imam Khumayni, 
accelerated the revolutionary movement and caused an outburst of popular outrage across 
the country. The regime attempted to quell the eruption of the people‟s anger, by silencing 
338 
 
the protest and uprising with bloodshed, but this only quickened the pace of the Revolution. 
The seventh-day and fortieth-day commemorations of the martyrs of the Revolution like a 
series of steady heartbeats added greater vitality, intensity, fervor and solidarity to this 
movement all over the country. In the course of this popular movement, the employees of 
all government establishments took an active part in the effort to overthrow the tyrannical 
regime, by calling a general strike and participating in street demonstrations. The 
widespread solidarity of men and women of all segments of society and of all political and 
religious persuasions played a significant role in the struggle. The women, especially, 
participated in large numbers and were actively involved in a most conspicuous manner at 
all stages of this great struggle. The common sight of mothers with infants in their arms 
rushing towards the scene of battle and in front of the barrels of machine-guns, indicated 
the essential and decisive role played in the struggle, by this major segment of society. 
 
The Price the Nation Paid  
After a little more than a year of continuous and unrelenting struggle, the nascent 
Revolution sustained by the blood of more than 60,000 martyrs as well as 100,000 
wounded and disabled not to mention billions of tumans (Iranian currency) of damage to 
property came to bear fruit amidst cries of “Independence! Freedom! Islamic government!” 
This great movement, which triumphed through reliance on faith, unity, and the 
decisiveness of its leadership at every critical and sensitive juncture, as well as on the self-
sacrificing spirit of the people, succeeded in upsetting all the calculations of imperialism 
and destroyed all its nexuses and institutions, thereby opening a new chapter in the history 
of all-embracing popular revolutions of the world. Bahman 21 and 22, 1357 H. Sh. 
(February 12 and 13, 1979) witnessed the collapse of the monarchical regime and abolition 
of domestic tyranny and foreign domination based on it. This great victory proved to be the 
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rebirth of Islamic government, a long-cherished desire of the Muslim people, and brought 
with it the glad tidings of final victory. In the referendum on the Islamic Republic, the 
Iranian people, unanimously and along with the marãji„ al-taqlīd of Islam and the 
leadership, declared their final and firm decision to bring about a new political order, an 
Islamic Republic, by a 98.2% majority vote. Now the Constitution of the Islamic Republic 
of Iran, setting forth as it does the society‟s political, social, cultural, and economic 
institutions and their interrelationships, must now pave the way for the consolidation of the 
foundations of Islamic government and propound a plan for a new system of government 
to be established upon the ruins of the previous tãghũtī [i.e. anti-God, profane, tyrannical] 
order. 
 
The form of Government in Islam  
In the view of Islam, government does not derive from the interests of a class, nor does it 
cater to the domination of an individual or group. It represents, rather, the crystallization of 
the political ideal of a people sharing a common faith and outlook, organized in order to 
pave the way, in the process of its intellectual and ideological development, for movement 
towards the ultimate goal the movement towards God. In the course of its revolutionary 
developments, our nation has cleansed itself of the dirt and impurities accumulated during 
the tãghũtī past and purged itself of foreign ideological influences, thus returning to the 
authentic intellectual standpoints and world view of Islam. It now intends to establish an 
ideal and model society based upon Islamic norms. The mission of the Constitution is to 
realize the ideological objectives of the movement and to create conditions conducive to 
the development of Man, in accordance with the sublime and universal values of Islam. 
With due attention to the Islamic content of the Iranian Revolution, as a movement aimed 
at the triumph of all the mustaè„afīn (oppressed) over the mustakbirīn (oppressors), the 
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Constitution provides the necessary basis for ensuring the continuity of the Revolution, at 
home and abroad. In the development of international relations in particular, the 
Constitution tries, with other Islamic and popular movements, to prepare the way for the 
formation of a single world community [in accordance with the Qur‟ãnic verse]: 
 
( ِىُُّذثعَاف نُکُّتَس َّ  ًجِذِحاّ ًَ َُّها نُُکر َُّها ٍِ ِزُ ىإ) 
(This community of yours is one community, and I am your Lord, so worship me, [21:92]) 
and to sustain the continuity of the struggle for the liberation of all deprived and oppressed 
peoples throughout the world. With due attention to the essential character or this great 
movement, the Constitution guarantees the rejection of all forms of intellectual and social 
tyranny and economic monopoly, and aims to entrust the destinies of the people to the 
people themselves in order to break completely with the system of despotism. [This is in 
accordance with the Qur‟ãnic verse]: 
 
(نِِ َيلَع َدًاک يرَّلأ للاغلأاّ ُن َشصإ ُنٌَِع ُعََضي َّ ) 
(He removes from them their burdens and the fetters that were upon them. [7:157]) in 
creating the political infrastructures and institutions which make the foundation of society 
on the basis of an ideological outlook, the righteous (sãlihīn) assume the responsibility of 
governing and administering the country [in accordance with the Qur‟ãnic verse] 
 
( َىُِْحلا َّصلا َیِداثِع اُِثَِشي َضَسلأا َّىإ) 
(Verily, my righteous servants shall inherit the earth. [21:105]) Legislation, which sets 
forth regulations for the administration of society, revolves around the Qur‟ãn and Sunnah. 
Accordingly, the exercise of close and earnest supervision by just, pious, and just scholars 
of Islam (al fugahã‟ ul-„Adil) is an absolute necessity. And as the purpose of government is 
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to foster the development of the human being in its movement towards a Divine order [in 
accordance with the Qur‟ãnic phrase]: 
 
( ُشيِصَولا الله َیلإ َّ ) 
(And toward God is the journeying, [3:28]) so as to bring about conditions favorable for 
the expression and blossoming of the human being‟s innate potential for manifesting the 
divine dimensions of Man, [in accordance with the injunction of the Prophet], 
 
(Mould yourselves according to the Divine morality, [Hadiiíth]) This goal cannot be 
achieved without the active and broad participation of all segments of society in the 
process of social transformation. With attention to this aspect, the Constitution provides 
the ground for such participation by all members of society at all stages of the political 
decision-making process, on which the destiny of the country depends, so that in the 
course of man‟s development towards perfection, each individual is himself involved in 
and responsible for the growth, advancement, and leadership of society. This is precisely 
the realization of the government of the mustad‟afin upon the earth [in accordance with the 
Qur‟ãnic verse]: 
(  ِضسلأا ِیف اْفِعُضرسا َييِزَّلا َیلَع َّيَُوً َىا ُذيُِشً َّ َيِيثِساْلا ُُنَِلَعجًَ َّ  ًح َّوَئأ ُنَِلَعَجً َّ ) 
(And we wish to show favor to those who have been oppressed upon the earth, and to 
make them leaders and to make them the inheritors. [28:5]) 
  
The Wilâyah of the Just Faqîh  
In keeping with [the Islamic principle of] governance (wilãyat al-amr) and the perpetual 
necessity of leadership (imãmah), the Constitution provides for the establishment of 
leadership by a qualified faqíh, recognized as Leader by the people. [This is in accordance 
with the hadíth]: 
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(  َه َِ ِهاشَح َّ  َِ ِللاَح یلَع ِءاٌَُهلأا ِللهات ءاَولُعلا َِذِيت ِسُُْهلأا يساج ) 
(The direction of [public] affairs is in the hands of those who are learned concerning God 
and are trustworthy in matters pertaining to what He has made lawful and unlawful. 
[Tuhaf ul-„ugũl, p. 176]) Such leadership will prevent any deviation from authentic Islamic 
duties by the various organs of the State. 
  
The Economy, a Means Not an End  
In strengthening the foundations of the economy, the principal consideration will be the 
fulfillment of the human being‟s material needs, in the course of its overall growth and 
development. This principle contrasts with other economic systems, where the aim is 
concentration and accumulation of wealth and maximization of profit. In materialist 
schools of thought, the economy is an end in itself, whereby it becomes a subversive, 
corrupting and ruinous factor in the course of man‟s development. In Islam, the economy 
is a means, and all that is required of a means is that it should provide better efficiency in 
realizing the ultimate goal. In this perspective, the economic program of Islam consists of 
providing the means for the expression of the multifarious creative talents of the human 
being. Accordingly, it is the duty of the Islamic government to furnish all citizens with 
equal and appropriate opportunities, to create employment, and to satisfy their essential 
needs, for the sake of unflagging of human development. 
  
Women in the Constitution  
Through the creation of Islamic social infrastructures, all the human resources that have 
hitherto been subject to multifaceted foreign exploitation shall regain their true identity and 
human rights. As a part of this process, it is only natural that women should benefit from a 
larger restitution of their rights, because of the greater oppression that they suffered under 
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the tãghũtí order. The family is the fundamental unit of society and the principal nucleus 
for the growth and edification of the human being. Compatibility of belief and ideals is the 
main consideration in the establishment of the family, which provides the primary basis for 
man‟s development and growth. It is the duty of the Islamic government to provide the 
necessary facilities for the realization of this goal. Such a view of the family unit delivers 
women from being regarded as objects and tools for the promotion of consumerism and 
exploitation. Thereby, while she recovers her momentous and precious function of 
motherhood and of rearing human beings committed to Islamic ideals, she also assumes a 
pioneering social role as a fellow struggler of man in all vital areas of life, thus shouldering 
a more serious responsibility and enjoying a higher worth and nobility from the Islamic 
viewpoint. 
  
An Army Committed to Islamic Principles  
The basic criterion to be attended to, in the organization and equipment of the country‟s 
defense forces, is faith and Islamic teaching. Accordingly, the Army of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran and the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps are to be organized in 
accordance with this goal. They will be responsible not only for guarding and preserving 
the frontiers of the country, but also for fulfilling the Islamic mission of Jihãd in God‟s 
way and of struggling for the cause of extending the sovereignty of God‟s law throughout 
the world: 
 
 )...نِِ ًُِّد يِه َييِشَخاَء َّ   َنُك ّ ُذَع َّ   َّ ُذَع َِ ِت َىُْثُِ ُشذ ليَخلا ِطاتِس يِه َّ  ٍج َّْ ُق يه ُنرَعَطرسااَه ُنَِل اّذَعأ  ِالله                  
 (Prepare against them whatever force you are able to muster, and strings of horses, 
striking fear into the enemy of God and your enemy, and others besides them. [8:601]) 
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The Judiciary in the Constitution  
The Judiciary is of vital importance in safeguarding the rights of the people in accordance 
with the course set by the Islamic movement, and for preventing deviations within the 
Islamic Ummah. Accordingly, provision has been made for the creation of a judicial 
system based on Islamic justice and constituted of judges who are just and have knowledge 
of the precise Islamic laws. Because of its essentially crucial nature and the need for 
conformity to Islamic teachings, this system must be free from every kind of unhealthy 
affiliations and connections. [This is in accordance with the Qur‟ãnic verse]: 
 
(...  ِلذَعلُات اُْوُکَحذ َىأ ِساٌَّلا يَيت ُنروَکَحاِرا َّ ...) 
(And when you judge among the people, judge with justice. [4:58]) 
 
The Executive  
Considering the special importance of the Executive in implementing the laws and 
ordinances of Islam for the purpose of bringing about a society subject to equitable 
relations, and considering as well the necessity of this vital issue, for paving the way for 
realization of the ultimate goal of life, the Executive must open the way for the creation of 
an Islamic society. Consequently, the Executive‟s confinement within any kind of complex 
and obstructive system that delays or compromises the attainment of this objective is 
rejected by Islam. Therefore, the system of bureaucracy, the product and issue of tãghũtí 
forms of rule, will be firmly discarded, so as to establish an executive system that is more 
efficient and swift in fulfilling its administrative commitments. 
  
The Mass Media  
The media of mass communication, radio and television, must serve the diffusion of 
Islamic culture in pursuit of the progressive path of the Islamic Revolution. To this end, 
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they should draw upon a healthy debate of different ideas, and strictly refrain from 
diffusing and propagating destructive and anti-Islamic traits. It is incumbent on all to 
follow the principles of this law, as it regards the freedom and dignity of the human race as 
its topmost objective and paves the way for the progress and development of the human 
being. It is also necessary that the Muslim Ummah should participate actively in building 
the Islamic society, by selecting competent and faithful officials and by keeping a constant 
watch on their performance, so as to succeed in building an Islamic society that may be a 
model and witness to the world‟s people [in accordance with the Qur‟ãnic verse]: 
  
( ِساٌَّلا َیلَع ءاَذُِش اًَُُْْکِرل ًاطَس َّ  ًح َُّها نُکاٌلَعَج ِکلزَک َّ ...) 
(Thus we made you a median community, that you might be witnesses to men. [2:143]) 
  
Representatives  
The Assembly of Experts, constituted of the people‟s representatives, concluded the task of 
framing the Constitution on the basis of the draft proposed by the government and 
proposals received from various groups. It consists of twelve chapters comprising one 
hundred and seventy-five articles and was completed, with the above-mentioned objectives 
and motives, on the eve of the fifteenth century of the hijrah of the Noble Messenger, may 
Peace and blessings be upon him and his family, the founder of the redeeming school of 
Islam, hoping that this century will witness the establishment of a world government of the 
mustaè„afín and the defeat of all mustakbirín. 
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CHAPTER I 
General Principles 
Article 1  
The form of government of Iran is that of an Islamic republic, endorsed by the people of 
Iran on the basis of their long-standing belief in the sovereignty of truth and Qur‟ãnic 
justice. This was confirmed through a majority of 98.2% of eligible voters in the 
referendum of 9 and 10 Farvardin, 1358 H. Sh., corresponding to 1 and 2 Jamãdí al-Awwal, 
1399 H. [29 and 30 March 1979], held after the victorious Islamic Revolution led by the 
eminent marja „taqlíd, Ãyatullãh al-„Uzmã Imam Khumayni. 
 
Article 2 
The Islamic Republic is a system based on belief in: 
1. The One God (as stated in the phrase الله ٌِلاا َ ِلا لا“There is no deity except God”), His 
exclusive sovereignty and right to legislate, and the necessity of compliance to His 
command; 
2. Divine revelation as the primary source of law; 
3. Resurrection, and the formative role of this belief in the course of man‟s ascent towards 
God; 
4. Divine justice, in creation as well as legislation; 
5. Perpetual leadership (imãmah) and guidance, and its fundamental role in ensuring the 
continuity of Islamic revolution; 
6. The exalted dignity and worth of the human being and its freedom accompanied with its 
responsibility before God, which secure equity, justice, and political, economic, social and 
cultural independence, as well as national solidarity, by recourse to: 
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a. Continuous ijtihãd by qualified jurists exercised on the basis of the Qur‟ãn and 
the Sunnah of the Infallible Ones (Ma „sũmín), may Peace be upon all of them; 
b. The use of sciences, arts and human achievements and endeavors for their 
advancement; 
c. Negation of all forms of oppression infliction of it as well as submission to it and 
of dominance, its imposition as well as its acceptance. 
 
Article 3  
In order to achieve the objectives specified in Article 2, the Government of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran must direct all its resources to the following goals: 
1. Creation of a favorable environment for the development of moral virtues based on faith 
and piety, and struggle against all forms of vice and corruption; 
2. Raising the level of public awareness in all areas through proper use of the press, mass 
media, and other means; 
3. Free education and physical training for everyone at all levels and facilitation and 
expansion of higher education; 
4. Strengthening the spirit of inquiry, investigation, and innovation in all scientific, 
technical, cultural, and Islamic spheres by establishing research centres and encouraging 
researchers; 
5. Complete elimination of imperialism and prevention of foreign influence; 
6. Elimination of all forms of despotism, autocracy, and monopoly; 
7. Ensuring political and social freedoms within the framework of law; 
8. The people‟s participation in determining their political, economic, social, and cultural 
destiny; 
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9. Abolition of all forms of unjust discrimination and provision of equitable opportunities 
for all, in material and intellectual spheres; 
10. Creation of a correct administrative system and elimination of superfluous government 
organizations; 
11. Comprehensive reinforcement of foundations of national defense through universal 
military training to safeguard the country‟s independence, territorial integrity, and Islamic 
order; 
12. Establishing the foundations of a correct and just economic system on the basis of 
Islamic criteria for creating welfare, eradicating of poverty and all form of deprivation with 
respect to food, housing, employment, hygiene, and providing social insurance for all; 
13. Obtaining self-sufficiency in scientific, technological, industrial, agricultural, military 
and other similar spheres; 
14. Securing the multi-faceted rights of all citizens, men and women, and providing just 
legal security for all, and equality of all before law; 
15. Expanding and strengthening Islamic brotherhood and general cooperation among all 
the people; 
16. Framing the country‟s foreign policy on the basis of Islamic criteria, fraternal 
commitment to all Muslims and unflinching support of the world‟s oppressed (mustaè 
„afín). 
 
Article 4  
All laws and regulations pertaining to civil, penal, financial, economic, administrative, 
cultural, military, political and other spheres must be based on Islamic criteria. This article 
governs absolutely and generally all articles of the Constitution, as well as all other laws 
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and regulations, and the duty to ascertain this matter devolve on the jurists of the Guardian 
Council. 
 
Article 5  
During the occultation of the Waí al- „Asr (i.e. the Twelfth Imam), may God expedite his 
appearance, the wilãyat al-amr and leadership of the Ummah devolve upon the just and 
pious jurist, fully aware of the times, courageous, possessing administrative and problem-
solving abilities, who will assume the responsibilities of this office in accordance with 
Article 107. 
 
Article 6  
The country‟s affairs in the Islamic Republic of Iran must be managed on the basis of 
public opinion as expressed through elections, including the election of the President, the 
representatives of the Islamic Parliament of Iran, and the members of the councils, and the 
like, or through referenda, in cases specified in other articles of this law. 
 
Article 7  
In accordance with the Qur‟ãnic prescription [as mentioned in the following verses]: 
(ُنٌََِيت یسُْش ُن ُشَهأ َّ ) 
(And their affairs [are settled] by consultation among them. [42:38]) 
( ِشَهلأا ِیف ُن سِّ اَش َّ ) 
(And consult them in the affair [of governance [3:159]) consultative bodies - such as the 
Islamic Parliament of Iran, and councils at the level of the province, city, region, district, 
and village, and the like - will be the country‟s decision-making and administrative organs. 
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The instances, the manner of their formation, jurisdiction, and duties will be defined by 
this law and the laws derived from it. 
 
Article 8  
In the Islamic Republic of Iran, summoning to what is good, commanding what is right and 
forbidding what is wrong (amr bil-ma „rũf wa nahy „anil-munkar) is a universal and mutual 
duty: of the people in relation to one another, of the government in relation to the people, 
and of the people in relation to the government. Its conditions, limits, and character will be 
defined by law. 
 
( ِشَکٌُولا ِيَع َىٌََِْي َّ  ِفُّشعَولِات َىُّشُهأي ٍطَعت ُءايلَّأ ُنُِضَعت ُخاٌَهؤُولا َّ  َىٌُْهؤُولاّ) 
(The faithful, men and women, are guardians in relation to one another: they enjoin what is 
right and forbid what is wrong. [9:71]) 
 
Article 9  
In the Islamic Republic of Iran, the country‟s freedom, independence, unity and territorial 
integrity are inseparable from one another, and it is the duty of the government and every 
individual citizen to safeguard them. No individual, group, or authority has the right to 
compromise, in the slightest degree, Iran‟s political, cultural, economic, and military 
independence and territorial integrity under the pretext of exercising freedom, and no 
authority has the right to withdraw legitimate freedoms under the pretext of preserving the 
country‟s independence and territorial integrity, not even by enacting laws and regulations. 
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Article 10  
As the family is the fundamental unit of Islamic society, all laws, regulations, and relevant 
planning must be directed towards facilitating the formation of family, safeguarding its 
sanctity and the stability of family relations on the basis of Islamic laws and morality. 
 
 Article 11  
In accordance with the noble verse [of the Qur‟ãn]: 
 
(  ًََأ َّ  ًجَذِحاّ ٌح َُّهأ ٍِ ِزُ َِّىإ ِىُّذثعَاف نُکُّتَسا ) 
This community of yours is one community, and I am your Lord, so worship me, [21:92]) 
all Muslims form a single ummah and it is the duty of the government of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran to formulate its general policies on the basis of the alliance and unity of 
Muslim nations, and to make consistent effort for the realization of the political, economic, 
and cultural unity of the Islamic world. 
 
Article 12 
The official religion of Iran is Islam and the madhhab (school of law) is the Twelver Ja„farí 
school, and this article will remain forever unalterable. Other legal schools (madhãhib) 
including the Hanafi, Shãfi„í, Mãlikí, Hanbalí, and Zaydí, are accorded full respect, and 
their followers are free to perform their religious rites in accordance with their own fiqh. 
These schools are officially recognized by the courts in matters pertaining to religious 
education and training and personal status (marriage, divorce, inheritance, and will) and 
the related litigation. In any region where the followers of any of these schools constitute a 
majority, the local regulations will be in accordance with that school within the jurisdiction 
of the local councils, with due observance of the rights of the adherents of other schools. 
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Article 13 
Zoroastrians, Jews, and Christians among Iranians are the only recognized religious 
minorities and they are free to perform their religious rites and ceremonies within the 
framework of law and to act in accordance with their own canon in matters of personal law 
and religious education. 
 
Article 14  
In compliance with the noble verse [of the Qur‟ãn]: 
(  َلإاُْطِسُقذ َّ  م ِ ٍُّ َُّشَثذ َىأ نُکِشيِد يِه نُکُْجِشُخي َنل َّ  ِيي َّذلا ِیف نُکُْلذَاُقي َنل َييِزَّلا ِيَع ُالله ُنُکٌََِيلاييِطِسقولا ُّةُِحي َالله َّىإ ُنِي ) 
(God does not forbid you from dealing kindly and justly with those who have not fought 
with you because of your religion and who did not expel you from your homes, [60:80]) 
the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Muslims have the duty to treat non-
Muslims in accordance with ethical norms and Islamic justice and fairness and to observe 
their human rights. This article applies to those who do not engage in conspiracy and 
hostile measures against Islam and the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
 
CHAPTER II 
The Country’s Official Language, Script, Calendar, and Flag 
 
Article 15  
The official and common language and script of the people of Iran is Persian. Official 
documents, correspondence and texts, as well as text-books must be in this language and 
script. However, the use of regional and tribal languages in the press and mass media, as 
well as the teaching of their literature in schools alongside Persian is allowed. 
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Article 16  
Since Arabic is the language of the Quran and Islamic sciences and teachings, and Persian 
literature is thoroughly permeated with this language, it must be taught, in all classes and 
in all areas of study, from after the primary level until the end of secondary school. 
 
Article 17  
The official calendar of the country commences from the migration (hijrah) of the 
Messenger of Islam, may God bless him and his Family. Both the solar and the lunar 
Islamic calendars are recognized, but government offices will follow the solar calendar. 
Friday is the official weekly holiday. 
 
Article 18  
The official flag of Iran is green, white, and red with the special emblem of the Islamic 
Republic and the َشثکأ الله God is the greatest. 
CHAPTER III 
The Rights of the People 
Article 19  
All the people of Iran, regardless of ethnic group or tribe, enjoy equal rights; color, race, 
language and the like do not bestow any privilege. 
 
Article 20  
All citizens of the country, men and women, enjoy equal protection of the law as well as 
all human, political, economic, social and cultural rights in conformity with Islamic criteria. 
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Article 21  
The government must ensure the comprehensive rights of women in conformity with 
Islamic criteria, and accomplish the following: 
1. Creation of a favorable environment for the growth of woman‟s personality and 
restoration of her rights, material and intellectual; 
2. Protection of mothers, particularly during pregnancy and child rearing, and protection of 
children without guardians; 
3. Establishment of competent courts for protection and preservation of the family; 
4. Provision of special insurance for widows, aged women, and women without support; 
5. Awarding guardianship of children to worthy mothers to secure the children‟s welfare in 
the absence of a legal guardian. 
 
Article 22  
The dignity, life, property, rights, residence, and occupation of the individual are inviolate, 
except in cases sanctioned by law. 
 
Article 23  
The investigation of the beliefs of persons is forbidden, and no one may be molested or 
prosecuted for holding a belief. 
 
Article 24  
Publications and the press have freedom of expression, except when it is detrimental to the 
fundamental principles of Islam or the rights of the public, and the details will be specified 
by law. 
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Article 25  
Except as provided by law, the inspection and interception of letters, recording and 
disclosure of telephone conversations, disclosure of telegraphic and telex communications, 
censorship, or willful failure to transmit them, eavesdropping, and all forms of covert 
investigation are forbidden. 
 
Article 26  
The formation of parties, societies, political or professional guilds, as well as religious 
associations, Islamic or pertaining to one of the recognized religious minorities, is 
permitted provided they do not violate the principles of independence, freedom, and 
national unity, Islamic criteria and the basis of the Islamic Republic. No one may be 
prevented from participating in the aforementioned groups, or compelled to participate 
therein. 
 
Article 27  
Public gatherings and marches, held without carrying arms, are allowed, provided they are 
not injurious to the fundamentals of Islam. 
 
Article 28  
Everyone has the right to choose any occupation he wishes, provided it does not infringe 
on the rights of others and is not contrary to Islam and public interests. It is the 
government‟s duty to provide all citizens with employment opportunity, and to create 
equal conditions for obtaining employment, with consideration of society‟s need for 
different professions. 
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Article 29  
It is universal right to benefit from social security in respect of retirement, unemployment, 
old age, disability, being stranded, absence of a guardian, accidents, and from health and 
medical services and care provided through insurance or other means. The government 
must provide the afore-mentioned services and financial support for every individual 
citizen, by drawing, in accordance with the law, on national revenues and funds, obtained 
through public contributions. 
 
Article 30  
The government must provide all citizens with free education up to secondary school, and 
must expand free higher education to the extent required by the country for attaining self-
sufficiency. 
 
Article 31  
It is the right of every Iranian individual and family to possess housing commensurate with 
his needs. The government must facilitate the implementation of this article by giving 
priority to those whose needs are greater, in particular the rural population and the workers. 
 
Article 32  
No one may be arrested except by the order of and in accordance with the procedure laid 
down by law. In case of arrest, the charges along with the grounds for accusation must be 
communicated without delay and explained in writing to the accused, and a provisional 
dossier must be forwarded to the competent judicial authorities within a maximum of 
twenty-four hours, so that the preliminaries of the trial can be completed as soon as 
possible. Violation of this article will be liable to penal action in accordance with the law. 
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Article 33  
No one may be banished from his place of residence, or prevented from residing in the 
place of his choice, or compelled to reside in a given locality, except in cases provided by 
law. 
 
Article 34  
It is the indisputable right of every citizen to seek justice by recourse to competent courts. 
All citizens have right of access to such courts, and no one may be barred from courts to 
which he has a lawful right of recourse. 
 
Article 35  
Both parties to a lawsuit have the right to select an attorney in all courts of law. If they are 
unable to do so, arrangements must be made to provide them with an attorney. 
 
Article 36  
Only competent courts are entitled to pass a sentence and execute it in accordance with the 
law. 
 
Article 37  
Innocence is to be presumed, and no one is to be held guilty of a charge, unless his guilt 
has been proven in a competent court. 
 
Article 38  
All forms of torture for the purpose of extracting confessions or acquiring information are 
forbidden. It is not permissible to compel individuals to testify, confess, or take an oath. 
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Any testimony, confession, or oath obtained under duress is devoid of value and credence. 
Violation of this article is liable to punishment in accordance with the law. 
 
Article 39  
Affronts, in whatever form, to the dignity and repute of persons arrested, detained, 
imprisoned, or banished, in accordance with law, are forbidden and liable to punishment. 
 
Article 40  
No one is entitled to exercise his rights in a way injurious to others or detrimental to public 
interests. 
 
Article 41  
Iranian citizenship is the indisputable right of every Iranian, and the government cannot 
withdraw citizenship from any Iranian, unless he himself requests it or acquires the 
citizenship of another country. 
 
Article 42  
Foreign nationals may acquire Iranian citizenship within the framework of the law. 
Citizenship may be withdrawn from such persons, if another State accepts them as citizens, 
or if they request it. 
  
 
 
 
 
359 
 
CHAPTER IV 
The Economy and Finance 
 
Article 43  
With the objectives of achieving society‟s economic independence, uprooting poverty and 
deprivation, and fulfilling human needs in the process of development, whilst preserving 
human liberty, the economy of the Islamic Republic of Iran will be based on the following 
criteria: 
1. Provision of basic necessities for all citizens: housing, food, clothing, hygiene, medical 
treatment, education, and the necessary facilities for establishing family; 
2. Securing conditions and opportunities of employment for everyone for the purpose of 
attaining full employment, and placing the means of work at the disposal of everyone able 
to work but lacking the means, through cooperatives, interest-free loans, or any other 
legitimate means that neither results in the concentration or circulation of wealth in the 
hands of a few individuals or groups, nor turns the government into a major and ubiquitous 
employer. These measures must be taken in due regard of the requirements governing the 
country‟s general economic plans, at each stage of development. 
3. The national economic plans must be structured in such a manner that the form, content, 
and hours of work of every individual allow him sufficient leisure and energy to engage, 
besides his occupational effort, in spiritual, political, and social self-development and to 
participate actively in the country‟s affairs, and to upgrade his skills and initiative; 
4. Respect for the right to free choice of occupation; absence of compulsion on persons to 
engage in a particular work; and preventing exploitation of others‟ labour; 
5. Prohibition of infliction of harm or loss upon others, monopoly, hoarding, usury, and 
other invalid and unlawful dealings; 
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6. Prohibition of extravagance and wastefulness in all matters related to the economy, 
including consumption, investment, production, distribution and services; 
7. Utilization of science and technology, and the training of skilled personnel in 
accordance with the developmental needs of the country‟s economy; 
8. Prevention of foreign economic domination over the country‟s economy; 
9. Emphasis on increase in industrial, agricultural and livestock production for meeting 
public needs and achieving the country‟s‟ self-sufficiency. 
 
Article 44  
The economy of the Islamic Republic of Iran will consist of three sectors, namely: state, 
cooperative and private. It is to be based on systematic and sound planning. The state 
sector will include all large-scale and mother industries, foreign trade, major minerals, 
banking, insurance, power generation, dams and large-scale irrigation networks, radio and 
television, post, telegraph and telephone services, aviation, shipping, roads, railroads and 
the like. All these will be publicly owned and managed by the State. The cooperative 
sector will include cooperative companies and enterprises engaged in production and 
distribution, and constituted in urban and rural areas in accordance with Islamic regulations. 
The private sector consists of activities related to agriculture, animal husbandry, industry, 
trade, and services that supplement the economic activities of the state and cooperative 
sectors. Ownership in each of these three sectors - in so far as it is in conformity with the 
other articles of this chapter, does not exceed the bounds of Islamic law, and contributes to 
the country‟s economic growth and progress and does not harm society - is protected by 
the law of the Islamic Republic. The detailed scope, regulations, and conditions pertaining 
to each of these sectors will be specified by law. 
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Article 45  
Public property and assets - such as uncultivated or abandoned land, mineral deposits, seas, 
lakes, rivers and other public waterways, mountains, valleys, marshlands, natural forests, 
open pasture land, legacies without heirs, property of undetermined ownership, and public 
property recovered‟ from usurpers - shall be at the disposal of the Islamic government to 
be utilized in accordance with public interest. Detailed procedures for the utilization of 
each of the foregoing will be specified by law. 
 
Article 46  
Everyone owns the fruits of his legitimate trade and work, and no one may deprive another 
of the opportunity of trade or work under the pretext of his own right of ownership over his 
trade or work. 
 
Article 47  
Private ownership, legitimately acquired, is to be respected. The relevant criteria will be 
determined by law. 
 
Article 48  
There must be no discrimination among the various provinces in respect of exploitation of 
natural resources, utilization of public revenues, and distribution of economic activities 
among the country‟s different provinces and regions, so that every region has access to the 
necessary capital and facilities in accordance with its needs and potential for growth. 
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Article 49  
It is government‟s duty to confiscate all wealth accumulated through usury, usurpation, 
bribery, embezzlement, theft, gambling, misuse of endowments, misuse of government 
contracts and transactions, sale of uncultivated lands and other resources subject to public 
ownership, operation of centers of prostitution, and other illicit means and restore it to its 
legitimate owner. If he cannot be identified, it must be entrusted to the public treasury. 
This rule must be executed by the government, after proper investigation and furnishing of 
necessary evidence, in accordance with Islamic law. 
 
Article 50  
The preservation of the environment - wherein the present as well as the future generations 
have a right to a flourishing social existence - is considered a public duty in the Islamic 
Republic. Economic and other activities that involve pollution of the environment or cause 
irreparable damage to it are therefore forbidden. 
 
Article 51  
Taxes of any kind may not be imposed except in accordance with law. Provisions for tax 
exemption and reduction will be determined by law. 
 
Article 52  
The country‟s annual budget will be drawn up by the government in the manner specified 
by law, and submitted to the Islamic Parliament of Iran for examination and approval. Any 
changes in budget figures will be in accordance with procedures determined by law. 
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Article 53  
All receipts collected by the government will be deposited into government accounts at the 
central treasury, and all disbursements will be made within approved credits in accordance 
with the law. 
 
Article 54  
The National Accounts Bureau will be under the direct supervision of the Islamic 
Parliament of Iran. Its organization and administration in Tehran and provincial capitals 
are to be determined by law. 
 
Article 55  
In accordance with the procedure specified by law the Accounts Bureau will inspect and 
audit all the accounts of the ministries, government institutions and companies as well as 
other organizations that draw in any way on the general budget of the country, to ensure 
that no expenditure exceeds approved credits and that all sums are spent for their specified 
purpose. The Accounts Bureau will collect all relevant accounts, documents, and records in 
accordance with law and submit an annual budget clearance report, along with its own 
comments, to the Islamic Parliament of Iran. This report must be made accessible to the 
public. 
  
CHAPTER V 
National Sovereignty and Powers Derived from it 
Article 56  
Absolute sovereignty of the universe and Man belongs to God, and it is He Who has made 
the human being master of its own social destiny. No one may deprive the human being of 
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this God-given right, nor subordinate it to vested interests of some individual or group. The 
people are to exercise this God-given right in ways specified in the following articles. 
 
Article 57  
The powers of the State in the Islamic Republic are vested in the Legislature, the Judiciary, 
and the Executive, functioning under the supervision of the absolute wilí al-amr and 
Leader of the Ummah, in accordance with the forthcoming articles of this law. These 
powers are independent of each other. 
 
Article 58  
The functions of the Legislature are to be exercised by the Islamic Parliament of Iran, 
consisting of the elected representatives of the people. Legislation approved by this body, 
after covering the stages specified in the following articles, is communicated to the 
Executive and the Judiciary for implementation. 
 
Article 59  
In very important economic, political, social, and cultural matters, the functions of the 
legislature may be exercised through direct recourse to popular vote through a referendum. 
Any request for such direct recourse to public opinion must be approved by two-thirds of 
the members of the Islamic Parliament of Iran. 
 
Article 60  
Excepting matters that are directly placed under the jurisdiction of the Leadership by the 
Constitution, the functions of the Executive are to be exercised by the President and the 
ministers. 
365 
 
Article 61  
The functions of the Judiciary are to be performed by courts of justice formed in 
accordance with the criteria of Islam and vested with the authority to examine and settle 
lawsuits, protect the public rights, dispense and enact justice, and implement the penalties 
prescribed by God (hudũd-e Ilãhí). 
  
 
CHAPTER VI 
The Legislature 
¨ Section One: The Islamic Parliament of Iran 
Article 62  
The Islamic Parliament of Iran is constituted by the people‟s representatives elected 
directly and by secret ballot. The qualifications of voters and candidates, as well as the 
character of the elections, will be specified by law. 
 
Article 63  
The term of membership of the Islamic Parliament of Iran is four years. Elections for each 
term must take place before the end of the preceding term, so that the country is never left 
without a Parliament. 
 
Article 64  
The number of representatives of the Islamic Parliament of Iran shall be two hundred and 
seventy, and for every decade since the national referendum of 1368 H. Sh. (1987) it may, 
in consideration of human, political, geographic and other factors, be increased by a 
maximum of twenty. The Zoroastrians and Jews will each elect one representative; 
Assyrian and Chaldean Christians will jointly elect one representative; and Armenian 
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Christians in the north and the south will each elect one representative. The boundaries of 
the election constituencies and the number of representatives will be determined by law. 
 
Article 65  
After elections, the sessions of the Islamic Parliament of Iran will have a quorum with two-
thirds of the members present. Drafts and bills will be passed in accordance with the 
approved internal procedure, excepting cases where another quorum is specified by the 
Constitution. A quorum of two-thirds of its members is required for approval of the 
internal code of procedure. 
 
Article 66  
The manner of election of the Speaker and the Presiding Board of the Parliament, the 
number of committees and their terms of office, and matters related to the Parliament‟s 
deliberations and discipline will be determined by the Parliament‟s internal code of 
procedure. 
 
Article 67  
The representatives must take the following oath at the first session of the Parliament and 
affix their signatures to its text: in the Name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful. “In 
the presence of the Glorious Quran, I swear by God, the Exalted and Almighty, and 
undertake by my honor as a human being, to protect Islam, to guard the achievements of 
the Islamic Revolution of the Iranian people and the foundations of the Islamic Republic, 
to preserve, as a just trustee, the trust entrusted to me by the people; to observe honesty and 
piety in fulfilling my duties as a representative, to remain always committed to the 
independence and honor of the country, to safeguarding the nation‟s rights and serving the 
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people, to defending the Constitution, and to keep in mind, in my speech, writing and 
while expressing my views, the independence of the country, the freedom of the people, 
and the security of their interests”. Members belonging to religious minorities will swear 
by their own scriptures while taking this oath. Members absent from the first session will 
take the oath at the first session they attend. 
 
Article 68  
In time of war and military occupation of the country, elections in occupied areas or 
throughout the country may be withheld for a specified period on the proposal of the 
President of the Republic, approved by three-fourths of all the members of the Islamic 
Parliament of Iran, and endorsed by the Guardian Council. In the absence of a new 
Parliament, the present one will continue to function. 
 
Article 69  
The deliberations of the Islamic Parliament of Iran must be open, and full minutes of them 
must be made available to the public through the radio and the official gazette. A closed 
session may be held in emergency conditions, if such is required for national security, 
upon the request of the President, or one of the ministers, or ten members of the Parliament. 
Legislation passed during closed session is valid only when approved by three-fourths of 
the members, in the presence of the Guardian Council. After emergency conditions have 
ceased, the minutes of such closed sessions and any legislation approved by them must be 
made available to the public. 
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Article 70  
The President, his deputies, and the ministers have a right to participate in the open 
sessions of the Parliament either collectively or individually. They may also be 
accompanied by their advisers. Also, if the members of the Parliament so require, the 
ministers are obliged to attend, and their statements will be heard upon their request. 
Section Two: The Parliament‟s Powers and Competence 
 
Article 71  
The Islamic Parliament of Iran may pass laws in all matters, within the jurisdiction defined 
by the Constitution. 
 
Article 72  
The Islamic Parliament of Iran may not enact laws contrary to the Constitution, or to the 
doctrines and laws of the country‟s official religion. It is the duty of the Guardian Council 
to determine any such violation, in accordance with Article 96 of the Constitution. 
 
Article 73  
The interpretation of ordinary laws falls within the competence of the Islamic Parliament 
of Iran. The intent of this Article does not preclude interpretation by judges in their effort 
to ascertain the truth. 
 
Article 74  
Government bills are presented to the Islamic Parliament of Iran after the approval of the 
Cabinet of Ministers. Members‟ bills may be presented to the Islamic Parliament of Iran if 
sponsored by at least fifteen members. 
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Article 75  
Members‟ bills and proposals, as well as amendments to government bills proposed by 
members, that entail reduction of the public income, or increase of public expenditure, may 
be introduced to the Parliament, only if the means of compensating for the decrease in 
income, or of meeting the new expenditure, are also specified. 
 
Article 76  
The Islamic Parliament of Iran has the right to investigate and examine all the affairs of the 
country. 
 
Article 77  
All international treaties, protocols, contracts, and agreements must be approved by the 
Islamic Parliament of Iran. 
 
Article 78  
All changes in the country‟s frontiers are forbidden, with the exception of minor 
amendments in the interests of the country, provided such changes are not unilateral, do 
not encroach on the country‟s independence and territorial integrity, and are approved by 
four-fifths of all members of the Islamic Parliament of Iran. 
 
Article 79  
The proclamation of martial law is forbidden. In case of war or a similar state of 
emergency, the government has the right to temporarily impose certain restrictions with the 
approval of the Islamic Parliament of Iran. But in no case may such restrictions exceed 
370 
 
thirty days, and if the necessity should persist, the government must seek new 
authorization from the Parliament. 
 
Article 80  
The taking or granting of loans or grants-in-aid, domestic or foreign, by the government 
must be with the approval of the Islamic Parliament of Iran. 
 
 Article 81  
The granting of concessions to foreigners, whether for the establishment of companies or 
institutions dealing with commerce, industry, agriculture, services or mineral extraction, is 
absolutely forbidden. 
 
Article 82  
The employment of foreign experts is forbidden, except in cases of necessity and with the 
approval of the Islamic Parliament of Iran. 
 
Article 83  
Government buildings and property regarded as part of the national heritage may not be 
transferred except with the approval of the Islamic Parliament of Iran, with the exclusion 
of irreplaceable treasures. 
 
Article 84  
Every representative is accountable to the entire nation and has the right to express his 
views on all affairs of the country, internal and external. 
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Article 85  
The office of a representative is vested in the individual, and is not transferable. The 
Parliament may not delegate the power of legislation to an individual or committee. But 
whenever necessary, it may delegate the power of enacting certain laws to its own 
committees, in accordance with Article 72. In such cases, the laws will be implemented on 
a tentative basis for a period specified by the Parliament, and their final approval will be 
with the Parliament. Similarly, the Parliament may, in accordance with Article 72, delegate 
to the relevant committees the responsibility of permanent approval of articles of 
association of government organizations, companies, and institutions, or such as are 
affiliated to the government, or permit the government to approve them. In this case, the 
government approvals may not contradict the principles and laws of the country‟s official 
religion or the Constitution. Judgment in this matter will lie with the Guardian Council in 
accordance with the procedure stated in Article 96. Furthermore, the government approvals 
may not be against the general laws and regulations of the country, and while being 
notified for implementation, they must be communicated to the Speaker of the Islamic 
Parliament of Iran to examine and confirm the absence of any inconsistency therein with 
the aforementioned laws. 
 
Article 86  
In the course of performing their duties as representatives, members of the Parliament are 
completely free to express their views and cast their votes. They may not be prosecuted or 
arrested for opinions expressed in the Parliament, or votes cast in the course of their duties 
as representatives. 
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Article 87  
The President must obtain a vote of confidence from the Parliament for the Cabinet after 
its formation and before all other business. During his incumbency, he may also seek such 
a vote of confidence for the Cabinet from the Parliament on important and controversial 
issues. 
 
Article 88  
Whenever at least one-fourth of the total members of the Islamic Parliament of Iran raise a 
question with the President, or when any one member of the Parliament poses a question to 
a minister, on a subject relating to their duties, the President, or the minister, is obliged to 
attend the Parliament and answer the question. This answer may not be delayed for more 
than one month in the case of the President, and ten days in the case of the minister, except 
with an excuse deemed reasonable by the Islamic Parliament of Iran. 
 
Article 89  
1. Members of the Islamic Parliament of Iran may interpellate the Ministerial Cabinet or an 
individual minister, whenever it is deemed necessary. Interpellations may be tabled when 
presented to the Parliament signed by at least ten members. The Cabinet or the 
interpellated minister must be present in the Parliament within ten days after the tabling of 
the interpellation, in order to respond to it and seek a vote of confidence. If the Cabinet, or 
the minister, fails to attend the Parliament, the members who tabled the interpellation will 
explain their reasons and the Parliament may declare a vote of no-confidence, if deemed 
necessary. If a vote of confidence is not pronounced by the Parliament, the Cabinet, or the 
minister interpellated, will be dismissed. In both the cases, the minister interpellated may 
not be a member of the next Cabinet. 
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2. In the event of at least one-third of the members of the Islamic Parliament of Iran 
interpellating the President, in respect of his performance of administrative responsibilities 
related to the Executive Power and administration of the country‟s executive affairs, he 
should, within one month after the tabling of the interpellation, present himself in the 
Parliament and give adequate explanations regarding the questions raised. Should two-
thirds of the members of the Parliament declare a vote of no confidence after hearing the 
statements of the opposing and favoring members and the reply of the President, this will 
be communicated to the Leadership for implementation of Clause 10 of Article 110. 
 
Article 90  
Complaints concerning the performance of the Parliament, or the Executive, or the 
Judiciary, may be forwarded in writing to the Islamic Parliament of Iran. The Parliament 
must investigate these complaints and give a satisfactory reply. When the complaint relates 
to the Executive or the Judiciary, the Parliament must demand a proper investigation and 
an adequate explanation from them, and announce the results within a reasonable time. 
When the subject of the complaint is of public interest, the reply must be made public. 
 
Article 91  
A council to be known as the Guardian Council is to be constituted to safeguard Islamic 
laws and the Constitution and to verify the compatibility of legislation passed by the 
Islamic Parliament of Iran with them. It will be composed of the following: 
 
1. Six Islamic jurists (fuqahã‟), who are persons of integrity („ãdil), well aware of the 
present needs and issues of the day. They will be appointed by the Leader. 
2. Six lawyers, specializing in various fields of law. They will be elected by the Islamic 
Parliament of Iran from among Muslim lawyers nominated by the Head of the Judiciary. 
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Article 92  
Members of the Guardian Council are appointed for six years, but after three years during 
the first term half of the members from each group will be replaced by lot and new 
members appointed in their place. 
 
Article 93  
The Islamic Parliament of Iran has no legal status without the Guardian Council, except for 
approving the credentials of its own members and electing six lawyers of the Guardian 
Council. 
 
Article 94  
All legislation passed by the Islamic Parliament of Iran must be sent to the Guardian 
Council. The Guardian Council must review it within ten days of its receipt to verify its 
compatibility with the criteria of Islam and the Constitution. If it finds the legislation 
incompatible, it will be returned to the Parliament for review. Otherwise the legislation 
will be considered passed. 
 
Article 95  
When the Guardian Council considers ten days inadequate for completing the process of 
review and delivering a definite opinion, the Islamic Parliament of Iran may be requested 
to grant an extension not exceeding ten days citing the grounds for the request. 
 
Article 96  
Ascertainment of the compatibility of legislation passed by the Islamic Parliament of Iran 
with the laws of Islam rests with the majority of the six jurists (fuqahã‟) on the guardian 
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Council, and ascertainment of its concordance with the Constitution rests with the majority 
of all members of the Guardian Council. 
 
Article 97  
In order to expedite matters, members of the Guardian Council may attend the Parliament, 
when a government or a members‟ bill is discussed and listen to the deliberations. When 
an urgent government or members‟ bill is placed on the agenda of the Parliament, the 
members of the Guardian Council must attend the Parliament and make their views known. 
 
Article 98  
The right of interpretation of the Constitution is vested in the Guardian Council and is 
subject to the consent of three-fourths of its members. 
 
Article 99  
The Guardian Council is responsible for supervising the elections of the Parliament of 
Experts for Leadership, the President of the Republic, the Islamic Parliament of Iran, and 
direct recourse to popular opinion through referenda. 
  
CHAPTER VII 
The Councils 
Article 100  
In order to expedite social, economic, public health, cultural, educational and development 
programs and facilitate other public welfare affairs through the people‟s participation and 
in accordance with the local needs, the administration of each village, division, city, town, 
and province will be supervised by a local Council which will be known as Village, 
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Division, City, Town, or Provincial Council. The members of every council will be elected 
by its respective population. 
 
Eligibility of the voters and candidates of these local Councils, as well as their jurisdiction 
and authority, mode of election, supervision, and hierarchy which should be in due 
consideration of the principles of national unity, territorial integrity, the order of the 
Islamic Republic, and the sovereignty of the central government will be determined by law. 
 
Article 101  
A Supreme Council of the Provinces will be established consisting of representatives of the 
Provincial Councils, in order to prevent discrimination and to ensure cooperation in the 
formulation of welfare and development plans for the provinces, and to coordinate the 
execution of such plans. The manner of formation and duties of this council will be 
determined by law. 
 
Article 102  
Within its jurisdiction, the Supreme Council of the Provinces has the right to draft bills and 
to submit them to the Islamic Parliament of Iran, either directly or through the government. 
These bills must be examined by the Parliament. 
 
Article 103  
Governors of provinces, towns and divisions as well as other officials appointed by the 
government must abide by the decisions of the local Councils made within their 
jurisdiction. 
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Article 104  
In order to ensure Islamic justice and cooperation in planning and coordination in 
expediting matters, councils will be formed, constituted of representatives of workers, 
peasants, other employees and managers, in production units, industrial and agricultural, 
and of representatives of members of units in educational, administrative, service and other 
similar sectors. The formation, duties and jurisdiction of these councils will be determined 
by law. 
 
Article 105  
Decisions of the Councils must not conflict with Islamic criteria and the country‟s laws. 
 
Article 106  
The Councils may not be dissolved unless they deviate from their lawful duties. The 
authority responsible for ascertaining such deviation, as well as the procedure for the 
dissolution and reformation of the Councils will be specified by law. Should a Council 
have any objection to its dissolution, it has the right to appeal to a competent court which 
will be duty-bound to examine it outside the docket sequence. 
  
CHAPTER VIII 
The Leader or the Leadership Council 
 
 Article 107  
After the demise of the eminent marja„taqlíd, the great leader of the Global Islamic 
Revolution and the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Hadrat Ãyatullãh al-„Uzmã 
Imam Khumayni, may God sanctify his noble spirit, who was recognized and accepted as 
marja„ and Leader by a decisive majority of the people, the appointment of the Leader 
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shall be vested in the Parliament of Experts elected by the people. These Experts will 
review and deliberate concerning the merits of all the qualified jurists possessing the 
qualifications specified in Articles 5 and 109. In the event of them finding someone more 
learned in Islamic ordinances and subjects of Islamic law, or in political and social issues, 
or possessing general popularity, or a special prominence, in respect of the qualifications 
mentioned in Article 109, he will be appointed as the Leader. Otherwise, they shall elect 
one of them as the Leader. The Leader thus appointed [or elected] by the Experts shall 
assume the wilãyat al-amr and all responsibilities arising from it. The Leader is equal to all 
other citizens in the eyes of law. 
 
Article 108  
The law relating to the number of the Experts, their qualifications, mode of their election, 
and the internal code of procedure for holding sessions must, for the first term, be drawn 
up by the jurists on the first Guardian Council and passed by a majority vote and finally 
approved by the Leader of the Revolution. Thereafter, any change or review in this law or 
framing other rules is within the Experts‟ own duties and competence. 
 
Article 109  
The qualifications for Leadership are: 
 
1. The scholarship required for giving ruling (fatwa) in various fields of Islamic law (fiqh). 
2. The integrity („adãlah) and piety required for leadership of the Islamic Ummah. 
3. A sound political and social vision, prudence, courage, administrative skills and 
adequate leadership abilities. 
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Should several persons fulfill these requirements, the one with a stronger vision in fiqhí 
and political matters will be given preference. 
 
Article 110  
The Leader‟s functions and authority [consist of the following]: 
 
1. Defining the general policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran after consultation with the 
State Expediency Council. 
2. Supervision of the proper execution of the general policies of the regime. 
3. Issuing of decrees for national referenda. 
4. Supreme command of the armed forces. 
5. Declaration of war and peace, and mobilization of the armed forces. 
6. Appointment, dismissal, and acceptance of the resignation of: 
a. The jurists of the Guardian Council. 
b. The Head of the Judiciary. 
c. The Head of the radio and television network of the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
d. The Chief of the joint staff. 
e. The Commander-in-Chief of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps. 
f. The Commanders-in-Chief of the armed forces and the law-enforcement forces. 
7. Resolving differences between the three powers of the State and regulation of their 
relations. 
8. Resolving problems irresolvable by conventional means through the State Expediency 
Council. 
9. Signing the President‟s appointment orders after his election by the people. The 
competence of candidates for the Presidency, in respect of the qualifications specified in 
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the Constitution, must be confirmed by the Guardian Council before elections, and also by 
the Leadership during the first term. 
10. Dismissal of the President, in consideration of the country‟s interests, after the 
Supreme Court finds him guilty of violating his constitutional duties, or following a vote of 
no confidence by the Islamic Parliament of Iran on the basis of Article 89. 
11. Pardon or reduction, within the framework of Islamic criteria, of the sentences of 
convicts upon the proposal of the Head of the Judiciary. 
 
The Leader may delegate part of his functions and authority to another person. 
 
Article 111  
Whenever the Leader is incapable of carrying out his constitutional duties, or loses one of 
the qualifications mentioned in Articles 5 and 109, or it becomes known that he did not 
initially possess these, he will be dismissed. The judgment in this matter rests with the 
Experts mentioned in Article 108. 
 
In the event of the death, resignation, or dismissal of the Leader, the Parliament of Experts 
shall expedite the appointment of a new Leader. During this time a Council consisting of 
the President, Head of the Judiciary, and a jurist from the Guardian Council, as decided by 
the State Expediency Council, shall provisionally assume the duties of the Leader. In the 
event of any one of them being unable to fulfill these duties, for whatsoever reason, 
another person shall be appointed by the State Expediency Council, with due observance 
of a majority of jurists on the [Provisional Leadership] Council. This Council will carry out 
the functions of the Leader in respect of Clauses 1, 2, 3, 5, and 10, and Sub-classes (d), (e) 
and (f) of Clause 6 of Article 110, with the approval of three-fourths of the members of the 
State Expediency Council. 
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Whenever the Leader becomes temporarily unable to perform the duties of Leadership, 
owing to illness or some other accident, the [Provisional] Council mentioned in this article 
shall assume his duties. 
 
Article 112  
The State Expediency Council will meet by the order of the Leader to decide what is most 
expedient, whenever the Guardian Council considers a bill approved by the Islamic 
Parliament of Iran to be contrary to the principles of the Sharí„ah, or the Constitution and 
the Parliament is unable to secure the satisfaction of the Guardian Council, on the basis of 
national expediency. The State Expediency Council will also meet to consult on any issue 
referred to it by the Leader, or related to its duties, as mentioned in this Constitution. 
 
The permanent and provisional members of this Council shall be appointed by the Leader. 
The rules related to the Council shall be framed and approved by its members and 
confirmed by the Leader. 
  
CHAPTER IX 
The Executive 
¨ Section One: The Presidency 
 
Article 113  
After the office of Leadership, the President is the country‟s highest official. He is 
responsible for implementing the Constitution and presiding over the Executive, except in 
matters directly concerned with the Leadership. 
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Article 114  
The President is elected for a four-year term by the direct vote of the people. He may be re-
elected only once for a second successive term. 
 
Article 115  
The President must be elected from among religious and political personalities possessing 
the following qualifications: He must be of Iranian origin and an Iranian national, possess 
administrative and problem-solving skills, have a good track record, be trustworthy and 
pious, have faith and conviction in the fundamental principles of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran and the country‟s official religion. 
 
Article 116  
Presidential candidates must declare their candidature officially before the beginning of 
elections. The process of presidential elections will be determined by law. 
 
Article 117  
The President is elected by an absolute majority of the voters. If none of the candidates 
wins such a majority in the first round, a second round of voting will be held on the 
subsequent Friday. In the second round only the two candidates with the greatest number 
of votes in the first-round will participate. If, however, any of the candidates who secured 
the greatest number of votes in the first round withdraws from the elections, two from 
among the rest of candidates securing the largest number of votes in the first round will be 
named for the second round. 
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Article 118  
The Guardian Council is responsible for the supervision of the Presidential elections in 
accordance with Article 99. However, before the establishment of the first Guardian 
Council, this responsibility lies with a supervisory body to be constituted by law. 
 
Article 119  
The election of a new President must take place within one month of the end of the term of 
the outgoing President. In the period between the election of the new President and the end 
of the term of the outgoing President, the outgoing President will continue to function as 
President. 
 
Article 120  
Should any of the candidates, whose competence was established in terms of the 
qualifications listed above, die within ten days of the polling day, the elections will be 
postponed for two weeks. Should any of the candidates who secured the greatest number of 
votes die after the first round of voting, the election will be postponed for two weeks. 
 
Article 121  
The President must take and sign an oath as follows, in the presence of the head of the 
Judiciary and members of the Guardian Council at a session of the Islamic Parliament of 
Iran: In the Name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful  
 
I, as President, swear in the presence of the Holy Qur‟an and in front of the people of Iran, 
by God, the Exalted and Almighty, that I will guard the official religion of the country, the 
order of the Islamic Republic, and the Constitution of the country; that I will devote all my 
energy and ability to fulfill the responsibilities that I have assumed; that I will dedicate 
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myself to the service of the people, the honour of the country, the propagation of religion 
and morality, and the support of truth and the spread of justice, refraining from every kind 
of arbitrary conduct; that I will defend the freedom and dignity of individuals and 
constitutional rights of the nation; that I will not shirk from taking any necessary measure 
in guarding the country‟s frontiers and its political, economic and cultural independence; 
that by seeking God‟s help and following the Prophet of Islam and the Infallible Imams, 
may Peace be upon them, I will guard, as a pious and selfless trustee, the authority vested 
in me by the people as a sacred trust and transfer it to whomever the people may elect after 
me. 
 
Article 122  
Within the authority and responsibilities vested in him by the Constitution and or ordinary 
laws, the President is accountable to the people, the Leader, and the Islamic Parliament of 
Iran. 
 
Article 123  
The President is obliged to sign the legislation approved by the Parliament, or the result of 
a referendum, after it is forwarded to him and the legal stages are covered, and to forward 
to the relevant authorities for implementation. 
 
Article 124  
The President may appoint deputies for the execution of his constitutional duties. Subject 
to the President‟s approval, the vice president will be responsible for administering the 
Ministerial Cabinet and coordinating the functions of the other deputies. 
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Article 125  
The President or his legal representative has the authority to sign treaties, protocols, 
contracts, and agreements concluded by the Iranian government with other governments, 
as well as agreements pertaining to international organizations, after the approval of the 
Islamic Parliament of Iran. 
 
Article 126  
The President is directly responsible for national planning and budgeting and the 
government‟s administrative and employment affairs, but he may delegate the management 
of these to others. 
 
Article 127  
In special cases, when necessary, the President may, with the approval of the Ministerial 
Cabinet, appoint one or more plenipotentiaries with specific powers. The decisions of this 
plenipotentiary will then be regarded as decisions of the President and the Ministerial 
Cabinet. 
 
Article 128  
The ambassadors will be appointed on the proposal of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and 
the approval of the President. The President will sign the credentials of the ambassadors 
and will receive the credentials of ambassadors of foreign countries. 
 
Article 129  
The awarding of State decorations is the prerogative of the President. 
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Article 130  
The President will submit his resignation to the Leader, but will continue to perform his 
duties until his resignation is accepted. 
 
Article 131  
In case of the President‟s death, dismissal, resignation, or an absence or illness exceeding 
two months, or on expiry of his term of office without a new President‟s being elected due 
to some obstacles, or a similar circumstance, vice president will assume the authority and 
responsibilities of the President with the Leader‟s approval. A council consisting of the 
Speaker of the Parliament, Head of the Judiciary, and vice president of the must arrange 
for a new President to be elected within fifty days. In case of the death of vice president, or 
some other circumstance which prevents him from performing his duties, or when the 
President did not have a vice president, the Leader shall appoint another person to his 
office. 
 
Article 132  
During the period when the authority and responsibilities of the President are delegated to 
vice president or another person in accordance with Article 131, ministers may neither be 
interpellated nor may a vote of no confidence be passed against them, nor may a national 
referendum be held, nor any steps may be taken to review the Constitution. 
 
Article 133  
Ministers will be appointed by the President and presented to the Parliament for a vote of 
confidence. A new Parliament would not require a new vote of confidence. The number of 
ministers and their jurisdiction will be determined by law. 
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Article 134  
The President heads the Ministerial Cabinet, supervises the work of the ministers and takes 
necessary measures to coordinate the decisions of the ministers and the Cabinet. He 
formulates the plans and policies of the government with the ministers‟ cooperation, and 
implements the laws. In the case of disagreement or overlapping of the legal duties of 
government departments, provided it does not call for an interpretation or modification of 
the laws, the decision of the Cabinet taken at the President‟s proposal shall be binding. The 
President is accountable-to the Parliament for the actions of the Cabinet. 
 
Article 135  
The ministers shall continue in office unless they are dismissed, or receive a vote of no 
confidence from the Parliament as a result of their interpellation or a non-confidence 
motion. The resignation of the Cabinet or individual ministers will be submitted to the 
President, but the Cabinet will continue to function until a new government is appointed. 
The President may appoint a caretaker minister for a maximum period of three months for 
ministries without a minister. 
 
Article 136  
The President may dismiss the minister(s) and obtain a vote of confidence for the new 
minister(s) from the Parliament. When half of the members of the Cabinet have changed 
since the government received its vote of confidence, the government must seek a new 
vote of confidence from the Parliament. 
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Article 137  
Each of the ministers is accountable to the President and the Parliament in respect of his 
duties. But in matters approved by the Cabinet as a whole, he is also accountable for the 
actions of the others. 
 
Article 138  
In addition to cases where the Cabinet or an individual minister is authorized to frame 
procedures for the implementation of laws, the Cabinet has also the right to frame 
regulations and procedures to carry out its administrative duties, to ensure the 
implementation of laws, and to regulate administrative bodies. Individual ministers have 
also the right to frame regulations and issue circulars in matters within their jurisdiction 
and in conformity with the decisions of the Cabinet. However, the content of all such 
regulations may not violate the letter or the spirit of law. The government may assign some 
of the tasks relating to its duties to commissions composed of several ministers. The 
decisions of such commissions within the laws will be binding after the President‟s 
endorsement. 
 
The government‟s decisions and the procedures framed by it, as well as the decisions of 
the commissions mentioned herein, will also be communicated to the Speaker of the 
Islamic Parliament of Iran, whilst being forwarded for implementation, so that in the event 
of him finding them contrary to law, he may return them stating his reasons for the 
necessity of their review by the Cabinet. 
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Article 139  
The settlement of claims pertaining to public and State property, or the referral thereof for 
arbitration, shall depend in all cases on the approval of the Cabinet, and brought to the 
notice of the Parliament. In cases where one party to the dispute is a foreigner, or when .it 
is an important domestic case, the approval of the Parliament must also be obtained. The 
important cases will be specified by law. 
 
Article 140  
Allegations of common crimes against the President, his deputies, and ministers will be 
investigated in common courts of justice, with the knowledge of the Islamic Parliament of 
Iran. 
 
Article 141  
The President, his deputies, ministers, and government employees may not hold more than-
one government position. It is also forbidden for them: to hold any kind of additional 
position in institutions of which all or part of the capital belongs to the government or 
public institutions; to be a member of the Islamic Parliament of Iran; to practice the 
profession of an attorney or legal adviser; or to hold the post of president, managing 
director, or membership of the board of directors of any kind of private company, with the 
exception of cooperative companies affiliated to government departments and institutions. 
Teaching positions in universities and research institutions are exempted from this rule. 
 
Article 142  
The assets of the Leader, the President, his deputies and ministers, as well as those of their 
spouses and children will be investigated before and after their term of office by the head 
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of the Judiciary, in order to ensure that such assets have not increased in contravention of 
the law. 
 
¨ Section Two: The Army and the Islamic Revolution 
Guards Corps  
 
Article 143  
The Army of the Islamic Republic of Iran is responsible for guarding the independence and 
territorial integrity of the country, as well as the state of the Islamic Republic. 
 
Article 144  
The Army of the Islamic Republic of Iran must be an Islamic army, that is, an army 
committed to Islamic teaching and derived from the people. It must recruit into its ranks 
worthy individuals having faith in the objectives of the Islamic Revolution and devoted to 
its cause. 
 
Article 145  
No foreigner may serve in the Army or the country‟s security forces. 
 
Article 146  
The establishment of any kind of foreign military base in Iran, even for peaceful purposes, 
is forbidden. 
 
Article 147  
In time of peace, the government must utilize the personnel and equipment of the Army in 
work relating to relief, education, production, and the Construction Jihãd, whilst observing 
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the criteria of Islamic justice and to the extent that such utilization does not affect the 
Army‟s combat readiness. 
 
Article 148  
All forms of personal use of military vehicles, equipment, and means, as well as taking 
advantage of Army personnel as personal servants, chauffeurs, and the like are forbidden. 
 
Article 149  
Promotions and demotions of the Army personnel will be in accordance with law. 
 
Article 150  
The Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, founded in the first days of the victory of the 
Revolution, is to be maintained in order to maintain its role of guarding the Revolution and 
its achievements. The scope of the Corps‟ duties and their areas of responsibility in relation 
to the duties and areas of responsibility of other armed forces are to be determined by law, 
emphasizing brotherly cooperation and coordination. 
 
Article 151  
The government is obliged to provide a program of military training and furnish the 
requisite facilities to all its citizens, in accordance with the Islamic criteria, to ensure that 
all citizens at all times have the ability for armed defense of the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
This is in accordance with the Qur‟anic verse: 
 
عَطرسااَه ُنَِل اّ ُّذَعأ َّنِِ ًُِّد يِه َييِشَخأّ نُکُّذَع َّ  ِالله َّّ ُذَع َِ ِت َىُْثُِ ُشذ ِليَخلا ِطاتِس يِه َّ  ٍج َّْ ُق يِه ُنر...  
(Prepare against them whatever force you are able to muster, and strings of horses, striking 
fear into the enemy of God and your enemy, and others besides them. [8:601]) 
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The possession of arms, however, is subject to official permission 
 
CHAPTER X 
Foreign Policy 
 
Article 152  
The foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is based upon rejection of all forms of 
domination - both the assertion of it and submission to it - preservation of the country‟s all 
round independence, its territorial integrity, defense of the rights of all Muslims, non-
alignment with hegemonic superpowers, and the maintenance of peaceful relations with all 
non-belligerent States. 
 
Article 153  
Any kind of agreement resulting in foreign control of the country‟s natural resources, 
economy, army, culture, and other aspects of national life, is forbidden. 
 
Article 154  
The realization of human felicity throughout human society is the ideal of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran and it considers independence, freedom, and the rule of justice and Truth 
to be the right of all people of the world. Accordingly, whilst scrupulously refraining from 
all forms of interference in the internal affairs of other nations, it supports the struggle of 
the mustad„afín against the mustakbirín for their rights in every corner of the globe. 
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Article 155  
The government of the Islamic Republic of Iran may grant political asylum to those who 
seek it, unless they are considered to be traitors and criminals according to the law of Iran. 
 
CHAPTER XI 
The Judiciary 
 
Article 156  
The Judiciary is an independent power [of the State] and protector of individual and social 
rights. It is responsible for the realization of justice, and is entrusted with the following 
duties: 
 
1. Investigation and passing judgment in relation- to grievances, violations, and 
„complaints; resolution of litigation; settling of disputes; and deciding on such matters of 
personal status as are specified by law; 
2. Restoring public rights, promoting justice and legitimate freedoms; 
3. Supervising the proper enforcement of laws; 
4. Exposing of crimes; prosecution and penalization of criminals and enacting the penalties 
and provisions of the Islamic penal code; 
5. Taking suitable measures for prevention of crime and rehabilitation of criminals. 
 
Article 157  
The Leader shall appoint a mujtahid, possessing integrity and administrative and problem-
solving abilities, and well-versed in judicial affairs as the Head of the Judiciary for a 
period of five years, to carry out the judicial, administrative, and executive responsibilities 
of the Judiciary. His will be the highest judicial office. 
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Article 158  
The Head of the Judiciary is responsible for the following: 
 
1. Creating the necessary organization for the administration of justice to fulfill the 
responsibilities specified in Article 156; 
2. Preparation of bills on judicial affairs appropriate to [the form of government of] the 
Islamic Republic; 
3. Employment of just and worthy judges, their dismissal, appointment, transfer, their 
assignment to particular duties, promotions, and the carrying out of similar administrative 
duties in accordance with law. 
 
Article 159  
The judicial administration is the official authority for the referral of all grievances and 
complaints. The formation of courts and their jurisdiction will be determined by law. 
 
Article 160  
The Minister of Justice is responsible for all matters concerning the Judiciary‟s relations 
with the Executive and the Legislature. He will be elected from among individuals 
proposed to the President by the head of the Judiciary. The head of the Judiciary may 
delegate to the Minister of Justice authority in financial and administrative areas, as well as 
in the employment of personnel other than judges. In that case, the Minister of Justice will 
have the same authority and responsibility as foreseen by law for the other ministers, in 
their capacity as highest executive officials. 
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Article 161  
The Supreme Court will be formed in accordance with the regulations established by the 
Head of the Judiciary, to supervise the correct implementation of the laws by the courts, to 
ensure uniformity of judicial procedures, and to fulfill any other functions assigned to it by 
law. 
 
Article 162  
The Chief of the Supreme Court and the Prosecutor General must be mujtahids, possessing 
integrity and well versed in judicial matters. They will be nominated by the Head of the 
Judiciary for a period of five years, in consultation with the judges of the Supreme Court. 
 
Article 163  
The conditions and qualifications of a judge will be determined by law in accordance with 
the criteria of filth. 
 
Article 164  
A judge may not be removed, temporarily or permanently, from his post except when he is 
tried in a court of law and found guilty, or in consequence of an offense requiring his 
dismissal. A judge cannot be transferred or reassigned to another post without his consent, 
except where called for by the interests of society upon the decision of the Head of the 
Judiciary after consultation with the Chief of the Supreme Court and the Prosecutor 
General. The periodic transfer and rotation of judges will be in accordance with general 
rules determined by law. 
 
 
396 
 
Article 165  
Trials are to be held openly and members of the public may attend without any restriction, 
unless the court considers an open trial to be contrary to public morality or law and order, 
or when requested by both parties in a civil dispute. 
Article 166  
The verdicts of courts must be well-reasoned and documented with reference to the articles 
and clauses of law on which they are based. 
 
Article 167  
The judge must endeavour to base his judgment in each case on codified laws. If he cannot 
find such basis, he should deliver judgment on the basis of authoritative Islamic sources 
and reputable rulings (fatwa). He may not refrain from admitting and examining cases and 
delivering judgment on the excuse of the silence or inadequacy of law in a matter, or its 
being general or ambiguous. 
 
Article 168  
Political and press offences will be tried by jury in open courts. The manner of the 
selection of the jury, its qualifications and powers, and the definition of political offences, 
will be determined by law, in accordance with Islamic criteria. 
 
Article 169  
No act of commission or omission may be regarded as a crime with retrospective effect, on 
the basis of a law framed subsequently. 
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Article 170  
Judges are obliged to refrain from enforcing the government‟s decrees and regulations that 
are in conflict with Islamic laws and norms, or which lie outside the competence of the 
Executive. Everyone has a duty to demand the annulment of any such regulation from the 
Court of Administrative Justice. 
 
Article 171  
Whenever an individual suffers moral or material harm, or loss as a result of a judge‟s 
default, or error regarding the subject matter of a case, or the law applicable, or in the 
application of law to a particular case, the defaulting judge is liable for the reparations in 
accordance with Islamic criteria. Otherwise, losses will be compensated by the State, and 
in all such cases, the repute and good standing of the accused will be restored. 
 
Article 172  
Military courts will be established to investigate crimes related to military or security 
duties of personnel of the Army, Gendarmerie, police, and the Islamic Revolution Guards 
Corps. However, they will be tried in public courts for common crimes, or crimes 
committed while serving the department of justice in an executive capacity. The military 
courts and the office of military prosecutor are part of the Judiciary and are subject to the 
same articles that apply to it. 
 
Article 173  
A court to be known as the Court of Administrative Justice will be constituted under the 
supervision of the Head of the Judiciary in order to investigate the complaints, grievances, 
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and objections of the people in respect of government officials, organs, and statutes. The 
jurisdiction, powers, and mode of operation of this court will be determined by law. 
 
Article 174  
An organization to be known as the General Inspection Organization will be constituted 
under the supervision of the Head of the Judiciary, in accordance with the supervisory 
rights of the Judiciary over the conduction of affairs and correct implementation of laws by 
the government‟s administrative organs. The jurisdiction and functions of this organization 
will be determined by law. 
 
CHAPTER XII 
Radio and Television 
 
Article 175  
The freedom of expression and dissemination of ideas must be secure in the Radio and 
Television of the Islamic Republic of Iran, with due observance of Islamic norms and the 
country‟s interests. The appointment and dismissal of the head of the Radio and Television 
Organization of the Islamic Republic of Iran will be by the Leader. A Council consisting of 
two representatives each from the Executive, the Head of the Judiciary and the Islamic 
Parliament of Iran will supervise this organization. The policies and procedures for the 
administration of this organization and its supervision will be determined by law. 
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CHAPTER XIII 
 
The Supreme Council of National Security 
 
Article 176  
A Supreme Council of National Security presided over by the President will be established 
to secure national interests, preservation of the Islamic Revolution, national sovereignty, 
and territorial integrity of the Islamic Republic. It is to fulfill the following duties: 
 
1. Determine the defense and national security policies within the framework of the 
general policies determined by the Leader. 
2. Coordinate political, intelligence, social, cultural, and economic activities in accordance 
with the general defense and security plans. 
3. Utilize the material and non-material resources of the country to confront internal and 
external threats. 
 
This Council shall consist of: 
a. The heads of three branches of powers of the State, 
b. The chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, 
c. The official responsible for planning and budgeting affairs, 
d. Two representatives appointed by the Leader, 
e. The ministers of foreign affairs, the interior, and intelligence, 
f. One of the ministers, in accordance with the relevance of a case, and the highest 
ranking official of the Armed Forces and the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps. 
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The Supreme Council of National Security shall, commensurate with its duties, form sub-
councils such as a Council for Defense and a State Security Council. Each sub-council will 
be presided over by the President, or a member of the Supreme Council of National 
Security appointed by the President. The jurisdiction and functions of the sub-councils will 
be determined by law and their organizational structure will be approved by the Supreme 
Council of National Security. The decisions of the Supreme Council of National Security 
shall be effective after the Leader‟s approval. 
 
CHAPTER XIV 
Revision of the Constitution 
 
Article 177  
The revision of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, whenever deemed 
necessary, will be according to the following procedure: 
 
The Leader will issue a decree to the President after consultation with the State 
Expediency Council stipulating the amendments or additions required to be made by the 
Council for Revision of the Constitution consisting of: 
 
1. The members of the Guardian Council 
2. The heads of the three powers of the State. 
3. The permanent members of the State Expediency Council. 
4. Five members from the Parliament of Experts. 
5. Ten members nominated by the Leader. 
6. Three members of Cabinet. 
7. Three members from the Judiciary. 
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8. Ten members from among the representatives of the Islamic Parliament of Iran. 
9. Three university professors. 
 
The procedure, method of selection and qualifications for the Council will be determined 
by law. The decisions of the council, once confirmed and signed by the Leader, will be 
valid if approved by an absolute majority of voters participating in a national referendum. 
The provisions of Article 59 of the Constitution will not apply to a referendum in respect 
of a revision of the Constitution. 
 
The contents of the Article pertaining to the Islamic character of the country‟s political 
order, the necessity of basing all laws and regulations on Islamic criteria, the religious 
foundations and objectives of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the republican character of the 
State, the wilayas al-amr and imamah of the Ummah, the administration-of the country‟s 
affairs on the basis of public opinion, and the official religion and madhhab of Iran, are 
unalterable. 
 
 
 
 
Pars Times, Centre Iran and Beyond 
http://www.parstimes.com/ (1979) 
http://en.parliran.ir/index.aspx?siteid=84&pageid=3053 
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Appendix 3 
 
Image of loyalty 
 
 
The President of Iran, Ahmadinejad leans forward to kiss Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah 
Ali Khamenei's hand to show him his honour and loyalty after being elected in 2005. 
 
 
www.allvoices.com/contributed-news/8526879/image/75634193-mahmud-ahmadinejad-
kisses-ali-khamenei-s-hand 
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Appendix 4 
 
Map of Iran's Declared Nuclear Installations on 06 April 2015 
 
 
 
 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/irans-nuclear-installations-2015 
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Appendix 5 
 
Satellite Imagery Shows Tunnel Construction in Isfahan Facility in Iran on 17 
February 2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/new-satellite-images-show-tunnel-construction-at-
esfahan-facility-in-iran/8#images 
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Appendix 6 
 
 
 
http://www.theisraelproject.org/site/apps/nlnet/content2.aspx?c=ewJXKcOUJlIaG&b=773
7551&ct=11145537#.UUyRMRwvloF 
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Appendix 7 
 
Speech by President Bush 
Speech to the 89th annual national convention of the American Legion in Reno, 
Nevada. 
August 28, 2007 
 
Thank you all very much. (Applause) Thank you all. Please be seated. Commander, thank 
you very much for the invitation to come. I'm honored to be here. I'm honored to represent 
Post 77 of Houston, Texas. (Applause) I hope my fellow Texans behave themselves here in 
Reno (Laughter). You won't? Okay, well -- (Laughter)  
 
I appreciate the fact that nearly every community in America has been enriched by the 
American Legion and the Women's Auxiliary. I appreciate the work that you do to remind 
our citizens about the blessings of America. You have the profound gratitude of the 
President and the people of this country. Thank you for your service (Applause) 
 
I particularly appreciate the work you do with our country's young. I like the fact that you 
have an oratorical competition that, according to your organization, helps Americans 
communicate their ideas clearly and effectively. Paul suggested I might want to sign up. 
(Laughter and applause) I appreciate the fact that through Boys and Girls Nation you teach 
young people who are interested in public service about how Washington really works. 
(Laughter) I'm not there. (Laughter and applause)  
 
We meet today at a critical time for our country. America is engaged in a great ideological 
struggle -- fighting Islamic extremists across the globe. Today I want to talk to you and to 
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the American people about a key aspect of the struggle: the fight for the future of the 
Middle East. I'm going to explain why defeating the extremists in this troubled region is 
essential to our nation's security, and why success in Iraq is vital to winning this larger 
ideological battle. (Applause)  
 
I do want to thank your Commander. It's been my pleasure to work with Paul. He's been in 
the White House a lot, along with the Executive Director, John Sommer. He's represented 
you well, and he's served with distinction. (Applause) 
 
I thank JoAnn Cronin, the National President of the American Legion Auxiliary. I 
appreciate Bob Spanogle, the National Adjutant of the American Legion. I want to 
welcome the Governor of the great state of Nevada with us today -- Governor Jim Gibbons 
is with us. Mr. Governor, thanks for coming. (Applause) The Congressman from this 
district is the fine representative named Dean Heller. His wife Lynne sang the National 
Anthem. Thank you both for being here today. (Applause)  
 
I'm honored to be in the presence of those who wear our nation's uniform. I thank General 
Charles Campbell, Commanding General U.S. Army Forces Command, for joining us. 
Major General Gale Pollock, Acting Surgeon General of the U.S. Army. And for all those 
who wear the uniform, thank you for volunteering to defend this nation in a time of peril. 
I'm proud to be your Commander-in-Chief. (Applause)  
 
For nearly a century, Presidents have looked to the American Legion to provide an 
example of vision, valor, and love of country. In times of peace, you counseled vigilance. 
In times of war, you counseled resolve. And in every era, you have carried the well-being 
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of our men and women in uniform in your prayers and in your hearts. We're grateful to 
your service.  
 
You have an appreciation for how special America is because you have defended her. You 
know how fragile freedom is because you have seen it under attack. And you know the 
pain of war because you have lost friends and family members on distant shores -- 
including those whose fates are still unknown. We must not, and we will not, end our 
search until we have accounted for every member of our Armed Forces from every war 
and every corner of the Earth. (Applause)  
 
I appreciate your efforts to honor the American flag. There are those who say the flag is 
just a piece of cloth. That's not the view of those who bled for it and saw it drape the 
caskets of some of our finest men and women. It was the American flag that we planted 
proudly on Iwo Jima, that first graced the silver surface of the moon. The country is careful 
to protect many things because of what they symbolize. Surely we can find a way to show 
equal respect for the symbol that our soldiers and sailors and airmen and Marines and 
Coast Guard's men and women have risked their lives for -- the flag of our nation. So today 
I join the Legion in calling on the United States Congress to make protection of the flag the 
law of our land. (Applause)  
 
I also thank you for your strong support of our nation's veterans. We share a common goal: 
to make sure our veterans have all the help they need. (Applause.) We have worked 
together to achieve that goal. The budget this year that I submitted is nearly $87 billion for 
our veterans. That's a 77-percent increase since I took office. It is the highest level of 
support for veterans in America's history. (Applause)  
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I know health care is a concern of yours, and that's why we've extended treatment to a 
million additional veterans, including hundreds of thousands of men and women returning 
from Afghanistan and Iraq. We're building new VA facilities in places where veterans are 
returning [sic] so more veterans can get top-quality health care closer to your home. We've 
expanded grants to help homeless veterans in all 50 states and the District of Columbia. 
My point is this: The veterans were there when we needed them -- and this administration 
will be with the veterans when they need us. (Applause)  
 
Perhaps the most important duty that Legion members undertake is to serve as living 
reminders that a great country has great responsibilities. Once again, America finds itself a 
nation at war. Once again, we're called to assume the mantle of global leadership. And 
once again, the American Legion is walking point. I thank you for your fervent and 
enthusiastic defense of our men and women in uniform as they take the fight to the enemy 
in Afghanistan, in Iraq, and across the world. They're the finest military on Earth -- and we 
are right to be proud of them. (Applause)  
 
Many people in this country are asking whether the fight underway today is worth it. This 
is not the first time Americans have asked that question. We always enter wars reluctantly 
-- yet we have fought whenever dangers came. We fought when turmoil in Europe 
threatened to shroud the world in darkness. America sent its military to fight two bitter and 
bloody conflicts -- we did what we had to do to get the job done. We fought when powers 
in Asia attacked our country and our allies. We sent Americans to restore the peace -- and 
we did what we had to do to get the job done. And we responded when radicals and 
extremists attacked our homeland in the first ideological war of the 21st century. We 
toppled two regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq that gave harbor to terrorists, defied the 
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international community, and threatened the security of our nation. And now we're 
working to help build free and secure societies in their place -- and like the past, we will do 
what we have to do to get the job done. (Applause)  
 
We've learned from history that dangers in other parts of the world -- such as Europe and 
Asia -- directly affect our security here at home. On September the 11th, 2001, we learned 
that there's another region of the world that directly threatens the security of the American 
people -- and that is the Middle East. America has enduring and vital interests in the region. 
Throughout our history, the American people have had strong links with this region -- 
through ties of commerce and education and faith. Long before oil and gas were 
discovered in the Middle East the region was a key source of trade. It is the home to three 
of the world's great religions. It remains a strategic crossroads for the world.  
 
Yet the hope and prosperity that transformed other parts of the world in the 20th century 
has bypassed too many in the Middle East. For too long, the world was content to ignore 
forms of government in this region -- in the name of stability. The result was that a 
generation of young people grew up with little hope to improve their lives, and many fell 
under the sway of violent Islamic extremism. The terrorist movement multiplied in 
strength, and bitterness that had simmered for years boiled into violence across the world. 
The cradle of civilization became the home of the suicide bomber. And resentments that 
began on the streets of the Middle East are now killing innocent people in train stations 
and airplanes and office buildings around the world.  
 
The murderers and beheaders are not the true face of Islam; they are the face of evil. They 
seek to exploit religion as a path to power and a means to dominate the Middle East. The 
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violent Islamic radicalism that inspires them has two main strains. One is Sunni extremism, 
embodied by al Qaida and its terrorist allies. Their organization advances a vision that 
rejects tolerance, crushes all dissent, and justifies the murder of innocent men, women, and 
children in the pursuit of political power. We saw this vision in the brutal rule of the 
Taliban in Afghanistan, where women were publicly whipped, men were beaten for 
missing prayer meetings, and young girls could not go to school. 
 
These extremists hope to impose that same dark vision across the Middle East by raising 
up a violent and radical caliphate that spans from Spain to Indonesia. So they kill fellow 
Muslims in places like Algeria and Jordan and Egypt and Saudi Arabia in an attempt to 
undermine their governments. And they kill Americans because they know we stand in 
their way. And that is why they attacked U.S. embassies in Africa in 1998, and killed 
sailors aboard the USS Cole in 2001 [sic]. And that is why they killed nearly 3,000 people 
on 9/11. And that is why they plot to attack us again. And that is why we must stay in the 
fight until the fight is won. (Applause)  
 
The other strain of radicalism in the Middle East is Shia extremism, supported and 
embodied by the regime that sits in Tehran. Iran has long been a source of trouble in the 
region. It is the world's leading state sponsor of terrorism. Iran backs Hezbollah who are 
trying to undermine the democratic government of Lebanon. Iran funds terrorist groups 
like Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, which murder the innocent, and target Israel, 
and destabilize the Palestinian territories. Iran is sending arms to the Taliban in 
Afghanistan, which could be used to attack American and NATO troops. Iran has arrested 
visiting American scholars who have committed no crimes and pose no threat to their 
regime. And Iran's active pursuit of technology that could lead to nuclear weapons 
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threatens to put a region already known for instability and violence under the shadow of a 
nuclear holocaust.  
 
Iran's actions threaten the security of nations everywhere. And that is why the United 
States is rallying friends and allies around the world to isolate the regime, to impose 
economic sanctions. We will confront this danger before it is too late. (Applause)  
 
I want our fellow citizens to consider what would happen if these forces of radicalism and 
extremism are allowed to drive us out of the Middle East. The region would be 
dramatically transformed in a way that could imperil the civilized world. Extremists of all 
strains would be emboldened by the knowledge that they forced America to retreat. 
Terrorists could have more safe havens to conduct attacks on Americans and our friends 
and allies. Iran could conclude that we were weak -- and could not stop them from gaining 
nuclear weapons. And once Iran had nuclear weapons, it would set off a nuclear arms race 
in the region.  
 
Extremists would control a key part of the world's energy supply, could blackmail and 
sabotage the global economy. They could use billions of dollars of oil revenues to buy 
weapons and pursue their deadly ambitions. Our allies in the region would be under greater 
siege by the enemies of freedom. Early movements toward democracy in the region would 
be violently reversed. This scenario would be a disaster for the people of the Middle East, 
a danger to our friends and allies, and a direct threat to American peace and security. This 
is what the extremists plan. For the sake of our own security, we'll pursue our enemies, 
we'll persevere and we will prevail. (Applause)  
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In the short-term, we're using all elements of American power to protect the American 
people by taking the fight to the enemy. Our troops are carrying out operations day by day 
to bring the terrorists to justice. We're keeping the pressure on them. We're forcing them to 
move. Our law enforcement and intelligence professionals are working to cut off terrorist 
financing and disrupt their networks. Our diplomats are rallying our friends and allies 
throughout the region to share intelligence and to tighten security and to rout out the 
extremists hiding in their midst. Every day we work to protect the American people. Our 
strategy is this: We will fight them over there so we do not have to face them in the United 
States of America. (Applause)  
 
In the long-term, we are advancing freedom and liberty as the alternative to the ideologies 
of hatred and repression. We seek a Middle East of secure democratic states that are at 
peace with one another, that are participating in the global markets, and that are partners in 
this fight against the extremists and radicals. We seek to dry up the stream of recruits for al 
Qaeda and other extremists by helping nations offer their people a path to a more hopeful 
future. We seek an Iran whose government is accountable to its people -- instead of to 
leaders who promote terror and pursue the technology that could be used to develop 
nuclear weapons. We seek to advance a two-state solution for the Israelis and Palestinians 
so they can live side by side in peace and security. We seek justice and dignity and human 
rights for all the people of the Middle East.  
 
Achieving this future requires hard work and strategic patience over many years. Yet our 
security depends on it. We have done this kind of work before in Europe. We have done 
this kind of work before in Japan. We have done this kind of work before -- and it can be 
done again. (Applause)  
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The future course of the Middle East will turn heavily on the outcome of the fight in Iraq. 
Iraq is at the heart of the Middle East. And the two dangerous strains of extremism vying 
for control of the Middle East have now closed in on this country in an effort to bring 
down the young democracy.  
 
In Iraq, Sunni extremists, led by al Qaeda, are staging sensational attacks on innocent men, 
women, and children in an attempt to stoke sectarian violence. Their operatives have 
assassinated those seeking to build a new future for the Iraqi people. Their targets include 
everyone they consider infidels -- including Christians and Jews and Yezidis and Shia, and 
even fellow Sunnis who do not share their radical distortion of Islam. Their ranks include 
foreign fighters who travel to Iraq through Syria. Their operations seek to create images of 
chaos and carnage to break the will of the American people. These killers don't understand 
our country. America does not give in to thugs and assassins -- and America will not 
abandon Iraq in its hour of need. (Applause)  
 
Shia extremists, backed by Iran, are training Iraqis to carry out attacks on our forces and 
the Iraqi people. Members of the Qods Force of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 
are supplying extremist groups with funding and weapons, including sophisticated IEDs. 
And with the assistance of Hezbollah, they've provided training for these violent forces 
inside of Iraq. Recently, coalition forces seized 240-millimeter rockets that had been 
manufactured in Iran this year and that had been provided to Iraqi extremist groups by 
Iranian agents. The attacks on our bases and our troops by Iranian-supplied munitions have 
increased in the last few months -- despite pledges by Iran to help stabilize the security 
situation in Iraq.  
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Some say Iran's leaders are not aware of what members of their own regime are doing. 
Others say Iran's leaders are actively seeking to provoke the West. Either way, they cannot 
escape responsibility for aiding attacks against coalition forces and the murder of innocent 
Iraqis. The Iranian regime must halt these actions. And until it does, I will take actions 
necessary to protect our troops. I have authorized our military commanders in Iraq to 
confront Tehran's murderous activities. (Applause)  
 
For all those who ask whether the fight in Iraq is worth it, imagine an Iraq where militia 
groups backed by Iran control large parts of the country. Imagine an Iraq where al Qaeda 
has established sanctuaries to safely plot future attacks on targets all over the world, 
including America. We've seen what these enemies will do when American forces are 
actively engaged in Iraq. And we can envision what they would do if we -- if they were 
emboldened by American forces in retreat.  
 
The challenge in Iraq comes down to this: Either the forces of extremism succeed, or the 
forces of freedom succeed. Either our enemies advance their interests in Iraq, or we 
advance our interests. The most important and immediate way to counter the ambitions of 
al Qaeda and Iran and other forces of instability and terror is to win the fight in Iraq. 
(Applause)  
 
Together our coalition has achieved great things in Iraq. We toppled one of the world's 
most brutal and dangerous dictators. This world is better off without Saddam Hussein in 
power. (Applause) The Iraqi people held three national elections, choosing a transitional 
government, adopting the most progressive and democratic constitution in the Arab world, 
and then electing a government under that constitution. Despite endless threats from the 
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car bombers and assassins, nearly 12 million Iraqi citizens came out to vote in a show of 
hope and solidarity that we should never forget.  
 
In 2006, a thinking enemy struck back. The extremists provoked a level of sectarian 
violence that threatened to unravel the democratic gains the Iraqi people had made. 
Momentum was shifting to the extremists. The Iraqi people saw that their government 
could not protect them, or deliver basic services. Many Shia turned to militias for security. 
Many Sunnis did not see a place for them in the new Iraq. Baghdad was descending into 
chaos. And one of our military intelligence analysts wrote that Anbar Province -- al 
Qaeda's base in Iraq -- was lost to the enemy.  
 
Given the stakes in Iraq, given the fact that what happens in Iraq matters in the United 
States, it became clear that we needed to adjust our approach to address these changes on 
the ground. So in January, I laid out a new strategy. This strategy was designed to help 
bring security to the Iraqi population, especially in Baghdad. It was designed to help clear 
the terrorists out of Iraqi cities and communities so that local governments could retake 
control, resume basic services, and help revive businesses in their communities. It was 
designed to give the Iraqi security forces time to grow in size and capability so that they 
can ultimately bring security to their country. It was designed to provide a secure 
environment in which national reconciliation could take place. And it was designed to 
encourage more members of the international community to recognize their interest in a 
free and democratic Iraq -- and to do more to help make that possible.  
 
The central objective of this strategy was to aid the rise of an Iraqi government that can 
protect its people, deliver basic services, and be an ally in this war on terror. And we 
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understood that none of these goals could be met until the Iraqi people feel safer in their 
own homes and neighborhoods.  
 
To carry out this new strategy I sent reinforcements to Baghdad and Anbar Province. I put 
a new commander in place -- General David Petraeus, an expert on counterinsurgency. 
Those reinforcements have been fully operational for just over two months. Yet there are 
unmistakable signs that our strategy is achieving the objectives we set out. Our new 
strategy is showing results in terms of security. Our forces are in the fight all over Iraq. 
Since January, each month we have captured or killed an average of more than 1,500 al 
Qaeda terrorists and other enemies of Iraq's elected government. (Applause) Al Qaeda is 
being displaced from former strongholds in Baghdad and Anbar and Diyala provinces.  
 
We've conducted operations against Iranian agents supplying lethal munitions to extremist 
groups. We've targeted Shia death squads and their supply networks. The Prime Minister 
of Iraq, Prime Minister Maliki, has courageously committed to pursue the forces of evil 
and destruction. Sectarian violence has sharply decreased in Baghdad. The momentum is 
now on our side. The surge is seizing the initiative from the enemy -- and handing it to the 
Iraqi people.  
 
Our new strategy is also showing results in places where it matters most -- the cities and 
neighborhoods where ordinary Iraqis live. In these areas, Iraqis are increasingly reaching 
accommodations with each other, with the coalition, and with the government in Baghdad. 
This reconciliation is coming from the bottom up. It's having an impact in the fight against 
the enemy and it's building a solid foundation for a democratic Iraq.  
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In Anbar, the province that had been thought to be lost to the enemy, is increasingly 
becoming more peaceful because members of local Sunnis are turning against al Qaeda. 
They're sick and tired of the dark vision of these murderers. Local sheikhs have joined the 
American forces to drive the terrorists out of the capital city of Ramadi and elsewhere. 
Residents are providing critical intelligence, and tribesmen have joined the Iraqi police and 
security forces.  
 
People want to live in peace. Mothers want to raise their children in a peaceful 
environment. The local Iraqis, given a chance, are turning against these murderers and 
extremists. (Applause)  
 
Many Iraqis who once felt marginalized in a free Iraq are rejoining the political process, 
and now it's the enemy of a free Iraq that is being left on the margins. Last month, 
provincial officials reopened parts of the war-damaged government center with the help of 
one of our provincial reconstruction teams. Similar scenes are taking place all across 
Anbar, the province once thought lost. Virtually every city and every town in the province 
now has a mayor and a municipal council. Local officials are forming ties with the central 
government in Baghdad because these Sunni leaders now see a role for their people in a 
new Iraq. And in an encouraging sign, the central government is beginning to respond with 
funding for vital services and reconstruction, and increased security forces.  
 
In other provinces, there are also signs of this kind of bottom-up progress. In Diyala 
Province, the city of Baqubah reopened six banks, providing residents with capital for the 
local economy. In Ninewa Province, local officials have established a commission to 
investigate corruption, with a local judge empowered to pursue charges of fraud and 
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racketeering. These are signs that our strategy to encourage political cooperation at the 
grassroots level is working. And over time, see, and over time, as the Iraqis take control 
over their lives at the local level, they will demand more action from their national leaders 
in Baghdad. That's how democracy works. And that's why the encouraging developments 
at the local level are so important for Iraq's future.  
 
At the moment, our new strategy is showing fewer results at the national level. Iraq is 
overcoming decades of tyranny and deprivation, which left scars on Iraq's people and their 
psyche. The serious sectarian violence of 2006 and early 2007 further tore at the fabric of 
Iraqi society, increasing distrust between Iraq's ethnic and religious communities. In the 
midst of the security challenges, Iraq's leaders are being asked to resolve political issues as 
complex and emotional as the struggle for civil rights in our own country. So it is no 
wonder that progress is halting, and people are often frustrated. The result is that it has 
been harder than anticipated for Iraqis to meet the legislative benchmarks on which we 
have all been focused.  
 
In my weekly consultations with Ambassador Crocker we discuss these challenges. We 
also discuss the signs of hope. We're encouraged by the agreement reached Sunday night 
by the top leaders in Iraq's government. They agree on several draft pieces of legislation 
that are at the core of national reconciliation -- and are among the benchmarks identified 
by the United States Congress. For example, the draft law on de-Baathification reform 
addresses the question of how Iraqis will deal with their past. The draft legislation on 
provincial powers tackles how Iraqis will map out their future. These measures still have to 
be passed by the Iraqi parliament. Yet the agreement shows that Iraq's leaders can put aside 
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their differences, they can sit down together, and they can work out tough issues central to 
the fate of their country.  
 
The agreement by Iraq's leaders was significant for another reason. It thanks the coalition 
for our sacrifices, and recognizes the importance of maintaining a coalition presence in 
Iraq. It also calls for the development of a long-term relationship with the United States. I 
welcome this invitation. I've committed our government to negotiating such a partnership 
soon. This long-term relationship need not require the level of engagement that we have in 
Iraq today. But it can serve the common interests of both Iraq and the United States -- to 
combat terrorism, and to help bring stability to an important country and region.  
 
Iraq's government still has more work to do to meet many of its legislative benchmarks. 
Yet it's also important to note that many of the goals behind these benchmarks are being 
achieved without legislation. Here's an example: We believed that an equitable sharing of 
oil revenues would require the Iraqi parliament to pass an oil-sharing law. In fact, the 
national government is already sharing oil revenues with the provinces -- despite the fact 
that no formal law has been passed. Iraq's government is making gains in other important 
areas. Electricity production is improving. The parliament has passed about 60 pieces of 
legislation, including a $41-billion budget. Despite the slow progress in the Iraqi 
parliament -- here's the evidence -- Iraq as a whole is moving forward.  
 
Our strategy is also showing results at the international level. The United Nations and Iraq 
-- with support from the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and nations from 
around the globe -- have finalized an International Compact for Iraq that will bring new 
economic assistance and debt relief in exchange for aggressive economic reforms. So far, 
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the Iraqis have made significant progress in meeting the IMF's economic benchmarks. The 
Iraqis have convened a Neighbors Conference that's bringing together nations in the region. 
The goal is to help the Iraqis through specific security and economic and diplomatic 
cooperation.  
 
As part of these diplomatic initiatives, Prime Minister Maliki has met with counterparts in 
Turkey, Syria, and Iran to urge the support for his nation. Saudi Arabia is looking to open a 
new embassy in Baghdad. The United Nations Security Council has decided to expand its 
mission in Iraq, and is seeking to help with local elections and reconciliation. The United 
Nations will soon name a new high-ranking envoy to Iraq, to coordinate the UN's 
expanded effort to that country. Here's what I'm telling you -- the international community 
increasingly understands the importance of a free Iraq. They understand a free Iraq is 
important for world peace. And that is why we'll continue to rally the world for this noble 
and necessary cause. (Applause)  
 
All these developments are hopeful -- they're hopeful for Iraq, and they're hopeful for the 
Middle East, and they're hopeful for peace. In two weeks, General Petraeus and 
Ambassador Crocker will return to Washington to deliver an interim assessment of the 
situation on the ground and the prospects for the future. This status report comes less than 
three months after the surge became fully operational. It will likely assess what's going 
well in Iraq, and what needs to be improved, and what changes we need to make in our 
strategy and force deployments in the months ahead. Congress asked for this assessment. 
Congress should listen to it in its entirety. And I ask members of the Congress to withhold 
any conclusions until they can hear these men out. (Applause)   
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Unfortunately, some who had complained about a lack of security in Iraq are now 
attempting to change the terms of the debate. Their argument used to be that security was 
bad, so the surge has failed. Now their argument seems to be security is better, so the surge 
has failed. They disregard the political advances on the local level, and instead change -- 
charge that the slow pace of legislative progress on the national level proves our strategy 
has not worked. This argument gets it backwards. Improving security is the precondition 
for making gains in other areas.  
 
Senator Joe Lieberman puts it this way: "While it is true there is no pure 'military' solution 
to the violence in Iraq, it is worth remembering that neither is there any pure 'political' 
solution." Security progress must come first. And only then can political progress follow -- 
first locally, and then in Baghdad. So it's going to take time for the recent progress we have 
seen in security to translate into political progress. In short, it makes no sense to respond to 
military progress by claiming that we have failed because Iraq's parliament has yet to pass 
every law it said it would.  
 
The American people know how difficult democracy can be. Our own country has an 
advanced and sophisticated political system in place. Yet even we can't pass a budget on 
time -- and we've had 200 years of practice. (Applause) Prime Minister Maliki and other 
Iraqi leaders are dealing with the issues far more controversial and complicated, and they 
are trying to do it all at once, after decades of a brutal dictatorship. Iraq's leaders aren't 
perfect. But they were elected by their people. They want what we want -- a free Iraq that 
fights terrorists instead of harboring them. And leaders in Washington need to look for 
ways to help our Iraqi allies succeed -- not excuses for abandoning them. (Applause)  
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The challenge is before us -- the challenge before us is hard, but America can meet it. And 
the conflict has come at a cost, on behalf of a cause that is right and essential to the 
American people. It's a noble cause. It is a just cause. It is a necessary cause. I wouldn't 
have asked the young men and women of our military to go in harm's way if I didn't think 
success in Iraq was necessary for the security of the United States of America. (Applause) 
I know it can be difficult to see sometimes, but what happens on the streets of Baghdad 
and in the neighborhoods of Anbar has a direct impact on the safety of Americans here at 
home. And that is why we're in this fight. And that's why we'll stay in the fight, and that is 
why we're going to win this fight. (Applause)  
 
One of the great blessings of this country is that our men and women in uniform 
understand it. One of those young men was Specialist First Class Stephen Davis of 
Fayetteville, North Carolina. Stephen came from a proud military family. His father and 
grandfather were veterans. His younger brother, his mother, and her father were all 
stationed with him in Iraq.  
 
When Stephen was killed by an insurgent grenade on the Fourth of July, their hearts were 
broken. And yet, somehow this remarkable family found a way to put aside their grief and 
continues to serve our country. Stephen's mother said that Stephen was proud of what they 
were doing in Iraq -- so six days after the funeral, she went back on duty as a medic. His 
father, Buck, a Gulf War veteran, says he wants to go to Iraq today. This family represents 
the best of the American spirit -- a spirit that shows we have the grit and the will to defend 
the American people. (Applause)  
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One day years from now, another president will be in a room like this. That president will 
look out upon a sea of caps worn by those who show a quiet pride in their service. Some in 
that audience will include people who won the fight against fascism and Nazism and 
communism. You'll be joined by younger veterans who have fought in places like 
Kandahar and Ramadi. And just like you, the new generation of veterans will be able to 
say proudly they held fast against determined and ruthless enemies, helped salvage an 
entire region from tyranny and terror, and made a safer world for the American people.  
To those future members of the American Legion, and to all of you, I offer the gratitude of 
our nation, and offer my prayers for a future of peace. Thank you. And may God America. 
(Applause) 
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Appendix 8 
Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq 
 
General David H. Petraeus 
Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq 
10-11 September 2007 
 
Mr. Chairmen, Ranking Members, Members of the Committees, thank you for the 
opportunity to provide my assessment of the security situation in Iraq and to discuss the 
recommendations I recently provided to my chain of command for the way forward. 
 
At the outset, I would like to note that this is my testimony. Although I have briefed my 
assessment and recommendations to my chain of command, I wrote this testimony myself. 
It has not been cleared by, nor shared with, anyone in the Pentagon, the White House, or 
Congress. 
 
As a bottom line up front, the military objectives of the surge are, in large measure, being 
met. In recent months, in the face of tough enemies and the brutal summer heat of Iraq, 
Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces have achieved progress in the security arena. Though 
the improvements have been uneven across Iraq, the overall number of security incidents 
in Iraq has declined in 8 of the past 12 weeks, with the numbers of incidents in the last two 
weeks at the lowest levels seen since June 2006. 
 
One reason for the decline in incidents is that Coalition and Iraqi forces have dealt 
significant blows to Al Qaeda-Iraq. Though Al Qaeda and its affiliates in Iraq remain 
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dangerous, we have taken away a number of their sanctuaries and gained the initiative in 
many areas. 
 
We have also disrupted Shia militia extremists, capturing the head and numerous other 
leaders of the Iranian-supported Special Groups, along with a senior Lebanese Hezbollah 
operative supporting Iran‟s activities in Iraq. 
 
Coalition and Iraqi operations have helped reduce ethno-sectarian violence, as well, 
bringing down the number of ethno-sectarian deaths substantially in Baghdad and across 
Iraq since the height of the sectarian violence last December. The number of overall 
civilian deaths has also declined during this period, although the numbers in each area are 
still at troubling levels. 
 
Iraqi Security Forces have also continued to grow and to shoulder more of the load, albeit 
slowly and amid continuing concerns about the sectarian tendencies of some elements in 
their ranks. In general, however, Iraqi elements have been standing and fighting and 
sustaining tough losses, and they have taken the lead in operations in many areas. 
 
Additionally, in what may be the most significant development of the past 8 months, the 
tribal rejection of Al Qaeda that started in Anbar Province and helped produce such 
significant change there has now spread to a number of other locations as well. 
 
Based on all this and on the further progress we believe we can achieve over the next few 
months, I believe that we will be able to reduce our forces to the pre-surge level of brigade 
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combat teams by next summer without jeopardizing the security gains that we have fought 
so hard to achieve. 
 
Beyond that, while noting that the situation in Iraq remains complex, difficult, and 
sometimes downright frustrating, I also believe that it is possible to achieve our objectives 
in Iraq over time, though doing so will be neither quick nor easy. 
 
Having provided that summary, I would like to review the nature of the conflict in Iraq, 
recall the situation before the surge, describe the current situation, and explain the 
recommendations I have provided to my chain of command for the way ahead in Iraq. 
 
The Nature of the Conflict 
 
The fundamental source of the conflict in Iraq is competition among ethnic and sectarian 
communities for power and resources. This competition will take place, and its resolution 
is key to producing long-term stability in the new Iraq. The question is whether the 
competition takes place more – or less – violently. This chart shows the security challenges 
in Iraq. Foreign and home-grown terrorists, insurgents, militia extremists, and criminals all 
push the ethno-sectarian competition toward violence. Malign actions by Syria and, 
especially, by Iran fuel that violence. Lack of adequate governmental capacity, lingering 
sectarian mistrust, and various forms of corruption add to Iraq‟s challenges. 
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The Situation in December 2006 and the Surge 
 
In our recent efforts to look to the future, we found it useful to revisit the past. In 
December 2006, during the height of the ethno-sectarian violence that escalated in the 
wake of the bombing of the Golden Dome Mosque in Samarra, the leaders in Iraq at that 
time – General George Casey and Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad – concluded that the 
coalition was failing to achieve its objectives. Their review underscored the need to protect 
the population and reduce sectarian violence, especially in Baghdad. As a result, General 
Casey requested additional forces to enable the Coalition to accomplish these tasks, and 
those forces began to flow in January. 
 
In the ensuing months, our forces and our Iraqi counterparts have focused on improving 
security, especially in Baghdad and the areas around it, wresting sanctuaries from Al 
Qaeda control, and disrupting the efforts of the Iranian-supported militia extremists. We 
have employed counterinsurgency practices that underscore the importance of units living 
among the people they are securing, and accordingly, our forces have established dozens of 
joint security stations and patrol bases manned by Coalition and Iraqi forces in Baghdad 
and in other areas across Iraq. 
 
In mid-June, with all the surge brigades in place, we launched a series of offensive 
operations focused on: expanding the gains achieved in the preceding months in Anbar 
Province; clearing Baqubah, several key Baghdad neighborhoods, the remaining 
sanctuaries in Anbar Province, and important areas in the so-called “belts” around 
Baghdad; and pursuing Al Qaeda in the Diyala River Valley and several other areas. 
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Throughout this period, as well, we engaged in dialogue with insurgent groups and tribes, 
and this led to additional elements standing up to oppose Al Qaeda and other extremists. 
We also continued to emphasize the development of the Iraqi Security Forces and we 
employed non-kinetic means to exploit the opportunities provided by the conduct of our 
kinetic operations – aided in this effort by the arrival of additional Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams. 
 
Current Situation and Trends 
 
The progress our forces have achieved with our Iraqi counterparts has, as I noted at the 
outset, been substantial. While there have been setbacks as well as successes and tough 
losses along the way, overall, our tactical commanders and I see improvements in the 
security environment. We do not, however, just rely on gut feel or personal observations; 
we also conduct considerable data collection and analysis to gauge progress and determine 
trends. We do this by gathering and refining data from coalition and Iraqi operations 
centers, using a methodology that has been in place for well over a year and that has 
benefited over the past seven months from the increased presence of our forces living 
among the Iraqi people. We endeavor to ensure our analysis of that data is conducted with 
rigor and consistency, as our ability to achieve a nuanced understanding of the security 
environment is dependent on collecting and analyzing data in a consistent way over time. 
Two US intelligence agencies recently reviewed our methodology, and they concluded that 
the data we produce is the most accurate and authoritative in Iraq. 
 
As I mentioned up front, and as the chart before you reflects, the level of security incidents 
has decreased significantly since the start of the surge of offensive operations in mid-June, 
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declining in 8 of the past 12 weeks, with the level of incidents in the past two weeks the 
lowest since June 2006 and with the number of attacks this past week the lowest since 
April 2006. 
 
Civilian deaths of all categories, less natural causes, have also declined considerably, by 
over 45% Iraq-wide since the height of the sectarian violence in December. This is shown 
by the top line on this chart, and the decline by some 70% in Baghdad is shown by the 
bottom line. Periodic mass casualty attacks by Al Qaeda have tragically added to the 
numbers outside Baghdad, in particular. Even without the sensational attacks, however, the 
level of civilian deaths is clearly still too high and continues to be of serious concern. 
 
As the next chart shows, the number of ethno-sectarian deaths, an important subset of the 
overall civilian casualty figures, has also declined significantly since the height of the 
sectarian violence in December. Iraq-wide, as shown by the top line on this chart, the 
number of ethno-sectarian deaths has come down by over 55%, and it would have come 
down much further were it not for the casualties inflicted by barbaric Al Qaeda bombings 
attempting to reignite sectarian violence. In Baghdad, as the bottom line shows, the 
number of ethno-sectarian deaths has come down by some 80% since December. This 
chart also displays the density of sectarian incidents in various Baghdad neighborhoods 
and it both reflects the progress made in reducing ethno-sectarian violence in the Iraqi 
capital and identifies the areas that remain the most challenging. 
 
As we have gone on the offensive in former Al Qaeda and insurgent sanctuaries, and as 
locals have increasingly supported our efforts, we have found a substantially increased 
number of arms, ammunition, and explosives caches. As this chart shows, we have, so far 
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this year, already found and cleared over 4,400 caches, nearly 1,700 more than we 
discovered in all of last year. This may be a factor in the reduction in the number of overall 
improvised explosive device attacks in recent months, which as this chart shows, has 
declined sharply, by about one-third, since June. 
 
The change in the security situation in Anbar Province has, of course, been particularly 
dramatic. As this chart shows, monthly attack levels in Anbar have declined from some 
1,350 in October 2006 to a bit over 200 in August of this year. This dramatic decrease 
reflects the significance of the local rejection of Al Qaeda and the newfound willingness of 
local Anbaris to volunteer to serve in the Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police Service. As I noted 
earlier, we are seeing similar actions in other locations, as well. 
 
To be sure, trends have not been uniformly positive across Iraq, as is shown by this chart 
depicting violence levels in several key Iraqi provinces. The trend in Ninevah Province, for 
example, has been much more up and down, until a recent decline, and the same is true in 
Sala ad Din Province, though recent trends there and in Baghdad have been in the right 
direction. In any event, the overall trajectory in Iraq – a steady decline of incidents in the 
past three months – is still quite significant. 
 
The number of car bombings and suicide attacks has also declined in each of the past 5 
months, from a high of some 175 in March, as this chart shows, to about 90 this past month. 
While this trend in recent months has been heartening, the number of high profile attacks is 
still too high, and we continue to work hard to destroy the networks that carry out these 
barbaric attacks. 
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Our operations have, in fact, produced substantial progress against Al Qaeda and its 
affiliates in Iraq. As this chart shows, in the past 8 months, we have considerably reduced 
the areas in which Al Qaeda enjoyed sanctuary. We have also neutralized 5 media cells, 
detained the senior Iraqi leader of Al Qaeda-Iraq, and killed or captured nearly 100 other 
key leaders and some 2,500 rank-and-file fighters. Al Qaeda is certainly not defeated; 
however, it is off balance and we are pursuing its leaders and operators aggressively. Of 
note, as the recent National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq explained, these gains against Al 
Qaeda are a result of the synergy of actions by: conventional forces to deny the terrorists 
sanctuary; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets to find the enemy; and 
special operations elements to conduct targeted raids. A combination of these assets is 
necessary to prevent the creation of a terrorist safe haven in Iraq. 
 
In the past six months we have also targeted Shia militia extremists, capturing a number of 
senior leaders and fighters, as well as the deputy commander of Lebanese Hezbollah 
Department 2800, the organization created to support the training, arming, funding, and, in 
some cases, direction of the militia extremists by the Iranian Republican Guard Corps‟ 
Qods Force. These elements have assassinated and kidnapped Iraqi governmental leaders, 
killed and wounded our soldiers with advanced explosive devices provided by Iran, and 
indiscriminately rocketed civilians in the International Zone and elsewhere. It is 
increasingly apparent to both Coalition and Iraqi leaders that Iran, through the use of the 
Qods Force, seeks to turn the Iraqi Special Groups into a Hezbollah-like force to serve its 
interests and fight a proxy war against the Iraqi state and coalition forces in Iraq. 
 
The most significant development in the past six months likely has been the increasing 
emergence of tribes and local citizens rejecting Al Qaeda and other extremists. This has, of 
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course, been most visible in Anbar Province. A year ago the province was assessed as “lost” 
politically. Today, it is a model of what happens when local leaders and citizens decide to 
oppose Al Qaeda and reject its Taliban-like ideology. While Anbar is unique and the 
model it provides cannot be replicated everywhere in Iraq, it does demonstrate the 
dramatic change in security that is possible with the support and participation of local 
citizens. As this chart shows, other tribes have been inspired by the actions of those in 
Anbar and have volunteered to fight extremists as well. We have, in coordination with the 
Iraqi government‟s National Reconciliation Committee, been engaging these tribes and 
groups of local citizens who want to oppose extremists and to contribute to local security. 
Some 20,000 such individuals are already being hired for the Iraqi Police, thousands of 
others are being assimilated into the Iraqi Army, and thousands more are vying for a spot 
in Iraq‟s Security Forces. 
 
Iraqi Security Forces 
 
As I noted earlier, Iraqi Security Forces have continued to grow, to develop their 
capabilities, and to shoulder more of the burden of providing security for their country. 
Despite concerns about sectarian influence, inadequate logistics and supporting institutions, 
and an insufficient number of qualified commissioned and non-commissioned officers, 
Iraqi units are engaged around the country. 
 
As this chart shows, there are now nearly 140 Iraqi Army, National Police, and Special 
Operations Forces Battalions in the fight, with about 95 of those capable of taking the lead 
in operations, albeit with some coalition support. Beyond that, all of Iraq‟s battalions have 
been heavily involved in combat operations that often result in the loss of leaders, soldiers, 
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and equipment. These losses are among the shortcomings identified by operational 
readiness assessments, but we should not take from these assessments the impression that 
Iraqi forces are not in the fight and contributing. Indeed, despite their shortages, many Iraqi 
units across Iraq now operate with minimal coalition assistance. 
 
As counterinsurgency operations require substantial numbers of boots on the ground, we 
are helping the Iraqis expand the size of their security forces. Currently, there are some 
445,000 individuals on the payrolls of Iraq‟s Interior and Defense Ministries. Based on 
recent decisions by Prime Minister Maliki, the number of Iraq‟s security forces will grow 
further by the end of this year, possibly by as much as 40,000. Given the security 
challenges Iraq faces, we support this decision, and we will work with the two security 
ministries as they continue their efforts to expand their basic training capacity, leader 
development programs, logistical structures and elements, and various other institutional 
capabilities to support the substantial growth in Iraqi forces. 
 
Significantly, in 2007, Iraq will, as in 2006, spend more on its security forces than it will 
receive in security assistance from the United States. In fact, Iraq is becoming one of the 
United States‟ larger foreign military sales customers, committing some $1.6 billion to 
FMS already, with the possibility of up to $1.8 billion more being committed before the 
end of this year. And I appreciate the attention that some members of Congress have 
recently given to speeding up the FMS process for Iraq. 
 
To summarize, the security situation in Iraq is improving, and Iraqis elements are slowly 
taking on more of the responsibility for protecting their citizens. Innumerable challenges 
lie ahead; however, Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces have made progress toward 
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achieving sustainable security. As a result, the United States will be in a position to reduce 
its forces in Iraq in the months ahead. 
 
Recommendations 
 
Two weeks ago I provided recommendations for the way ahead in Iraq to the members of 
my chain of command and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The essence of the approach I 
recommended is captured in its title: “Security While Transitioning: From Leading to 
Partnering to Overwatch.” This approach seeks to build on the security improvements our 
troopers and our Iraqi counterparts have fought so hard to achieve in recent months. It 
reflects recognition of the importance of securing the population and the imperative of 
transitioning responsibilities to Iraqi institutions and Iraqi forces as quickly as possible, but 
without rushing to failure. It includes substantial support for the continuing development of 
Iraqi Security Forces. It also stresses the need to continue the counterinsurgency strategy 
that we have been employing, but with Iraqis gradually shouldering more of the load. And 
it highlights the importance of regional and global diplomatic approaches. Finally, in 
recognition of the fact that this war is not only being fought on the ground in Iraq but also 
in cyberspace, it also notes the need to contest the enemy‟s growing use of that important 
medium to spread extremism. 
 
The recommendations I provided were informed by operational and strategic 
considerations. The operational considerations include recognition that: 
 
•  Military aspects of the surge have achieved progress and generated momentum; 
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•  Iraqi Security Forces have continued to grow and have slowly been shouldering 
more of the security burden in Iraq; 
•  A mission focus on either population security or transition alone will not be 
adequate to achieve our objectives; 
•  Success against Al Qaeda-Iraq and Iranian-supported militia extremists requires 
conventional forces as well as special operations forces; and 
•  The security and local political situations will enable us to draw down the surge 
forces. 
 
My recommendations also took into account a number of strategic considerations: 
 
•  Political progress will take place only if sufficient security exists; 
•  Long-term US ground force viability will benefit from force reductions as the surge 
runs its course; 
•  Regional, global, and cyberspace initiatives are critical to success; and 
•  Iraqi leaders understandably want to assume greater sovereignty in their country, 
although, as they recently announced, they do desire continued presence of 
coalition forces in Iraq in 2008 under a new UN Security Council Resolution and, 
following that, they want to negotiate a long term security agreement with the 
United States and other nations. 
 
Based on these considerations, and having worked the battlefield geometry with Lieutenant 
General Ray Odierno to ensure that we retain and build on the gains for which our troopers 
have fought, I have recommended a drawdown of the surge forces from Iraq. In fact, later 
this month, the Marine Expeditionary Unit deployed as part of the surge will depart Iraq. 
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Beyond that, if my recommendations are approved, that unit‟s departure will be followed 
by the withdrawal of a brigade combat team without replacement in mid-December and the 
further redeployment without replacement of four other brigade combat teams and the two 
surge Marine battalions in the first 7 months of 2008, until we reach the pre-surge level of 
15 brigade combat teams by mid-July 2008. 
 
I would also like to discuss the period beyond next summer. Force reductions will continue 
beyond the pre-surge levels of brigade combat teams that we will reach by mid-July 2008; 
however, in my professional judgment, it would be premature to make recommendations 
on the pace of such reductions at this time. In fact, our experience in Iraq has repeatedly 
shown that projecting too far into the future is not just difficult, it can be misleading and 
even hazardous. The events of the past six months underscore that point. When I testified 
in January, for example, no one would have dared to forecast that Anbar Province would 
have been transformed the way it has in the past 6 months. Nor would anyone have 
predicted that volunteers in one-time Al Qaeda strongholds like Ghazaliyah in western 
Baghdad or in Adamiya in eastern Baghdad would seek to join the fight against Al Qaeda. 
Nor would we have anticipated that a Shia-led government would accept significant 
numbers of Sunni volunteers into the ranks of the local police force in Abu Ghraib. 
Beyond that, on a less encouraging note, none of us earlier this year appreciated the extent 
of Iranian involvement in Iraq, something about which we and Iraq‟s leaders all now have 
greater concern. 
 
In view of this, I do not believe it is reasonable to have an adequate appreciation for the 
pace of further reductions and mission adjustments beyond the summer of 2008 until about 
mid-March of next year. We will, no later than that time, consider factors similar to those 
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on which I based the current recommendations, having by then, of course, a better feel for 
the security situation, the improvements in the capabilities of our Iraqi counterparts, and 
the enemy situation. I will then, as I did in developing the recommendations I have 
explained here today, also take into consideration the demands on our Nation‟s ground 
forces, although I believe that that consideration should once again inform, not drive, the 
recommendations I make. 
 
This chart captures the recommendations I have described, showing the recommended 
reduction of brigade combat teams as the surge runs its course and illustrating the concept 
of our units adjusting their missions and transitioning responsibilities to Iraqis, as the 
situation and Iraqi capabilities permit. It also reflects the no-later-than date for 
recommendations on force adjustments beyond next summer and provides a possible 
approach we have considered for the future force structure and mission set in Iraq. 
 
One may argue that the best way to speed the process in Iraq is to change the MNF-I 
mission from one that emphasizes population security, counter-terrorism, and transition, to 
one that is strictly focused on transition and counter-terrorism. Making that change now 
would, in our view, be premature. We have learned before that there is a real danger in 
handing over tasks to the Iraqi Security Forces before their capacity and local conditions 
warrant. In fact, the drafters of the recently released National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq 
recognized this danger when they wrote, and I quote, “We assess that changing the mission 
of Coalition forces from a primarily counterinsurgency and stabilization role to a primary 
combat support role for Iraqi forces and counterterrorist operations to prevent AQI from 
establishing a safe haven would erode security gains achieved thus far.” 
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In describing the recommendations I have made, I should note again that, like Ambassador 
Crocker, I believe Iraq‟s problems will require a long-term effort. There are no easy 
answers or quick solutions. And though we both believe this effort can succeed, it will take 
time. Our assessments underscore, in fact, the importance of recognizing that a premature 
drawdown of our forces would likely have devastating consequences. 
 
That assessment is supported by the findings of a 16 August Defense Intelligence Agency 
report on the implications of a rapid withdrawal of US forces from Iraq. Summarizing it in 
an unclassified fashion, it concludes that a rapid withdrawal would result in the further 
release of the strong centrifugal forces in Iraq and produce a number of dangerous results, 
including a high risk of disintegration of the Iraqi Security Forces; rapid deterioration of 
local security initiatives; Al Qaeda-Iraq regaining lost ground and freedom of maneuver; a 
marked increase in violence and further ethno-sectarian displacement and refugee flows; 
alliances of convenience by Iraqi groups with internal and external forces to gain 
advantages over their rivals; and exacerbation of already challenging regional dynamics, 
especially with respect to Iran. 
 
Lieutenant General Odierno and I share this assessment and believe that the best way to 
secure our national interests and avoid an unfavorable outcome in Iraq is to continue to 
focus our operations on securing the Iraqi people while targeting terrorist groups and 
militia extremists and, as quickly as conditions are met, transitioning security tasks to Iraqi 
elements. 
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Closing Comments 
 
Before closing, I want to thank you and your colleagues for your support of our men and 
women in uniform in Iraq. The Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen 
with whom I‟m honored to serve are the best equipped and, very likely, the most 
professional force in our nation‟s history. Impressively, despite all that has been asked of 
them in recent years, they continue to raise their right hands and volunteer to stay in 
uniform. With three weeks to go in this fiscal year, in fact, the Army elements in Iraq, for 
example, have achieved well over 130% of the reenlistment goals in the initial term and 
careerist categories and nearly 115% in the mid-career category. All of us appreciate what 
you have done to ensure that these great troopers have had what they‟ve needed to 
accomplish their mission, just as we appreciate what you have done to take care of their 
families, as they, too, have made significant sacrifices in recent years. 
 
The advances you have underwritten in weapons systems and individual equipment; in 
munitions; in command, control, and communications systems; in intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities; in vehicles and counter-IED systems and 
programs; and in manned and unmanned aircraft have proven invaluable in Iraq. The 
capabilities that you have funded most recently – especially the vehicles that will provide 
greater protection against improvised explosive devices – are also of enormous importance. 
Additionally, your funding of the Commander‟s Emergency Response Program has given 
our leaders a critical tool with which to prosecute the counterinsurgency campaign. Finally, 
we appreciate as well your funding of our new detention programs and rule of law 
initiatives in Iraq. 
 
441 
 
In closing, it remains an enormous privilege to soldier again in Iraq with America‟s new 
“Greatest Generation.” Our country‟s men and women in uniform have done a magnificent 
job in the most complex and challenging environment imaginable. All Americans should 
be very proud of their sons and daughters serving in Iraq today. 
 
Thank you very much. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/pet091007.pdf 
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Appendix 9 
Image of loyalty 
 
 
 
 
The Secretary General of Hezbollah, sayyed Hassan Nasrallah kisses the hand of Iran's 
supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali khamenei in July 2000, expresses honour and loyalty. 
 
http://tmtv.shiatv.net/search_result.php?search_id=ummah 
AL-Sadeq, Ali. (2006). What Do You Know About Hezbollah. Arabic version, No.1 
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Appendix 10 
 
U.S. House of Representatives 
 
 
 
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2006_rpt/hpsci082306.pdf 
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Appendix 11 
Bush: Iran threatens world security 
CNN Politics .com 
January 14, 2008 
 
ABU DHABI, United Arab Emirates (CNN) -- President Bush said Sunday that Iran is 
threatening the security of the world, and that the United States and Arab allies must join 
together to confront the danger "before it's too late." 
 
Bush said Iran funds terrorist extremists, undermines peace in Lebanon, sends arms to the 
Taliban, seeks to intimidate its neighbors with alarming rhetoric, defies the United Nations 
and destabilizes the entire region by refusing to be open about its nuclear program. 
 
"Iran is the world's leading state sponsor of terror," Bush said in a speech he delivered 
about midway through his eight-day Mideast trip that began with a renewed push for an 
Israeli-Palestinian peace pact -- an accord he said whose "time has come." 
 
Bush also chided U.S. allies who have withheld civil liberties, saying governments will 
never build trust by harassing or imprisoning candidates and protesters. But his rebuke was 
general, and he did not single out any U.S. partner in the region for oppressive practices. 
 
"You cannot expect people to believe in the promise of a better future when they are jailed 
for peacefully petitioning their government," Bush said. "And you cannot stand up a 
modern, confident nation when you do not allow people to voice their legitimate 
criticisms."  Watch excerpts from Bush speech » 
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Bush gave the speech on democracy in one of the few countries in the region -- the United 
Arab Emirates -- where democracy has been virtually ignored. In other countries in the 
region, especially Egypt, the fight between democracy activists and autocratic 
governments has been much more pointed and controversial. 
 
He called on the Palestinians to reject extremists, although he did not mention the Islamic 
radical group Hamas, which has gained control of Gaza. And he said the Iranian 
government in Tehran should make itself accountable to its people. 
 
"Iran's actions threaten the security of nations everywhere," Bush said. "So the United 
States is strengthening our long-standing security commitments with our friends in the 
Gulf, and rallying friends around the world to confront this danger before it is too late." 
 
Bush spoke at the Emirates Palace, at an opulent, gold-trimmed hotel where a suite goes 
for $2,450 a night. Built at a cost of $3 billion, the hotel is a kilometer long from end to 
end and has a 1.3 kilometer white sand beach -- every grain of it imported from Algeria, 
according to Steven Pike, a spokesman at the U.S. Embassy here. Half the audience was 
dressed in western attire and the other half in Arabic clothes -- white robes and headdresses 
for men and black abayas, many with jeweled edges, for women. Bush said advancing 
democracy and freedom is the core of his administration's foreign policy and critical to U.S. 
security. 
 
"The United States has no desire for territory. We seek our shared security in your liberty. 
We believe that stability can only come through a free and just Middle East where the 
extremists are marginalized," the president said. 
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He noted democratic reform in Iraq. "You have made your choice for democracy and have 
stood firm," Bush said, speaking to the Iraqi people. "The terrorists and extremists cannot 
prevail."  Watch report on the state of democracy in the United Arab Emirates. » 
Making an equally direct appeal to the Palestinians, Bush said "The dignity and 
sovereignty that is your right is within your reach." 
 
In renewing his "Freedom Agenda" -- Bush's grand ambition to seed democracy around the 
globe -- he declared that "democracy is the only form of government that treats individuals 
with the dignity and equality that is their right." 
 
"We know from experience that democracy is the only system of government that yields 
lasting peace and stability," he added. 
 
Yet he was speaking about democracy in a deeply undemocratic country, the Emirates, 
where an elite of royal rulers makes virtually all the decisions. Large numbers of foreign 
resident workers have few legal or human rights, including no right to citizenship and no 
right to protest working conditions. 
 
Some human rights groups have accused the Emirates of tolerating virtual indentured 
servitude, where workers from poor countries like Sri Lanka are forced to work to pay off 
debts to employers, and have their passports seized so they can't leave. 
 
Officials in Abu Dhabi and the neighboring emirate of Dubai have said they are taking 
slow and gradual steps toward reform, both democratic and in labor rights. 
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In the country's first-ever elections in late 2006, the government hand-picked a group of 
voters to cast ballots to choose members of a government advisory panel. 
 
But there is little clamor for elections in a wealthy country whose citizens are a privileged 
minority with access to free housing and lucrative government jobs. Many here say the 
galloping economy is evidence the government has done a good job. 
 
Earlier Sunday in Bahrain, U.S. Vice Adm. Kevin Cosgriff, commander of the U.S. Navy's 
5th Fleet, which patrols the Gulf, told Bush that he took it "deadly seriously" when an 
Iranian fleet of high-speed boats on January 6 charged at and threatened to blow up a 
three-ship U.S. Navy convoy passing near Iranian waters. The Iranian naval forces 
vanished as the American ship commanders were preparing to open fire. 
 
Bush spoke with Cosgriff after he had a breakfast of pancakes and bacon with troops of the 
U.S. 5th Fleet based in Bahrain. 
 
In visits over three days in Kuwait, Bahrain and Abu Dhabi, Bush also was urging 
continued and visible Arab support for fragile peace talks between Israel and the 
Palestinians. Arab backing, and probably funding, is considered essential to make any 
agreement stick. 
 
 
www.edition.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/01/13/bush.mideast.speech/index.html 
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